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of the centuries-old, multinational Habsburg Monarchy in order to conduct a public 
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portrayed Austria’s past in an attempt to define its national future, even as Austrian 
schools tried to disseminate those national and historical ideals to the next generation of 
Austrian citizens in a practical sense. The first section describes how the leaders of the 
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Introduction: Imperial Ghosts, Imperial Shadows
Vienna today is a city in many ways still haunted by the ghosts of the Habsburgs.  
Walking its streets, one encounters around every corner magnificent reminders of an 
imperial past which seem rather out of place in the capital city of a prosperous but modest 
Alpine state of just over eight million inhabitants.  These physical remnants of an older 
Austria– the soaring medieval spires of Saint Stephen’s Cathedral, the gaudy opulence of 
baroque palaces such as the Schönbrunn and the Belvedere, the sprawling and eclectic 
nineteenth-century edifices on the Ringstrasse–all serve as mute but nonetheless eloquent 
testimonies to the fact that Vienna was once the focal point of a vast, multinational 
empire which played a pivotal role in European affairs for more than five hundred years.  
That old empire, ruled by the Habsburg dynasty throughout its existence, vanished 
forever in 1918, shattered by national tensions and a cataclysmic World War.  One might 
well assert that all that remains of Austria’s Habsburg past now are these architectural 
reminders, which are significant only insofar as they entice tourists to spend their dollars, 
euros, and yen to the benefit of the Austrian economy.  Such an argument might be 
superficially accurate, yet it glosses over a larger truth: the old Habsburg Monarchy, 
while extinct for nearly a century, continues to play a significant role in Austrian 
consciousness, and memories of the Habsburg past played a critical role in the efforts by 
Austrians to define who they were and their place in the world after 1918.
The collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy was the seminal event in modern 
Austrian history.  When the Habsburg empire– which had stretched from the Alps to the 
Carpathians, encompassing no less than 11 distinct national groups and several religious 
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faiths– crumbled, the German-speaking inhabitants of the new Austrian state were thrown 
into a profound crisis of identity.  Once they had been a privileged national population 
within the old dynastic state, the favorite sons of an empire which had been one of the 
great political and cultural powers on the European continent for centuries.1  After 1918, 
they found themselves cut off from the other territories and peoples of the old Monarchy, 
and shunted into a small and economically disadvantaged state which wielded none of its 
previous influence, prestige and power.  The inhabitants of this new Austria were forced 
to ask themselves whether the name “Austria” truly meant anything without the imperial 
trappings which had been the very essence of that term for so long.
The alternative was to abandon the “Austrian” label for one which also had 
considerable resonance for the inhabitants of the new state: “German.”  As proud as most 
Austrians had been of the achievements and status of the Habsburg Monarchy, they also 
felt a kinship with the inhabitants of Germany, with whom an overwhelming majority of 
the Austrian population shared a language, a culture, and an ethnic lineage.  In the 
aftermath of the old Monarchy’s collapse, many Austrians felt that it no longer made 
sense for them to live in an independent country, and they argued that their future lay in a 
union, or Anschluß,  with the larger and more powerful German state.  For these 
Austrians, there was really no such thing as an Austrian “nation.”  The Austrian label 
applied to their territory, but in all the ways that mattered–language, culture, ethnicity–
1On the privileged position of German-speakers in the Habsburg Monarchy, see Robert A. Kann, A History 
of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 204; Robin Okey, 
The Habsburg Monarchy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 10-16, 119-120, 194-195; Adam 
Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, vol.6 (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 339-362.
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the inhabitants of that region were bound to the German nation and Volk.2  Other 
Austrians disagreed, and felt that there was indeed something unique about Austria which 
was worth preserving in the form of an independent state.  
The debate between these two basic factions in Austria was an intense one which 
lasted for nearly two generations, over a span of time which marked the most dramatic 
and disturbing period in twentieth-century European history.  The argument concerning 
Austrian national identity changed course repeatedly, and the form which it took was 
dictated by both the political ideology of the individual participants and by the diplomatic 
situation in which Austria found itself at any given moment.  The one constant feature of  
this debate, however, was the manner in which both sides were forced to interpret 
Austria’s history as part of the Habsburgs’ multinational Monarchy in order to define its 
contemporary identity.  That history was really the only thing which served to distinguish 
German-speakers in Austria from those in Germany, and participants in this national 
debate inevitably were forced to make sense of Austria’s Habsburg past, no matter how 
they defined the Austrian people’s relationship to the German nation.
This study analyzes the ways Austrian politicians, intellectuals, writers, 
government officials, and educators used the memory of the Habsburg Monarchy to 
answer the problematic question of what exactly it meant to be “Austrian” during the 
tumultuous period stretching from the birth of the modern Austrian state in 1918 to the 
achievement of a tenuous consensus on national identity in 1955.  Ultimately, it will 
2The German word “Volk” (pl. Völker) is most directly translated into English as “people.”  Volk has certain 
national, ethnic and even racial connotations which are largely absent from its English equivalent, however.  
This study uses this term in the German sense, to refer to groups of people who perceive themselves to be 
linked with one another by the bonds of language, culture, ethnicity, nationhood, and destiny.
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show that historical memories of the Habsburg past were always an integral part of 
Austria’s effort to resolve its own identity crisis, even if there was never any widespread 
agreement in Austria about that past.  The political and national ideals of the participants 
in this debate and the shifting diplomatic realities of the Austrian state throughout this 
period helped dictate how they portrayed the Habsburg past. 
The study demonstrates that the debate about Austrian national identity ultimately 
depended on how Austrians interpreted their own history to a far greater degree than it 
did upon questions of language, ethnicity, or religion, which were never really in dispute 
between 1918 and 1955.  All Austrians during this time agreed that they spoke German 
and were ethnically related to other German-speakers.  That agreement, however, did not 
resolve the debate.   Austrians continuously appealed to their history as part of the 
Habsburg Monarchy because that was the only feature which had the potential to support 
the idea of a separate Austrian nation.  Those who argued in favor of Austrian nationhood 
referred to the Habsburg Monarchy’s distinctive history in order make their arguments.  
Those who denied Austrian nationhood likewise needed to confront the Habsburg past in 
order to explain why Austria’s distinctive history did not serve to separate Austrian 
German-speakers from the rest of the German nation.
This study traces how the state of this historical and national debate shifted in 
response to circumstances and to political ideology as well.  Each era in Austria’s history 
between 1918 and 1955–the First Republic of 1918-1 933, the Ständestaat of 1933-1938, 
the union with Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1945, and the Second Republic after 
1945– featured a different set of circumstances which influenced the course of the debate, 
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as union with Germany in turn was prohibited by the Entente, loomed as an unwelcome 
possibility, was forcibly achieved by the Third Reich, and was just as forcibly undone by 
the victorious Allies.  Each of these sets of circumstances forced the participants in the 
debate to modify their historical arguments, and only the signing of the Austrian State 
Treaty in 1955, which firmly cemented Austria’s place in Europe for the duration of the 
Cold War, gave the Austrian people the stability which they required to resolve this 
debate.
In a similar manner, political ideology influenced the way that Austrians used 
their history to define their modern identity.  The conservative-Catholic right, as the 
Austrian political faction which had most strongly supported the dynasty before 1918, 
continued to take pride in Austria’s Habsburg past throughout the decades after the 
Monarchy’s collapse, no matter whether they were arguing for Anschluß, as they did 
during the 1920s, or for the continued existence of an independent Austria nation after 
1945.  Likewise, Austria’s leftist political parties , the Social Democrats and the 
Communists, both took a classically Marxist view of Austrian history, portraying the old 
Monarchy as a reactionary entity which had oppressed all of its subject peoples.  Yet 
these two Marxist groups used their shared view of the Habsburg past to make 
dramatically different arguments, as the Communists fiercely proclaimed Austria’s 
unique nationhood while the Social Democrats continued to support Anschluß until 
almost the end of the Second World War.  A third ideological faction, the Austrian 
German nationalists, centered their entire political program around the goal of union with 
Germany throughout this era, and invariably inveighed against the Habsburg Monarchy 
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for barring the path to German unity and for placing its own political interests above 
those of the German Volk.   Some of these political factions changed their opinions on 
Austrian national identity in response to Austria’s changing circumstances between 1918 
and 1955 while other groups did not; the broad outlines of each ideological faction’s 
interpretation of the Habsburg past, however, remained remarkably stable throughout this 
period no matter how their national arguments may have changed.  
Thus, ideology and circumstance both had a profound influence on how the 
Austrian debate on national identity unfolded.  No matter how ideology or circumstances 
influenced the way Austrians interpreted the Habsburg legacy and its national 
implications for contemporary Europe, however, the necessity of making reference to the 
Habsburg past was the one inevitable constant in the Austrian debate regarding national 
identity.  Simply put, it is not possible to understand Austrian history or national identity 
in the first half of the twentieth century without also understanding how Austrians 
defined and redefined their past as part of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Methodology and Sources
This study seeks to examine the relationship between national identity, historical 
memory, political ideology, and diplomatic contingencies in Austria between 1918 and 
1955.  It is designed to illuminate the manner in which Austria’s political, intellectual, 
and pedagogical leaders attempted to influence public sentiments regarding Austrian 
national identity throughout the radically changing circumstances in which Austria found 
itself during this time.  There are a number of reasons for this focus upon the public 
statements of Austrian elites regarding this national crisis of identity.
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First, I contend that social and political leaders, and the institutions which they 
dominated, played a decisive role in the formation of Austria’s modern national identity.  
This study agrees with the ideas of such scholars of nationalism and national identity as 
Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawn, and Benedict Anderson, who argue that nations do not 
evolve organically, but rather are constructed as intentional creations by governments and 
social institutions.3  Such national projects may not always follow the precise course 
intended by the leaders, and indeed, the Austrian case is full of examples of the limits 
upon the powers of Austria’s leaders to build a durable national consensus in a short 
amount of time.  Likewise, nations cannot simply be invented out of thin air by elites, but 
need to be constructed upon a foundation of historical consciousness and ethnic, cultural, 
and linguistic relationships.4  Nevertheless, I am convinced that nations are constructed 
entities, and that the emergence of a enduring national identity in Austria was due in large 
part to the efforts of Austrian elites to manipulate such building blocks of nationhood as 
language, religion, culture, ethnicity, and, above all, history, in order to argue for a 
specific vision of Austrian national identity.  This process proceeded from the “top” of 
3.See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990); 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(Thetford, Norfolk: The Thetford Press, 1983).  See also, Geoffrey Cubitt, ed. Imagining Nations
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cilia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin 
Liebhart, eds., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, trans. Angelika Hirsch and Richard Mitten 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).
4Indeed, Anderson probably goes too far when he uses the word “imagined communities” to describe the 
formation of nations.  We would also do well to keep in mind the work on nationalism of Anthony Smith, 
who emphasizes the necessity of pre-existing notions of kinship in the birth of national sentiment.  Anthony 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: B. Blackwell, 1987); idem, National Identity (Reno: 
University of Nevada Press, 1991); idem, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about 
Ethnicity and Nationalism (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000).   See also Rogers Brubaker, 
Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
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Austrian society downward, as Austria’s leaders attempted to mold the views of the 
Austrian people.  Ultimately, the influence of these leaders upon the course of Austria’s 
national debate was decisive.
Second, while an examination of public opinion regarding Austrian nationhood 
would be an interesting and worthy project, such an enterprise would be extremely 
problematic for this period of Austrian history.  There is simply too little comprehensive 
evidence regarding the state of popular opinion and its evolution before the era of modern 
public opinion polling.  Indeed, during certain portions of the period covered by this 
study, there were authoritarian governments in power which were deeply concerned with 
the topic of Austrian nationhood, and to dissent from the views of those regimes was to 
risk imprisonment and possibly even death.  Thus, it is exceedingly difficult to get at any 
sort of comprehensive view of the state of opinion of average Austrians concerning their 
national status.  What we are left with, then, are the public and institutional efforts of 
Austria’s leaders to influence Austrian popular opinion.  There is some scattered 
evidence regarding the success of those efforts, and this study takes that information into 
account.  For the most part, however, I focus upon how public intellectuals and 
politicians attempted to use the Habsburg past to resolve Austria’s identity crisis.
In restricting itself to an examination of how Austria’s leaders attempted to define 
the relationship of their people to Germany, this study necessarily omits any detailed 
treatment of minority groups in Austria whose discussions regarding the notion of 
national identity were distinctive and complex.  The vast majority of the Austrian 
population after 1918 spoke German and considered themselves ethnically German.  The 
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were, however, small groups of ethnic Czechs, Magyars, and Jews living in Austria who 
naturally had a more problematic relationship to the debate regarding Austrian 
nationhood.5  In the same manner, this study does not seek to examine regional variations 
in the Austria’s identity crisis, even though many of Austria’s individual provinces 
displayed strong senses of local consciousness.  All of these smaller factions within 
Austria conducted their own distinctive struggles over their national ideals, but those 
efforts did not affect the broad outline of the Austrian debate concerning national identity 
at the state level to any significant degree, and thus their stories, while interesting, fall 
outside the scope of this study.
This study conceives of memory as an intentional, public, and, above all, political 
act.  While the word “memory” can connote a sentimental, passive recollection of the 
past, what I am examining in this study is a far more active phenomenon.  What is 
interesting about the role of the Habsburg past in the debate over Austrian national 
identity is not simply that different Austrians remembered their past in different ways.  
Such a point is certainly a trivial one.  What makes the use of the Habsburg past during 
this era fascinating is the manner in which Austria’s leaders formulated a vision of their 
land’s past precisely in order to influence the ideas of their countrymen regarding 
Austria’s character, its place in the world, and its ultimate destiny.  This project was not 
based upon a misty sort of remembering of the past; rather it involved the intentional 
crafting of historical narratives by Austrians leaders, intellectuals, and teachers in order to 
5For some information on the national identity of ethnic Czechs living in Austria after 1918, see Michael 
John, “‘We Do Not Even Possess Ourselves’: On Identity and Ethnicity in Austria, 1880-1937,” Austrian 
History Yearbook, 30 (1999): 17-64. For an examination of the national identity of Austrian Jews, many of 
whom considered themselves German, during the First World War see Marsha Rozenblit, Reconstructing a 
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tell other Austrians about how they should see themselves and their homeland, and to 
establish a stable position for the Austrian state in the European balance of power.  The 
very act of creating such historical narratives transforms memory in a public enterprise, 
rather than a private or personal one.6
Given the intensely public nature of the efforts by Austrian leaders to use the 
Habsburg past to influence the national opinions of the Austrian population, this study 
relies for the most part upon public, published documents.  The published works and 
public speeches of prominent intellectuals and political leaders, the official party 
platforms, newspapers, and ideological journals of the major Austrian political parties of 
the era, and Austria’s most important non-partisan periodicals and pedagogical journals 
provide the body of evidence upon which this study is based.  Those sources, calculated 
to reach and sway a large audience, provide the basic foundation for any comprehensive 
view of how Austria’s leaders, political parties, public intellectuals, and teachers not only 
attempted to make sense of Austria’s past and national status on a personal level, but also 
sought to disseminate their views in order to influence the state of Austrian opinion 
regarding such matters.
Additionally, this study seeks to describe the manner in which various, sometimes 
National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I, (New York : Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
6For but a few of the most prominent scholarly studies on historical memory see Pierra Nora, Realms of 
Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), on the importance of memories of the French 
Revolution of 1789 for French history, and Paul Fussel, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), and Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in 
European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), on memory and the First 
World War.   See also Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael S. Roth, The Ironist’s Cage: Memory, Trauma and the 
Construction of History (New York: Columbia Press, 1995).
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competing visions of Austrian history and nationhood were spread to the Austrian 
population on a practical level through the means of Austria’s state educational system.  
Therefore, it also examines Austrian state educational curricula, laws, and the history and 
civics textbooks and readers used in Austrian schools in order to evaluate how the 
broader public debate was translated into classroom instruction for the next generation of 
Austrian citizens.  Thus, this study is conceived of as not only a work of intellectual and 
political history, but also as an examination of how ideas regarding the Habsburg past 
and Austrian nationhood articulated by political leaders were transmitted on a more 
practical and institutional level in order to mold Austria’s national ideals.
It is also worth describing briefly the manner in which this study defines the 
Habsburg past.  Obviously this turn of phrase has the potential to encompass an 
enormous span of Austria’s history.  Most often, however, this study uses the Habsburg 
past to refer to two main aspects of Austria’s history: the role of the monarchs of the 
House of Habsburg itself as the political, dynastic rulers of the Austrian lands between 
the fourteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the Monarchy’s status as a large 
multinational empire in Central Europe, which most properly dates to the addition of the 
Bohemian lands and Hungary to the Habsburgs’ holdings in the sixteenth century.  These 
were the two features of Austria’s history before 1918 that featured most prominently in 
the public debate regarding Austrian national identity after that year, and which therefore 
constitute a special focus of this study.  The participants in the national debate also 
sometimes used other aspects of Austrian history to make their arguments, however, 
ranging from Austria’s distinguished musical culture during the nineteenth century back 
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to the establishment of de facto Austrian independence under the leadership of the House 
of Babenberg nearly a millennium ago.  Such elements of Austria’s past formed a smaller 
but still important part of the twentieth-century debate on Austrian identity, and are also 
examined from time to time in this study.  For the sake of simplicity, then, the term 
“Habsburg past” is used in this study to refer to all of relevant features of Austria’s 
political and cultural history from the medieval period up until the collapse of the 
Monarchy itself in 1918, but with an emphasis upon Habsburg rule over its multinational, 
dynastic state from the sixteenth century onward.
The Historiography of Austrian National Identity and Memory
There is already a large and diverse scholarship on Austrian national identity and 
historical memory to which this study hopes to contribute.  For the past generation or so, 
scholars of Austrian history, both in Austria and abroad, have been particularly interested 
in the construction of Austrian national identity after 1918. This focus is unsurprising 
given the many decades during which Austria wavered between professions of 
Germanness and declarations of Austrian national patriotism.  Indeed, the American 
historian Pieter Judson dates the beginning of these discussions regarding Austrian 
nationhood to the birth of modern nationalism during the nineteenth century.7   Other 
scholars such as Felix Kreissler, Friedrich Heer, David Luft, Peter Katzenstein, and 
Michael John have described the longstanding debate carried out by German-speakers 
7Peter M. Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in 
the Austrian Empire, 1848_1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997).  On issues of the national 
identity of German-speakers in Bohemia during the last century of the Habsburg Monarchy see Gary 
Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861_1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1981); Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: a Local History of Bohemian 
Politics, 1848_1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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within and outside of the Habsburg lands over whether or not Austrians were actually 
Germans in a national sense, and the ramifications of that debate for Austrian national 
identity for both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Austrian Republic.  These scholars are 
in general agreement concerning the issue of a contested Austrian identity preceding the 
fall of the Monarchy, although they disagree concerning the extent to which Austrians 
might also be considered to be Germans in some sense.  They also agree that the end of 
the multinational framework which the Monarchy provided served only to deepen and 
intensify the crisis of Austrian identity.8  In a similar manner, Peter Thaler and Fritz 
Fellner have described the manner in which this debate was continued after the Second 
World War, and how supporters of a vision of Austria as a nation separate and distinct 
from Germany used their ideas to distance the Second Republic from the crimes of Nazi 
Germany.9
Indeed, it is this focus upon the Nazi past which has most characterized the recent 
scholarship on Austrian historical memory.  The majority of these scholars, including 
Thaler, Anton Pelinka, Heidemarie Uhl, Emil Brix, and Peter Utgaard, have been most 
concerned with the construction of the so-called “Austria-as-victim myth” by Austria’s 
leaders after 1945, which portrayed Austria as the “first victim” of “foreign,” German 
aggression as a means of minimizing or denying Austrian complicity in the crimes of 
8Felix Kreissler, Der Österreicher und seine Nation: Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen (Vienna, Cologne 
and Graz: H. Böhlau, 1984); Friedrich Heer, Der Kampf um die österriechische Identität (Vienna: Böhlau, 
1981); David S. Luft, “Austria as a Region of German Culture,” Austrian History Yearbook 23 (1992): 135-
148;  Michael John “‘We Do Not Even Possess Ourselves:’ On Identity and Ethnicity in Austria, 1880-
1937,” 17-64; Peter J. Katzenstein, Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany Since 1815 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976); Anton Pelinka Zur österreichiche Identität. Zwischen deutscher 
Vereinigung und Mitteleuropa (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1990).
9Peter Thaler,The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation_building in a Modern 
Society (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001); Fritz Fellner, “The Problem of the 
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Nazi Germany during World War II.10  Some of these scholars have also correctly noted 
that the final outcome of the Austrian debate on national identity in favor of a non-
German Austrian identity was due in large part to these efforts to distance Austria from 
the German state which had initiated the Second World War and carried out the 
Holocaust.11
These studies are all valuable, but they do not completely describe the course of 
the Austrian debate regarding national identity after 1918.  Many of the studies on 
Austrian national identity restrict themselves to making judgements concerning which 
side of the Austrian national debate was actually right, or in simply documenting the fact 
that such a national debate occurred and was ultimately resolved.  Additionally, most of 
these studies take a highly periodized view of Austrian history, and describe aspects of 
the debate during specific epochs of Austrian history such as the First Republic, the 
Austrian Nation after 1945,”  The Journal of Modern History 60 (June 1988): 264-289.
10Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity; Heidemarie Uhl,  “The Politics of Memory: Austria’s Perception of 
the Second World War and the National Socialist Period,” in Austrian Historical Memory and National 
Identity, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 64-5; Emil Brix, “Zur Frage der österreichischen Identität am Begin der Zweiten Repubik,” in Die 
bevormundete Nation: Österreich und die Allierten 1945-1949, ed. Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost 
(Innsbruck: Haymo-Verlag, 1988), 94-5; Anton Pelinka, “Taboos and Self-Deception: The Second
Republic’s Reconstruction of History,” in Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, 99-100; Peter 
Utgaard, Remembering And Forgetting Nazism: Education, National Identity and the Victim Myth in 
Postwar Austria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); Gerhard Botz and Gerald Sprengengel, eds., 
Kontoversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte.  Verdrängte Vergangenheit, Österreich-Identität, Waldheim 
und die Historiker (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1994); Anton Pelinka and Erika Weinzierl, 
Das große Tabu.  Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit (Vienna: Edition S., 1987).
11These scholarly examinations of Austria’s failure to deal with the Nazi past are part of a wider historical 
literature on the Second World War and memory in Europe.  See for example Henry Rousso, The Vichy 
Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991); Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997; Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German 
National Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The 
Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001); Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitk: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit
(Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1996); Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity After the Holocaust
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1999); Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the 
Third Reich (New York: Routledge, 2002). István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., The Politics of 
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Ständestaat, the Nazi era, or the Second Republic.  In the same manner, the works on 
Austrian national identity and the Nazi past describe the relationship between the official 
repression of the Nazi past by the Austrian government after 1945, and the construction 
of a sense of distinctive Austrian nationhood, but generally do not acknowledge the 
important links between those efforts and the wider national debate which had been going 
on in Austria since the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy.  This study will be the first to 
trace the shifting course of the modern Austrian debate on national identity in its entirety, 
over the course of several different regimes and sets of circumstances.  Each era within 
Austrian history during this span was indeed distinctive in terms of the manner in which 
the debate over national identity unfolded, but there was also considerable continuity in 
the national arguments which key individuals and ideological groups made throughout 
these periods which has not been adequately appreciated by the historical scholarship.
Moreover, this study will be the first to examine in depth the critical role of 
interpretations of the Habsburg past in the Austrian debate concerning national identity.  
Other works have dealt with aspects of the use of that past in Austria’s national 
discussion, but none have really probed the matter in enough depth to reveal how central 
it was to Austrian life and identity throughout the several decades after 1918.12  This work 
will demonstrate that the Habsburg past was indeed the most important part of that 
Austrian debate, and it will show how all of Austria’s major ideological groups and 
Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
12See for example essays in Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms, The Habsburg Legacy: National 
Identity in Historical Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994); Maria Bucur and Nancy 
M. Wingfield, Staging the Past The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the 
Present (West Lafayette, Indiana: Perdue University Press, 2001); Peter M. Judson and Marsha L. 
Rozenblit, eds., Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe (New York and Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2005); Bischof and Pelinka, Memory and National Identity in Austria.
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political factions were inevitably forced to confront and define the legacy of the 
Habsburg Monarchy in order to advance their arguments concerning Austria’s national 
character, place in the world, and future destiny.
The first two chapters of this study deal with the period of the Austrian First 
Republic between 1918 and 1933.  Despite the fact that the victorious Entente powers 
had forbidden Austria from joining the German state, most Austrians during this period, 
aside from a small but vocal minority, considered Austria to be a politically and 
economically unviable state inhabited by German nationals who belonged with their 
ethnic brethren in Germany.  The major Austrian political factions disagreed sharply 
concerning whether the old Habsburg state had been a force for good or ill for Austrian 
Germans, but they did basically agree concerning Austria’s German character.  The 
teaching of Austrian history in state schools as a part of the sweep of German history as a 
whole reflected this initial “Germanist” consensus.  The third and fourth chapters deal 
with the period of corporatist dictatorship between 1934 and 1938, when the conservative 
right organized itself along authoritarian lines to quell what they perceived as 
unmanageable opposition from both the Marxist left and the increasingly powerful and 
rabidly “Germanist” Austrian Nazis.  In order to fight the influence of Nazism, the 
Corporatists attempted to cultivate Austrian patriotism by presenting a view of Austria as 
a “second German state,” which was still essentially German in culture, but which also 
represented all that was best in that culture due to its distinctive Habsburg past, a past 
which was emphasized in history education during this era.  The fifth chapter examines 
the period between 1938 and 1945 when Austria became a part of Nazi Germany, which 
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was characterized by the Hitler regime’s assault on the very concept of Austria itself, as 
the Austrian territory was completely dissolved, and the Habsburg monarchy was 
portrayed as an oppressive, anti-German dynasty in Nazi history education.  The anemic 
Austrian resistance to Nazism generally rallied behind notions of Austrian patriotism, and 
often presented visions of a new post-war Austria which frequently recast the old 
Monarchy in a modern guise.  The final two chapters discuss the Austrian Second 
Republic between the end of World War II in 1945 and the signing of the Austrian State 
Treaty and the withdrawal of Allied troops in1955, as the reborn Austrian state struggled 
to distance itself, both politically and through state educational policy, from the crimes of 
Nazi Germany against the backdrop of the early Cold War.  During this era, the 
experience of Nazi rule had so tainted the vision of Austrians as part of the German 
nation that almost all of the Second Republic’s political factions developed a new 
consensus which saw Austrians as a distinct national group, separate from Germans.
Ultimately, this study concludes that the profound and frequent shifts in national 
identity in Austria between 1918 and 1945 provide a forceful argument for the  theories 
of nationalism that present national identity as variable and constructed, rather than as an 
immutable ethnic destiny. Additionally this study will also contribute to the growing 
literature on historical memory, essentially agreeing with the notion that memories of the 
past are often manipulated in order to influence political developments in contemporary 
states.  Scholarship concerning nationalism and investigations of historical memory are 
two topics which have generally been kept separate in the historical profession, but this 
study is unique in the manner in which it illustrates the powerful link between the two 
fields in the Austrian case.  In the end, this study will demonstrate the importance of the 
Habsburg past to the effort by Austrians after 1918 to define their place in the world, and 
to make sense of the relationship between their present circumstances and their deeper 
history.  Austrians between 1918 and 1955 repeatedly constructed and reconstructed their 
national identity out of the raw materials of history and memory, and their example 
demonstrates the malleable and variable nature of nationhood.  The Habsburgs cast a long 
shadow which continued to influence Austria’s definition of itself in a profound manner 
for decades after the last emperor stepped off of the Austrian throne.  This study is the 
story of Austrian life in that shadow.
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Part I. Breaking with the Past?: “German-Austria,” 1918-1933
Chapter 1.  Politics and the Habsburg Past in the First Republic 
On November 11, 1918, Karl I of the House of Habsburg, Emperor of Austria and 
King of Hungary, formally renounced further participation in the political affairs of the 
territories over which he ruled.  His proclamation was not actually a formal abdication of 
his throne, but it nevertheless marked the end of the Habsburg dynasty’s centuries-old 
sovereignty over a vast multinational empire in Central Europe.  The Habsburgs had first 
come to rule over the territory which eventually became the Austrian Republic in 1276, 
and in the centuries thereafter the Habsburg line had gradually expanded its dynastic 
holdings to include Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia, Galicia, and the 
Bukovina.  At the time of its dissolution in 1918, the Habsburg Monarchy had a 
population of more than fifty million, which included inhabitants of five different 
religious faiths and some eleven different nationalities.13
13Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria, Empire and Republic, 1815-1986, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 151-153; Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 1-3, 603-608.
Karl’s renunciation of power was something of formality, however.  By 
November 11 his state had already begun to crumble, as the Monarchy’s Czech, Slovak, 
Polish, Ruthenian, Slovenian, Croat, Serb, Romanian and Magyar populations dissolved 
their associations with the empire which they had been a part of for nearly four hundred 
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years.  Although many of the nationalities living in the Monarchy had been dissatisfied to
greater and lesser degrees with the imperial government for decades, the ultimate cause 
of the Habsburg state’s disintegration was the Monarchy’s defeat in the First World War.  
The Habsburg empire’s government had precipitated the conflict by declaring war on the 
Kingdom of Serbia following the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir 
to the Monarchy’s throne, by an Bosnian Serb nationalist, allegedly on the orders of the 
Serbian government, on June 28, 1914 and the war had eventually spread throughout 
Europe.  The Habsburg Monarchy, along with its allies in the German Reich, Bulgaria, 
and the Ottoman Empire, was eventually defeated by the so-called Entente powers: 
France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Romania and Serbia.  In the final months 
of the conflict in 1918, the Entente forces had encouraged the decision by some of the  
rebellious national groups within the Monarchy to break away from the dynastic 
government and form independent states or join other already existing states with which 
they shared ethnic ties.  
On October 16, Hungary declared independence from the Monarchy.  The Czechs 
followed on October 28, and in the ensuing weeks all of the Monarchy’s other non-
German-speaking nationalities likewise proclaimed their independence from Habsburg 
rule.  By the end of 1918,  Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland had 
replaced the Habsburg Monarchy on the map of Europe.  Italy and Romania similarly had 
moved to add parts of the Monarchy to their existing holdings as well.  Some of these 
states constituted themselves entirely out of territory formerly ruled by the Habsburgs 
while others combined portions of the House of Austria’s old lands with other territories 
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which had never been part of the Monarchy, but they all participated in the dismantling of 
the multinational empire which had dominated Central Europe for centuries.14  Even the 
Monarchy’s German-speaking regions proclaimed the creation of a new, independent  
republic on October 24.  By the time Karl signed an armistice ending formal hostilities on 
November 3rd, his empire had in fact already begun to fall apart.15
In few places was the end of Habsburg rule so dramatically unsettling as in the 
Monarchy’s predominantly German-speaking lands in the Alps and on the Danube.  This 
territory, Austria, had been ruled by the Habsburgs for longer than any other part of the 
old Monarchy, and its largest city, Vienna, had been the seat of imperial power and the 
opulent cultural focal point of the empire for more than six hundred years.  Now the 
inhabitants of this region had been suddenly separated from territories with which they 
had been culturally, economically and historically linked for centuries even as the 
dynasty which had ruled their own homeland for even longer had abandoned its political 
role.  As German-speakers standing in the ruins of what had been Europe’s only German-
dominated great power outside of the German Reich itself, the people of Austria were 
now forced by their new circumstances to struggle to redefine their own national identity, 
14Richard Georg Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, and Arnold Suppan, eds., Innere Front.  Militärassistenz, 
Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918, vol. 2, Umstrurz (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte 
und Politik, 1974),142-315; Hans Leo Mikoletzky, Österreichische Zeitgeschichte vom Ende 
Donaumonarchie bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1966), 30-44.
15Most historians agree that the combination of the Monarchy’s difficulties in balancing the demands of its 
constituent nationalities and the political, social and economic shocks which accompanied the Monarchy’s 
defeat in World War I were responsible for the demise of the Habsburg state, although there is considerable 
debate regarding which of these two problems was most decisive in ending the Habsburg state.  Among the 
best scholarly treatments of the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy, including its participation in 
World War I and its ultimate collapse are: Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-
1918, (London and New York: Longman, 1989), 187-271; Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy, (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 191-400; A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History 
of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 130-261; 
Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 1-
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and to decide what sort of land Austria would be in the future.  Were the German-
speakers of Austria part of the German nation or were Austrians unique enough because 
of their distinctive past as part of the old Monarchy to constitute a separate national 
group?  Would Austria pursue a political union with Germany, seek to continue its 
previous association with the other portions of the old Monarchy’s territory in some new 
form, or simply be content with an independent Austrian state free from any formal 
relationships with other European states?  These were the sorts of questions which the 
inhabitants of Austria faced after the collapse of the Habsburg state.  From the very 
moment the last Habsburg ruler stepped off of the throne, however, the subsequent course 
of Austria’s identity crisis would be in large part dictated by how Austrians defined the 
legacy of Habsburg rule in Austria as their circumstances shifted time and again 
throughout the next several tumultuous decades of their history.
The Monarchy’s old  imperial parliament, which had previously shared legislative 
authority which the Habsburg monarch, and which still included German-speaking 
members from Bohemia and Moravia, and Silesia, regions over which the newborn 
Czechoslovak and Polish republics, respectively, had already claimed sovereignty, was 
the body which made the initial postwar choices regarding Austria’s course after the end 
of the Great War.16  The first decision made by Austria’s representatives was to confirm 
Karl’s renunciation of power by once again proclaiming on November 12 that Austria 
was to be governed democratically by a parliament which derived its authority from the 
Austrian people.  Thus, the Austrian First Republic was born from the ashes of the old 
23; Kann, 367-519.  
16Jerry W. Pyle, “Austrian Patriotism: Alternative to the Anschluss,” in Conquering the Past: Austrian 
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Monarchy.  The representatives did not stop with their proclamation of republican rule, 
however.  They also declared that the Habsburg Monarchy’s predominantly German-
speaking lands were a “constituent part” of Germany, a state which was also experiencing 
a transition from monarchical to republican form of government.  The Austrian 
representatives even used a name for their land, “Deutschösterreich” (German-Austria), 
which emphasized the territory’s national kinship with Germany.  Thus, a union of 
Austria with Germany, generally referred to by the German term “Anschluß,” was the 
path which the territory’s government envisioned in 1918.17
If the Austrian parliament’s decision had been allowed to stand, then Austria’s 
crisis of national identity might well have been a short one.  The Entente powers, 
however, had sacrificed the lives of millions of their citizens in the struggle to defeat 
Germany, the most powerful of the Habsburg Monarchy’s allies, during World War I, 
and they wanted both to punish their German antagonists and to prevent any territorial 
changes which might have had the effect of reinvigorating German power in Europe.  
The addition of the territory and population of “German-Austria” to that of the new 
German Republic in 1918 certainly would have represented just such a change, and for 
this reason, the governments of the Entente states forbade the Anschluß.  The Entente 
backed up its decision with military force, and ultimately forced the Austrian Republic 
formally to abandon the goal of Anschluß in the Treaty of Saint Germain, the diplomatic 
agreement which formally ended the war between Austria and its enemies in September 
of 1919.  The treaty went so far as to compel “Deutschösterreich” to change its name to 
Nazism Yesterday and Today, ed. F. Parkinson (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 72-90.
17John Swanson, The Remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of Modern Austria and Hungary, 
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the less nationally contentious label “Österreich” (Austria).18
It would not be the last time that Austria found its internal debate on national 
identity decisively influenced by outside forces.  Over the next several decades Austria 
would frequently find itself forced to comply with desires of other powerful European 
states concerning its own national destiny, whether in the form of the prohibition of 
Anschluß by the Entente powers during the First Republic, the military invasion and 
forced Anschluß enacted by Nazi Germany in 1938, or the reestablishment of Austrian 
statehood by the Allied states which presided over the recreation of a new European order 
following the Second World War.  In all of these instances, Austrians had to react to the 
decisions concerning their fate made by far more powerful countries.  Yet the internal 
Austrian debate concerning national identity was no less vigorous for being influenced by 
external forces.  
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Austrians began their attempts 
to define what it meant to be an Austrian after the collapse of the Habsburgs’ 
multinational Monarchy.  This question could not be answered without reference to 
Austria’s Habsburg past, nor could the new state be founded without a thorough debate 
over the meaning of Austrian history.  As we shall see, in 1918 the majority of the 
Austrian population believed that Austrians were indeed Germans, and that, in the 
absence of the dynastic structure which had separated Austrian Germans from the rest of 
their national brethren for so long, Austria should become part of Germany, no matter 
1918-1922 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2001), 13-41.
18The Treaty did provide that Anschluß might occur if it were to be approved by the League of Nations, a 
newly created international organization.  Given the domination of the League by the Entente powers, 
however, such approval was never a very likely prospect.  Jelavich, 156-157; Alfred D. Low, The 
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what other European states might think.
The matter of Austria’s national identity was far from the only concern facing the 
new state in the immediate postwar period, however.  The people of Austria had just 
suffered a humiliating defeat in the most devastatingly destructive conflict the human 
race had yet seen, and had been forced, along with the other Central Powers, to accept the 
blame for a conflict which had cost so many Austrian lives.  Most Austrians felt that they 
had been no more responsible for the conflict than the Entente powers, and they burned 
with resentment at what they viewed as the Entente’s failure to deliver upon its promises 
for an equitable peace and a new European order based upon the principle of national 
self-determination.  In the aftermath of the war there were also persistent shortages of 
food, coal, and other basic requirements for survival.  The postwar situation was made 
even more difficult by the fact that Austria had been severed from the other regions of the 
old Monarchy with which it had formed an economic unit for centuries.  None of the 
other successor states, given their own straitened circumstances, were very willing, nor 
even particularly capable of providing Austria with the economic necessities upon which 
it had previously depended.  Austria’s separation from the Habsburg state’s industrial 
heartland in Bohemia, which was now part of Czechoslovakia, was a particularly difficult 
economic blow for Austria, and left the new Austrian state dependent upon the 
comparatively small industrial sector centered around the capital in Vienna, which was 
inadequate to supply the new Republic’s economic needs, especially in an era of soaring 
inflation.  To make matters still worse, the shortages and economic chaos that 
Anschluss Movement 1918-1919 and the Paris Peace Conference  (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, (1974), 326-328; John Swanson, 13-41.
25
accompanied the war and the end of the Monarchy created a perfect climate for the 
spread of infectious disease, and numerous epidemics, including the global influenza 
pandemic of 1918, ravaged Austria as well.19  Thus, the first years of the First Republic 
were exceedingly difficult for its citizens, as they were subjected to endemic poverty and 
shortages, ravaging diseases, and an international treaty arrangement which they 
perceived to be humiliating and unjust.
19Swanson, 163-188, 221-250; Hans Leo Mikoletzky, Österreichische Zeitgeschichte vom Ende 
Donaumonarchie bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1966), 60-92.
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Austrians did not agree with one another concerning how best to meet these 
challenges, and the new Republic’s political factions quarreled bitterly about which 
policies would help the state achieve stability.  The major political factions of the 
Austrian First Republic were the same ones which had dominated Austrian political life 
during the Habsburg Monarchy’s last decades.  The Christian Social Party (Christlich 
Sozial Partei, CSP) was the  major party of the political right, and had fervently 
supported dynastic rule in Austria in the Monarchy’s twilight years.  In 1918, the CSP 
reluctantly accepted democratic rule in Austria, but it remained staunchly conservative 
and Catholic in its outlook during the era of the First Republic.  The predominant party of 
the left was the Social Democratic Workers Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei, 
SDAP), a Marxist group which sought to promote democracy, social justice and the 
interests of the Austrian working class, as well as Anschluß with Germany.  The 
remainder of Austria’s postwar political landscape was filled by numerous different 
smaller parties.  The most important of these were the various German nationalist parties, 
which banded together to form two larger political organizations during the early 1920s, 
the Great German People’s Party (Großdeutschen Volkspartei, GDVP) and the Landbund 
(Agrarian League), and which fervently sought to achieve Anschluß.  This faction was 
generally anti-Marxist and thus firmly opposed the agenda of the Social Democrats, but it 
was also far from comfortable with the traditionalism and Catholicism of the CSP.   The 
Christian Social Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian German nationalist 
camp were the three basic political factions of the early First Republic, and they debated 
incessantly over the appropriate relationship between the Catholic Church and the state, 
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social policy, diplomacy, and the content of Austrian education.20
The First Republic was thus faced with severe difficulties and endemic political 
strife, and never entirely stabilized during the course of its existence.  Its first few years 
were hard ones, as the government struggled to draft a constitution and to improve the 
state’s economic situation.  The Social Democrats won a narrow plurality in the 
Republic’s first election in February of 1919, and ruled in coalition with the CSP, which 
was only slightly less popular with the voters.  Together, the two parties drafted a 
constitution, approved in 1920, which created a bicameral legislature which governed a 
federal state in conjunction with a weak presidency.  This achievement would mark the 
end of cooperation between the Republic’s two largest parties, however.  At the first 
election after the approval of the Constitution in 1920, the CSP won a plurality, and 
would remain the most popular of the Austrian political factions throughout most of the 
rest of  First Republic.  The CSP never achieved an outright electoral majority, however, 
and was always forced to govern in coalition with the GDVP or some combination of the 
other, smaller political parties.  The Social Democrats for their part were never again able 
to command a preeminent statewide electoral position, but they continued to wield 
considerable influence on national affairs as the major opposition party, and they 
20There were of course other political parties as well, but they commanded far less support than did these 
three main political blocks.  The Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) was founded in 1918, and would 
eventually become an important, more radical Marxist alternative to the SPD after the creation of the 
authoritarian Ständestaat in 1934.  For the time being, however, they were eclipsed by the Social 
Democrats, and failed to gain any parliamentary representation during the First Republic.  Two other 
factions on the political right, the conservative militia group known as the Heimwehr, and the radically 
German nationalist National Socialist Party also had their origins during the First Republic, but failed to 
develop into mass political movements until the 1930s.  See later chapters of this study for a more detailed 
discussion of all of these groups.
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consistently dominated the local government in the state capital of Vienna.21
The First Republic’s economic situation gradually improved, especially after the 
signing of the Geneva Protocol, a loan to Austria from various other states which was 
secured by the Christian Social Chancellor Iganz Seipel in 1922.  In order to gain this 
assistance, however, Seipel was forced to pledge that Austria would not pursue Anschluß
with Germany for a period of twenty years.  Despite Seipel’s economic successes, the 
Socialists and German nationalists were outraged at his renunciation of a union with 
Germany, and his government fell two years later.  Even as Austria’s financial 
circumstances brightened, the political situation continued to be tense, and the right and 
left adopted increasingly intractable stances regarding social and religious issues.  By the 
mid-1920s, both the anti-Marxist right and the Marxist left had formed “defensive” 
paramilitary groups, and in 1927, a clash between the two militia factions prompted a 
massive strike by the Social Democrats in Vienna which resulted in the destruction by 
arson of the Austrian Ministry of Justice building.  Even as the tensions between the two 
major ideological camps sharpened, the First Republic’s still fragile economic health took 
a dramatic turn for the worse as the global economic depression of 1929 hit Austria.  
Unemployment and inflation increased catastrophically, and the Social Democrats gained 
a plurality of votes in the 1930 election, only to be denied control of the government by a 
tenuous coalition between the CSP and the right-wing paramilitary Heimwehr block.  The 
new governing coalition was highly unstable, however, and subsequent governments rose 
21Jelavich, 165-170; Walter Goldinger, “Der geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Österreich von 1918 
bis 1945,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte 
und Politik, 1954), 15-144; F. L. Carlsten, The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938 (Cambridge: 
Gower/Maurice Temple Smith, 1986), 1-96.
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and fell with alarming regularity.  In March of 1933, the Christian Social Chancellor 
Engelbert Dollfuß, in response to the abrupt resignation of the legislature’s leadership, 
dissolved the Parliament and reconstituted  the government along authoritarian lines, 
effectively ending the Austrian First Republic after a decade and a half of instability and 
strife.22
Throughout this difficult and ideologically charged period, however, all of 
Austria’s major political factions returned time and again to the issue of Austrian national 
identity.  Despite the official prohibition of Anschluß by the Treaty of Saint Germain of 
1919 and the Geneva Protocols of 1922, which might have been expected to settle the 
matter, prominent Austrians continually discussed Austria’s relationship with Germany, 
and whether Anschluß might or might not solve the endemic economic, social, and 
political problems which the First Republic faced.  Invariably, these discussions were 
forced to refer to Austria’s history as part of the old multinational Habsburg Monarchy, 
and to come to grips with Austria’s past in order to make recommendations for the course 
which the new Republic ought to follow in the future.
Initially, all of Austria’s political factions, in a rare instance of unanimity, were 
united in support of Anschluß.  Indeed, the vast majority of the Austrian population 
seemed to see the prospect of an independent Austrian state as economically and 
politically unviable option, and enthusiastically supported union with Germany.23  The 
22Jelavich 179-195; Goldinger, 104-288; Carlsten, 97-178.
23For example, a plebiscite held in 1921 in the Austrian province of Tyrol showed heavy support for 
Anschluß.  Interestingly, the same voters had two years earlier spoken in favor of Tyrolean independence, 
and the province of Voralberg had voted in 1919 to join Switzerland.  Such electoral positions probably say 
more about the Tyrolean fear that part of their province would be claimed by Italy (which did in fact 
subsequently occur), and the Voralbergers’ doubts concerning the viability of an independent Austria than 
they do about the existence of any Tyrolean or Swiss national sentiment within the Austrian First Republic.  
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major parties all agreed that Austrians were part of the German Volk and that Anschluß
was a desirable goal, but they differed sharply concerning the relationship of Austrian 
Germans to their Habsburg past.  Indeed, the stance of all three political camps regarding 
the old dynastic state had changed little since the time when the Habsburgs still sat on the 
throne.  The Christian Social Party took an essentially positive view of the old Monarchy, 
and argued that the Habsburg state had done a great deal to advance the cause of both the 
German Volk and Western civilization as a whole in Europe.  The CSP lamented the 
demise of the old dynastic state, and declared that modern Austrians were the heirs of a 
great and valuable Habsburg legacy.  Since the Monarchy no longer existed, however, the 
Christian Socials argued that an independent small Austrian state could not possibly 
prosper on its own, and that a union with Germany made good practical as well as 
national sense.  The Social Democrats on the other hand, took an overwhelmingly 
negative view of the old Monarchy.  Prominent Social Democrats portrayed the Habsburg 
state as an oppressive, reactionary entity which had acted against the interests of the real 
progressive force in human history: the working class.  The Socialists saw the Monarchy 
as a “prison of the peoples,” which had denied the rights and liberties of all of the 
nationalities living within its territory, including German Austrians.  As orthodox 
Marxists, the Social Democrats envisioned Anschluß in the context of a progressive, 
democratic great-German Republic dominated by the German working class.  Indeed, the 
SDAP argued that Anschluß had only been prevented by the imperialistic bourgeoisies of 
By the early 1920s, both regions had become hotbeds of German nationalism and pro-Anschluß sentiment.  
Jelavich, 159-162; Swanson, 35-37, Low, 326-328.  On national identity in Tyrol before 1918, see 
Laurence Cole,“Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland.”  National Identität der deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung 
Tirols, 1860-1914 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2000).
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the victorious Western nations.  The German nationalists who made up the GDVP and 
the Landbund took a similar view of the old Monarchy, but they abhorred the Socialists’ 
Marxist ideology.  These right-wing German nationalists wanted no part of a Socialist 
Republic, but rather called for Austria to become part of a powerful great-German nation 
state which would right the wrongs done to the German Volk by the French, and by the 
treacherous Slavic nationalities of the old Monarchy.  These nationalists most often saw 
the Habsburg dynasty as a princely house which had betrayed the German Volk in order 
to maintain its own political power, and which had worked against German interests in 
order to preserve its domination of Central Europe.  For many Austrian German 
nationalists, the Habsburg state in its last years had been an odiously pro-Slavic and pro-
Magyar institution, and they argued that contemporary Germans were better off now that 
the old state had disintegrated.  A smaller group of Austrian German nationalists did in 
fact acknowledge that the Habsburg Monarchy had provided Austrian Germans with 
some real benefits, but even they argued that the memory of the old multinational state 
offered no solutions to the problems facing Austria after 1918.  Thus, without the 
Habsburgs to stand in their way, the nationalist faction hoped that the German Volk might 
finally achieve its ancient dreams of unity in a true “Volksgemeinschaft” (community of 
the [German] people).
The views of some of these political factions regarding Anschluß and the 
Habsburg past changed somewhat as the First Republic slowly became more stable 
during the decade of the 1920s, however.  These changes reflected the practical 
difficulties involved in supporting a German union which had been prohibited by the 
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great powers of Europe as well as fears regarding the growing potency of radical right-
wing German nationalist factions such as the National Socialist Party in Austria and 
Germany.  The CSP never formally repudiated the notion of Anschluß as a matter of 
principle, but by the middle of the 1920s it had largely abandoned the notion as 
impractical.  The CSP’s leading figure, and periodic chancellor of the First Republic, 
Iganz Seipel, was instrumental in the movement of the conservative Austrian right away 
from its emphasis upon union with Germany.  In the place of their previous advocacy for 
Anschluß, many Austrian conservatives substituted a fervent Austrian patriotism, which 
paid tribute to Austria’s past as part of the old multinational and Catholic Habsburg state.
While the traditional Austrian right did not deny that Austrians were Germans, many 
conservatives began to argue that the Austrian people could best live up to their historical 
inheritance and preserve their unique variety of German culture within the confines of an 
independent Austrian state.  The Social Democrats, on the other hand, changed neither 
their support for Anschluß nor their criticisms of the Habsburg dynasty, but they did 
adopt a more moderate tone in their national discussions in response to the rising tide of 
anti-Marxist German nationalism at the end of the decade.  During the last years of the 
First Republic, the Socialists continued to support the idea of union with a democratic 
and socialist German state, but they took greater pains to distinguish between their 
progressive national aims and the chauvinistic nationalism of the radical right.  Only the 
Great German People’s Party and the Landbund failed to substantially modify their 
rhetoric as the First Republic matured.  Austrian German nationalists continued to 
advocate Anschluß and to criticize the old dynastic empire, even as increasing numbers of 
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Austrian German nationalists in the early 1930s began to look to Hitler’s radical Nazi 
movement in Germany as a more appealing model for right-wing German national 
sentiment.24
Thus the debate regarding Austrian national identity and the meaning of the 
Habsburg past raged throughout the era of the First Republic and was never satisfactorily 
resolved.  The initial consensus regarding the essential German character of Austria did 
not disappear entirely, but as the Republic matured, the passion with which at least some 
Austrians argued for Anschluß diminished significantly, and the conservative right in 
particular moved toward a position of patriotic support for Austrian independence
grounded in the memory of the old Habsburg Monarchy.  In 1933, this newfound 
conservative commitment to Austrian independence became the official policy of the 
authoritarian Ständestaat which replaced the Republic, and which repressed both the 
Social Democratic and German nationalist camps in order to better indoctrinate Austrian 
citizens in the ideals of Austrian patriotism and self sufficiency.  While the more 
pluralistic First Republic endured, however, arguments concerning Austrian identity and 
history were conducted freely, and were a persistent feature of public discourse in 
Austria. 
i. Austrian Conservatives and the Habsburg Past in the First Republic. 
The conservative Austrian right demonstrated far more dedication to a vision of 
Austria which was grounded in its past as part of the old Habsburg Monarchy than any of 
the other factions in the First Republic’s political spectrum.  Such dedication was hardly 
24Bruce F. Pauley, “The Austrian Nazi Party before 1938: Some Recent Revelations,” in Conquering the 
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surprising.  The Christian Social Party, the major political association of the conservative 
camp, had been founded during the 1870s in old Austria as a Catholic-oriented, anti-
capitalist, anti-Marxist, and anti-Semitic party which sought to capture the votes of the 
Viennese petit-bourgeoisie.  By the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the 
Christian Socials had combined their previous program with an outspoken advocacy for 
Habsburg rule and Austrian tradition.  Thus, from its relatively humble beginnings as a 
small urban party interested in non-Marxist social reform, the Christian Social Party 
gradually became a conservative Reichspartei (Imperial party) which commanded broad 
support from both the Austrian countryside and the urban middle class, and which was 
the most staunchly loyal of all of the old Monarchy’s political organizations to the House 
of Austria.  Needless to say, the collapse of the Habsburg’s vast multinational Empire 
came as a severe shock to this faction.25
This study uses the term “conservative” to refer to the members and supporters of 
the CSP and its post-1945 successor, the Austrian People’s Party.  That label did not 
apply to the CSP when it was first founded, but by 1918 the Party’s adoption of a 
staunchly  traditionalist stance and its advocacy for the religious and political values that 
the Habsburg dynasty, the aristocracy, and the Church had represented during the 
Monarchy’s last century made this term a better fit, and indeed one which the Catholic 
right often used to describe its ideology.  It is also worth noting that during the time 
period under discussion here, the meaning of conservatism in Europe was itself in a state 
Past, 34-56.
25On the origins and history of the CSP see John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: 
Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 184-410; idem, Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power,1897_1918
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of flux.  The term, which during the nineteenth century had connoted support for 
aristocratic culture, a close relationship between Church and state, and a monarchical 
form of government, had by 1945 come to signify a political ideology which was less 
dependent upon the traditions of the ancien regime and more compatible with liberal-
democratic government.26
Of course not all Austrian conservatives were entirely comfortable with the 
populist rhetoric or the concessions to republicanism of the Christian Social Party.   The 
proponents of the more classical conservatism which had flourished in Austria during the 
nineteenth century, especially among the aristocracy and the upper level clergy, were 
deeply hostile to the new political and social order in Austria after 1918 which had 
weakened the position of the Church, abolished aristocratic privilege, and, in some cases, 
confiscated aristocratic lands.  Many of these figures, and particularly Church leaders, 
were willing to compromise to a certain degree, and supported the CSP as the one major 
party which came the closest to representing their political and religious beliefs.27  Others, 
however, refused to make ideological accommodations and joined smaller political 
movements in order to pursue their more classically conservative vision of Austrian 
society.  Although most on the Austrian right recognized that the opposition of the 
Entente powers as well as a large portion of the Austrian population made the prospect of 
a restoration of the Monarchy completely impractical, there were a number of 
conservative organizations dedicated to placing a Habsburg on the throne once more, and 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 444-462.
26Adam Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. 
Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1954), 307-317.  On the evolution of 
European political conservatism in the twentieth century, see Roland M. Stromberg, European Intellectual 
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these attracted strong support from members of the old Austrian aristocracy.28  Other 
aristocrats found a home in the Heimwehr (Home Guard) movement, a cluster of 
authoritarian militia groups which were far more antagonistic to democratic rule than the 
CSP, and which, while not a very significant political force during the 1920s, eventually 
played an important role in the foundation of the right-wing Ständestaat  dictatorship in 
1933.29  Thus, while most conservatives supported the Christian Social Party, not all did, 
and, as we shall see, some individual conservative intellectuals and leaders articulated 
ideas concerning Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past which went further 
than those espoused by the CSP itself.
With the birth of Austrian democracy out of the ashes of the old Monarchy, most 
Austrian conservatives supported Anschluß, as did most other Austrians, but the 
traditional right’s ardor for union with Germany cooled fairly quickly, and by the end of 
the era of the First Republic, the conservative camp for the most part advocated the 
continued existence of an independent Austrian state as the best way to preserve the 
cultural uniqueness which the Austrian people had developed as a result of their long 
history as part the Habsburg multinational state.  Austrian conservatives never denied that 
Austrians were Germans in a national sense, but as the First Republican era wore on, they 
History Since 1789, 6th ed. (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 49-53, 267-270.
27Wandruszka, 307-317; Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna, 410.
28Blair R. Holmes, “The Austrian Monarchists, 1918-1938: Legitimism versus Nazism,” in Conquering The 
Past, 91-109.
29Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg and Kurt von Schuschnigg were two conservatives from aristocratic 
families who became heavily involved in the Heimwehr and the Ständestaat.  See Ernst Rüdiger 
Starhemberg, Memoiren, (Vienna and Munich: Amalthea Verlag, 1971); Kurt von Schuschnigg, Dreimal 
Österreich, trans. John Segrue (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1938); “Allgemeine politische Grundsätze des 
Heimatblockes, 1930,” in Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, ed. Klaus Berchtold (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967), 403-408; C. Earl Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918-1936, 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1978), 3-6.
37
were increasingly willing to argue that Austrian Germans did not necessarily need to 
belong to the same political state as other Germans in order to act in the interests of the 
German Volk.  This stance essentially represented a continuation of the CSP’s pre-1918 
national views, which cast Austrians as Germans and yet saw no inherent contradiction 
between loyalty to both the German Volk as a whole and the Habsburg state.30
From the very beginning of the republican era, Austrian conservatives were not 
completely comfortable with the idea of democratic rule in Austria.  Even as late as 
October of 1918, many party members had still hoped to preserve the old Monarchy, and 
it was only with considerable reluctance that the Austrian right agreed to cooperate with 
the other parties to found the First Republic.31  The first party platforms issued by the 
CSP in the early months of the Republic all acknowledged the legitimacy of democratic 
rule on the basis of popular sovereignty and full suffrage.  At the same time, however, 
these documents expressed the fears of Austrian conservatives that the new state would 
decline into endemic class conflict or even civil war if their chief antagonists on the left, 
the Social Democrats, were allowed to pursue their agenda unfettered.32  Ignaz Seipel, a 
Catholic clergyman and the principal ideological leader of the CSP, noted that democratic 
rule could be used for good or bad ends, and that the majority was not always necessarily 
right in its judgements.  Therefore, he argued that the formal apparatus of democracy 
could never be an end in itself for Austria, but rather had to be a means toward social 
30Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna, 214-218.
31Wandruszka, 317-322.
32“Kundgebung der Christlich Sozialen an die Parteiangehörigen,” “Das Aktionsprogramm der 
Christlichsozialen Vereinigung, 1919,” “Das Parteiprogramm der Wiener Christlichsozialen , 1919,” in 
Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 355; 359; 365-371.
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unity, morality, and sound spiritual judgement.33  Thus, the Austrian conservative camp 
did not celebrate the birth of democracy in Austria as the Social Democrats did, but rather 
acknowledged that republican government was simply the only realistic solution for the 
Austrian territory in the aftermath of the Monarchy’s collapse.
The Christian Social Party was determined to ensure that the new Republic 
reflected the traditional ideals which it had supported for decades.  As a party which was 
closely tied to the Catholic Church in Austria, the Christian Socials insisted that there 
was a necessary relationship between Church and state, in direct opposition to the 
Socialists’ attempts to base the new government upon firmly secular grounds.  In 
particular, the CSP insisted that religious instruction was an important part of education 
for Austrian children, and argued that students should be obligated to receive religious 
education in their respective religious traditions.34
The Party likewise maintained the anti-Semitic stance which had been part of its 
official program since its foundation in the late nineteenth century, and argued that 
Austrian Jews, as a separate, non-German “nation” living in a nationally German 
territory, could not be allowed to dominate or oppress the German Volk of Austria.  Thus, 
the CSP’s various political platforms during the First Republic called for a limit on 
33Iganz Seipel, “Das Wesen des demokratischen Staates,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 20, 1918; “Die 
demokratische Verfassung.” Reichspost (Vienna), November 21, 1918; “Das Volk und die künftige 
Staatsform,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 23, 1918; “Die große Linie der gestigen Entwicklung unserer 
Zeit,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, ed. Josef Getzl (Vienna: Verlag “Heroes”, 1926), 89-
93.
34While the vast majority of the Austrian population was Roman Catholic, there were significant Protestant 
and Jewish religious minorities which had the right to religious instruction in their own traditional faiths.  
“Das Wahlprogramm der Christlichsozialen Partei, 1918,” “Das Programm der Chritlichsozialen Partei, 
1926,” in Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 356-359; 374-376; “Das Aktionsprogramm der 
Christlichsozialen Vereinigung, 1919, 361; Seipel, “Kirkliches und staatliches Organisationsprinzip,” in 
Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 196-199.
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Jewish influence in Austrian economic life and restrictions on the number of Jewish 
teachers in Austria as well.35
The Austrian conservative camp also proposed a system of social legislation to 
protect the interests of the poor and disadvantaged in Austria.  This stance had been quite 
characteristic of the CSP during the last decades of the Monarchy as well.  The Christian 
Socials were always careful to note their support for the principle of private property, 
however, and to oppose the sort of class warfare which they saw as the basis of the more 
radical social legislation proposed by the Social Democrats.36  Thus, Austrian 
conservatives opposed Marxism and Jewish influence in the Austrian First Republic, and 
supported democracy in Austria only with some reluctance.  They recognized republican 
rule as legitimate, but argued that Austrian religious and cultural traditions needed to be 
nurtured by the new Republic, rather than uprooted or abandoned.
Austrian Conservatives and the Question of Austrian Germanness.
During the first years of the First Republic, the Christian Social Party defined its 
position concerning Austrian nationhood, a position which would remain consistent until 
1938.  The Party proclaimed that Austrians were part of the German Volk, and shared 
interests and characteristics in common with the other Germans of Europe.  None of the 
35“Das Wahlprogramm der Christlichsozialen Partei, 1918,” 356-359; “Das Parteiprogramm der Wiener 
Christlichsozialen , 1919,” 364; “Der ‘Linzer Programm’ der christlich Arbeiter Österreichs,” in 
Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 374.  The CSP’s ideological anti-Semitism, though 
prominent, was largely rhetorical and was not generally accompanied by the sort of substantial legislative 
efforts to discriminate against Austrian Jews which had been characteristic of the Party before 1918.  Most 
likely the strength of the Social Democratic opposition during the First Republic made any such efforts 
prohibitively difficult to pursue at a time when the CSP had to struggle to advance even the most important 
aspects of its agenda.
36“Kundgebung der Christlich Sozialen an die Parteiangehörigen,” 355; “Das Aktionsprogramm der 
Christlichsozialen Vereinigung, 1919,” 359; “Das Parteiprogramm der Wiener Christlichsozialen , 1919,” 
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First Republic’s Christian Social leaders devoted much effort to systematic explorations 
of the issue of Austrian Germanness.  They simply accepted Austria’s German character 
as fact which did not require much theoretical justification or discussion.  The Party’s 
statements about Austrian Germanness generally eschewed the sort of racial or völkisch
language typical of the Austrian German nationalist parties, however, invoking instead 
Austria’s history and culture as the key aspects of its German character.  The CSP’s early 
political platforms expressed solidarity with the rest of German Volk, and urged the 
protection of the national interests of the allegedly oppressed ethnic German minorities 
living within the old Monarchy’s successor states, especially in Czechoslovakia.37
Indeed, the Viennese chapter of the Party neatly summarized the national views of the 
entire movement when it proclaimed itself to be founded upon “Christian, German, and 
anti-Semitic” principles.38
Initially at least, the Party accompanied its declarations of Austrian Germanness 
with statements which supported Anschluß with Germany.  The party’s spokesman at the 
June, 1919 meeting of the Austrian National Assembly, Johann Hauser, proclaimed that 
the CSP supported a union with Germany, and angrily denounced the Entente’s 
prohibition of Anschluß as unfair and as a direct contradiction of the victors’ own 
professed dedication to the principle of national self-determination.  Hauser also argued 
that a small Austria state, severed from its historical ties with the remainder of the former 
territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, could never hope to support itself economically, and 
365-371.“Das Programm der Chritlichsozialen Partei, 1926,” 374-376.
37“Das Wahlprogramm der Christlichsozialen Partei, 1918,” 356-359; “Das Aktionsprogramm der 
Christlichsozialen Vereinigung, 1919,” 359.
38“Das Programm der Wiener Christlichsozialen , 1919,” 364.
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that Anschluß was the only course which could secure prosperity for Austria.39  The 
Party’s “Action Program” of the same year reiterated these points, and even called for the 
Austrian Republic’s laws to be adjusted so as to be in harmony with the legal structure of 
the German Reich in anticipation of an eventual great-German union.40
Alexander Spitzmüller, a former economic official in the old Habsburg 
government, likewise served as an early conservative advocate for Anschluß.  In his 1919 
book, Political Breakdown and the Anschluß Question, Spitzmüller discussed the reasons 
why he believed that a union with Germany represented the most promising option for 
post-Habsburg Austria.  Unlike many advocates of Anschluß of other political 
orientations, Spitzmüller acknowledged that such a union actually might harm Austrian 
economic interests in the short run because Austrian industries were generally less 
competitive and efficient than those of Germany.  In the long term, however, he argued 
that a great-German union would help orient the Austrian economy toward trade with 
more economically robust regions in north and western Europe while at the same time 
serving as a far better advocate for continuing German economic interests in Central and 
Eastern Europe than an independent small Austrian state.  Spitzmüller still found the 
multinational ideals of the Habsburg state very attractive, but he asserted that after the 
Monarchy’s collapse, Anschluß constituted a far more practical option for Austria than 
fanciful dreams of a Danubian economic union with the very same national groups which 
had undermined the old state before 1918, and which remained hostile to German 
39Johann Hauser, “Unser Friede! Die Kundgebung der Deutschösterreichischen Nationalversammlung in 
der Sitzung vom 7. Juni 1919,”  Flugblätter für Deutschösterreichs Recht 33 (1919), 24-25.
40“Das Aktionsprogramm der Christlichsozialen Vereinigung, 1919,” 361.
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interests in the postwar era.41
As we have seen, however, the Entente powers were unwilling to permit Anschluß
because they wished to avoid any concomitant increase in the potential military might of 
Germany.  The Geneva Protocols which Seipel negotiated in1922 further cemented the 
Austrian separation from Germany in exchange for loans which helped Austria to 
maintain its tenuous economic existence.  Anschluß was never a realistic goal for Austria 
during the 1920s, and the conservative movement appeared to make peace with this fact 
far sooner than Austria’s other political camps.  The CSP’s 1926 political platform 
demonstrated the Austrian right’s increasing moderation on the national issue by taking a 
small step back from the Party’s previous declaration of support for union with Germany.  
In this document, the Party simply stated that it sought “equality for the German Volk
within the European family of Völker and the organization of the relationship to the 
German Reich on the grounds of the right to self determination.”42  Certainly the 1926 
Party Platform still implied that an Austrian union with Germany might be desirable, but 
its language was far more vague than the Party’s previous statements on the matter, and 
considerably more ambiguous than the policy positions of either the Social Democrats or 
the German nationalist camp during the mid-1920s.
More than any other figure on the Catholic right, Ignaz Seipel, the CSP’s 
ideological and spiritual leader, was the key figure in promoting acceptance of the 
Austrian independence among conservatives.  Seipel, a Catholic priest and academically 
trained scholar, was by far the most outspoken and intellectually sophisticated theorist in 
41Alexander Spitzmüller, Die politische Zusammenbruch und die Anschlußfrage (Vienna: Manzische 
Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1919), 28-31.
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the Christian Social camp.  As the chancellor who had led the negotiations on the Geneva 
Protocols, Seipel received considerable criticism from Austrians of all political 
allegiances for giving in to the Western powers and renouncing Anschluß on Austria’s 
behalf.43  Seipel, however, defended his decision vigorously, and stated that he simply 
opposed all solutions to Austria’s problems which were not realistic.  He argued that 
because the international community had refused to assist Austria unless it abandoned the 
goal of Anschluß, he had been forced to choose Austria’s welfare over a token stance in 
favor of union with Germany which the rest of Europe had no intention of ever 
allowing.44
Seipel certainly did not deny that Austrians were part of the German Volk.  He 
agreed that Austrians were indeed Germans, but he also argued that nationality was 
primarily a cultural characteristic, rather than a political one.  He asserted that Austrian 
culture had always thrived within a larger German context, and could not be separated 
from that context, no matter what the territorial boundaries happened to be.45  Seipel 
argued that the dramatic differences of opinion between Western and Central Europe 
regarding the degree to which the nation and the political state were expected to 
correspond to one another lay at the root of the Anschluß debate.  He noted that 
historically the German lands had never shown the sort of overlap between nationality 
and political statehood found in England or France.  Seipel affirmed that Austrians could 
be simultaneously loyal to the German nation and the Austrian state, as they had been 
42“Das Programm der Chritlichsozialen Partei, 1926,” 76.
43Wandruszka, 389.
44Seipel, “Die erste Regierungs Erklärung,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts , 19-21.
45Seipel, Die Aufgaben der deutschen Hochschule in Österreich gegenüber dem deutschen Volke (Vienna: 
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throughout the history of the old Monarchy, which had encompassed only a part of the 
German Volk.  Seipel even questioned the prevailing state of opinion in Europe in favor 
of the nation state as political form.  He argued that national minorities were not always 
mistreated when they lived in states with other, more numerous national populations, and 
indeed sometimes benefitted from such a situation.  He further asserted that nation states 
sometimes went against the logic of historical cultural and economic ties between Völker, 
and if pursued too single-mindedly could lead to great conflict and upheaval, as the past 
decade had amply shown.46
Indeed, Seipel elsewhere argued that a Europe composed of nation states was 
simply an impossibility.  He noted that the Völker were too intermixed in various 
territories, and especially in the lands which the Habsburgs had ruled before 1918, ever to 
permit a pure correspondence between nationality and state government.  For that reason, 
he argued that it made no sense for Austrians to be outraged by the prohibition on 
Anschluß.  Despite the rhetoric of the Entente powers, political and geographic realities 
ensured that the ideal of the nation state could never be more than just an ideal.  He thus 
argued that Austrian foreign policy needed to be realistic, and work within the existing 
system.47
For Seipel, the real issue facing Austria was not whether or not Anschluß would 
ever occur, but rather whether postwar Europe could ever establish a continental order 
which ensured justice and a durable peace.  He urged his Austrian countrymen to resist 
Erste Wiener Verein-Buchdruckerei, 1925), 5-7.
46Seipel,“Die gesitige Grundlagen der Minderheitfrage,” and “Probleme des deutschen Staates,” in Seipels 
Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 160-164; 286-289.
47Seipel, “Die Neugestaltung Europas,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 178-187.
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the temptation to become bitter in response to the postwar treaties.  Such resentments 
where not productive, he argued.  They merely led to the vengeful desire to reverse the 
postwar order, a desire which, in Seipel’s opinion, only could lead to another continental 
war.  The actual problem with the postwar treaties according to Seipel was not that they 
were fundamentally unjust, but rather that they had not been fully enforced.  If the 
Entente powers simply fulfilled the promises regarding fairness, economic cooperation, 
and the protection of national minorities which they themselves had made at the end of 
the war, then the Germans of Central Europe, whether in Austria, in Germany, or in any 
of the old Monarchy’s successor states, would be satisfied, and the tumultuous postwar 
era would settle into a lasting period of peace.  According to Seipel, national unrest in 
Austria had far less to do with national boundaries than with the First Republic’s 
precarious financial and material situation after the severing of its economic ties with the 
Habsburg Monarchy’s other successor states.  If the German Volk was actually allowed to 
secure its economic and national interests, he argued, then the Anschluß debate would 
cease to have any urgency.48
While most Austrian conservatives followed Seipel’s lead and did not dispute that 
Austrians were Germans in a national sense, a small but vocal minority of conservative 
Austrian patriots made a more radical argument concerning Austrian nationhood.  For 
example, Oscar Schmitz, a Reich German who had immigrated to Austria and become a 
staunch Austrian patriot in the process, took great pains to distinguish between Austrians 
and Germans in a 1924 work entitled Der österreichische Mensch (The Austrian Man).  
48Seipel, “Der Weg zum Frieden im Volk und unter den Völkern,” “Das wahre Antlitz Österreichs,”and 
“Das neue Österreich,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 166-176; 290-29; 308-311.
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In this book, Schmitz argued that Austrians, thanks to their pious Catholicism and unique 
blend of baroque-aristocratic and peasant values, constituted a group which was 
dramatically different from other German-speakers.  Indeed, Schmitz used this 
opportunity to launch into a polemic against Prussia, which he argued had been molded 
by the success of the Protestant Reformation and the unusual strength of its bourgeoisie 
into a brutally individualistic land which always sought to impose its will.  The Austrian 
ideals of easy-going sensuousness, communal spirit, toleration, and above all, 
understanding for other Völker were thus worlds apart from the sort of national culture 
which predominated in the German Reich.49  Schmitz never explicitly denied that 
Austrians were part of the German nation as a whole, but he certainly implied as much 
given the single-mindedness with which he drew his contrast between Austrians and 
Prussians.
Another conservative patriot, Oswald Straub, made a similar ambiguous argument 
concerning Austrian nationhood which also went a bit further than the position of the 
conservative mainstream.  Straub argued that the Habsburg Monarchy had in fact been a 
nation as well as a state, and that all of old Empire’s various Völker had been justifiably 
loyal to this “Austrian nation.”  Straub did, however, make a fine distinction between the 
terms “nation” (Nation) and “nationality” (Nationalität), asserting that Austrian German-
speakers had always simultaneously served the interests of both their Austrian nation and 
the German nationality.  Straub lamented the state of national consciousness in the 
Austrian First Republic as well, arguing that the Austria’s inhabitants had recently 
49Oscar A. H. Schmitz, Der österreichische Mensch, zum Anschauungsunterricht für Europäer, 
inbesondere für Reichsdeutsche (Vienna: Wiener Literarische Anstalt, 1924),21-25, 49-55.
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overemphasized either their Germanness or their loyalty to their particular local Heimat
(homeland).  Straub argued that what contemporary Austria really needed was a true 
sense of Austrian nationhood on the part of its citizens.  He denied that such a patriotic 
identification with the Austrian nation amounted to treason to the German Volk, and he 
warned that Austria’s unique brand of German culture would inevitably be destroyed in 
the event of Anschluß with Germany.50  Neither Schmitz nor Straub made any appreciable 
impact on the debate regarding Austrian nationhood in the First Republic, but their 
arguments foreshadowed the pride in Austria’s distinctiveness which ultimately became 
an important part of conservative ideology during the Ständestaat and the early Second 
Republic.
Thus, all Austrian conservatives essentially maintained that Austrians were in 
some sense also Germans, even if there was some difference of opinion regarding the 
degree of difference between Austrians and other Germans.  Invariably, however, the 
traditionalist Austrian right was far more willing than either the Social Democratic or 
German nationalist camps to emphasize Austria’s cultural and historical distinctiveness, 
and the Christian Social Party was the only one of the First Republic’s political factions 
to make peace with the idea of Austria’s independence as a state separate from the rest of 
the German Volk.  This willingness to embrace Austrian patriotism undoubtedly stemmed 
from the ideological heritage of Austrian conservatism, which had never recognized any 
real conflict between pride in Austrian Germanness and devotion to Austria’s own 
distinctive brand of German culture and to the Habsburgs’ multinational state.
50Oswald Straub, Um Österreichs Zukunft, ein Streitschrift für Österreich (Vienna: Paul Kaltschmid, 1930), 
18-30.
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Austrian Conservatives’ Portrayals of the Habsburg Monarchy.
Indeed, Seipel and other Austrian conservatives were perhaps more easily able to 
dispense with the idea of Anschluß than other Austrian political factions because they 
looked to Austria’s past as part of the Habsburg state as an essential part of Austrian 
identity as a whole.  For them, Austria was not simply a German land which had been 
ruled by the Habsburgs, but rather had been the very core of great Catholic Empire which 
had served a valuable function in Central Europe.  Thus the conservatives did not 
advocate a narrow focus upon the issue of nationality alone as did Austrian German 
nationalists, or propose a vision of the German Volk as a participant in a wider socialist 
revolution as did the Social Democrats.  Rather, Austrian conservatives were able to 
embrace all of Austria’s Habsburg past, and envisioned modern Austria as the heir to the 
old Habsburg state’s centuries-old tradition of service to Catholic Christianity and 
Western civilization above and beyond the simple interests of the German Volk alone.  At 
the same time, however, Austrian conservatives argued that the old dynasty had never 
been in any sense an anti-German entity.  In fact, they asserted that the Habsburg state 
had done more to advance the position of the German Volk in Central Europe than any 
other single entity.
To be sure, the CSP’s earliest postwar statements about the Habsburg past did 
sometimes attempt to distance contemporary Austria from the legacy of the old 
Monarchy.  For example, in the Austrian National Assembly in 1919, Hauser argued that 
Austria should not be the sole party saddled with guilt for the wartime actions of the old 
Monarchy by the Entente powers.  He proclaimed that while Austrian Germans had 
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fulfilled their duty to the dynasty with bravery, they were not responsible for the 
Monarchy’s decision to enter the war.51
51Hauser, “Unser Friede! Die Kundgebung der Deutschösterreichischen Nationalversammlung in der 
Sitzung vom 7. Juni 1919,” 24-25.
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  Such statements appear to have been designed to secure a more favorable settlement in 
the postwar peace negotiations, however, and once Austrian conservatives realized that 
Entente would indeed blame Austria for the supposed sins of the old Habsburg state, they 
became more willing to embrace the legacy of the Monarchy.  Indeed, Straub argued as 
much in 1930, proclaiming that while Austria had been forced by the Entente powers to 
accept the blame for the war, nobody had forced Austrians to repudiate their great history 
as part of the multinational Habsburg state.  Straub thus issued a call to the Austrian 
people to reclaim their historical inheritance, a call which many conservatives were 
already heeding.52
Some of the ways in which the traditionalist Austrian right attempted to 
emphasize the continuity between the First Republic and the old Monarchy were purely 
symbolic.  For example, in 1928, the Christian Social government decided to replace the 
Austrian national anthem which had been adopted immediately after the fall of the 
Habsburg state.  That initial republican anthem had lyrics penned by the Social 
Democratic president of the Republic, Karl Renner, set to a totally different piece of 
music than the anthem used by the Monarchy.  In the place of the Renner anthem, the 
conservative government decided to use a new patriotic song which emphasized Austrian 
patriotism in much the same way Renner’s lyric had, but which also returned to the 
melody Joseph Haydn had composed for the old Habsburg anthem.53  The Social
52Straub, 16.
53Interestingly, the Haydn melody was also the basis for the “Deutschlandlied,” the national anthem of 
Germany, and the government was careful to warn Austrian schools not only to discontinue use of the 
previous republican anthem, but also to ensure that instructors and students did not instead sing the words 
to the German anthem, which of course had German nationalist connotations.  “Einführung der 
österreichischen Bundeshymne in den Schulen,” Verordnungsblatt für den Dienstbereich des 
Bundesministeriums für Unterricht (February 1, 1930), 33-4; “Einführung der österreichischen 
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Democrats were incensed, arguing that the Haydn melody was tainted by its association 
with dynastic rule, but the Christian Socials nonetheless made the change, explicitly 
emphasizing contemporary Austria’s continuity with the old Monarchy.54
Other conservative efforts to emphasize such continuity were even more explicit.  
Seipel himself regularly referred to the Habsburg state in his statements about 
contemporary Austria.  Indeed, Seipel had been part of the Monarchy’s last government, 
and had helped draft  Emperor Karl’s statement renouncing political power in 1918.  As 
Chancellor of the First Republic, Seipel acknowledged that this previous service to 
Monarchy before its collapse might cause some Austrian democrats to suspect him.  
Indeed, he proclaimed that he had sacrificed a great deal for the cause of the old 
multinational state, and would have given almost anything to preserve it.  Ultimately, 
however, he had failed, and he admitted that the Monarchy would never return.  Thus, 
Seipel in 1926 declared his dedication to the welfare of the German Volk and to the new 
Austrian Republic.55
Seipel’s new allegiances did not prevent him from admiring the old dynastic state, 
though, and he continually presented the Habsburg Monarchy as a model for the modern 
Austrian Republic.  Seipel argued that the Habsburg state had never been opposed to the 
German nation.  Rather, it had sought to keep order and to advance the cause of 
Christianity and the interests of all its subjects.  German Austrians living under the 
Habsburg scepter had never had any difficulty in cultivating their national interests while 
at the same time supporting the dynastic, supranational state.  Indeed, the existence of 
Bundeshymne in den Schulen,” Verordnungsblatt (February 15, 1930), 51.
54“Was machen wir zur Republikfeier?” Die Sozialistische Erziehung (1930): 211-12.
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national oppression in a supranational entity such as the Habsburg Monarchy was almost 
an impossibility because no one nation had really ever dominated the government.  To 
the contrary, all of the different national groups in old Austria had been free to pursue 
their own cultural and national interests under the protection of Habsburg rule.  
According to Seipel, Austrian Germans had played an important role in the great cultural 
work of the German Volk throughout the centuries.  Seipel admitted that some cultural 
movements, such as Baroque art, had involved all of old Austria’s Völker, but he argued 
that Austrian Germans had been part of a wider German culture which extended beyond 
the Monarchy’s borders.  That larger German culture had not included the dynastic state’s 
other subject nationalities, which had most often cultivated their own distinctive cultures.  
Seipel insisted that Austrian Germans had indeed been the cultural leaders of the 
Habsburg state, but at the same time had encouraged the Monarchy’s other nations to 
nurture their own cultural uniqueness.56
Spitzmüller, another former imperial official, agreed with Seipel about the 
positive characteristics of the old Monarchy, even if he also advocated Anschluß as the 
most realistic course for Austria in the post-Habsburg era.  Spitzmüller, writing in 1919, 
declared that, as an economic policy maker in the old Monarchy, he had always 
supported the ideal of a multinational Central European state under German leadership, 
and he lamented the Monarchy’s demise.  He argued that the Habsburgs had always 
served as the best protector of German interests in the region, and asserted that their state 
55Seipel, “Die erste Regierungs Erklärung,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 15-23.
56Seipel,“Die geisitige Grundlagen der Minderheitfrage,” “Probleme des deutschen Staates,” and 
“Österreich, wie es wirklich ist,” in Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts, 160-162; 286-288; 312-
324.
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essentially had represented a positive example for the European continent of how 
different national groups might cooperate for mutual benefit, rather than wasting their 
energies fighting with one another.  According to Spitzmüller, the rise of nationalistic 
politics during the nineteenth century had served to unravel the Monarchy’s benevolent 
multinational balance.  Spitzmüller harshly criticized the Czechs and especially the 
Magyars for abandoning the interests of the Habsburg state as a whole in order to pursue 
positions of privilege for their respective Völker.  He did not exempt the Austrian 
German nationalists of the late imperial era from his criticisms, however, and charged 
that they not only had rejected the Monarchy’s felicitous multinational ideals but also in 
fact had undermined the very imperial government which had served as the protector of 
the German Volk throughout Austria’s history.  Spitzmüller ultimately supported 
Anschluß not out of some idealistic attachment to the dream of German national unity, 
but rather because he believed that Austria could better serve as an advocate for German 
interests in Central Europe as part of a great-German state than it could as a small and 
relatively impotent independent entity surrounded by hostile neighbors.57
57Spitzmüller, 4-6, 27-41.
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Schmitz likewise presented a very positive view of the old Monarchy, and argued 
that its patriarchal oversight of a Catholic, multinational state at the heart of the European 
continent had provided the only conceivable model for peace in Europe in the future.  
Schmitz certainly acknowledged that the Habsburg dynasty had made its share of 
mistakes, and he particularly criticized Joseph II and his successors for attempting to 
centralize the Monarchy’s political structure at the expense of the regional diversity and 
freedom which had always been its greatest strength.  Indeed he argued that such 
centralization had actually weakened the imperial government by alienating the 
Monarchy’s various national groups and thus encouraging the sort of centrifugal 
nationalism which eventually had destroyed the Habsburg state in 1918.  Ultimately, 
however, old Austria’s strengths had outweighed its weaknesses in Schmitz’ opinion, and 
he argued that positive aspects of the Habsburgs’ multinational empire might be 
translated into a peaceful European confederation of states in the contemporary era.  
Schmitz asserted that even a small Austrian state still had a vital role to play in the 
forefront of such an enterprise, and he urged modern Austria to return to the values of 
understanding and cooperation among the Völker which had always represented the very 
essence of Habsburg rule.58
Other Austrian conservatives emphasized the continuity between contemporary 
Austria and the Habsburg Monarchy in their comments about individual Habsburg rulers.  
For example, a 1930 Reichspost article by Josefine Widmar on Maria Theresa 
emphasized the eighteenth-century Austrian empress’ “motherly” love for all of her 
subjects, regardless of their nationality, and presented her as a reform-minded and 
58Schmitz, 13-15, 35-40.
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devoutly Catholic ruler who, along with her son and successor, Joseph II, had helped 
move Austria into the modern age.  Indeed, Widmar argued that Maria Theresa’s 
example was relevant even in republican era, and urged modern Austrians to look back 
on her legacy with pride and gratitude.59
Similarly, the former imperial minister Max Hussarek presented Franz Josef, the 
Habsburg ruler of Austria from 1848 to 1916, as a pious, dedicated, and conscientious 
ruler who had embodied the best ideals of the Habsburg tradition.  Hussarek described 
Franz Joseph as the direct successor to other pragmatic and successful Habsburg rulers 
throughout Austrian history, such as Rudolph von Habsburg, the founder of the dynasty, 
Marie Theresa, and Karl V.  Hussarek also contrasted Franz Joseph’s dedication to the 
prosperity of all of the Monarchy’s nationalities and to the strength of the Austrian state 
with what he perceived as the endemic squabbling and irresponsibility of contemporary 
Austria’s political leaders in parliament, and argued that the Emperor’s love of the 
Austrian Fatherland and his willingness to make sacrifices for the greater good of the 
state provided a model for all contemporary Austrians.  Hussarek closed his reflections 
on Franz Joseph by arguing that the Habsburg ruler had been, “honorable as a man, great 
as a statesman, true to his duty as a ruler, and, above all, everything which providence 
and birth had called him to be: an emperor.”60
One figure who inspired a great deal of commentary from Austrian conservatives 
was the Monarchy’s last emperor, Karl, who had died in exile a little less than four years 
after relinquishing his throne.  Austrian conservatives reacted strongly to Karl’s death, 
59Josefine Widmar, “Die letzen Tage Maria Theresas,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 29, 1930, 3.
60Max Hussarek, “Franz Josef I.,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 21, 1926, 3.
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and indeed sometimes used melodramatic terms to describe his demise.  For example, an 
article  reporting Karl’s death in the Reichpost, the CSP’s daily newspaper, likened his 
life to a Greek tragedy, and bitterly lamented his sad fate.  The article denied that Karl 
had ever been the enemy of the Germany Volk that some critics had accused him of 
being, and instead asserted that the emperor had always worked for the welfare of all of 
his subjects, no matter what their nationality.  The piece portrayed Karl as a pious and 
dedicated man who had been martyred by the proponents of force-based politics, and 
even compared his death, allegedly due to the inhospitable climate of the island to which 
he had be exiled, to the murder of the last Romanov ruler and his family by the 
Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution of 1917.  Indeed, the author argued that the 
circumstances surrounding Karl’s demise constituted a “a disgrace.. . which will ring 
throughout the centuries.”  The article closed by noting that those who wished to truly 
serve the Austrian Republic ought to embrace the figure of Karl as part of Austria’s 
historical inheritance, and thus heal some of the political wounds which had troubled the 
new Austrian state.61  An accompanying biographical sketch in the same edition of the 
Reichspost described Karl’s studious nature and brave military service to the Monarchy 
during the war, and contrasted his characteristically Viennese friendliness with the strict 
formality of his imperial predecessor, Franz Joseph.  The piece also noted that in the last 
days of his reign Karl had been concerned not with his own fate, but rather with the plight 
of his people, who had been so devastatingly affected by four years of war.62
Ten years later the positive conservative view of Karl had not changed at all.  
61“Tod in der Verbannung,” Reichspost (Vienna), April 2, 1922, 1.
62“Aus dem Leben Kaiser Karls,” Reichspost (Vienna), April 2, 1922, 1-4.  See also Spitzmüller, 21.
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Writing in the Reichspost, Karl Zetzner-Spitzenberg described the last Habsburg as an 
ardent Catholic, who had worked toward the cause of peace and reconciliation between 
the Völker of Europe.  In fact, according to Zetzner-Spitzenberg, Karl had been the only 
figure besides Pope Benedict XV who had truly proven himself to be dedicated to the 
idea of a negotiated peace based upon understanding between the warring powers, rather 
than one founded on vengeance.63 The monarchist writer and politician Wilhelm Schmid 
used similar religious language to describe Karl, and indeed referred to the manner of his 
death as “biblical,” drawing an implicit parallel between Karl’s largely thankless 
sacrifices for his Fatherland and the martyrdom of Jesus and his apostles.64  Above all, 
conservatives portrayed Karl as something of a symbol of the centuries of Habsburg rule 
in Austria, and they defended his reputation after his death with the same vigor with 
which they defended the legacy of the Monarchy as whole.  In their minds Karl 
represented the inextricable bond between Austria’s past and its ruling dynasty.  As one 
conservative wrote, “In the young Habsburg there lived, despite everything, a belief in 
the mission of this wondrous creation [the old Monarchy], to which in glory and pain the 
fate of his House was linked.”65
Given their lingering affection for the Habsburg state, and their suspicions 
regarding democratic rule, conservatives described the Republic which had replaced the 
old Monarchy in ambiguous terms.  For example, Austrian conservatives commenting on 
the tenth anniversary of the birth of the First Republic displayed decidedly mixed feelings 
about the new Austrian state.  While these commentators did indeed argue that the new 
63Karl Zetzner-Spitzenberg, “Kaiser Karl zum Gedanken,” Reichspost (Vienna), April 1, 1932, 1-2.
64Wilhelm Schmid, Gross österreichische Gemeinschaft (Vienna: Vaterland-Bücherei, 1930), 10.
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Republic had accomplished a great deal in the face of severe hardships, and professed 
their hopes for a brighter future for their homeland, they also found the occasion 
melancholy.  As one conservative writing for the Reichspost, noted, November 11 
marked the “the death day of old Austria [as well as] the birthday of the new.”66  Another 
writer remarked that the birth of the First Republic could not be separated from the 
catastrophic circumstances which had accompanied its founding, including the demise of 
the Monarchy and the forcible separation of German Austrians from their national 
brethren in the Empire’s successor states.67
A number of figures on the Austrian right indeed argued that the tenth anniversary 
was being used by the Social Democrats to advance their own Marxist agenda, rather 
than to celebrate the loyalty of the Austrian people to their Fatherland.  These writers 
noted that despite the Socialists’ attempts to portray the foundation of the First Republic 
as the result of a social and national “revolution” against the dynasty, the Monarchy had 
in fact only ended because of its defeat in World War I.  Indeed, one Christian Social 
writer even charged that the Social Democrats had in fact aided the cause of Austria’s 
enemies with their bitter criticisms of Habsburg rule during the last years of the war.  The 
new Republic was, in the eyes of conservatives, best seen as an heir to the old dynastic 
state, and not a revolutionary new creation which had been forged by the Austrian left.  
For conservative writers, the aspect of the new state which was most appropriate to 
celebrate was not the fact that it was a republic, but rather the fact that it was still the 
65“Tod in der Verbannung,” Reichspost (Vienna), April 2, 1922, 1.
66“O Heimat!” Reichspost (Vienna), November 11, 1928, 1-2. 
67“Gedanken,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 11, 1928, 1-2. 
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Austrian Fatherland, just as it had been under Habsburg rule.68
Several conservatives even emphasized the continuity between the old Monarchy 
and the new state to such a degree that they argued that the roots of the First Republic lay 
as much with the Emperor Karl’s October, 1918 plan for a federal reorganization of the 
Monarchy, which would have awarded a measure of political autonomy to the state’s 
major national groups, as it did with his actual renunciation of power.  As usual, Seipel 
led the way in making these arguments.  He asserted that the modern Austrian state had 
really begun when Karl had, for the first time since the Middle Ages, designated the 
German-speaking lands of the Monarchy as a single political unit in his federal scheme.  
The creation of the new republican government on November 11 and the signing of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain in 1919 had completed the creation of modern Austria, but 
Seipel stated quite clearly that he saw the initial impetus toward Austrian statehood in 
Karl’s plan.69
Other conservatives made similar arguments.  For example, a 1922 Reichpost 
article asserted that the Karl’s plan had been a “warm-hearted invitation to his people to 
collaborate in the rebuilding of the state,” and argued that had these measures been 
implemented but one year earlier, the catastrophic collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy 
might have been avoided.  Even as a failed attempt to save the larger multinational state, 
however, Karl’s federal plan had been, according to the article’s author, throughly in line 
with Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” and had essentially reorganized the 
Monarchy on the basis of national autonomy and popular sovereignty, the same concepts 
68Ibid., 1- 2; Ernst Streerwitz, “Tradition und Zukunftswille,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 11, 1928, 3; 
“Dissonanzen an die Staatsfeiertag,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 13, 1928, 1.
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expressed in the First Republic’s constitution.70  Hussarek likewise emphasized Karl’s 
attempt to federalize the Monarchy, and noted that the dynasty had in fact been part of 
the movement to transform Austria rather than an opponent of reform.71  Indeed, it seems 
that many on the traditional Austrian right tried to portray the last Habsburg ruler as one 
of the founders of the Austrian First Republic, rather than the last obstacle to its creation.
The most radical Austrian conservatives, however, denied that the First Republic 
had ever been a good idea.  For example, Wilhelm Schmid, the leader of a small faction 
of Austrian monarchists, published a pamphlet in 1930 which argued for the 
reestablishment of Habsburg rule in Austria.  Schmid argued that contemporary Austria 
had lost its faith in its own identity and character, and had fallen prey to the rampant 
selfishness and individualism implicit in a republican state.  He bitterly denounced the 
Social Democrats, and argued that Austria needed to return to its roots in sincere and 
fervent Catholicism and dynastic monarchy.  He repudiated democracy itself in favor of 
an authoritarian state, just as he denounced both nationalism and capitalism.  Indeed, 
Schmid vigorously opposed Anschluß, and saw union with Germany as move which 
would subject Austria to a foreign people and culture, and which would represent “a final 
breach with our past.”72  Certainly most conservatives did not go as far as did Schmid in 
his total rejection of democracy and Anschluß, or in his call for an actual Habsburg 
restoration, but they did at least agree with him that the Habsburg Monarchy had been a 
positive force in the history of Europe and had represented the best qualities of the 
69Seipel,“Das neue Österreich,” 308; “Österreich, wie es wirklich ist,” 312.
70“Aus dem Leben Kaiser Karls,” Reichspost, (Vienna), April 2, 1922, 1-4.




Austrian Conservatives and the “Austrian Mission.”
Another way in which Austrian conservatives attempted to emphasize the link 
between contemporary Austria and the Habsburg past was by proposing the existence of 
an “Austrian mission” which had motivated the policies of the Habsburgs during 
Austria’s past, and which continued to be a relevant concept even in the present.  As we 
shall see, the notion of an Austrian mission was to be an enduring feature in the rhetoric 
of those individuals, and especially of those conservatives who supported Austrian 
independence, and this idea invariably served to define the ways in which Austrians 
differed from other German-speakers.  Various conservatives described the Austrian 
mission in a variety of ways, but most of them identified two complementary but distinct 
historical “functions” for Austria.  The first element of the Austrian mission involved the 
old Austrian state’s role as the defender of either the German Volk or Western civilization 
as a whole from military invasions from the east.  The Austrian mission’s second aspect 
emphasized Austria’s function in facilitating cooperation between the various national 
groups of Central Europe, and in encouraging the cultural development of the region’s 
non-German nationalities.  Conservatives employed this second facet of the Austrian 
mission to emphasize the paternalistic role Austrian German-speakers had played in 
helping the other, supposedly less advanced Völker of the Habsburg lands to enhance 
their cultural and material prosperity.  Individual conservatives might refer to one or the 
other of these aspects of the Austrian mission, but the two elements frequently appeared 
72Schmid, 1-19.
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together, and were often proposed by these commentators as complementary Austrian 
functions.  Invariably, the notion of an Austrian mission depended heavily upon 
references to the Habsburg dynasty and the old imperial state, which had overseen and 
guided Austria’s attempts to fulfill its supposed historical role throughout the centuries.73
Schmitz was one of the most forceful conservative proponents of the second 
aspect of the Austrian mission during the First Republic.  He used the idea of a special 
Austrian European mission to make the argument that Austrians were different from 
other Germans, and especially from Prussians, and thus should not regard Anschluß as a 
desirable goal.   Schmitz’ basic argument revolved around the frequent accusation that 
Austrians lacked efficiency and competence (Tüchtigkeit) in comparison to their north 
German neighbors.  While this charge was usually meant to denigrate the Austrian 
character, Schmitz never disputed its validity.  Rather, he argued that Austrians possessed 
other characteristic virtues which were in fact far more valuable than Prussian or north 
German Tüchtigkeit.  Schmitz argued that too often the vaunted north German passion for 
efficiency had found its ultimate expression in violence and brutal wars of conquest. For 
Schmitz the real genius of the Austrian people derived from their very lack of such 
passionate efficiency, and from their “softness” in comparison to the Prussians’ drive to 
impose their own will on any given situation.  Austria’s real talent, Schmitz argued, had 
always lain in its willingness to understand the cultures which surrounded it, and to build 
bridges between the German culture of the West and the other cultures of the East.  The 
valuable transmission of German culture which Austria achieved had been made possible 
73The figures who made these arguments variously used the German terms “Aufgabe,” “Sendung ,” or 
“Mission” to describe Austria’s historical function in Central Europe.  In this context, the sense of all three 
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by the Austrian people’s willingness to adapt to new circumstances, and to react 
creatively, rather than attempting to bludgeon their way toward a preconceived plan in 
the Prussian manner.  In essence, Austria’s lack of Tüchtigkeit gave it a more gentle, 
yielding outlook which had allowed it to be a successful cultural bridge builder, and 
indeed had made Austria the “heart of Europe.”  According to Schmitz, Austria’s unique 
gifts made it the birthplace of the “pan-national idea” of various peoples working 
together within the framework of a state for their mutual benefit.74
Schmitz also asserted, however, that Austria in the modern era had lost 
confidence in its own character and mission.  During the Great War, Austria’s better 
understanding of affairs meant that its leaders had known far earlier than Prussia that the 
conflict was unwinnable, yet Austria’s doubts about its lack of Tüchtigkeit had lured it to 
follow Prussia’s lead anyway.  Schmitz argued that once the Monarchy collapsed, Austria 
lost some of its traditional culture, so that contemporary Austrian life, especially in 
Vienna, now seemed to resemble the hectic, characterless pace of Prussian or even 
American society.  Yet Schmitz had confidence that Austria could find its way back to its 
traditional values.  Ultimately, he foresaw a new a Central European block arising to take 
the place of the old Monarchy, in which Austria would play a vital role as the core of a 
“United States of Europe,” delivering the continent from its endemic wars and 
bloodshed.75
According to Schmitz, the one circumstance which Austria had to avoid at all 
costs was Anschluß with Germany.  Such a move would have the effect of diluting 
of these words is best represented by the English word “mission.”
74Schmitz, 7-13.
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Austria’s unique character, perhaps permanently, and of making the Austrian people just 
a small body of German-speakers within a characterless great-German Reich.  Austria’s 
real destiny lay not with Germany, but rather in its old role as a bridge builder, which 
could make Vienna the very heart of Europe once more.  Ultimately, for Schmitz, Austria 
had to return to the traditions which had made the old Monarchy so great: its Catholicism, 
its talent for understanding other Völker, and its felicitous blending of aristocratic and 
peasant culture.76
Other conservative intellectuals used both aspects of the Austrian mission in their 
arguments.  As usual, Seipel was at the forefront of these discussions, arguing that the 
“eastern mission” which the old Monarchy pursued for so long had not ended.  Seipel 
asserted that the Austrian Republic could not afford to simply orient itself toward its 
German neighbor to the north; it needed to continue the efforts which had been begun by 
the Habsburgs to spread the benefits of German culture to the other Völker to the east and 
south.  He assured his audience that Austria would not alienate northern Germans through 
such activities.  One the contrary, such efforts were in the interests of the entire German 
Volk, and constituted a duty  which only Austria could perform for the German nation.77
Seipel also emphasized the defensive function which the Austrian had played as well, 
noting that in the past, Austria had served as a barrier to Islamic expansion into Europe 
and had helped to move Hungary and parts of the Balkans into the cultural circle of 
Christian Europe.  Austria continued to serve a similar function even after 1918, as it 
75Ibid., 1- 7, 63-68.
76Ibid., 1- 7, 63-68.
77Seipel, Die Aufgaben der deutschen Hochschule in Österreich gegenüber dem deutschen Volke, 11-12.
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helped to prevent the spread of Bolshevism into Central Europe.78
Hussarek, the former imperial minister, presented a similar vision of a dual 
Austrian mission in 1926.  Hussarek remarked that the old Monarchy had created a zone 
of peace and prosperity in Central Europe which had served both to turn back “Asian 
barbarism” and to ensure the spread of Christian culture to the peoples of the region.  
According to Hussarek, this double mission had been implicit in the Holy Roman 
Imperial crown which the Habsburgs had worn for so many centuries, and had resulted in 
dynastic rule in the Habsburg lands, serving the good of the entire continent, rather than 
just the narrow interests of the German Volk.79 Straub agreed, arguing that the old 
Monarchy had served to transmit the classical and Christian ideals of the West eastward 
even as it stood as a shield against eastern “unculture.”  He noted that Austria’s service to 
the region had been necessary, even if modern German nationalists had given the state 
little credit for its efforts, and he argued that contemporary Austria needed to pursue its 
historic mission by cultivating ties with the Monarchy’s other successor states while 
standing as a barrier against the expansion of Bolshevism.80
Thus many conservatives used the notion of Austrian mission to proclaim 
Austrian uniqueness, and to offer visions of the appropriate role of an independent 
Austrian state in Europe.  Such statements were part of an broader tendency among 
Austrian conservatives to emphasize the continuity between the modern Austrian state 
and the Habsburg Monarchy, and to invoke the memory of the Habsburg past in order to 
bolster their arguments regarding the best course for Austria in the present.  While 
78Seipel, “Österreich, wie es wirklich ist,” 316.
79Hussarek, “Franz Josef I.,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 21, 1926, 3-4.
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Austrian conservatives were initially just as vehement as the First Republic’s other 
political factions in calling for Anschluß, their ardor for a union with Germany cooled 
relatively quickly.  The conservative right for the most part never really denied that 
Austrians were Germans, but rather argued that they represented a special variety of 
Germanness thanks to their long historical experience within the Habsburg’s 
multinational Catholic state.   Thus most Austrian conservatives quickly made peace with 
the notion of Austrian independence, which they saw as the best way to preserve the 
traditions and historical heritage which modern Austria had inherited from the Habsburg 
state.  The First Republic’s other two major political factions, however, disagreed sharply 
with the conservatives regarding Austrian national identity and the legacy of Habsburg 
rule.
ii. The Social Democratic Party and the Habsburg Past in the First Republic
The Austrian Social Democratic Party, like the Christian Social Party, was a 
political organization which the First Republic inherited from the Habsburg Monarchy.  
The Party had been founded as a union of various socialist and labor groups at a meeting 
in the Austrian city of Hainfeld in 1889 under the leadership of Viktor Adler.  From that 
point, the Social Democrats quickly became one of the leading political factions in the 
German-speaking regions of the Monarchy.  The Party was, of course, profoundly 
influenced by the writings of Marx and Engels and served as the major advocate for 
Marxist ideology within the Habsburg state.  The Social Democrats were always 
nominally dedicated to the notion of a revolutionary seizure of power by the Austrian 
working class, but, like Social Democratic parties throughout Europe, they attempted to 
80Straub, 20-31.
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achieve that dramatic change through peaceful, democratic means, rather than through a 
violent proletarian uprising.  Likewise, the Party’s leaders railed against what they saw as 
the repressive and exploitative tendencies of the Monarchy’s dynastic government in 
their rhetoric, but at the same time were willing to pursue its program of reform within 
the bounds of that very government.  Thus, the Social Democratic Party worked patiently 
for a variety of political and social reforms in late imperial Austria such as universal 
suffrage, improved working conditions, trade union rights, and various state-sponsored 
social welfare programs.81
The Social Democrats did not limit their activities to the campaign for practical 
reforms, however.  The Party also included a group of notable Marxist intellectuals, 
including Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and Max Adler, collectively known as the “Austro-
Marxists,” who produced a body of distinguished theoretic work which discussed 
sociology, science, law, and nationalism from a Marxist perspective and which garnered 
attention not just in Habsburg Austria but throughout the European continent.  While the 
Austro-Marxists were always socialist thinkers first and foremost, their ideas also were 
influenced profoundly by the vibrant intellectual environment of late-imperial Vienna, 
and particularly by Austrian neo-Kantianism, the scientific positivism of Ernst Mach, and 
the economic ideas of the so-called “Vienna Circle.”82  While Viktor Adler himself did 
not live to see the end of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of the First 
Republic, Bauer, Renner and Max Adler did, and they provided the Social Democratic 
81Wandruszka, 423-431; Jelavich, 162-173; Melanie A. Sully, “Social Democracy and the Political Culture 
of the First Republic,” in The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social Democracy and Austromarxism, 1918-
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82Tom Bottomore, “Introduction,” in Austro-Marxism, ed. and trans. Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode 
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Party with  leadership which was as interested in theoretical matters as it was with 
practical parliamentary maneuvering.
During the years of the Austrian First Republic, the Social Democrats’ political 
platform preserved the policies and goals which the Party had set out for itself during the 
last years of imperial rule.  The Social Democrats remained committed to progress 
toward a socialist society through peaceful and democratic means, and they were the 
staunchest supporters of Austrian democracy of all of Austria’s political parties.  Some of 
the Party’s previous aims, such as full suffrage and a political system based upon the 
ideal of popular sovereignty, had been achieved in 1918.  The Social Democrats were not 
satisfied with these successes, however, but rather sought to build upon them in order to 
craft a still more perfect and just society.  The Party’s “Action Program” of 1919 and its 
“Linz Program” of 1926 laid out the ideals to which the Social Democrats dedicated 
themselves: expanded social welfare programs for Austrian workers, freely available 
education for all Austrian citizens, women’s rights, the separation of Church and state, 
and the protection of the rights of national minorities in Austria and abroad.  The Party 
also pledged itself, in good Marxist style, to fight against the forces of capitalism, 
imperialism, and militarism in Austrian society.83  The Social Democratic Party’s agenda 
was of course in almost total opposition to that of the Christian Social Party, and the 
conflict between the two political groups only became more heated and fractious as they 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 1-43; William M. Johnston, The Austrian Mind, An Intellectual and 
Social History, 1848-1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 99-114.
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each sought to achieve their goals during the First Republic.
The leaders of the Social Democratic Party greeted the end of the Habsburg 
Monarchy with applause, and saw the establishment of a democratic government as a 
great victory for the forces of progress in Austria.  The Social Democrats were firm 
proponents of Anschluß, however, and were dismayed when the Entente powers refused 
to allow an Austrian union with Germany.  The Party’s leaders regarded Austrians as 
Germans who possessed no national identity apart from the German nation, and they 
argued that Austria’s destiny was to become part of a great-German socialist republic 
which would safeguard the interests of the entire German working class.  The Social 
Democratic leadership portrayed the Habsburg Monarchy as an oppressive entity which 
had not only sought to keep its working class in a state of perpetual economic bondage, 
but which also had frustrated the national aspirations of all of its constituent nationalities 
in order to preserve the political power of the House of Habsburg and its allies in the old 
nobility, the Church, and the Austrian bourgeoisie.  In contrast to this vision of the 
Monarchy as an agent of social, political and national subjugation, the Social Democrats 
presented their own historical counter-narrative which emphasized the working class and 
its Marxist leadership as the only real proponents of progress and justice in Austria’s 
past.  Thus, the Social Democratic Party cast the Habsburgs as the villains of Austrian 
history and argued that the fall of the Monarchy and the establishment of democracy in 
Austria in 1918 represented a positive but intermediate step on the road to German 
national unity in the form of a peaceful and socialist great-German republic.
The Social Democratic Party and Austrian National Identity
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Like all of the First Republic’s other political parties, the Social Democratic Party 
announced its support for union with Germany immediately after the fall of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.  The Social Democrats’ first political platform of the Republican era, the 
Action Program of 1919, declared that the Party sought Anschluß as soon as possible with 
Germany, and the document even contained a provision which recommended that the 
organization lay the ground work for an anticipated merger with the German Social 
Democratic Party.   Unlike the Christian Social Party, however, the Social Democrats’ 
enthusiasm for Anschluß did not wane after the stabilization of the First Republic.  The 
Party’s Linz Program of 1926 retained the call for Anschluß with Germany through 
peaceful means.  Indeed the Party’s official commitment to an Austrian union with 
Germany remained a part of the Party’s platform until the Nazi seizure of power in 
Germany in 1933, and even then most Social Democrats still hoped for an eventual 
Anschluß once the Third Reich fell, as they believed it inevitably would.84
The Social Democrats based their call for Anschluß upon their firm stance that 
Austrian German-speakers were part of the German Volk, and thus properly belonged in a 
German state with their national brethren.  The Party’s two most prominent leaders, Otto 
Bauer and Karl Renner, both proclaimed their belief in Austrian Germanness in no 
uncertain terms.  Bauer argued that all of Austria’s recent history had revolved around the 
conflict between the German national feeling of Austrian Germans and their loyalty to 
the Habsburg state.  With the collapse of the old Monarchy, however, Bauer asserted that 
84“Das Aktionsprogramm des Verbandes sozialdemokratischer Abgeordneter, 1919,”  “Das ‘Linzer 
Programm’ der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Österreichs, 1926," and “Der Parteitag der 
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Austrians were simply a part of the larger German nation, even if they were kept apart 
from the rest of their Volk by the hegemonic interests of the Western capitalist powers.85
Renner agreed, and argued that the old Austrian state had never been a nation in its own 
right, but rather had represented a collection of various different nations living in a 
political union with one another.   He noted that, even within the confines of this 
multinational empire, Austrians had always been Germans, and that Vienna had for many 
centuries been the capital of the German Reich as well as of the Habsburgs’ own lands.  
The separation between Austria and Germany had been a recent phenomenon which 
Renner dated to Austria’s exclusion from Bismarck’s German unification movement in 
1866.   With the end of the Monarchy, Austrians had to decide their own national destiny, 
which he argued lay in the form of a union with Germany.  As he proclaimed in 1930, 
“We [Austrians] are a great tribe of the great German nation, no more, but also no less!”86
The stance of these two Austro-Marxist leaders in favor of Anschluß after1918 is 
interesting considering the fact that both men had produced plans for the reorganization 
and improvement of the Habsburgs’ multinational state before the Monarchy had ended.  
Austro-Marxism had always been unique among European Socialist factions in its 
acceptance of national liberty as part of the wider cause of socialism.  The Social 
Democrats’ Brünn Program of 1899 had recognized the legitimacy of the claims of the 
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Monarchy’s various Völker for national rights and had urged federal reform along 
national lines within the Habsburg state at a time when most Marxists in Europe 
dismissed nationalism as a weapon used by the bourgeoisie to divide the international 
working class.87  Indeed, both Bauer and Renner had, during the last decades of the 
Habsburg era, recognized the old Monarchy’s multinational character as one of its most 
positive features, and had argued then for national reform within the old state rather than 
for that state’s dismemberment and a subsequent Austrian union with Germany.  Both 
Bauer’s The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy, published in 1907, and 
Renner’s The Struggle of the Austrian Nationalities for the State, published in 1902, 
envisioned a reorganized federal Habsburg Monarchy in which representation would be 
determined according to a given nationality’s proportion of the state’s population, rather 
than on the basis of territorial divisions.88  Neither Austro-Marxist leader advocated 
Anschluß while the Monarchy still existed.
Both men recognized that their new position regarding a German union might be 
construed as a change in their overall ideology, but they argued that circumstances had 
changed dramatically after the fall of the Monarchy.  Renner thought that the Social 
Democrats’ position on Austrian nationhood had always been misunderstood, and he 
noted that German nationalists during the last decades of the Monarchy had accused the 
Party of “national treason,” because of the Socialists’ dedication to the reform of the 
national, social, and political organization of the old state.  The dynasty and its 
87Kann, 436; Okey, 308; Schlomo Avineri, “Marxism and Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History
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supporters, on the other hand, had charged that the Social Democrats were German 
nationalists without loyalty to the Habsburg state because of the Socialists’ persistent 
dedication to the international German workers’ movement.  In reality, according to 
Renner, the Socialists’ stance had always been consistent.  They had supported the rights 
of all nationalities while at the same time maintaining a focus upon the cause of Austrian 
working class as a part of the German proletariat as a whole. The Socialists had 
advocated this position with equal zeal both before and after 1918.  Renner proclaimed 
that the Socialists were dedicated to the cause of democracy and social justice, and that 
national rights, including those of the German Volk, were a part of that cause.89    Bauer 
agreed, noting that the Social Democrats’ stance was, above all, a pragmatic one, and that 
the Party had always sought the means which might best serve the interests of the 
Austrian working class, whether through reform within a multinational state or 
Anschluß.90
The Social Democrats always drew a clear distinction between their own 
conception of Austrian Germanness and that of other Austrian German nationalists.  
Bauer defined the nation as a “the totality of men bound together through a common 
destiny into a community of character,” and identified language, culture, and history as 
the chief traits which served to tie members of the nation together.91  Apart from his 
repudiation of race as an element of nationhood, Bauer’s definition was not especially 
different from those proposed by German nationalists who were not affiliated with the 
um der Staat (Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1902).
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Social Democratic Party.  Yet the Social Democrats did not regard the nation or the 
interests of any one national group as ends in themselves.  Rather, they argued that the 
right to national self determination was something which had to be pursued in the context 
of Marxism’s wider crusade for the rights of the international working class.  Thus, the 
Party’s stance regarding Austrian national identity always placed the ideal of German 
national unity alongside such other Social Democratic ideals as internationalism, 
pacifism, and support for democratic government. 
Party leaders argued that the Socialist theory of the nation was far removed from 
chauvinistic, bourgeois nationalism which inevitably led to conflict between national 
groups.  Indeed, many Social Democratic commentators asserted that bourgeois German 
nationalism had caused the recent cataclysmic war.92   Social Democrats eschewed such 
chauvinism in favor of  more peaceful, cosmopolitan national ideals.  As one 1932 article 
in a Social Democratic pedagogical journal argued, Socialism denied “nationalism” as a 
conspiracy of the greedy bourgeoisie, which stood to profit from war, even as it embraced 
“the nation” as a valuable and natural aspect of human life.93  By the early 1930s, the 
Party was particularly concerned with the rise of National Socialism in Germany and 
Austria, and took pains to specifically repudiate the Nazis’ racial and militaristic vision of 
national identity as well.94  According to the Social Democrats, the Marxist view of the 
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nation as a necessary part of larger internationalist order of peace and social justice 
provided the only ideological means through which Austrians might achieve Anschluß
without triggering another horrific European war.
The Social Democratic Party’s call for Anschluß was also in part based upon more 
pragmatic concerns.  Just as other Austrian proponents of union with Germany during the 
First Republic argued that an independent Austria was economically unviable, so too did 
Social Democratic leaders assert that the new Austrian state was simply too small to 
survive on its own once it had been severed from the other more economically developed 
regions of the old Monarchy.  At a 1919 meeting of the Austrian National Assembly, 
Bauer presented a litany of reasons why Austria could not survive on its own, including 
the allegedly unfair and insuperable reparations which the Entente powers had foisted 
upon the First Republic, the flood of impoverished refugees from the other regions of the 
old Monarchy who were totally dependent upon the support of the Austrian government, 
and the confiscation of vital German Austrian property and resources by the governments 
of the other successor states.  Bauer argued that Austria was simply in no position to meet 
all of the obligations which it had been forced to assume, or even to sustain its own 
existence, and he cautioned the world that a nationally resentful and economically 
oppressed Austria could become the incubator for another European war in much the 
same way that circumstances in a similarly disadvantaged Serbian state had served as the 
spark which set off the First World War in 1914.95
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Yet Bauer also clearly stated that Austrian Social Democrats did not merely hope 
for Anschluß, but rather envisioned an Austrian union with Germany under the auspices 
of a socialist, republican government.  Indeed, Bauer noted in 1927 that such an outcome 
for the German Volk might only be possible once the imperialistic, bourgeois regimes in 
France and Italy, which had prevented Anschluß for so long, had been replaced by 
socialist governments which would allow the principles of justice and national self 
determination to truly apply throughout Europe, and not merely to serve the interests of 
the capitalists in the west.96  Ultimately, the Austrian Social Democratic Party did not 
support a union with Germany for the sake of an idealized vision of national unity, but 
rather because they thought such a step was both economically necessary for Austria and 
an important part of the progress of history toward a more just and democratic socialist 
order.
Social Democratic Portrayals of the Habsburg Monarchy
In making their arguments regarding Austria’s bright future as part of a socialist 
great German Republic, the Social Democrats also invariably portrayed Austria’s 
Habsburg past as a bitter story of exploitation and subjugation for the workers and 
nations of Central Europe, and they celebrated the collapse of the Habsburg dynasty’s 
power in 1918 as a positive achievement for the region.  For the Social Democrats, the 
House of Habsburg simply was the enemy of progress in Austrian history.  Whether 
standing alongside the Austrian aristocracy and the Catholic Church as the chief 
proponent of a feudal, agrarian social order during the early modern period, or working in 
96Bauer, “Drei Gruppen in Anschlußlager,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), July 7, 1927.
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a close alliance with the Austrian bourgeoisie to support the growth of capitalism during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, the dynasty which had dominated the Austrian 
lands for so long had always been a reactionary, oppressive entity.  Party leaders argued 
that any progress for the downtrodden majority during the imperial era had occurred
despite the efforts of the Habsburgs rather than because of them.  Thus, the Social 
Democrats viewed 1918 as the point when the cruel Habsburg yoke had finally been 
thrown off, and they portrayed the birth of the First Republic as a clean break with the 
Habsburg past and a fresh start for the Austrian working class.  They also opposed any 
plan for postwar Central Europe which invoked the legacy of the Habsburg past, whether 
explicitly or implicitly.
Most Socialist commentators argued that the old Monarchy was an oppressive 
institution which had consistently worked against the interests of the working class and of 
the various subject national groups which lived under the Habsburg scepter.  From their 
first seizure of authority in Austria during the medieval period to their brutal suppression 
of political, social, and national liberty during the Revolutions of 1848 to their 
participation in the imperialist competition which had triggered the First World War, the 
Habsburgs and their agents invariably appeared in Social Democratic accounts as the 
enemies of justice, freedom, and progress in Austrian history.97  While most Socialist 
commentators focused upon the dynasty’s role in supporting the unjust feudal and 
capitalistic social order, many Social Democrats also assailed the Habsburgs’ role in 
thwarting the national aspirations of their various subject Völker.  One 1932 Socialist 
97See for example, Bauer, “Habsburg vor den Toren,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 23, 1921, 1-
2; Emil Strauß, “Die nationale Revolution in Deutschböhmen 1848,” Der Kampf 20 (January, 1927): 31-37; 
78
article referred to the Habsburg Monarchy as a “Völkerkerker” (prison house of the 
peoples), while Renner and Bauer both remarked upon the manner in which the House of 
Habsburg had stood in the way of German unification during the nineteenth century in 
order to further its own dynastic interests.98
Indeed, Bauer argued that the Habsburgs were by no means unique in their 
opposition to national liberty, but rather represented typical dynastic rulers who 
oppressed their subjects in order to maintain their own political power.  Bauer placed the 
Habsburgs alongside the Hohenzollerns of Prussia and the Romanovs of Russia in the 
ranks of royal houses which had opposed the rights of national minorities.  According to 
Bauer, the Habsburgs were no better and no worse than any other European imperial 
dynasty; their oppressive habits were simply inherent in the monarchical system which 
had served to subjugate Europe’s lower classes throughout the centuries.99  In a 1930 
article in the Socialist monthly Der Kampf, the young Social Democratic (and later 
Communist) intellectual Ernst Fischer took Bauer’s analysis even further, arguing that 
capitalism in the era after 1918 actually functioned as a sort of analogue to absolutist 
monarchy which robbed even the bourgeoisie of the valuable liberal achievements which 
it had managed to gain during the early capitalist era.  Fischer’s rather unorthodox 
argument was quickly corrected in a subsequent issue of Der Kampf by Heinrich Soffner, 
who reminded him that capitalism was the creation of the bourgeoisie and always served 
their interests, but Fischer’s comment still illustrates the manner in which the very notion 
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of monarchy could easily be associated with all forms of oppression in the minds of 
Austrian Socialists.100
Social Democrats also frequently attacked the Habsburg Monarchy by blaming it 
for the Great War.  At the 1919 meeting of the Austrian National Assembly, Friedrich 
Adler vigorously denounced the Entente powers for forcing the workers of German 
Austria to accept the blame for the destructive conflict which the deposed Habsburgs had 
begun with the help of the bourgeoisie.101  Another Social Democratic commentator, 
Anton Tesarek, noted that all war occurred because of injustice, and that the Austrian 
emperor, as the head of an unjust order, could never extricate his state from the 
devastating war which he had helped start.  Only a republican revolution led by the 
workers’ movement had the ability to achieve such an end.102  Socialist leaders generally 
exonerated both the workers and the Party itself of any blame for the conflict, and they 
argued that the dynasty and its government had led the old state into the conflagration 
which had ultimately consumed it, with the new Republic left to deal with the 
consequences of Habsburg mistakes.103
The Social Democrats obviously greeted the demise of the Habsburg Monarchy 
and the creation of the First Republic as a triumph for the Austrian working class, and the 
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Party’s leaders did their best to ensure that the new Republic was cleansed of all vestiges 
of the old dynastic state.  The Party’s first postwar program stated in no uncertain terms 
the Socialists’ support for republican rule and popular sovereignty, and demanded that 
the new Austrian government declare that the House of Habsburg was deposed in Austria 
for all time.  It likewise called for the new Republic to abandon its use of Habsburg 
imperial symbols, to cease granting titles of nobility, to confiscate the property of the 
dynasty in Austria, and to punish any citizens found to be working for Habsburg 
restoration.104  The prominent Party intellectual, Max Adler, stated the basic Socialist 
view on the demise of dynasty in particularly passionate terms in 1919:
And above all, the Socialist proletariat must leave no one in doubt that for us the 
Habsburgs belong to the ranks of the dead, and we will throw anyone else to the 
dead who wishes to put them or any other contenders upon the throne.  We would 
rather perish in our own defense than to endure such a disgrace ever again.105
The Social Democrats viewed the end of the House of Habsburg’s rule in Central Europe 
as a positive achievement for the working class, and they dedicated themselves to 
ensuring that the dynasty would never return to power.
The Party was not completely satisfied with the state of affairs after the dynasty’s 
collapse.  As we have seen, the Social Democrats were indignant that Austrian Germans 
had not been allowed the same right to national self determination as the old Monarchy’s 
other nationalities, and indeed many Socialist commentators accused the Entente powers 
of replicating some of the worst aspects of the Habsburg state in their postwar redrawing 
of the territorial boundaries of Central Europe.  In 1919, Friedrich Adler angrily 
104“Das Aktionsprogramm des Verbandes sozialdemokratischer Abgeordneter, 1919,” 233.
105Max Adler, “Zum 12. November,” Der Kampf 12 (November, 1919): 746.
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denounced the Entente’s refusal to allow Austria to proceed with Anschluß, and he 
accused Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Italy of adopting the Habsburgs’ imperialistic 
methods in order to seize German Austrian territory and oppress the German people.106
That same year Bauer criticized the governments of two of Austria’s neighbors for 
claiming territories inhabited by German national majorities, arguing that 
Czechoslovakia’s seizure of the Sudetenland and German Bohemia, and Italy’s 
annexation of South Tyrol, all regions with sizable German-speaking populations, 
amounted to ill advised attempts to recreate the Habsburg Monarchy’s system of national 
oppression.  Bauer alleged these regions were tied by the history, geography, and 
nationality to German Austria, and he warned that refusing to grant the right of national 
self determination to the inhabitants of Central Europe had the potential to lead to another 
war which might be even more destructive than the previous one.107
If the Social Democrats were critical of the new Central European order because 
it replicated elements of the old Monarchy, so too did they denounce any proposals which 
might have even more forcefully reproduced features of the Habsburg state.  In particular, 
many Social Democrats feared that suggestions to create a Danubian customs union or 
federation among the Monarchy’s successor states had the potential to open the door to a 
Habsburg restoration.  Bauer was especially critical of these proposals and argued that 
any such a scheme represented a covert attempt by Austrian monarchists to recreate the 
old Monarchy.  He noted that if a Danubian federation ever became a reality, it would 
106Friedrich Adler, “Unser Friede! I. Die Kundgebung der Deutschösterreichischen Nationalversammlung
in der Sitzung vom 7. Juni 1919,” 31.
107Bauer, “Unser Friede!  Die Kundgebung der Deutschösterreichischen Nationalversammlung in der 
Sitzung vom 7. Juni 1919,” 5-15.
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essentially recreate all of the national strife which had plagued the old Monarchy, only 
without the favorable position accorded to Austrian Germans under Habsburg rule.  
Additionally, the proposed union would lead to capitalistic competition between states 
and hence would be thoroughly incompatible with Socialist principles.  Bauer concluded 
that none of the successor states would be interested in joining a federation with a 
national group which they had seen as their oppressors before 1918, so the plan was 
unrealistic and utopian in the first place.108
One Socialist writer, Paul Szende, did defend the idea of a Danubian federation as 
a realistic and progressive idea in a 1932 article in Der Kampf.  Szende argued that 
Anschluß was in fact not a realistic option for Austria given the dogmatic opposition of 
France to any potential expansion of German power.  A Danubian federation offered 
Austria the possibility to represent the interests of the German working class and to 
advance the cause of democratic government in an increasingly reactionary and 
authoritarian part of the continent.  He even asserted that any such federal arrangement 
would actually deter a Habsburg return to power anywhere in Central Europe by granting 
any one federal member state a veto over a dynastic return in any other constituent 
state.109  Szende’s position was exceedingly rare in Social Democratic circles, however, 
and in the next issue of Der Kampf Karl Appel rebutted Szende’s arguments, attacking 
the Danubian federal plan as dangerous and reactionary.110  As early as 1918, Bauer also 
provided a forceful articulation of the Party’s basic views about the possibility of a 
continuing association between Austria and the other successor states, arguing that 
108Bauer, “Zollunion?” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), December 25, 1919, 1-2.
109Paul Szende “Die Donauföderation,” Der Kampf 25 (August/September, 1932): 344-349.
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Austria was not willing to put its interests at risk for the sake of a Central European 
federation which could easily recreate the old Monarchy’s system of national 
exploitation:
The old Austria is dead.  We German Social Democrats wish to build a new one, 
which should be a union of free peoples.  But if the other nations of Austria do not 
wish such a community with us, or if they only wish so under conditions and 
forms which would not guarantee our economic interests or our right to national 
self-determination. . . . then the German-Austria will be forced to choose 
Anschluß with the German Reich as a special federal province.111
The Social Democrats were of course even more vociferously critical of any overt 
attempts to return the Habsburgs to the throne.  The establishment of a right-wing 
“regency” in Hungary by the government of Miklós Horthy in 1920, even if the Entente 
and the other regional powers never actually permitted a Habsburg to sit upon Hungary’s 
vacant throne, naturally caused considerable alarm in Austrian Social Democratic circles.  
The Party was concerned that such a Habsburg restoration might also spread to Austria 
itself.  Sigmund Kunfi argued that the simple fact that a Habsburg return could be 
contemplated by any of the national groups in the region which had previously been 
oppressed by the dynasty for so many centuries was ample evidence of the 
“unhealthiness” and injustice of the postwar order which the Entente had established in 
Central Europe.112  Another Socialist commentator argued that those who were nostalgic 
for the trappings of the old Monarchy were a dying breed in Austria at least, and he 
predicted that soon there would be no more Austrians who identified with the old 
110Karl Appel, “Donauföderation?” Der Kampf 25 (October, 1932): 405-408.
111Bauer, “Deutschland und wir,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 16, 1918.
112Sigmund Kunfi, “Das Haus Habsburg zum Viertenmal,” Der Kampf 19 (February, 1926): 49-56.
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clerical-dynastic state rather than the working class and the German Volk.113
Bauer took the threat of a restoration more seriously, however, warning that a 
Habsburg return would not simply stop with the Hungarian crown of Saint Stephen, but 
would inevitably lead to war in Central Europe.  He declared that “a Habsburg at the 
gates” would never be tolerated by the people of the successor states, including Austria, 
who had only recently thrown off the “Habsburgs’ bloody yoke.”  Bauer even saw 
monarchists trying to coopt the Anschluß movement by enticing Austrians with the 
prospect of a reborn Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation which would both unite 
the Germans and rule over the other Danubian peoples.114  By the early 1930s Karl 
Renner was also suspicious of the right-wing Heimwehr  movement, which he argued 
aimed to restore the old Monarchy and to return Austria to its dynastic relationship with 
Hungary at the center of a Central European federal empire.115
The Social Democratic Historical Narrative
The Social Democrats vigorously opposed even the hint of a Habsburg restoration 
after 1918, and they firmly denounced the dynasty as the epitome of reaction and 
oppression in Austrian history.  For the Social Democratic Party, the Habsburgs had 
always been the enemies of the Austrian working class, and the imperial house 
constituted the main villains in Austria’s historical narrative.  The Social Democrats did 
not view the past solely as the story of one dynasty’s attempts to oppress its subjects and 
113Johann Hieronymus, “Der vaterländische Dichter als Denker,” Der Kampf 18 (June, 1925): 211-219.
114Bauer, “Habsburg vor den Toren,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung, (Vienna), October 23, 1921, 1-3; “Drei 
Gruppen in Anschlußlager,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), July 7, 1927, 1-2; “Die Bourgeois Republik in 
Österriech,” Der Kampf 23 (1930), 193-208; The Austrian Revolution, 225.
115Renner, “Bedrohung und Verteidigung der Republik in Österreich,” in Karl Renner in Dokumenten und 
Erinnerungen, 114-117.
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stifle the forces of progress, however.  Rather, Social Democratic leaders proposed a 
historical counter-narrative of their own in which the true protagonists of Austrian 
history– the Austrian working class and the Social Democratic Party itself– had opposed 
the Habsburg dynasty and had worked to advance the cause of peace, democracy and 
social justice.
The Social Democrats generally began their progressive historical narrative with 
the Austrian Revolution of 1848.  The Social Democratic Party itself of course had yet to 
be founded at that point, and indeed the Austrian working class itself had still been quite 
small, but modern Austrian Socialists identified quite strongly with the democratic and 
national ideals of the revolutionaries nonetheless.  Bauer and Renner both argued that the 
Social Democratic Party had been in part inspired by the ideals of the Revolution, and 
had built upon them in its pursuit of freedom and justice.116
Other Socialist writers interpreted the significance of the Revolution of 1848 for 
contemporary Austria in a variety of ways.  For example, Emil Strauß argued that the 
Revolution had represented the true German national ideals of the inhabitants of Austria, 
Bohemia, and Moravia.  Those ideals had subsequently been forgotten by most of the 
Monarchy’s German-speakers as the House of Habsburg had crushed the Revolution and 
sought to overcome the national sentiment that had caused it by encouraging dynastic 
patriotism.  Ultimately, Strauß argued, the workers had been a significant progressive 
force over the course of the Revolution, but they had been betrayed by the Austrian 
bourgeoisie which had wanted to continue its economic exploitation the Monarchy’s 
116Bauer, “Das neue Europa,”  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 17, 1918, 1-2; Renner, “Persönliche 
Erinnerungen und politische Bemerkungen vom 12. November 1918 und den Jahren voher und nachher, “ 
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other Völker rather than to achieve German national unity under democratic auspices.  
After 1918, however, the working class had become the dominant force in Austria, and 
Austrians had rediscovered the national and democratic principles which were the legacy 
of the 1848 Revolution against the Habsburgs.117  Another article in Der Kampf in 1919 
reprinted the statement of one of the representatives in the revolutionary Parliament in 
Frankfurt, Arnold Ruge, from July of 1848, noting that Ruge’s comments prefigured the 
modern disarmament and League of Nations movements, which the Austrian Social 
Democrats supported.118  The Party’s leaders thus argued that its ideological lineage 
extended back to the barricades of 1848 and they claimed to embody the ideals of the 
revolutionaries who had sacrificed so much in their heroic but futile struggles against 
Habsburg oppression.
Even more than the Revolution of 1848, however, the Social Democrats dated the 
beginning of real progress in Austrian history to the foundation of their own Party at their 
first Party Assembly in the city of Hainfeld in 1889.  A variety of Social Democratic 
intellectuals and writers credited the Party’s first leader, Viktor Adler, with forging the 
previously disparate and chaotic collection of Austrian workers’ organizations into a 
disciplined and powerful political movement.  Adler’s Party almost immediately began to 
achieve real success in its efforts to attain practical social and legal benefits for Austrian 
workers, becoming one of the Monarchy’s most influential political movements almost 
from the very first moment of its existence.  The modern Social Democratic Party thus 
Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), November 11, 1928.
117Strauß,  “Die nationale Revolution in Deutschböhmen 1848,” 31-37.
118“Eine Stimme in der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung (1848) für Abrustung und Völkerbund,” Der 
Kampf 12 (May, 1919): 315-320.
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cast itself as the true defender of democracy and social justice in Austria, and celebrated 
its foundation some three decades earlier as the first time when the Habsburgs found 
themselves faced with an organized and powerful antagonist willing to act in defense of 
the interests of the working class.119
Other Social Democrats celebrated the origins of the modern Austrian workers’ 
movement in a slightly different manner.  For example, in 1920, K. L. Müller wrote an 
article in Der Kampf which commemorated the first organized May Day march in Vienna 
in 1890 by the Social Democrats and the Austrian workers.  Müller argued that this first 
demonstration of the power of the Austrian working class had terrified the dynasty and its 
bourgeois and clericist allies and marked the beginning of the erosion of the power of the 
capitalist middle class in Austria.  A 1932 article in the Socialist pedagogical journal, 
Sozialistische Erziehung, confirmed the historical importance of the May Day holiday for 
the Austrian workers’ movement, and placed it alongside the birthday of the Republic as 
the most important holiday in the Socialist calendar.120
Indeed, the birth of the Republic represented the most significant achievement for 
the Austrian workers’ movement in the eyes of contemporary Social Democratic 
commentators.  If all of the working classes’ previous accomplishments had come as a 
result of long years of struggle against the reactionary Habsburgs and their allies, then the 
collapse of the dynastic government in Austria stood as a great victory which had 
119Bauer “Der Rythmus der Arbeiterbewegung,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 23, 1925, 1-3; 
Bauer, “Viktor Adler, der Parteiman,” Der Kampf 21 (March, 1929): 135-139; Michael Schacherl “Der 
Geist von Hainfeld,” Der Kampf 22 (January, 1929): 1-4; Emile Vandervelde, “Viktor Adler und die 
Internationale,” Der Kampf 22 (January, 1929): 5-8; “Der Hainfelder Parteitagung,” Die Sozialistische 
Erziehung (November, 1932): 248-249.
120“K. L. Müller, “Die erste Maifeier und die altösterreichische Regierung,” Der Kampf 13 (April, 1919): 
121-126; “Die 12. November,” Die Sozialistische Erziehung (November, 1932): 248.
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removed a major obstacle from the path of progress.  The Social Democrats viewed the 
destruction of the Monarchy and the creation of the First Republic as the achievement of 
their own Party.  While Socialist writers certainly acknowledged that the defeat in World 
War I had played an important part in the collapse of the Habsburg state, most of them 
agreed with Bauer when he characterized November 12, 1918 as a “revolution” which 
had been consciously pursued by the Austrian workers.121
In 1919 Bauer argued that the Austrian Republic ought not to be seen as the 
“heir” of the old Monarchy.  To be sure, Bauer was primarily complaining that the Treaty 
of Saint Germain had imposed onerous and unfair penalties upon Austria, yet at the same 
time he still articulated an argument which was to be the typical stance of the Social 
Democrats throughout the subsequent decades.  He asserted that the First Republic was 
no less of a new creation than Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, and that it could not be 
held responsible for the wartime actions of the Habsburg state.  The old Monarchy had 
been something against which the Austrian Socialists had struggled.  The new Republic, 
on the other hand, was their own creation, and represented a sharp break with the 
Habsburg past.122  Indeed, to emphasize the extent to which he envisioned the modern 
Austrian Republic, including its orientation toward Anschluß with Germany, as a solely 
Socialist creation, Bauer argued that it had been only the working class which had 
supported the creation of a great-German Republic in 1918. He asserted that the Austrian 
121Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, 53-78.  In its “Linz Platform” of 1926, the Party specifically claimed the 
credit for the creation of the First Republic.  “Das ‘Linzer Programm’ der Sozialdemokratischen 
Arbeiterpartei Österreichs, 1926,” 251.  Interestingly, in a private letter to Peter Waller, Karl Renner denied 
that any Social Democratic leader had ever really wanted or worked toward the demise of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, and argued that the Socialists could not be blamed for that event.  “Sozial Demokraten wollten 
den Untergang des Donaureiches nicht,” in Karl Renner in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen, 95-96.
122Bauer, “Kein Erbe der alten Monarchie,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), May 27, 1919, 1-2.
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bourgeoisie had wanted to preserve the old supranational Monarchy in some form, the 
better to continue exploiting the other Völker of Central Europe.  Later they embraced the 
idea of union with Germany, but with other, decidedly more reactionary ends in mind 
than the Socialist goal of a democratic and Marxist great-German republic.123
Despite the fact that they regarded the First Republic as their sole creation, the 
Social Democrats did not control the Austrian government after their electoral defeat in 
October of 1920.  The Party denounced the relatively more popular Christian Social Party 
for using the bourgeoisie’s economic influence to seize control of the Republic, and 
portrayed the CSP as the inheritor of the Habsburg dynasty’s old role as the primary 
enemy of the working class.124  The Party held out hope that one day it would reclaim 
control of the Republic which it had founded from the Christian Social Party’s 
“Bürgerblock.”  As the future Social Democratic mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz, wrote in 
1928:
The Republic will once again be ours, however.  There will come a day when the 
fury of the people will sweep away the Bürgerblock regime and fulfill the 
promise, there will come a day when the Republic will be renewed in power and 
beauty, and will take us across into a better future– to our goal– to Socialism!125
Thus, the Social Democratic Party viewed itself as part of the march of the forces of 
progress in Austria toward an eventual great-German socialist republic.  The awakening 
of the working class had started during the revolutionary strife of 1848, and the working 
123Bauer, “Wandlungen und Probleme der Anschlußpolitik,” Der Kampf 20 (1927), 297-307; Bauer, The 
Austrian Revolution, 115-117, 278-279.
124Indeed, Social Democratic writers portrayed the late nineteenth-century founder of the CSP, Karl Lueger 
as “black-gold” to his core, and argued that this major party of the right had always served as the close ally 
of the Habsburg dynasty in its efforts to oppress the Austrian working class.  Paul Gustav, “Dr. Karl 
Lueger,” Der Kampf 19 (December, 1926): 536-541; Renner, “Bedrohung und Verteidigung der Republik 
in Österreich,” in Karl Renner in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen, 112-119.
125Seitz, 520.
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class began to use its power in earnest after the birth of the Party itself 1889.  Under the 
leadership of the Party, the Austrian workers had deposed the Habsburgs and created a 
more just and more democratic Austrian state.  The First Republic was never an end in 
itself, however, but merely an important step on the road to true democracy and socialism 
throughout the world.126
Of course, the Austrian Social Democrats did not view their cause entirely in the 
context of Austrian history, but also saw themselves as part of the wider Marxist 
revolutionary movement.   The Social Democratic monthly journal, Der Kampf, 
abounded with articles dedicated to the works and personalities of Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels, and Ferdinand Lassalle, the seminal figures in the history of European 
Socialism.127  Likewise, the Social Democrats envisioned themselves as the heirs of all of 
Europe’s revolutionary causes throughout history.  Such a position meant that Austrian 
Socialists saw their lineage as encompassing not only Austrian events such as the 
Revolution of 1848, but also the French Revolution of 1789 and the Paris Commune of 
1870.128  Indeed, the Social Democrats harkened back not only to Austrian figures such as 
Viktor Adler, and to European Socialists of international reputation such as Karl 
126Bauer “Der Rythmus der Arbeiterbewegung,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 23, 1925, 1-3; 
Julius Grünwald, “Die Sozialgesetzgebung im alten Oesterreich,” Der Kampf 13 (May, 1920): 199-202.
127See for example Kathe Pick, “Der Staat im kommunistischen Manifest,” Der Kampf 12 (August, 1919): 
551-555; Max Adler, “Engels und die Soziale Revolution,” Der Kampf 13 (December, 1920): 433-443; 
Bauer, “Marx als Mahnung,” Der Kampf, 16 (February, 1923): 81-88; Helene Bauer “Zur Theorie der 
Marktpreise bei Marx,” Der Kampf 18 (June, 1925): 219-225; Karl Kautsky, “Friedrich Engels,” Der 
Kampf 18 (August/September, 1925): 331-338; Renner, “Zum 100. Geburtstag Ferdinand Lassalles,” Der 
Kampf 18 (April, 1925): 121-125.
128Alfred Seidel, “Ein Vergleich zwischen der großen Französischen Revolution und der heutigen (1789-
1919),” Der Kampf 12 (June, 1919): 393-396; Bauer, “Die Bourgeois Republik in Österriech,” Der Kampf
23 (May,1930), 193-208; Zoltán Rónai, “Die Kommune und die Revolutionen unser Zeit,” Der Kampf 24 
(March, 1931): 131-137.  Of course such a view of the historical lineage of Socialism was quite typical of 
twentieth-century Marxists.  See François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the 
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Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, but also to non-Marxist European prophets of 
liberation such as Voltaire and Goethe.129  Thus, the Austrian Social Democrats did not 
have a narrow vision of their own inheritance, but rather saw themselves as part of a 
broad European struggle for freedom and social justice.
This larger context of course encompassed Austrian membership in the German 
Volk as well.  As we have seen, the Social Democrats saw Austrians as Germans, and 
presented Austrian history as part of the wider history of the German nation as a whole.  
The Party attested to this fact by using the November 1928 issue of Der Kampf to 
commemorate not only the tenth anniversary of the Austrian First Republic, but also the 
tenth anniversary of the German Weimar Republic as well.130  Yet this very same issue 
also revealed that the Austrian Social Democrats saw more continuity between the old 
Monarchy and modern Austria than they were willing to admit.  The same issue also 
contained pieces assessing the progress of democracy in Czechoslovakia ten years after 
the Monarchy’s collapse and lamenting the reactionary dictatorship which had succeeded 
dynastic rule in Hungary.131  Clearly, there was still some sense of lingering kinship with 
these regions, despite the Party’s firm declarations of Austrian Germanness.
The Austrian Social Democratic Party dedicated itself to the goal of Anschluß
with a democratic and socialist great-German state, and never lost its enthusiasm for that 
33.
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project even as the First Republic stabilized after the economic and social tumult 
following its creation.  The Social Democrats bitterly assailed the memory of the old 
Habsburg Monarchy, and portrayed the dynasty and its allies as the enemies of not just 
democracy and social justice in Central Europe, but also of the national rights of all of the 
region’s Völker, including the Germans.  In contrast to this portrayal of the House of 
Habsburg as the villains of Austrian history, the Social Democrats presented the workers’ 
movement and their own Party as the true agents of progress, justice and liberation in 
Austria’s past, who had finally deposed the oppressive dynasty and replaced it with the 
First Republic.  For the Social Democrats, the Habsburgs had left no legacy for modern 
Austrians beyond the happy fact of their defeat at the hands the working class.  Austria’s 
future belonged to the workers, and those workers would one day live in a socialist
Germany, as part of a peaceful, democratic, and socialist world order.
iii. Austrian German Nationalists and the Habsburg Past in the First Republic 
Austrian German nationalists formed the third major ideological faction in the 
Austrian First Republic.  Unlike the other two dominant ideological camps, the German 
nationalist movement was quite diverse politically.  While both the Austrian conservative 
and Social Democratic factions discussed Austrian national identity within the context of 
reasonably well defined and coherent views concerning religion, social relationships, and 
politics, Austrian German nationalists defined themselves first and foremost through their 
fervent support for Anschluß and their largely racial or völkisch vision of Germanness.  
All Austrian German nationalists argued that the inhabitants of Austria were simply 
Germans whose ultimate destiny was to become part of a great-German state.  Beyond 
93
that profession of Austria’s essential Germanness, however, Austrian German nationalists 
possessed no defining political ideology.  
The largest of the Austrian German nationalist political parties, the Great German 
People’s Party, was anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, and anti-Catholic.  The other 
prominent German nationalist organization, the Landbund (Agrarian League), shared 
those ideals, but also emphasized the special concerns of the Austrian peasantry.  Many 
individual Austrians argued that Anschluß with Germany was the most pressing concern 
for Austria in 1918, yet at the same, however, did not share the political principles of 
either of the major German nationalist political factions.  As we have seen, the vast 
majority of Marxists doggedly advocated Anschluß throughout the republican era, but 
only as a part of their broader world view of progress toward socialist democracy.  
Similarly, some Austrian German nationalists fervently advocated Anschluß without 
necessarily endorsing the political programs of either GDVP or the Landbund.
Austrian German nationalists did tend to present similar arguments concerning 
Austria’s Habsburg past, however, even if they did not always agree with one another 
concerning political, social, or religious principles.  Most Austrian German nationalists 
took an essentially negative view of the old Monarchy.  The most radical critics from the 
nationalist camp portrayed the dynasty and its multinational state as anti-German, and 
argued that the Habsburgs had pursued their own political interests at the expense of 
Austria’s German inhabitants and of the cause of German unity.  Even those Austrian 
German nationalists who were not quite so hostile toward the Monarchy still argued that 
the Habsburg state was dead and gone, and that its legacy offered no guidance for a 
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modern Austria which needed to pursue a new beginning in the form of a union with 
Germany.  All Austrian German nationalists certainly took great pains to present 
Anschluß as the only option which offered the Germans of Austria any hope of peace and 
prosperity.  Many of these nationalists vigorously attacked other possible paths for 
contemporary Austria such as a Danubian federation, a pan-European Union, or 
continued Austrian independence separate from Germany.  Most often, nationalist critics 
of these alternatives to Anschluß argued that these other options essentially recapitulated 
some of the negative aspects of the Habsburgs’ old multinational state in one form or 
another.  For the Austrian German nationalist camp then, Anschluß stood either as the 
antidote to centuries of Habsburg misrule or as a positive new path for Austria in an era 
in which the old Monarchy’s multinational ideals had become irrelevant.  Thus, Austrian 
German nationalists, no matter what their individual political preferences might be, often 
not only argued for Anschluß, but in doing so also presented a view of Austrian history 
which criticized or at least devalued the importance of the old Habsburg Monarchy.
German Nationalist Political Parties
While Austrian German nationalists might have professed a wide variety of 
political, social, and religious views beyond their shared support for Anschluß, the two 
major nationalist political parties, the Great German People’s Party and the Landbund, 
did articulate clearly defined political platforms.  Of the two, the Great German People’s 
Party was the most popular, and garnered anywhere from five to ten percent of the seats 
in the Austrian parliament during the First Republic.  The Landbund’s electoral support 
was generally about half that of the GDVP, but both nationalist factions habitually won 
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enough seats to be courted by the Christian Social Party in its periodic efforts to form 
governments in the absence of an outright parliamentary majority.132
The Great German People’s Party officially formed in 1920, and represented the 
union of a number of Austrian German nationalist factions which had existed during the 
last half century of Habsburg rule.  German nationalism during the Habsburg era had 
been no less politically diverse than it was after 1918, and the GDVP brought a number 
of different nationalist ideologies, represented by dozens of small nationalist parties and 
associations, into one unified organizational framework.  The most radical of the major 
nationalist ideological streams which fed into the GDVP was that of Georg von 
Schönerer, the ardently racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic critic of Habsburg rule who 
founded his Pan-German Party in 1879.  Schönerer’s wing of the German nationalist 
movement had vehemently denounced imperial rule in Austria and unabashedly 
proclaimed its loyalty to Wilhemine Germany.  Schönerer’s Party represented only a 
minority within the Austrian German nationalist community, but it had commanded a 
level of influence that outstripped its popular support thanks to its leader’s great charisma 
and the stridency of its rhetoric.  The other major pre-1918 nationalist bloc, which had 
gone by a variety of names throughout its decades of existence, was led by Otto 
Steinwender, and was much more willing to compromise with the imperial government.  
Steinwender was no less dedicated to the German nationalist cause than Schönerer, but 
his faction’s anti-Semitism and political rhetoric were far more mild than the that of the 
Pan-German Party.133  Both of these leaders died in 1921, just months after the formation 
132Jelavich, 175-176, 186-188; Wandruszka, 382-394.
133Andrew G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-
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of the Great German People’s Party, and despite their personal differences in approach, 
left behind a political movement unified behind a platform of basic political principles.
The first of these principles, obviously, was Anschluß.  In its first party platform, 
the “Salzburg Program” of 1920, which remained in place until 1934, the Great German 
People’s Party proclaimed that a union with Germany was its primary goal.  The Party 
declared in unequivocal terms that Austrian German-speakers were part of the racially-
defined German Volk and that the establishment of a great German nation state and a true 
Volksgemeinschaft represented the highest priority for Germans everywhere.134  Beyond 
this simple profession of Austrian Germanness, the Party dedicated itself to a number of 
other ideals.
Politically, the Great German People’s Party’s ambivalence toward the liberal 
principles of the First Republic’s constitution resembled that of the Christian Social 
Party.  The Salzburg Program proclaimed that the GDVP supported democracy, and 
indeed avowed that the German Volk possessed a particular national affinity for 
democratic rule.  At the same time, however, the program vehemently denounced 
liberalism for its supposedly pernicious emphasis upon selfishness and individualism at 
the expense of communal spirit.  Likewise, the Salzburg Program called for restrictions 
upon such characteristically liberal ideals as freedom of the press and free markets.  The 
Germanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 107-326; Wandruzska, 381-383.  Steinwender 
argued that Jewish assimilation into German culture and society could essentially solve the “Jewish 
problem,” while Schönerer’s racist and more virulent stance against the Jews denied the possibility of such 
a solution.  Adolf Hitler’s own murderous anti-Semitism was in part inspired by Schönerer’s views.  On 
Austrian liberalism’s turn toward German nationalism and anti-Semitism, see Peter M. Judson, Exclusive 
Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 
1848_1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997), 193-266.
134“Das ‘Salzburger Programm’ der Großdeutschen Volkspartei, 1920,”  in Österreichisch 
Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 439-440.
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Party thus repudiated liberal democratic ideals in favor of a more nationalistic brand of 
democracy which emphasized the unity and interests of the German Volk above 
individual liberties.135
Just as the Party denounced liberalism, so too did it repudiate both Marxism and 
Roman Catholicism.  The Salzburg Program portrayed Marxism as an outgrowth of 
liberal ideology which placed the interests of economic class above those of the 
community of the Volk.  According to the nationalist ideologues of the Great German 
People’s Party, Marxist class conflict was a pernicious concept which sowed divisions 
within the German nation, and which diluted the appropriate loyalty of the German 
workers of Austria to their Volk.  The Party’s criticisms of Roman Catholicism followed 
similar reasoning, and argued for a strict separation between Church and state in Austria.  
The Salzburg Program characterized the Catholic Church as a “foreign” institution which 
worked against German unity in the name of internationalism and the fallacious 
assumption that all nations and peoples were equally valuable.  The Great German 
People’s Party proclaimed that all nations were in fact not equal, and it unsurprisingly 
argued that the German Volk represented the highest and most worthy national 
community in Europe.  Thus the Salzburg Program denounced the egalitarianism inherent 
in liberalism, Marxism, and Catholicism, and asserted that the Austrian government 
needed to dedicate itself to the interests of the German Volk as a whole.136
The Party’s political platform also contained a lengthy section concerning the 




basically regurgitated the sort of political anti-Semitism which had been all too common 
in Central Europe since the end of the previous century.  The “Salzburg Program” 
accused the Jews of dominating the Austrian press, theater, and finance, and charged that 
the Jews had created liberalism, capitalism, and socialism, which the Party naturally saw 
as pernicious anti-German ideologies.  Indeed, the Great German People’s Party argued 
that liberal democratic rule itself was a premeditated Jewish plot to reduce both the power 
of the state and the German communal spirit in order to allow the Jews to assume a 
dominant position in Austrian society.  The Program charged that Jews were first and 
foremost individualists to whom the sort of characteristically German communal ethic 
expressed in Kant’s categorical imperative was utterly foreign.  The Jews were a 
parasitic, foreign race which abhorred real labor.  Unable to create a workable society on 
their own, the Jews thus had to exploit the German Volk.  The Salzburg Program did 
caution Party members, in what must have seemed like cold comfort to Austrian Jews, 
that hateful speech against the Jews was to be avoided, and that even if the Jews could 
not be allowed to dominate Austrian society, so too they should not be oppressed by 
Austrian Germans.137
The Landbund, the other major political faction within the Austrian German 
nationalist camp, professed similar principles.  Founded in 1923 in a merger of a number 
of different agrarian parties, the Landbund was no less anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, or anti-
Semitic than the Great German People’s Party.  The main difference between the two 
German nationalist parties lay in the Landbund’s determination to serve as the advocate 
for Austrian farmers and agrarian workers.  While such a stance might seem like the sort 
137Ibid., 444, 456, 478-482.
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of factionalism which the GDVP argued was so corrosive to German national unity, the 
Landbund argued that the interests of the Austrian countryside were in fact identical to 
those of the Volk as a whole.  According to the Landbund, the liberal parliamentarians, 
Marxists, and Jews, concentrated in Vienna, worked against the ideals and values of the 
German national community.  In place of such liberal individualism and class conflict, 
the Landbund pledged to serve the simple, anti-materialistic national values of the
Austrian peasant, offering the promise of national renewal and völkish unity.   Indeed, the 
Landbund’s political platform of 1923 denounced the liberal republican order entirely, 
and called for the reorganization of political representation in Austria on the basis of 
corporatist Berufstände (“professions” or traditional social blocks), rather than according 
to individual votes for political parties.138  The Landbund also emphasized the value of 
religion to a greater degree than the GDVP, and the 1923 platform asserted that the 
party’s politics needed to be based upon the “national and Christian world view,” albeit 
without specifying whether or not such a Christian perspective included Roman 
Catholicism or not.139
Thus both of the major Austrian German nationalist political parties combined 
their staunch advocacy for Anschluß with anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, and anti-Semitic 
political principles.  Union with Germany, however, remained the core of their political 
program throughout the First Republic, and it was this determined support for Anschluß
138Interestingly, when the Christian Social Party ended republican rule in Austria in 1933, the new 
authoritarian government which they instituted basically followed the corporatist model advocated by the 
Landbund, yet at the same time took a firm stance in favor of Austrian independence.  See Chapter 3.
139Such ambiguity was probably intentional and calculated to avoid alienating the firmly Catholic Austrian 
countryside at a time when the Christian Social Party stood as the staunchest supporter of the Catholic 
Church’s role in Austrian public life.  “Politische Leitsätze des Landbundes für Österreich, 1923,”  in 
Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 482-483.
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which, along with their stance against the Catholic Church and their racist version of anti-
Semitism, served to distinguish between the German nationalist parties and the otherwise 
fairly ideologically similar Christian Social Party.  Indeed, as both of the nationalist 
parties entered into coalition governments with the Christian Socials during the early and 
mid 1920s, they were hard pressed to explain to their constituents how they could claim 
to stand for union with Germany and yet at the same time lend their support to cabinets 
which were willing to bargain away Anschluß, as the Seipel government did in the 
Geneva Protocols.  Therefore, by the late 1920s, both the Great German People’s Party 
and the Landbund saw their electoral support dwindle as German nationalist voters 
realized that neither party was in any position to further the cause of German unity.  By 
the beginning of the 1930s, those voters increasingly threw their support behind more 
radically anti-republican political entities such as the Heimwehr, which encompassed 
both German nationalist and patriotic Austrian wings, and the small but rapidly growing 
National Socialist Party.140
Austrian German Nationalist Portrayals of the Habsburg Monarchy
As we have seen the German nationalist camp in First Republican Austria was a 
politically diverse group.  Neither the Great German People’s Party and the Landbund, 
nor their more radical alternatives in the early 1930s could claim to really represent the 
political ideals of all Austrians who supported union with Germany.  Certainly anti-
liberalism, anti-Marxism, anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism were very prevalent in 
140Wandruska, 389-394; Jelavich, 182-190.  For more on the Heimwehr, see Chapter 3.  For more on the 
Austrian National Socialists, see Chapter 5.
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Austrian German nationalist circles, but they were far from universal, and some Austrians 
who saw Anschluß as the primary goal of the German Volk in Austria made their 
arguments without reference to the political and social ideals of the German nationalist 
parties.  The sole idea which really served to unify Austrian German nationalists was 
their shared desire for Anschluß, and their collective conviction that Austrians were 
Germans first and foremost.  
To illustrate this fact, one need only examine a collection of short essays arguing 
in favor of Anschluß published in 1919 entitled Deutschland, wir kommen! (Germany, We 
are Coming!).  Some of the authors represented in this collection were certainly right-
wing nationalists of the sort who later founded the GDVP and the Landbund.  Other 
authors, however, displayed no particular political ideology beyond their fervent 
advocacy for union with Germany.  These authors included university professors, 
engineers, doctors, architects, writers, and artists.  The collection even included a 
selection by Otto Bauer, the leader of the Social Democratic Party.  The essays amounted 
to a sustained series of polemics about why Austria’s destiny necessarily lay in a union 
with a great-German nation state.  The authors emphasized the bonds of national kinship 
which served to link German-speakers in Austria with the rest of the German Volk, and 
they often also presented various reasons why they believed an independent Austrian 
state would never be viable.  The common thread which linked this diverse array of 
authors was the notion that Austrians were Germans who did not need to fear the loss of 
any sort of a distinctive Austrian culture in a political union with the rest of the German 
nation.  According to all of the authors, Anschluß would represent a homecoming for 
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Austrian Germans, not a collision between different cultural groups.141
Beyond this shared dedication to Anschluß and the common sentiment that 
Austrians were part of the German Volk, it is possible to speak of one further ideological 
orientation which most Austrian German nationalists shared: they all tended to attack, or 
at least minimize the importance of, the Habsburg Monarchy’s legacy.  For most German 
nationalists, the old multinational Habsburg state had represented a profound aberration 
in an era in which the flow of history seemed to be moving inexorably toward a system of 
European nation states.  Many nationalists were quite hostile to the memory of the 
Monarchy, and argued that the Habsburgs had habitually persecuted their German 
subjects and deliberately worked against the cause of German national unity in order to 
enhance their own dynastic power.  Even Austrian German nationalist writers who did 
not display such outright hostility toward the old Monarchy at the very least still argued 
that the Habsburgs’ multinational experiment, whatever its relative merits might have 
been, had ceased to have any relevance for Austria in the postwar era of ascendent 
nationalism and the predominance of the nation state ideal.  Thus, in order to make their 
arguments for Anschluß and Austrian Germanness, Austrian German nationalists 
invariably also had to argue that Austria’s Habsburg past represented a historical dead 
end which could offer no guidance to modern Austrians attempting to fulfill their national 
destiny after 1918.
As early as 1919, Franz Dinghofer, the spokesman for the Great German Party, a 
precursor to the GDVP, argued in the Austrian National Assembly that the Habsburg 
dynasty had sought to keep the German Volk from achieving national unity in order to 
141Deutschland, wir kommen! (Haale: Richard Mühlmann Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919), 1-44.
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serve its own selfish political interests.  Indeed, Dinghofer was indignant that the Entente 
powers had forced the postwar Austrian state to adopt the same name as the Habsburg 
state, and accused the victors of the war of seeking to persecute the German Volk just as 
the old dynasty had done.  By creating a small and economically unviable Austrian state, 
necessarily dependent upon Czechoslovakia and Hungary for its very economic survival, 
the Entente powers had simply recreated the old Monarchy in a slightly new form, but 
under Slavic and Magyar rather than Habsburg leadership.142
Other German nationalists also repeatedly charged that the Habsburgs had 
deliberately sought to stifle the nineteenth-century movement toward a unified German 
state.  These nationalists argued that the Habsburg dynasty had seen the prospect of 
German unity as the end of its dynastic rule over a multinational empire in Central 
Europe.  The Habsburgs simply could not afford to allow their German subjects, who had 
always been the real source of the Monarchy’s cultural and economic vitality, to leave the 
Danubian empire, and thus had worked against the project of German unification.  Many 
Austrian German nationalists also expressed their resentment at the Habsburgs’ apparent 
favoritism toward the Monarchy’s non-German nationalities, and charged that the 
dynasty had betrayed the one national group most responsible for Austria’s historical 
power and influence.  That betrayal of German interests had ultimately been enshrined in 
the postwar peace settlement which victimized Austrian Germans even as it privileged 
the Monarchy’s Slavic peoples.  As Erwin Stransky bitterly noted, the Monarchy’s 
German subjects had “maintained loyalty to their last breath, for which we German-
Austrians and only we were thanked as a last testament with all sorts of terrible treatment, 
142Dinghofer, “Unser Friede!,” 26-29.
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in comparison to the favor which the Slavs, and only the Slavs. . . were granted at our 
expense.”143
Austrian German nationalists did not always restrict their criticisms to the 
Habsburgs, but also sometimes targeted the Hohenzollerns of Prussia in their jeremiads.  
The Hohenzollerns’ refusal to take the German crown in 1848 did not escape the notice 
of these nationalist commentators, nor did the efforts of the Prussian chancellor Bismarck 
during the 1860s to create a German state which deliberately excluded Austrian Germans.  
Many Austrian German nationalists accused both dynasties of placing their mutual 
competition for power and influence in Central Europe above the national aspirations of 
the German Volk, and of standing in the way of the movement toward a true großdeutsch
state.144  Yet most nationalist commentators saved the greater part of their venom for the 
Habsburgs themselves, and devoted more energy toward criticizing the old Austrian 
Monarchy, which they argued had opposed any sort of German nation state, than toward 
denouncing a Hohenzollern Prussian state which had at least taken a preliminary step 
toward German unity by creating the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich in 1871.145
The Austrian intellectual Friedrich Kleinwaechter provided one of the most 
elaborate Austrian German nationalist critiques of the Habsburg Monarchy in his 1926 
book Der deutschösterreichische Mensch und der Anschluß (The German-Austrian Man 
and Anschluß).  Kleinwaechter was inspired to write this work in response to Oscar
143Erwin Stansky, “Mahnworte eines deutsch-österriechischen Arztes,” in Deutschland, wir kommen!, 6.
144Edmund Bernatzik, Josef Engelhart, Eugen Oberhümmer, in Deutschland, wir kommen!, 16-17, 24-26, 
36-37; Dinghofer, 28.
145See for example Friedrich F. G. Kleinwaechter, Der deutschösterreichische Mensch und der Anschluß
(Vienna: Eckert- Verlag Adolf Luser, 1926), 153-156; Richard Paltauf, “Deutsches Volk von Österriech,” 
in Deutschland, wir kommen!, 30-32; A. Schwoner, Sollen wir uns an Deutschland anschliessen? (Vienna: 
Verlag von Leopold Heinrich, 1919), 11.
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Scmitz’ 1924 book, The Austrian Man, which, as we have seen, argued in favor of 
Austrian cultural uniqueness and independence.  Kleinwaechter’s book provided a point 
by point rebuttal of Schmitz’ assertions in order to argue the opposite position that 
Austria was a German land which ought to pursue a union with Germany.  Kleinwaechter 
also provided a set of criticisms of the old Habsburg state which countered Schmitz’ 
enthusiastic endorsement of the old Monarchy as the source of a distinctive Austrian 
national culture.
Like other Austrian German nationalists, Kleinwaechter argued that Austrian 
German-speakers were indeed part of the German Volk and had shared a common 
language, culture, ethnicity, and history with the other Germans of Europe for many 
centuries.  He took umbrage at the fact that the contemporary Austrian German state had 
been forced by the Entente powers to adopt the name “Austria,” which he argued had 
properly belonged only to the old Habsburg multinational state.  He stated, 
Old Austria was a state composed of eight nations, in which Germans were a 
minority.  It is therefore senseless to regard its German regions as a sort of smaller 
old Austria, as if one could dissolve the alloy brass into its component parts of 
zinc and copper, and yet continue to call zinc by the name of brass.  The 
Czechoslovak Republic, which includes Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenes, 
Poles and Magyars, could actually be called “Austria” with much more 
justification.  The Provisional National Assembly had the correct view when it 
argued that the new German-Austrian state was an original creation which had as 
little to do with the old state as any of the remaining ruins of the Monarchy.  With 
the Treaty of Saint Germain, the Entente has, against our will and against the 
logic of the facts, declared us to be the continuation of old Austria and has forced 
us to adopt the name “Austria.”146
Clearly, Kleinwaechter wanted no part of the name which he associated with the 
Habsburg state, and he argued that the Austrian Republic’s name had been selected in 
146Kleinwaechter, 61.
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order to force Austrian Germans to bear the blame for the Habsburg dynasty’s war even 
as they were kept from joining their countrymen in a great-German state. 
Not only did Kleinwaechter repudiate the name “Austria” as a relic of the old 
Monarchy, but he also vigorously attacked the Habsburg state as an anti-German entity 
which had acted against the interests of the German Volk.  In Kleinwaechter’s opinion, 
the Habsburg Monarchy had oppressed all of its constituent nationalities and had 
obstructed the movement toward national consciousness and self determination that all of 
Central Europe’s Völker experienced during the second half of the nineteenth century.  If 
Schmitz presented a relatively lenient view of the national resentments of the Monarchy’s 
Slavs and Italians while castigating the conduct of Austrian German nationalists during 
that era, Kleinwaechter took the opposite position, arguing that Austrian Germans had 
been blameless for the unrest during the Monarchy’s last decades even as the Czechs and 
Magyars had acted ruthlessly to enhance their own power within the Habsburg state.  
Kleinwaechter noted that despite the efforts of the Habsburgs to strangle German national 
aspirations, Bismarck had gotten far more enthusiastic applause from the people in 
Vienna during his 1892 visit than the Habsburg Emperor Franz Joseph ever received.147
Kleinwaechter did acknowledge that German Austrians possessed a unique and 
distinctive culture, but he disagreed strongly with Schmitz’ argument that such 
uniqueness was enough to justify Austrian independence.  Kleinwaechter asserted that 
Austrians were ultimately no different from Germans in Germany proper than any of the 
German tribes were from one another.  He also downplayed the traits which Schmitz had 
identified as the key components of Austria’s supposed national distinctiveness.  
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According to Kleinwaechter, baroque culture had never been a purely Austrian 
movement, but rather had encompassed both the Monarchy’s other nationalities and 
Germans outside of the Habsburg state’s boundaries.  He did acknowledge that a hard 
core of old Austrian patriots still existed, particularly in the Austrian military and in 
Vienna, but he denied that their views represented the true ideals of most Austrians.  
Ultimately, Kleinwaechter looked forward to the time when a new generation of Austrian 
Germans who had never known Habsburg rule would come of age and shake off the 
fetters of the past.148
Kleinwaechter also took aim at two of the favorite targets of the Austrian German 
nationalist political parties, the Catholic Church and the Jews, opposing Schmitz’ thesis 
that the Church had served as a unifying force in Austria which helped to distinguish 
between Austrians and Germans.  Kleinwaechter presented his own view of German 
history in which the originally freedom-loving yet highly communal German Volk had 
inheritied an “absolutist” and “despotic” imperial government and Catholic religion from 
the Roman Empire, which the Romans had in turn unfortunately acquired from their 
Asiatic neighbors.  According to Kleinwaechter, both the imperial ideals which the 
Habsburgs had embodied and the Catholic religion were ill-suited to the German 
character, and in many ways historically had served to retard or damage German cultural 
development.  The Protestant Reformation thus represented at least a partial reassertion 
of the characteristically German love of freedom in the face of the absolutist Catholic 




Catholicism in the south German population was due to the relatively weaker German 
blood there as a result of racial mixing.  Even so, he argued that the “Catholicism” of 
Austrian Germans was merely nominal, as religion had declined in significance.  In any 
case, religion was a less divisive issue in Austria than it was in Germany itself.  
According to Kleinwaechter, national Weltanschauung was more important than religion, 
which was fading into irrelevance in the modern era.149
In his discussions of the “Jewish problem” in Austria, Kleinwaechter went out of 
his way to discuss the matter “scientifically.”  In the end, however, he simply blamed the 
strength of anti-Semitism in Austria upon the Jews themselves, arguing that the Jews 
would not be faced with such opposition were it not for their own determined attempts to 
cultivate their own distinctive culture and separation from German society.  He charged 
that the Jews ultimately constituted a pernicious influence in Austria, dominating 
economic life and pushing the press in an increasingly sensationalistic and even 
pornographic direction.  In the end, Kleinwaechter could see no solution to the “Jewish 
question” other than Jewish migration or total Jewish assimilation into German culture 
and society.  Kleinwaechter was careful to assert that the Jews should not be the targets 
of violence or political discrimination, but he also argued that they could not make the 
issue of anti-Semitism go away by simply denouncing it as evil.  He believed that anti-
Semitism constituted an understandable German response to Jewish separateness, and 
would continue until the Jews themselves took steps to solve the problem which they had 
created.  Needless to say, Kleinwaechter included the Jews among those who were 
allegedly standing in the way of the Anschluß movement, and who had aided the Entente 
149Ibid., 143-151.
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powers in their attempts to continue the Habsburg legacy of oppression of the German 
Volk.150
Other Austrian German nationalists took a less hostile view of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, even if they argued that the old state was no longer relevant for contemporary 
Austrians.  The “Austrian mission,” which Kleinwaechter had dismissed as an idea with 
no appeal for Austrian Germans in search of national unity, appeared in the writings of 
some nationalist polemicists as a positive ideal.151  For example, A. Schwoner, in his 1919 
pamphlet on the Anschluß question, at least acknowledged that the Austrian mission had 
represented a necessary function for Austrian Germans throughout the medieval and early 
modern eras.  Schwoner argued that once the brief period of Babenberg hegemony and 
stability in Central Europe had ended, a union of the German-Austrian, Bohemian, and 
Hungarian territories became an appealing option in the face of Turkish incursions in the 
region.  He asserted, however, that Bohemia and Hungary had sought protection from the 
Habsburgs not because of that family’s own merits, but rather because of their leading 
role in the wider German Reich.  The Habsburg imperial office in essence offered the 
Monarchy’s non-German crownlands their only hope in averting Turkish conquest.  From 
that initial union in the early sixteenth century, the “Austrian idea” had developed further, 
incorporating the ideals of the defense of the Catholic faith and the notion of a 
supranational Monarchy as an important element in the European state system.  Only 
after the French Revolution did the various nationalities, inspired by more modern ideas, 




Schwoner, was too weak and too lacking in great personalities to defend its own 
historical mission, and hence perished in 1918.  In the aftermath of the Monarchy’s 
collapse Austrian mission which the Habsburgs had pursued had lost its relevance.  While 
the Monarchy had existed, its Austrian mission had been a worthy endeavor, and had 
even been worth the abandonment of German national unity by the German Volk in 
Austria.  The Turks no longer stood at the gates of Vienna, however, and the alliance of 
the Central European crownlands had ended, never to return. Thus, Anschluß was the 
only realistic option left for Austria in the postwar era.152
Karl Gottfried Hugelman made a similar argument regarding the Austrian mission 
in 1919 as well.  He asserted that the real bond which had linked all of the Habsburg 
lands together was their function as a bulwark against Turkish expansion and as a cultural 
bridge between East and West.  Hugelmann argued that this historical Austrian calling 
had been a necessary and valuable one so long as the Monarchy lasted.  By the nineteenth 
century, however, the Austrian mission had changed.  The new danger came from Russia, 
a thoroughly Asiatic power with an aggressively pan-Slavic ideology, and it became 
Austria’s duty to oppose the Russian Empire’s expansionism in Central Europe.  Austrian 
policy in this new era actually sharpened tensions in the area as it drove the Slavs of the 
Balkans into the arms of Russia.  The First World War had seen the West allied with 
Russia in a struggle against the Germans of Central Europe, and against the Austrian 
mission in the east.   Hugelmann argued that German-Austrians had served the dynasty 
loyally and sacrificed themselves for the Austrian mission, even in the face of this final, 
horrific conflict.  With the collapse of the Monarchy, however, the mission had ended, 
152Schwoner, 9-15.
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and it was only natural for German-Austrians to return to their German “mother Volk.”153
Most Austrian German nationalist writers were not so generous to the memory of 
the old Monarchy and its mission.  The view of the majority of these writers is probably 
best expressed by Stefan Edler, who simply charged that the “eastern mission” which the 
Habsburgs had pursed had ultimately been “fruitless.”154  All of these German nationalist 
commentators, whether they openly attacked the Habsburg Monarchy as a virulently 
oppressive, anti-German entity, or merely as relic of history which had passed into misty 
irrelevance, argued that the memory of the old dynastic state offered no solutions to 
modern Austrian problems.  Moreover, most Austrian German nationalists asserted that 
the Habsburg Monarchy’s unique qualities, whatever their relative merits, had never 
eclipsed the fact of Austrian Germanness.  These nationalist polemicists argued that 
Austrians were Germans, and that the even the old Monarchy itself had been a part of 
Germany in some sense until the nineteenth century.  Some commentators located the 
moment of separation between Austria and Germany at the Habsburgs’ forced abdication 
of the Holy Roman imperial throne by Napoleon in 1804, while others argued that 
Austria’s defeat at the hands of Bismarck in 1866 and subsequent exclusion from north 
German affairs during the wars of German unification had marked the moment of 
divergence.  All agreed, however, that any separation between Austria and Germany in an 
official sense was a recent phenomenon.  They also all agreed that Austria’s distinctive 
history as part of the Habsburg Monarchy was not sufficient to justify the existence of an 
153Karl Gottfried Hugelmann, “Der Anschluß Deutschösterreichs an Deutschland,” Flugblätter für 
Deutschösterreichs Recht 18 (1919), 5-6.  Hugelmann’s usage of the term “mother” here is peculiar.  Most 
German nationalists called Germany their “Fatherland,” and used patriarchal language to describe the 
individual German’s relationship to the German Volk and nation as a whole.
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independent Austrian state after the Monarchy’s collapse, or to support the idea that 
Austrians were not part of the German Volk.155
Austrian German Nationalists’ Arguments for Anschluß
The manner in which Austrian German nationalists during the First Republic 
made their arguments for Anschluß also generally demonstrated their attitudes toward the 
Habsburg Monarchy.  Such arguments did not merely describe the expected benefits 
which Austria would receive from union with Germany, but also often argued against 
other options, such as the formation of a Danubian federation with the Monarchy’s other 
successor states, participation in a broad, multinational pan-European union, or continued 
Austrian independence.  Austrian German nationalists frequently portrayed all of these 
alternatives to Anschluß as attempts to in some way reconstitute or emulate the 
Habsburgs’ multinational state, and they invariably characterized these options as being 
just as impractical or even detrimental to German interests as the Monarchy itself had 
been.
The idea of a Danubian federation presented the most obvious target for 
nationalist critics of the old Monarchy.  Such a scheme was never a very realistic option 
given the stance of both the Entente powers and the Monarchy’s other successor states.  
Indeed such a plan was rarely seriously proposed by even the most diehard Habsburg 
nostalgists during this period.  The idea was more seriously considered by Austrian 
patriots during the era of the Ständestaat between 1933 and 1938, when the government 
154Stefan Edler, in Deutschland wir kommen!, 37-38.
155Otto Wagner, Hans Uebersberger, and Eugen Oberhummer, in Deutschland, wir kommen!, 10-11, 13-14, 
36-37; Kleinwaechter, 156-163; Schwoner, 9-10; Hugelmann, 3-4.
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overtly invoked the legacy of the Habsburg Monarchy to support its own legitimacy, and 
by the conservative resistence movement to Nazi rule between 1938 and 1945.156
Nevertheless, just as Bauer and the Social Democrats critiqued the notion of a Danubian 
union as a covert attempt to restore the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy, so too did 
Austrian German nationalists attack the idea as an obstacle to the fulfillment of their 
dreams of German national unity.
In his comments regarding the prospect of a Danubian federation, Kleinwaechter 
clearly stated that he saw such a proposal as a means of both preventing Anschluß from 
ever occurring, and of reconstituting the Habsburg Monarchy in a new form.  
Kleinwaechter argued that the notion of a Danubian federation implicitly rested upon the 
unstated premise that the Habsburg state had been a necessary Central European 
institution rather than an entity created in order to further the House of Austria’s own 
dynastic interests.  As we have seen, Kleinwaechter regarded the Monarchy as a the fruit 
of Habsburg political interests, so he vigorously disputed the desirability of a new Central 
European union.  While some portions of the Monarchy had been united by the Danube 
as a natural feature of their geography, other regions within the old state had been 
oriented toward other geographic features such as the Elbe, the Alps, or the Carpathian 
Mountains.  Thus, the Monarchy had been a collection of economically and 
geographically diverse territories which had come together because of the Habsburgs’ 
political and military successes.  In his opinion, the old Monarchy had never been a 
natural or necessary entity by any means.157
156See Chapters 3 and 5.
157Kleinwaechter, 199-211.
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Furthermore, Kleinwaechter argued that the Monarchy had collapsed precisely 
because its constituent nationalities no longer desired to be a part of it.  To assert that 
some natural bond existed among the various successor states which required a 
continuing union was to deny that historical reality.  Indeed, he argued that the only way 
to make such a federal or economic union work was to create some sort of supra-
governmental organization which would essentially return the region to an approximation 
of its prewar status.  None of the Monarchy’s successor states had the slightest interest in 
renewing the association which they had viewed as an instrument of their own national 
oppression before 1918.  Those national groups had merely grown further apart since the 
Monarchy had collapsed. Furthermore, only Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were 
direct territorial descendants of the Monarchy, and other postwar states such as Poland, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia, which had gained territory when the Monarchy collapsed, 
would have to return that territory or at least relinquish some of their own autonomy in 
order to truly reconstitute the Habsburg state’s economic functions. Moreover a number 
of important European states, such as Germany, Russia, and Italy would regard such a 
Danubian union as a threat to their own economic interests and would inevitably prevent 
it from ever becoming a reality.  In the end, he noted that Austria was really the only state 
in Central Europe which needed to become part of some larger entity to secure its own 
economic viability.  Kleinwaechter concluded that union with Germany was a far more 
realistic proposition which had the support of a majority of the Austrian population.  He 
argued that there was simply nothing to be gained by pursuing a the proposal of a handful 
of nostalgic monarchists which would simply replicate the mistakes of the Habsburg 
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Monarchy and reignite the still smoldering national resentments from the last half century 
of the old state’s existence into new flame.158
Schwoner took a similarly dim view of the Danubian federal proposal, and argued 
that the old hatreds between the Monarchy’s nationalities would make such an option 
practically unworkable as well.  He also argued, however, that even if the successor states 
could abandon their mutual animosities in order to attempt such a union, that the outcome 
would actually work against the interests of Austrian Germans.  Whatever its faults, 
Germans had been a privileged group in the Monarchy   In a new Danubian federation, 
the weight of numbers would be on the side of the Slavs, and Austrian Germans would be 
at their mercy, and perhaps even forced at some time in the future to act against their 
national brethren in Germany on the orders of the anti-German majority.  At best, 
Schwoner argued that German-Austria would become a provincial state in such a 
federation, and at worst an outright possession of the Czechs.159
Schwoner also looked to the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy for evidence 
that such a proposal was entirely unrealistic.  He argued that after the power sharing 
agreement between the dynasty and its Hungarian crownlands in 1867, the so-called 
“Ausgleich,” the Habsburg state had been paralyzed by the Magyars’ attempts to preserve 
and enhance their position vis-à-vis the other nationalities.  According to Schwoner, a 
new Danubian federation would multiply the problems inherent in the Ausgleich
sevenfold, as each of the old Monarchy’s nationalities attempted to insure that they would 




Austria would be the loser thanks to its comparatively smaller population and power.  
Schwoner thus concluded that the federal proposal was a delusion which did not take into 
account the real interests and experiences of either Austria or the other peoples and states 
of the region.160
Other Austrian German nationalists generally concurred with Kleinwaechter and 
Schwoner’s assessments, and argued that a Danubian federation was an unrealistic idea 
which would simply recreate the worst aspects of the Habsburg Monarchy.  Indeed, some 
nationalist commentators took the argument a step further, and argued that a new union 
of the lands on the Danube would be even worse than the old state.  Whatever their many 
faults might have been, the Habsburgs at least had been a nominally German princely 
house.  Some nationalist writers feared that a new Danubian federation would end up as 
an instrument of Slavic imperialism in which Austrian Germans would be persecuted and 
victimized by their national “enemies.”  Even if outright oppression of Germans in 
Austria was not the end result of such a union, at the very least such an agreement would 
require that Austrian Germans abandon their advocacy on the behalf of their German 
brethren living in Bohemian and Moravia in order to secure the cooperation of 
Czechoslovakia.161
One Austrian German nationalist, Kleinwaechter, also criticized the idea of a pan-
European union as an alternative to Anschluß.  The pan-Europa movement had been 
founded by the Austrian aristocrat Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923, and was based 
160Ibid., 21-24.
161“Der tschechische Imperialismus und Deutschösterreichs Schicksal,” Flugblätter für Deutschösterreichs 
Recht (1919), 3-6; Erwin Stransky, Alphonse Dopsch, Wilhelm Suida, Franz von Dafert, Ernst Kraufte,  
Paul von Hock, in Deutschland, wir kommen!, 6-7, 22-24, 27-29, 32-33, 43-45.
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upon the notion that the only way to secure European peace and prosperity after the First 
World War was to move away from the nationalistic notions which had contributed to the
conflict toward a continent-wide federal union.  Kleinwaechter did not attack 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas outright, and indeed he professed to find them commendable 
and attractive.  Kleinwaechter did, however, vigorously dispute the manner in which 
Oscar Schmitz had used the pan-European proposal in order to argue against Anschluß.162
Kleinwaechter noted that if such a European union were to be founded under Austrian 
leadership, it would appear very much like an attempt to recreate the Habsburgs’ 
patriarchal, multinational empire to the inhabitants of the successor states.  Thus, all of 
his criticisms regarding the prospect of a Danubian federation applied to a pan-European 
federation as well.  Moreover, Kleinwaechter argued that if European unity was truly the 
eventual goal of such a movement, then it really would not matter if Austria joined such 
an association outright or as part of a great-German union which might be founded in the 
meantime.  According to Kleinwaechter, Anschluß was no obstacle to an eventual united 
Europe, and he accused Schmitz of using a noble aim in order to advance his own anti-
Anschluß rhetoric.  Kleinwaechter acknowledged that a pan-European federation was a 
worthy idea, but he argued that it should not be used to perpetuate Habsburgist fantasies 
of a renewal of Austrian hegemony in Central Europe at the expense of the unity of the 
German Volk.163
Austrian German nationalists of course opposed the notion of continued Austrian 
162Coudenhove-Kalergi later revealed himself to be an opponent of Anschluß, and he proclaimed that the 
Pan-Europa movement was based in part upon the multinational example of the Habsburg Monarchy.  See 
Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Österreichs Europäische Sendung (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1934), 2-
24.
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independence.  As we have seen, many of them took umbrage at the fact that the First 
Republic had been forced by the Entente to bear the name of the Habsburg state in the 
first place.  Their arguments against Austrian independence in fact denied any 
meaningful continuity between the Habsburg Monarchy and postwar Austria.  Simply 
put, Austria was not the heir to the Habsburg Monarchy and had no basis for a separate 
existence apart from Germany now that the dynastic state which had divided the German 
Volk for so long had finally collapsed.  Moreover, these German nationalists argued that 
an independent Austria was economically unviable.  Some commentators admitted that 
an Austrian German state might have been feasible if it had included areas of dense 
German settlement in Bohemia and Moravia, as its leaders had originally intended.  
Those regions had been claimed by Czechoslovakia, however, and the German Austrian 
heartland could never survive for long on its own, severed from the economic network 
which had nurtured it during the Habsburg era.  Indeed, Austrian German nationalists 
pointed to Seipel’s Geneva Protocols as evidence that foreign loans were the only thing 
keeping the First Republic’s economy alive.  Anschluß, they proclaimed, was the only 
option left for Austrian Germans.164
Indeed, union with Germany was the only ideal which served to link the Austrian 
German nationalist camp together during the First Republic.  The Great German People’s 
Party, the Landbund, and later the Austrian National Socialist Party and elements of the 
Heimwehr represented the most potent nationalist political organizations, but Austrian 
163Kleinwaechter, 212-221.
164Wilhelm Winkler, “Die zunkünftige Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschösterreichs und der Anschluß an 
Deutschland,” Flugblätter für Deutschösterreichs Recht 31 (1919), 3-8; Schwoner, 15-16; Suida, 27-29; 
Hugelmann, 8-9, Kleinwaechter, 223-240.
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German nationalism encompassed a circle of public advocates which extended beyond 
the membership of those groups.  Beyond its support for German unity, the Austrian 
German nationalist camp lacked a strong collective vision for Austrian society and 
politics.  Most Austrian German nationalists did at least agree that the legacy of the 
Habsburg Monarchy did not offer contemporary Austrians any sort of guidance regarding 
what path they should take in the postwar era.  Furthermore, many nationalist 
commentators attacked the old Monarchy as a historically anti-German institution, and 
firmly rejected any proposed solution for Austria’s contemporary problems which looked 
to the Habsburg state as an example or model.  For Austrian German nationalists, the 
drive toward German unity in the form of a great German nation state was the essence of 
Austria’s history, and the Habsburg Monarchy simply had no place in any sort of modern 
definition of Austrian identity.  Anschluß was the future; the Habsburg Monarchy was 
part of a past best forgotten.
The Austrian First Republic saw a fairly stable consensus among the major 
political factions concerning Austrian national identity.  The entire political spectrum, 
ranging from the Marxist left to the Catholic right, affirmed that Austrians were
Germans, and attempts to argue for the existence of an Austrian nation separate from the 
German Volk were exceedingly rare.  The opinions of the various political camps 
regarding the question of Anschluß were somewhat more diverse, however.  In the first 
years after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, all of Austria’s political leaders called 
for Anschluß, and argued that an independent, small Austria was economically unviable, 
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and all of the major factions maintained this stance, although the Christian Social Party 
eventually combined its proclamations of Austrian Germanness with firm declarations of 
Austrian patriotism.
There was no similar consensus among the parties concerning the Habsburg past.  
The Christian Social Party, as the major organization of the traditional right in Austria, 
looked to the old Monarchy as a positive institution which had lamentably crumbled as a 
result of its defeat in the Great War.  The Social Democrats disagreed vehemently, and 
cast the dynasty and its multinational state as a “prison of the peoples” which had opposed 
the forces of progress, freedom and social justice at every turn.  The Social Democrats saw 
their own Party and the Austrian working class as the true heroes of Austria’s history, and 
they argued that the First Republic had been founded by the revolutionary workers as a 
clean break with the Habsburg legacy of tyranny and subjugation.  The Austrian German 
nationalist camp was somewhat divided regarding the Habsburg past.  Some portrayed the 
dynasty as an oppressive entity which had opposed the historical movement toward 
German unity in order to preserve its own political power.  Other German nationalists 
viewed the Monarchy as a less anti-German entity, but one which had passed from the 
stage of history nonetheless.  All of the various leaders and intellectuals in the Austrian 
German nationalist camp agreed that the legacy of the old Monarchy had no lessons to 
teach contemporary Austria, which was destined to become part of a great-German state.
The debate regarding the significance of Austria’s Habsburg past was not 
conducted in a vacuum, however, but rather was a part of the larger argument concerning 
the appropriate course for the Austrian state.  The political parties did not just argue about 
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the meaning of Austrian history, but also struggled with one another concerning the 
relationship between Church and state, the value of democracy, and the necessary level of 
social welfare to be provided by the government.  Indeed these ideological arguments only 
became more intense as the Republican era wore on, and were at the root of the collapse of 
democracy in Austria in 1933.  
One topic of particularly fierce debate among the First Republic’s political camps 
was the content of Austrian education.  As the parties vied with one another to determine 
the fate of Austria in the postwar era, they also struggled to influence to content of the 
Republic’s educational curricula, textbooks, and classroom instruction.  Unsurprisingly, 
the political camps’ various visions of Austrian national identity and of the meaning 
Austria’s history as part of the Habsburg Monarchy featured prominently in these 
educational debates.  These struggles to reshape the Austrian education between 1918 and 
1933 offer a clear view of the extent to which these factions sought to inculcate their 
national and historical views in Austrian schoolchildren. 
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Chapter 2. Education and the Habsburg Past in the First Republic 
The leaders of the First Republic not only argued about Austrian national identity 
and the legacy of the Habsburg past, they also attempted to use Austria’s state education 
system to disseminate those ideas to the next generation of Austrian citizens.  All of 
Austria’s major political factions in 1918 agreed that Austrian education needed to be 
reformed to take into account the state’s new circumstances after the collapse of the 
Habsburg Monarchy.  The various camps disagreed sharply with one another concerning 
the precise form and appropriate extent of educational reform, however, and acrimonious 
debate regarding Austrian educational policy continued throughout the life of the First 
Republic.  The two major factions in this ongoing argument regarding educational policy 
were the two largest political parties, the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, and 
the debate encompassed not only the best way to educate students about Austria’s 
Habsburg past, but also the role of religion in education and the manner in which the 
school system ought to be organized.
The basic consensus about Austrian Germanness was indeed reflected in the First 
Republic’s educational laws, curricula, and textbooks.  Austrian educational policies 
emphasized the essential German character of the Austrian people, and portrayed Austrian 
history as part of the wider history of the German Volk.  Beyond this basic agreement 
concerning Austrian membership in the German nation, however, Austrian leaders and 
educators had difficulty agreeing on how Austria’s Habsburg past ought to be presented to 
Austrian students.  The pedagogical stances of the two main political parties naturally 
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corresponded quite closely with their basic views about the legacy of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.  Conservative politicians, teachers, and pedagogical theorists most often 
argued that Austrian children ought to be taught to see the First Republic as the inheritor 
of the proud historical legacy of the old Monarchy, and to internalize the Catholic 
religious principles which had featured so prominently in the Habsburgs’ multinational 
state.  Socialist leaders and educators, on the other hand, argued that Austrian education 
needed to move away from its previous strong focus upon dynastic, political, and military 
history, and they proposed educational reforms which sought to inculcate students with a 
devotion to democracy and egalitarianism.  Such an educational perspective inevitably 
presented the old Monarchy and its leaders in a negative light and emphasized the manner 
in which the First Republic represented a new beginning for the Austrian people.
This debate about how to teach Austria’s history was never satisfactorily resolved, 
and neither major political faction fully instituted its pedagogical ideals.  Even after the 
Socialists’ initial parliamentary dominance in the First Republic gave way to a succession 
of conservative coalition governments after 1920, the federal structure of the Austrian 
state allowed the SDP to influence educational policy on the provincial and local levels, 
especially in Vienna.  Indeed, even at the national level, the Christian Socials never 
commanded a firm enough governing majority to completely ignore Social Democratic 
opposition to its policies.  Thus, both sides had to compromise, and the new Republic’s 
educational policies reflected some of the ideas of both Austrian conservatives and Social 
Democrats.  Meaningful education reform did take place, however, and the development 
of new educational legislation and official state curricula during the republican era 
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reflected a view of Austrians as a German people.  Austrian education did not present a 
consistent view of Austria’s past, however, sometimes portraying the First Republic as a 
completely new entity, while at other times casting it as the heir of the old Monarchy.  The 
revised history and civics textbooks used by the state’s schools likewise emphasized the 
German character of the Austrian people.  Some of these texts, however, presented 
students with a fairly hostile view of the old Monarchy, while others highlighted the 
continuity between the old state and the new, and lauded the Habsburgs’ positive 
historical achievements.  The Austrian pedagogical community debated these issues 
further, and could come to no more of an agreement regarding the meaning of Austrian 
history than the First Republic’s educational policy makers or textbook authors.  
Ultimately, the debate on Austria’s Habsburg past and the content of Austrian education 
during the First Republic reflected the wide ideological differences between the state’s 
major political factions regarding politics, society, and the meaning of Austrian history, 
and it would be these very differences which would ultimately result in the destruction of 
Austrian democracy in 1933.
i. Austrian Educational Reform Between 1918 and 1933 
The debate over how Austria’s history ought best to be taught to students was but 
one of several disagreements between the two major parties regarding educational reform 
during the First Republic.  The Social Democrats, who dominated local school boards in 
Vienna and other large Austrian cities throughout the First Republic as well as the entire 
state’s educational bureaucracy during the Republic’s first year and a half, sought to 
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transform Austrian education into a more secular and egalitarian endeavor based upon 
democratic and Socialist ideological principles.  The Christian Social Party vigorously 
opposed the left’s reform program, and after its electoral success in 1920 was in position 
to ensure that a more conservative vision predominated in the Ministry of Education.  The 
various German nationalist political parties for the most part lacked a coherent educational 
agenda, and frequently supported the conservative right’s educational program when they 
joined various anti-Socialist coalition governments throughout the 1920s.165  Thus the 
Austrian First Republic saw repeated conflicts between the Socialists and conservatives 
regarding the scope of state educational reform.
The relationship between the Catholic Church and state educational policy was one 
area of particularly heated debate.  The Social Democrats wanted to ensure that the new 
Republic was a secular one, and they sought to limit the role of the Church in Austrian 
schools.  In particular, the Socialists argued that parents ought to have the right to exempt 
their children from religious education, which had been mandatory in state schools before 
1918.  The Catholic Church vehemently opposed this idea, and viewed it as an 
infringement upon its historical role in Austrian education. In 1919, the Socialist 
Undersecretary for Education, Otto Glöckel, issued a decree which exempted students 
from religious education courses upon parental request, and even future conservative 
165The German People’s Party and the Landbund largely agreed with the Christian Social Party’s social 
ideals, and thus frequently supported the CSP’s educational agenda throughout the Republican era despite 
their continuing unease with the conservative emphasis upon a close relationship between the state and the 
Catholic Church.  “Das ‘Salzburger Programm’ der Großdeutschen Volkspartei, 1920,” and “Politische 
Leitsätze des Landbundes für Österreich, 1923,” in Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, ed., 
Klaus Berchtold (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967), 439-483; Adam Wandruszka, “Österreichs 
politische Struktur,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik, 1954), 381-383; Michael J. Zeps, Education and the Crisis of the First Republic
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1987), 45-47, 55.
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governments continued this policy.  Throughout the early 1920s, the Christian Social 
Party was divided between a faction which urged a return to mandatory religious 
education, and a more moderate wing which did not want to risk alienating the Party’s 
anti-Catholic, German nationalist political allies in parliament by restoring the old system.  
Ultimately the moderate faction won the debate, but this victory came only after 
considerable acrimonious wrangling within the Party.  The most profoundly conservative 
and religious members of the Christian Social Party remained deeply dissatisfied with the 
so-called Glöckel Decree, and they continued to criticize this state of affairs until the 
decree was finally repealed by the authoritarian Ständestaat government in 1934.166
The Social Democrats also wanted to institute major reforms in the structure of the 
Austrian school system in order to make it more egalitarian.  In 1918, the Austrian 
educational system was still organized according the old imperial Constitution of 1867, 
which provided for a three track educational system that divided students according to 
academic ability.  Under this system, the least promising students studied in terminal, 
eight year primary schools or Volksschulen.  More talented children, especially in urban 
areas, could, after four or five years in a Volksschule, move on to receive instruction in 
more advanced primary schools called Bürgerschulen.  Only the most gifted Austrian 
children progressed from the Volksschulen to the secondary level in a variety of 
Mittelschulen which provided advanced technical or academic education in order to 
prepare them for entry into universities or professional schools.  This system forced 
166Zeps, 38, 58-60, 75, 83-103; Ernst Papanek, The Austrian School Reform: Its Bases, Principles and 
Development– The Twenty Years Between the Two World Wars (New York: Frederick Fell, Inc., 1962), 49-
57; “Das ‘Linzer Programm’ der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Österreichs, 1926,” in  
Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 258-261.
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parents and teachers to make decisions regarding children’s prospective career paths by 
the time students were ten years old.167
The Social Democrats, led by Glöckel, criticized this hierarchical set of 
educational paths as inherently unfair, and argued that the system discriminated against 
lower class children who did not have enough opportunity to demonstrate their talents by 
the young age required in order to gain access to the highest levels of academic education.  
After 1918 the Socialists advocated the creation of the Einheitsschule, or unified school.  
Under this proposed reform, state education in Austria would be split into three periods of 
four years, as all students attended, in turn, a primary-level Volksschule, an intermediate 
Mittelschule, and finally a secondary-level Oberschule.  Students within this system would 
be divided into two tracks, one for average and advanced, university-bound students, and 
one for less talented pupils.  The Social Democrats argued that such a system would allow 
intelligent but economically disadvantaged students access to higher quality education.  
Most conservatives, and many secondary school teachers and university professors, 
however, opposed the Einheitsschule proposal on the grounds that it did not take into 
account the distinctive needs of students of varying abilities, and that it would inevitably 
lead to a decline in the level of education offered in Austrian state schools.
The debate over the Einheitsschule continued throughout most of the Republic’s 
first decade, and was not resolved until the passage of the educational reform laws of 
1927, which  represented only a partial step toward the unified school system which the 
Social Democrats envisioned.  These laws limited attendance in Volkschulen to five years, 
and transformed the Bürgerschulen into Hauptschulen, schools which offered less talented 
167Zeps, 23, 70-71.
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students a lower level secondary education for the first time.  Mittelschulen remained the 
domain of the most gifted Austrian pupils, who could receive a liberal arts education, 
including the study of the classics in Greek and Latin, at Gymnasien, or pursue a rigorous 
program of science, mathematics and modern foreign languages at Realschulen, or attend 
Realgymnasien, institutions that combined elements from the programs of both Gymnasien
and Realschulen.  Additionally, the reforms created Frauenoberschulen, secondary 
schools which for the first time offered a more advanced academic education for gifted 
young women.  The program of instruction in the lower classes of the various types of 
Mittelschulen resembled that offered in the Hauptschulen, and, in theory, after fours years 
of distinguished academic performance an ambitious Hauptschule student could transfer 
to a Mittelschule for the reminder of his secondary education.  In practice, however, the 
demanding foreign or classical language requirements of the upper levels of the various 
Mittelschulen prevented most Hauptschule students, who usually did not receive the same 
early and intensive program of language instruction as students in the first four grades of 
the Mittleschulen, from making the leap to the higher educational track.  Still, the 1927 
reform laws enabled the Social Democrats to argue that they at least had begun to move 
the Austrian educational system in the direction of a more egalitarian structure, even if 
they had failed to create a true Einheitsschule system.168
The disputes between Austrian Social Democrats and Catholic conservatives about 
school organization and religious instruction in schools, combined with their 
168Zeps, 71; Papanek, 87-91; “Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,” Volkserziehung,Nachrichten des 
Österreichischen Unterrichtesamtes (1928): 2-4; “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” Volkserziehung, 
(1928): 5.  Educational reformers in Germany during the 1920s also unsuccessfully sought to create 
Einheitsschulen in order to reduce the class bias inherent in the similarly hierarchical German school 
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disagreements over how Austrian history ought to be presented to Austrian students, 
helped make educational policy a particularly charged political issue during the Austrian 
First Republic.  While the Social Democrats never gained a majority of the seats in 
parliament, they still commanded extensive electoral support throughout Austria, and the 
CSP’s governing coalitions with the German nationalist factions were usually too fragile 
to permit the conservatives simply to impose its will over the left’s objections.  
Acrimonious debate and prolonged negotiations over matters of educational policy were 
thus constant during the First Republic.  The two sides did reach at least tentative 
compromises concerning these educational controversies, but the ideological stalwarts in 
both camps were often dissatisfied with the manner in which the disputes were resolved.
Ultimately the authoritarian Ständestaat which succeeded the First Republic in 1933 undid 
many of the Republic’s reforms of the Austrian school system, but only after the Austrian 
politicians and educators had engaged in a wide ranging debate concerning the best way to 
teach students about Austrian national identity and the meaning of Austria’s Habsburg 
past.
State Educational Curricula and National Education
All of the First Republic’s policy makers and educators, no matter their political 
ideology, agreed that some manner of curricular reform was necessary for Austria after the 
collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, even if they often disagreed regarding the precise 
form such revisions ought to take.  The new state’s educational leaders were unanimous, 
system.  Fritz K. Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1979), 42-43.
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however, in their view of Austrian national identity.  They all argued that Austrians were 
part of the German Volk, and that the program of instruction in history, geography, and 
civics in Austrian state schools needed to emphasize that Austrians were Germans.  All of 
the various provisional curricula for schools during the First Republic’s early years as well 
as the new official curricula drafted as a part of the sweeping educational reform laws of 
1927 reflected this consensus concerning national identity and explicitly provided that 
students needed to be made aware of Austria’s Germanness.  The vision of the Habsburg 
past presented in these curricula was far less well defined, however.  The new history 
curricula naturally included the Habsburg period, but presented no precise instructions 
about which interpretation of Austria’s pre-1918 history ought to be taught.  Thus, the new 
curricula clearly stated that Austria was German land, and that Austrian history was best 
understood as part of the wider history of Germany, but beyond those ideals, they were 
mute regarding whether Austrian students ought to be taught to regard the old Monarchy 
as a positive or negative part of the First Republic’s heritage.
The policy makers and pedagogical theorists of the First Republic all agreed that 
education embodied more than a simple transfer of information and skills. For them 
education involved teaching children character and identity as well.  For example, in 1919 
the Socialist Undersecretary of Education, Otto Glöckel, issued a decree stating that the 
basic goal of state education was the spiritual, ethical, and artistic development of 
Austrian children.169  Likewise, a manual for teachers in Austrian Mittelschulen from 
nearly a decade later presented a similar conceptualization of the purpose of Austrian 
169“Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 16. Juni 1919, Z. 15151, 
betreffend Schule und Volksbildungsbstrebungen,” Volkserziehung, Official Section (1919): 174-177.
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schools: “Educational institutions must develop the spiritual, moral, and physical powers 
of the children entrusted to them and educate young people in a social, civic, national, and 
moral-religious spirit.”170  The First Republic’s educational laws envisioned education as 
an enterprise in which all of the subjects taught to students were organically related, and 
some of the state’s curricula explicitly stated that education should not be dominated by 
any particular political ideology, but rather needed to be directed toward helping students 
to contribute to the welfare of the Austrian state and the German Volk as a whole.171
Indeed, the idea that Austrian students needed to be taught that they were a were 
part of the German Volk featured prominently in many of the First Republic’s educational 
laws and curricula.  Of course these laws and curricula also noted that Austrian children 
needed to be taught loyalty to the Austrian state as well, and at times the language used in 
these laws and curricula was somewhat ambiguous.  For example, the term “Volk” 
(people) was most often used to refer to people who were members of the German nation, 
but the word was also used without national connotations to describe just the people living 
in the Austrian state.  In a similar manner the word “Vaterland” (fatherland) could refer to 
either Austria itself or the German nation as a whole, just as the term “Heimat” 
(homeland) might describe Austria proper or the provinces which made up the Austrian 
state.  Such terms were often used without modifiers in Austrian educational documents, 
and sometimes these sources did not offer enough context to make clear in which sense 
the terms were being used.  
170Peter Mosser and Theodor Ritterer, eds., Die Mittelschulen in Österreich: Ein Handbuch für Schule und 
Schulverwaltung (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1929), 227.
171“Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 7-8; “Lehrplanentwürfe für allgemein bildende Oberschulen,” 
Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section (1924): 39; “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” Volkserziehung, 
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More frequently, however, the First Republic’s educational laws and curricula 
quite explicitly argued that Austrian students needed to be taught to see themselves not 
only as citizens of the Austrian state, but also as proud members of the larger German 
nation.  One proposed curriculum from 1921 for history education in secondary schools 
stated that, “the end goal of a total historical education is a recognition of the uniqueness 
and significance of the German Volk as well as a historically-derived sense of individual 
ethical responsibility.”172  This document also referred to a prewar text from the German 
Kaiserreich which asserted that Germany really included all of the German Volk, whether 
they lived in Germany proper, Austria, or as national minorities in other European 
territories.  Similarly, a 1924 curricular outline explicitly stated that it was one of the most 
important goals of Austrian education to teach students that they belonged to the German 
Volk, no matter what the political boundaries in contemporary Europe happened to be, and 
that they had a duty to the entire Volk.173
The new official curricula drafted for upper level schools in 1927 were similarly 
explicit regarding Austrian national identity, and argued that instruction ought to 
emphasize German language and culture, as well as the history of both the German Volk
and Austrian Fatherland. The introductory comments to the curricula for Mittelschulen
argued that in addition to a sense of social responsibility to the wider community and 
loyalty to the Austrian state, Austrian education must be explicitly national in order to 
transform students into “conscious members of the cultural community of their Volk.”  By 
(1928): 3.
172“Lehrplanentwurf für den Geschichtsunterricht an achtklassigen Oberrealschulen,” Volkserziehung, ,
Pedagogical Section (August 1, 1921): 342-4.
173“Lehrplanentwürfe für allgemein bildende Oberschulen,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section (1924): 
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providing students with examples of the great men and women from the past, whether 
Austrian or German, such an education would acquaint them with the history, 
achievements, and worthiness of their Volk.  In one area, the document even noted in 
passing that Austrian education policy was designed to produce “educated Germans” 
through rigorous instruction in the German language, “the first and strongest bond for the 
great German Volk.”174
The emphasis upon Austrian Germanness found in many of the First Republic’s 
curricula did not, however, preclude an appreciation of the unique virtues of the Austrian 
homeland.  During his tenure as Undersecretary for Education, Glöckel issued a number of 
decrees which defined the awakening of children’s love for their Heimat and Austrian 
Fatherland as an important goal of Austrian state education.  Glöckel argued that such 
education was as much a spiritual (geistlich) and moral (sittlich) matter as it was a 
geographical one.  In a 1920 curricula for Volksschulen, Glöckel recommended that 
teachers use German language fairytales and folktales as well as descriptions of Austria’s 
natural beauty and historical monuments in order to help children to appreciate the special 
qualities of the “Austrian Alpine Volk.”  Curricula for Volksschulen after Glöckel had 
resigned his office continued to focus on cultivating students’ loyalty and affection for 
their Austrian homeland as well.  These sorts of statements were especially prominent in 
the guidelines for Volksschulen, but they appeared in some form in curricula for all of the 
levels of Austrian education.  Almost all Austrian school curricula also clearly stated that 
education regarding Austrian distinctiveness necessarily had to take into account Austria’s 
39.
174“Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,”2, 41; “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 2-4.
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larger context as part of the German cultural community and Volk.175  In certain instances, 
decrees or curricula issued by the Austrian Ministry of Education mentioned the need to 
help students to love their Austrian Fatherland without also specifically emphasizing 
Austria’s membership in the German nation, but such documents were so rare that they 
only serve to underscore the frequency with which Austrian policy makers linked the 
notions of students’ loyalty to the Austrian state and their duty to the German Volk as a 
whole.176  Thus, the leaders of the First Republic wanted to make young students aware of 
their valuable and distinctive Austrian heritage, but such an awareness was never designed 
as a denial of Austria’s essential Germanness.
The First Republic’s Ministry of Education also emphasized Austria’s continuing 
ties to other German-speakers in a number of other ways.  For example, a 1919 Ministry 
decree provided that the results of university entrance exams from Germany would be 
recognized by Austrian universities.177  In 1926, the Ministry issued a decree which 
allotted state funds to help Austrian students study in Germany (although the Austrian 
government provided similar funding for student trips to Budapest as well, indicating 
some sort of a continuing link between Austria and at least one of the Monarchy’s 
175“Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 16. Juni 1919, Z. 15151, 
betreffend Schule und Volksbildungsbstrebungen,” Volkserziehung, Official Section (1919): 174-177; 
“Erlaß des mit der Leitung des Unterrichtsamtes betrauen Unterstaatssekretärs vom 13. August,1920 Z. 
16047, betreffend die versuchsweise Einführung neuer Lehrpläne an den allgemeinen Volksschulen,” 
Volkserziehung, Official Section (1919): 542; “Lehrpläne für allgemein Volksschulen,” Volkserziehung,,
Pedagogical Section (1924): 100: “Lehrplan für die 1. bis 5. Schulstufe der allgemein Volkschulen,” 
Volkserziehung, Official Section (September 1, 1926): 58-59. 
176“Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Hauptschulen,” Volkserziehung,  Official 
Section (August 15, 1927): 130-134; “12. November 1928, Schulfeiern,” Volkserziehung, Official Section 
(October 15, 1928), 159-60.
177“Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 7. Juni 1919, B. 9560/a, 
betreffend die Anerkennung der Mittelschulen des Deuthschen Reiches abgelegten Reifeprüfungen,” 
Volkserziehung, Official Section (1919): 140-1.
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successor states).178  Austrian pedagogical journals frequently published articles written by 
German pedagogical theorists and reported the latest news regarding the state of 
educational policy and debate in Germany.179  In 1929, the Austrian government even 
followed the lead of the German Ministry of Education in declaring March 22 to be the 
“day of the good book” in order to impress upon students the importance of German 
language literature.180  All of these measures amply demonstrate the commitment of the 
First Republic’s educational policy makers to a view of Austria as part of the wider 
community of the German Volk.
The First Republic also designated several specific academic subjects as 
particularly useful for cultivating students’ sense of a German national identity.  History 
was the most important of these subjects.  The First Republic’s earliest provisional and 
proposed curricula for historical instruction in state schools almost always explicitly stated 
that an important part of the purpose of history education in Austria was to teach students 
to love not just their Austrian Fatherland, but also the German Volk as a whole.  Similarly, 
these curricula all conceived of Austrian history as part of the wider sweep of German 
history, and recommended that teachers present historical developments in Austria in the 
context of the history of all Germans throughout Europe.181
178“Kundmachungen– Erste heimatkundliche Osterstudienfahrt ins Reich,” Volkserziehung, Official 
Section (March 15, 1926): 32-3, 175.
179See for example, Johannes Kühnel, “Die Hauptaufgabe der neuen Erziehung,” Monatsheft für 
Pädagogische Reform 69 (1919): 284-288; “Geschichtsunterricht,” Der Neue Weg 5 (1924): 217-19.
180“Tag des guten Buches,” Volkserziehung, (March 15, 1929): 46.
181“Entwurf eines Lehrplanes für die vier Klassen der allgemeinen Mittelschule,” Volkserziehung, 
Pedagogical Section (May 15, 1922): 203; “Lehrplanentwürfe für die Landschulen,” Volkserziehung,
Pedagogical Section (1923): 49; “Lehrplan für drei- und vierklassige Volkschulen,”  Volkserziehung,
Pedagogical Section (1923): 76;“Lehrplan für fünf- und mehrklassige Volkschulen,” Volkserziehung, 
Pedagogical Section (1923): 96; “Lehrpläne für allgemein Volksschulen,” Volkserziehung,, Pedagogical 
Section (1924): 107; “Lehrplanentwürfe für allgemein bildende Oberschulen,” Volkserziehung,
Pedagogical Section (1924): 38; “Normal-Lehrplan des Reform-Realgymnasiums (5. bis 8. Klasse),” 
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The series of comprehensive official curricula for all levels of Austrian education 
promulgated in 1927 continued to present historical instruction as a medium for 
transmitting a sense of Austrian Germanness to students.  While the program for historical 
instruction for Volksschulen focused upon the history and geography of the students’ 
immediate Heimat and of Austria as a whole, the historical curricula designed for older 
students contained more nationally oriented material.182  The curriculum for Hauptschulen
defined history education as the “history of the Heimat and the German Volk” and argued 
that history instruction should awaken “respect for great men and deeds, and love of Volk
and Fatherland.”183  The curriculum for Mittelschulen contained identical language, and 
further provided that history ought to be used to educate the oldest and most gifted 
Austrian students about the economic, social, and political aspects of Austrian life in order 
to enable them to participate in “public life and the destiny of the Volksgemeinschaft (the 
community of the [German] Volk).”184
Such presentations of Austrian history obviously reflected a real historical link 
between historical developments in Austria and Germany.  After all, the Habsburgs 
themselves had been the customary bearers of the German imperial crown for hundreds of 
years, and the old Austrian Monarchy had been heavily involved in German affairs until 
the middle of the nineteenth century.  Still, historically Austria had been as closely linked 
Volkserziehung, Official Section (August 1, 1925): 147;“Lehrplanentwurf für die einheitliche allgemein 
bildende Oberschule,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section (September 15, 1925): 64; “Lehrplan für die 1. 
bis 5. Schulstufe der allgemein Volkschulen,” Volkserziehung, Official Section (September 1, 1926): 60.
182The relatively complicated topic of Austria’s national identity was presumably seen by the Austrian 
government as a topic for older, more sophisticated pupils.  “Erläuterungen zum Lehrplan für die 1. bis 5. 
Schulstufe an allgemeinen Volksschulen,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section (October 15, 1927): 90-94; 
“Die Lehrpläne für die allgemeinen Volksschulen,” Verordnungsblatt für den Dienstbereich des 
Bundesministeriums für Unterricht (1930): 10.  
183“Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,” 13.
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with the Slavic and Magyar lands in central and eastern Europe as it had been to the other 
German-speaking regions of the continent.  The First Republic’s historical curricula 
sometimes overlooked or minimized this fact, however.  Indeed, one 1924 Mittelschule
curriculum actually recommended that the history of the Monarchy’s successor states be 
taught only in so far as that information was necessary to help students understand the 
modern Austrian republic.  Clearly, educational policy makers wanted to emphasize their 
vision of Austria as a German land, even at the expense of acquainting students with their 
homeland’s historical relationship with other states which had once been ruled by the 
Habsburgs.185
The actual content of history education set out in these curricula obviously 
contained a great deal of material on Austria’s Habsburg past, but they also invariably 
presented Austrian history in a wider German context.  For example, a 1926 curriculum 
for Volksschulen began its narrative of Austrian history with an instructional unit entitled 
“How the Heimat became the soil of the German Volk.”186  Other historical curricula 
included topics in their programs of instruction which emphasized the relationship 
between Austrian history and that of Germany as whole with titles such as “the Volk and 
its members,” “Migration of the Germanic peoples,” “Christianization of the Germans,” 
“The Cultural Work of the Germanic peoples,”  “The German City in the Middle Ages,” 
“The Development of German trade,” “The Era of the Enlightenment in Austria and 
Germany,”   “The Foundation of the “Prussian-German Reich,” and “The Struggle for 
184“Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 30-31, 80, 148, 199.
185“Vaterlandskunde; Umgrenzung des Lehr- und Prüfungsstoffes, 5. April 1924,"  Volkserziehung, Official
Section (1924): 63-64; “Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,” 13-14, “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 30-31; 
79-81, 146-148, 198-200.
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Democracy in Austria and Germany (From the beginning of the Revolution in the Year 
1848 to the new foundation of state relationships in the year 1918),”187  These historical 
curricula did indeed generally trace the development of Austria from a small alpine duchy 
in the Middle Ages to a vast multinational empire under the rule of the Habsurgs, but they 
always presented Austria as a quintessentially German land which had been intimately 
linked to the other areas of German settlement in Europe throughout its history.
Some of these curricula also contained provisions which called for history teachers 
to place much less emphasis upon dynastic, political, and military history than they had in 
the past.  Instead, these curricula recommended that Austrian history education focus upon 
culture and the experiences of the Austrian population as a whole.  Such recommendations 
were particularly common during the early years of the First Republic when the Social 
Democrats dominated the Ministry of Education, but even later Christian Social 
governments sometimes provided for at least a more judicious balance between political 
and cultural history than had been characteristic of history education during the last 
decades of the Habsburg Monarchy.188  Obviously such a change in the focus of history 
education had the potential to minimize the role of the Habsburgs and their dynastic state 
in Austria’s past while simultaneously highlighting the importance of German culture as a 
186“Lehrplan für die 1. bis 5. Schulstufe der allgemeine Volkschulen,” 60.
187“Lehrplan für fünf- und mehrklassige Volkschulen,” 97-98; “Lehrpläne für allgemeine Volksschulen,” 
108; “Normal-Lehrplan des Reform-Realgymnasiums (5. bis 8. Klasse),” 147
188“Erlaß des mit der Leitung des Unterrichtsamtes betrauen Unterstaatssekretärs vom 8. Juni, 1920 Z. 
10738, betreffend die versuchweise Einführung der Lehrpläne für die vierklassige Grundschule sowie des 
Übergangslehrplanes für das 5. Schuljahr und betreffend die Verfassung von Stundenplänen an 
Bürgerschulen,”  Volkserziehung, Official Section (1920): 325-6; “Normal-Lehrplan des Reform-
Realgymnasiums (5. bis 8. Klasse),” 148; “Lehrplan für fünf- und mehrklassige Volkschulen,” 100; 
“Lehrplanentwürfe für allgemein bildende Oberschulen,” 38.  This emphasis upon cultural history was 
quite typical of efforts to reform the content of history education throughout Europe during this era.  
Ringer, 32-69, 157-259.
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historical bond between Austrians with the rest of the German Volk.
The First Republic’s curricula for geography similarly emphasized the links 
between Austria and Germany.  Indeed, most of these curricula throughout the republican 
era presented Austria and Germany as a single geographical unit to be studied by Austrian 
school children.  For example, the program for instruction in geography in secondary 
schools in 1921 defined Austria as part of the “region of German settlement in Central 
Europe,” while a 1923 curricular outline provided that students would study the geography 
of “Austria and the other areas of German settlement.”189  The 1927 official curricula 
preserved this language.  In addition, the new curricula added provisions mandating 
instruction concerning “Auslandsdeutschtum” (Germans living in states other than Austria 
or Germany), and advised teachers to focus only upon the geography of regions which 
were either globally important, or which had close ties to either Austria or Germany.190
These curricula had the effect of minimizing Austria’s geographical relationship to the 
Habsburg Monarchy’s other successor states, with which Austria had been closely 
associated for many centuries, while at the same time emphasizing Austria’s ties to the 
other German-speaking regions of Europe.
Civics was the final subject which the educational policy makers of the First 
Republic used in order to emphasize Austrian Germanness.  As might be expected, the 
majority of the program of instruction in Austrian civics classes during this era focused 
189“Lehrplanentwurf für den Erdkundeunterricht an achtklassigen Oberrealschulen.”  Volkserziehung, 
Pedagogical Section (August 1, 1921:, 345; “Lehrplanentwürfe für die Landschulen,” Volkserziehung,
Pedagogical Section (1923): 47.  For similar language emphasizing Austria’s geographical position as part 
of the German region of settlement in Central Europe, see “Lehrplan für drei- und vierklassige 
Volkschulen,”  74-75; “Lehrplan für fünf- und mehrklassige Volkschulen,” 94-5; “Lehrplanentwürfe für 
allgemein bildende Oberschulen,” 46; “Lehrpläne für allgemein Volksschulen,” 105-106.
190“Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,” 14-15, 54-55; “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,”, 31-32, 82-83, 148-
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upon the political organization of the First Republic’s government and the structure of 
Austrian society.  The curricula for education in civics also generally mandated that 
students be taught not just about of Austria’s constitution, however, but also that of 
Germany as well.191  Such instruction highlighted the kinship shared by Austrians and 
Germans, and even prepared Austrian students for the eventual union with Germany for 
which many Austrian political leaders so ardently hoped.
Education in the First Republic reflected the consensus of Austria’s major political 
factions that Austrians formed part of the German Volk, and was designed to impart that 
conviction to the next generation of Austrian citizens.  The state’s education curricula for 
history and geography also at least implicitly de-emphasized the importance of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, even as they explicitly highlighted the historical and geographical 
relationship between Austria and the other German-speaking regions of Europe.  Beyond a 
1920 law which mandated an end to the displays of reverence for Habsburg symbols 
required of students in the old Monarchy, the First Republic’s Ministry of Education was 
remarkably silent on the matter of how the Austria’s Habsburg past itself was to be taught 
to students.192
This silence is easily explained.  While all of the First Republic’s important 
political camps agreed about Austria’s Germanness, there was no similar consensus about 
the meaning or proper interpretation of Austria’s Habsburg past.  It was fairly easy for the 
various political factions to agree upon a broad outline for the teaching of Austrian 
149, 200-201;  “Die Lehrpläne für die allgemeinen Volksschulen,” 24, 39.
191“Lehrplanentwurf für die einheitliche allgemein bildende Oberschule,” 64;  Normal-Lehrplan des 
Reform-Realgymnasiums (5. bis 8. Klasse),” 147-148; “Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 31, 81, 148, 200.
192“Erlaß des mit der Leitung des Unterrichtsamtes betrauen Unterstaatssekretärs vom 2. März, 1920 Z. 
141
history.  The specific view of the old Monarchy which ought to be taught to Austrian 
students was a considerably more controversial matter, however.  Thus, the First 
Republic’s Ministry of Education never provided teachers in state schools with any 
concrete guidelines concerning how the Habsburg past should be portrayed, leaving 
considerable leeway for local school boards and individual educators and theorists to 
address that topic in their own way.
ii. The First Republic’s Pedagogical Community and the Habsburg Past 
The First Republic’s educators and pedagogical theorists did debate the meaning of 
the Habsburg past for contemporary Austria, a topic which the government’s educational 
laws and official curricula had not addressed.  In general, this debate within the 
pedagogical community reflected the same differences of opinion regarding the legacy of 
the Habsburg Monarchy which divided the First Republic’s major ideological factions in 
the sphere of public political discourse.  Of course, not all Austrian educators and political 
theorists were overtly affiliated with any specific political party, but most often the 
discussion concerning the Habsburg legacy in Austria broke down along lines which 
corresponded to the wider political debate concerning the past and Austrian national 
identity.  The First Republic’s two most important political parties, the Christian Socials 
and the Social Democrats, both had affiliated pedagogical organizations and journals, 
which, needless to say, translated in a fairly obvious manner the ideological positions of 
their respective political camps into a body of educational policy recommendations.
1502, betreffend die Außerkraftsetzung der auf Kaiserhaus bezughatenden Bestimmungen der Schulgesetze 
und Verordnunge,” Volkserziehung, Official Section (1920): 137.
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Most Austrian educators and pedagogical theorists agreed that Austrians were 
members of the wider German Volk in Europe, and they argued that state education in 
Austria needed to impart a German national consciousness to young Austrians in the First 
Republic’s classrooms.  There was, however, room for debate within the Austrian 
pedagogical community about the degree to which an Austrian sense of Germanness
needed to be emphasized to students, and concerning the precise content of national 
education.  Individual educators differed even more about the meaning of the Habsburg 
past for modern Austria.  Some educators and theorists tended to view the Habsburg 
Monarchy as a relic of the past which Austria was best advised to leave behind.  These 
educators usually celebrated the First Republic as a step on the path to Anschluß, and 
argued that history education needed to move away from its previously narrow focus upon 
political and military matters toward an emphasis upon cultural and social history, which 
more properly reflected the real experiences of the entire German Volk.  This view of the 
Habsburg past was especially pronounced within the Socialist pedagogical community 
which, unsurprisingly, argued that the students ought to be taught to view the old 
Monarchy as an oppressive and reactionary entity which had been defeated by the 
Austrian working class.  Other teachers and theorists, however, and especially those 
affiliated with the conservative Catholic camp, argued that Austria was the inheritor of a 
proud and valuable legacy from the old Habsburg Monarchy, and they asserted that the 
Habsburgs’ Catholic, multinational empire in Central Europe ought to be presented to 
students as a positive example which had continuing relevance for the modern Austrians.  
All educators could at least agree that some aspects of the Habsburg past, such as 
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Austria’s impressive historical contributions to art and music, could still be celebrated and 
claimed as part of the modern state’s heritage. 
Of course, these educational discussions did not occur in an ideological vacuum, 
but were rather part of a larger pedagogical debate between the left and right wings of the 
Austrian political spectrum.  The Social Democratic leaders, theorists, and teachers were 
first and foremost concerned with providing children with a secular and egalitarian 
education.  They argued that state education was an important tool which could be used by 
the Social Democratic Party to help the Austrian working class to become conscious of its 
own true interests and goals.  Thus they vigorously supported the idea of Einheitsschulen
which would ensure the access of all levels of Austrian society to quality education.193
Socialist pedagogues and indeed a number of other educators without any overt 
ideological affiliation had also been profoundly influenced by the recent catastrophic 
world war, and argued that the First Republic’s educational system needed to teach 
students the value of pacifism and reconciliation between the nations of Europe.194
Conservative educators, on the other hand, were much less enthusiastic about the 
Einheitsschule proposal, and asserted that such egalitarian educational reforms overlooked 
the distinctive needs and abilities of individual Austrian students in their zeal for social 
leveling.  Likewise, the Catholic pedagogical community adamantly opposed the 
193Johannes Kühnel, “ Die Hauptaufgabe der neuen Erziehung,” Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 
(1919): 284; “Ein Jahr republikanische Schulreform in Deutschösterreich,” Monatsheft für Pädagogische 
Reform 69 (1919): 370-374; Eduard Burger, “Hussarek auf dem Kriegspfade,” Monatshefte für 
Pädagogische Reform 70 (1920): 49-64; Marriane Pollak, “Wer soll das Proletarierkind erziehen?” Die 
Sozialistische Erziehung (May 15, 1921): 17; Fritz Kanitz, “Karl Marx und sozialistische Erziehung,” Die 
Sozialistische Erziehung (March 1933): 51-2.
194Burger, “Neue Zeit– Unsere Zeit!” Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 (1919): 3-10; W. A. 
Hammer, “Friedens Pädagogik, 1.,” Monatshefte für Pädagogische Reform 70 (1920): 20-5; “Nie wieder 
Erziehung zum Krieg!” Die Sozialistische Erziehung 4 (July 1924): 249; Josef Weinberger, “Deutsches 
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Socialists’ efforts to allow certain students to be exempt from religious education, and 
charged the left (and in some cases Austrian Jews) with conspiring to remove religion 
from Austrian schools entirely.  Conservative educators argued that religious instruction 
was an important part of the wider goal of state education to impart good character and 
spirit (Geist) to students, and they regarded religious education as an indispensable part of 
the Austrian educational system.195  Thus, the issue of how the relationship between 
Austria’s Habsburg past and Austrian national identity was to be presented to students was 
but one of several controversial issues discussed by the First Republic’s pedagogical 
community.
Austrian Educators and Austrian National Identity
Educators and pedagogical leaders and theorists in the First Republic all generally 
agreed that imparting a sense of German national consciousness to students was an 
important part of state education in Austria.  This consensus is certainly not surprising.  As 
we have seen, all of the First Republic’s major ideological groups argued that Austrians 
were part of the German Volk, and even the most ardent Austrian patriots within the 
conservative Catholic camp never really denied Austria’s German identity.  Likewise, the 
Republic’s educational legislation and official curricula all highlighted the necessity for 
Austrian state education to help inspire students to feel love for and a sense of duty to the 
German Volk as a whole.  Still, this broad agreement concerning Austrian Germanness left 
Bildungsideal und Humanität,” Der Neue Weg 8 (August, 1927): 396-403.
195Rudolf Hornich, “Grundzüge zu einem Schulprogramm der katholischen Leherschaft 
Deutschösterreichs,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (February 5, 1919): 17-22; “Die Wahlen in die 
Nationalversammlung und unser Schulprogramm,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (March 5, 1919): 
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individual educators some room to argue about precise manner and context in which 
Austria’s German character ought to be taught to students.
During his brief but highly influential tenure as Undersecretary for Education, the 
leading Socialist educational theorist, Otto Glöckel, clearly defined the basic view of the 
Social Democratic Party regarding national education in Austrian schools.  Glöckel argued 
that the dissolution of the old Monarchy and the final separation of Austrian Germans 
from the Habsburg state’s other Völker after 1918 necessitated an educational approach 
which presented the history of the Austrian Heimat as part of Germany.  Glöckel asserted 
that the next generation of Austrian citizens had to be made aware of and taught to 
treasure their own German history, and he argued that the essential Germanness of Austria 
had been an enduring fact throughout the centuries.  For Glöckel, Austria belonged to 
Germany, no matter how the current borders might be drawn.  He did not, however, 
advocate a narrow or chauvinistic German nationalism in Austrian education.  Rather, he 
asserted that students also had to be taught to appreciate the interrelationships between all 
Völker and the necessity for those groups to work together.  According to Glöckel, such an 
appreciation was best achieved through an understanding of one’s own Volk in all its 
myriad social classes, professions, and strata, and of the bonds which served to unite all of 
those parts into a coherent national whole.  Consciousness of one’s own Volk and its unity, 
he argued, was a prerequisite for any successful education in civics or history.196
Another leftist educator and Ministry of Education of official during the early 
37-40; “Soll unsere österreichische Volks- und Burgerschule ausgebaut oder zerstört werden?” 
Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (January/February, 1920): 11-12.
196“Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 10. September 1919, Z. 
19557, betreffend mit welchem Richtlinien für den Gebrauch der deutschen Lehrbücher und für den 
146
years of the First Republic, Eduard Burger, agreed wholeheartedly with Glöckel.  He 
argued that after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the severing of Austria’s 
previous ties to eastern lands, Austria now had to look to the community of the German 
Volk.  He asserted that even if Austria was a political entity separate from Germany, it was 
no less a part of “Mother Germania.”  Burger was however careful to note that “real” 
nationalism eschewed national chauvinism, and instead fostered peace, cosmopolitanism 
and world citizenship.  Thus, it was the true ideals of peaceful and cooperative German 
nationalism which should be taught in Austrian schools.197
Indeed, Socialist pedagogues insisted that while a sense of German nationhood 
was an important ideal to be presented in Austrian classrooms, such national sentiments 
could be dangerous if they were not taught in the context of Marxist internationalism and 
pacifism.  Without such an internationalist perspective, German nationalism in Austrian 
education might too easily degenerate into the sort of crude bourgeois chauvinism which 
had lead to the First World War.  For Socialist educators then, internationalism and the 
solidarity of the world’s working classes were more important values than German 
national unity.  Austrian state education should cultivate dedication to the German Volk, 
but also had to avoid sowing the seeds of national animosity.198
Conservative Catholic educators agreed at least in part with the Socialist stance 
regarding national education.  For example, the inaugural postwar issue of the Catholic 
Unterricht in der Geschichte und Vaterlandskunde an den dem Staatsamt unterstehenden Schulen 
Deutschösterreichs gegeben werden,” Volkserziehung, Official Section, (1919): 263-264.
197Burger, “Neue Zeit– Unsere Zeit!” Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 (1919): 3-10.
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right’s pedagogical journal referred to the Central Powers during the First World War as a 
single unit, “Germania-Austria,” and declared that teachers had a duty to fulfill toward 
Volk and Fatherland.199  Likewise, the ideological and spiritual leader of the Christian 
Social Party, Ignaz Seipel, avowed that education in Austria had to serve to interests of the 
entire German Volk rather than just the narrower interests of the Austrian state itself.  In 
other ways, however, the Austrian right displayed their own more conservative concerns 
in their discussions of national education.  Seipel for example argued that the state 
educational system, as a German institution, ought not to provide its services to any 
foreign-born Jew living in Austria.200  Another Catholic educator argued that German 
national consciousness and the Christian religion were inextricably linked.  He advocated 
that the text of Wagner’s overtly Christian opera Parsifal be taught by Catholic teachers in 
classrooms to help win ardent Austrian German nationalist families to the Christian Social 
Party’s cause.201
The First Republic’s non-partisan pedagogical journals also urged a German 
national perspective in Austrian state education.  Numerous educators and theorists used 
the pages of these journals to proclaim their firm belief in Austrian Germanness, and to 
argue that Austrian students needed to be taught to feel love for and a sense of duty to the 
German Volk.  These authors all agreed that devotion to the German nation was just as 
important as love of the Austrian Fatherland and loyalty to the Austrian state.  They also 
asserted that teachers needed to put aside their individual political beliefs and dedicate 
199“Auf zur neuen Arbeit im neuen Staate!” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (January 15, 1919): 1.
200Iganz Seipel, Die Aufgaben der deutschen Hochschule in Österreich gegenüber dem deutschen Volke
(Vienna: Erste Wiener Verein-Buchdruckerei, 1925), 6, 27-30. 
201“Die Wahlen in die Nationalversammlung und unser Schulprogramm,” Österreichische Pädagogische 
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themselves to providing an education which emphasized the national interests of the 
German Volk.  Many of these authors were also careful to state that their conception of 
German nationalism did not involve hostility toward other national groups, but rather 
served as a necessary precondition for peaceful cooperation among all of the Völker of 
Europe.202
Many Austrian educational theorists were convinced that the teaching of history 
provided a vital opportunity to help students to attain the necessary sense of dedication to
the German nation.  They argued, in accordance with the First Republic’s guidelines for 
history education, that the history of Austria needed to be presented as part of the broad 
tapestry of German history.  A 1927 handbook for Austrian history teachers argued that 
the history of the Austrian Heimat in fact could not be appropriately understood separately 
from the history of the German Volk.  In the same manner, the authors also argued than the 
history of an individual Volk was unintelligible apart from a study of the history of other 
Völker as well.  Thus, they presented Austrian history as one strand in the web of German 
history, which in turn was inextricably linked to that of the other nations of Europe.203
Other educators advocated a more narrow focus upon Austria’s historically 
German character, however.  For example, Franz Scheidl took a critical view of the recent 
educational emphasis upon Heimatsgeschichte (history of the [local] homeland) by some 
Warte (March 5, 1919): 39.
202Franz J. Scheidl, “Einige Bausteine zum Neubau unseres Geschichtsunterriches,” Volkserziehung, 
Pedagogical Section (November 1, 1920): 383-409; Burger, “Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!” 
Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 (1919): 329-331; Karl Woynar, “Der Geschichtsunterricht an den 
Mittelschulen,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section (February 15, 1927): 38-47; Leopold Lang, “Vom 
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Austrian pedagogical theorists.  He affirmed that such education was indeed important, 
but he also argued that this topic could tell Austrian students very little about their place in 
the world, if it were not also placed within the broader context of the history of the Volk as 
a whole.  Likewise, he argued that recent attempts by the pedagogical community to 
discuss “world citizenship” sounded good, but that in practice such a concept was vague 
and abstract, and far less necessary for students to learn about than the reality of their 
membership in the German Volk.204
Another educational commentator, Karl Meixner, also advocated a more forceful 
emphasis upon Austrian Germanness in the teaching of history, arguing that some teachers 
were placing too much emphasis upon classical antiquity at the expense of a properly 
expansive treatment of Austria’s roots in the civilization of the early Germanic tribes.  He 
asserted that German culture was the highest culture ever achieved by humanity, and that 
the ancient Greeks and Romans had unfairly denigrated the Germanic tribes, who in fact 
had been their cultural superiors.  Thus, Meixner argued that even if ancient historians had 
portrayed the earliest Germans as barbarians, Austrian students needed to be made aware 
of the superiority of their national culture in order to cultivate their loyalty to their Volk
and to the Austrian state.205
Other Austrian educators thought that there was already a bit too much emphasis 
placed on the relationship between Austria and Germany in Austrian history classrooms.  
One pedagogical theorist, Wilhelm Waldstein, writing in the government educational 
1927), 273-279.
204Scheidl, 404-409.
205Kurt Meixner, “Der Geschichtsunterricht auf falschem Wege,” Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 
(1919): 53-58.
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journal Volkserziehung in 1924, disagreed with what he saw as the excessively narrow 
focus on German nationalism in Austrian history education.  While he allowed that it was 
indeed important for the state’s schools to inspire students to love their Volk and 
Fatherland, Waldstein argued that the First Republic’s curricula had placed too much 
weight upon Germanic antiquity in the teaching of history.  Arguing in direct opposition to 
Meixner’s position, he asserted that the state’s curricula needed to balance its teaching of 
Austria’s national origins with more material on classical Greek and Roman culture and 
ideas.  According to Waldstein, Austria’s heritage included not just its German national 
roots, but also the classical legacy that had so profoundly influenced Western civilization 
as a whole.  To focus too narrowly upon Germanic history then was to do Austrian 
students a disservice by keeping them from becoming familiar with their entire cultural 
inheritance.206
206Wilhelm Waldstein, “Zur Frage des Geschichtsunterrichts an der Deutschen Mittelschule,”  
Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section  (1924): 71-74.
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One progressive educator, Heinrich Scherer argued that Austrians should not just 
be educated about their membership in the German Volk, but also their relationship to the 
Völker of Central Europe.  While he acknowledged that the German Volk exercised a 
dominant influence in the region, Scherer proclaimed that all of the region’s Völker had 
shared a common history, and still needed to cooperate in the modern era.  He even 
advocated the formulation of a model Central European school for the region which could 
be adopted by all of the region’s states and thus help serve the cause of such cooperation. 
According to Scherer, this project might help the states of Central Europe live together 
peacefully without abandoning their distinctive national features.  W. A. Hammer agreed, 
arguing in 1920 that even if the Monarchy had ended, Austria still had an enduring 
relationship to the former territories of the Habsburg state in Central Europe which needed 
to be reflected in the teaching of history and geography in the new Republic.207
Thus, educators and pedagogical theorists in the First Republic all basically agreed 
that Austrians were Germans, and that students needed to be made aware of this fact by 
the state’s educational system.  This basic consensus, however, left ample room for 
disagreement regarding the precise amount of weight that ought to be placed upon national 
education, and concerning the context in which Austrian membership in the German Volk
ought to be presented.  These teachers and theorists regarded history education as an 
important tool in the efforts by the Austrian state to impart German national consciousness 
to students.  Beyond this basic consensus, however, the First Republic’s teachers and 
pedagogues often disagreed sharply about how to teach Austria’s Habsburg past in the 
207Heinrich Scherer, “Mitteleuropäische Kultur und Schule,”   Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 
(1919): 20-23, 105-106; W. A. Hammer, “Friedens Pädagogik, 2.,” Monatshefte für Pädagogische Reform
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schools.
Austrian History Education and the Habsburg Past
The entire Austrian pedagogical community affirmed that the study of history was 
a vital part of the state’s efforts to educate the next generation of Austrian citizens.  All 
educators agreed that history education helped young Austrians to understand their place 
in society and the world, and prepared them deal with the political, social and economic 
concerns with which they would be confronted as mature Austrian citizens.208  Yet 
individual educators had difficulty agreeing upon the precise manner in which Austria’s 
history as part of the Habsburg Monarchy ought to be presented to students.  Such 
concerns were a part of a somewhat wider debate concerning the most appropriate focus of 
upper level history education.  Some pedagogues in the First Republic argued that state 
history education needed to move away from its previous focus upon political and military 
history toward a more culturally focused presentation of Austria’s past.  Others asserted 
that the territory’s history would simply be unintelligible without a reasonable description 
of the political events and military conflicts which had so profoundly influenced the lives 
of the Austrian people in the past.  
These different visions of history education roughly corresponded to two 
competing views of the Habsburg Monarchy.  Some Austrian educators, and particularly 
those affiliated with the Social Democrats, cast the old Habsburg state as a reactionary or 
70 (1920): 72-73.
208Valentin Pollak, “Grundforderungen eines modernen Geschichtsunterrichts,” Volkserziehung,
Pedagogical Section (1919): 197-99; 203; Scheidl,  383-409; Josef Gütter, “Die Gegenstände der 
sprachlich-historischen Gruppe an einer Versuchsklasse der Bürgerschule,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical 
153
nationally oppressive entity, and argued that an educational focus upon cultural history 
would place the actual experiences of Austrian Germans in the foreground, rather than 
their dynastic overlords.  Another group of more conservative educators and theorists 
argued that the Habsburgs and their state had been a positive force in the history of 
Central Europe, and they wanted to highlight the political history of the old Monarchy as a 
means of helping students appreciate its valuable legacy.  These ideological divisions 
within the First Republic’s educational community were not chiseled in stone, however, 
and individual educators sometimes argued for a presentation of Austrian history which 
represented a compromise between the extremes.
Almost from the very beginning of the First Republic, some leaders of the 
educational community made a vigorous argument in favor of an approach to history 
education which would minimize political and military topics in favor of a focus upon the 
culture and social organization of people of Austria.  Otto Glöckel, the influential Social 
Democratic educational theorist, was at the forefront of these efforts to reform history 
education in Austria.  Glöckel argued that the teaching of history in the new Republic 
needed to reflect the circumstances and opportunities which faced Austria after the 
catastrophic war and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy.  He lambasted the approach 
to history education favored by the old imperial government, an approach which he 
asserted had deliberately used descriptions of war and dynastic politics to inspire students 
with a facile patriotism and a sense of dependence upon the House of Habsburg.  Glöckel 
charged that, with Austria’s rebirth as a democratic state, such history education had 
become obsolete.  Now, presentations of history in this new era ought to focus to a much 
Section (April 1, 1921): 342-5; Woynar, 38.
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greater degree on the historical experiences of the people and their everyday lives.  
Glöckel did allow that the story of rulers, wars, and politics remained an important part of 
understanding the past, but he argued that the economic, cultural, and intellectual forces 
which shaped and influenced those events needed be more thoroughly acknowledged in 
Austrian history classrooms.209
Other members of the First Republic’s pedagogical community heeded Glöckel’s 
call to move away from political and military history.  Valentin Pollak agreed with the 
Undersecretary’s assessments regarding the problems with the old Monarchy’s approach 
to teaching history, and vigorously argued in favor of a program of historical instruction 
which highlighted the importance of culture and of social and economic relationships in 
Austria’s past.  Pollak was particularly critical of the teaching of military history, which 
he regarded as “unessential.”  He optimistically asserted that just as the horrible 
experience of the Great War had removed war from the body of policy options available to 
the new Austrian state once and for all, so too should military history be radically de-
209Glöckel, “Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 10. September 
1919, Z. 19557, betreffend mit welchem Richtlinien für den Gebrauch der deutschen Lehrbücher und für 
den Unterricht in der Geschichte und Vaterlandskunde an den dem Staatsamt unterstehenden Schulen 
Deutschösterreichs gegeben werden,” 260-263.  These recommendations were a staple of educational 
reform throughout the West.  See Ringer, 32-69, 157-259. 
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emphasized in Austrian history classrooms.210
210Valentin Pollak, “Grundforderungen eines modernen Geschichtsunterrichts,” 203.
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  While not all Austrian educators shared Pollak’s rather naive view that war had become 
irrelevant after 1918, many at least shared his opinion of the appropriate focus for history 
education.  Even as late as 1927, many Austrian educators continued to recommend that 
history teachers devote most of their energies to teaching students about culture, which 
served as a unifying force for the German Volk.  Military and political history were to be 
taught only insofar as they encompassed truly significant events which had a genuine 
impact upon the people of Austria and Germany as a whole.  These educators argued that 
the era of rote memorization of insignificant battles, treaties, and dates in history 
classrooms had come to an end.  It was now time for history education to help student to 
understand truly important changes in the lives of the people.211
Of course, not all history teachers and pedagogical leaders agreed with these 
educational strategies.  In a 1920 article in the Ministry of Education’s pedagogical 
journal Volkerziehung, Richard Raithel charged that Pollak had gone much too far in his 
recommendations to teachers to sharply de-emphasize political and military history in the 
Austrian history curriculum.  Raithel argued that the teaching of history could not omit 
political and military matters and still acquaint students with the most important aspects of 
Austria’s past.  Raithel worried that the elimination of military history from the 
curriculum would prevent teachers from informing young Austrians about the oppression 
of the German Volk in the aftermath of World War I, and he went so far as to term 
Pollak’s arguments regarding military history as “volksfremd” (foreign to the Volk).  
Raithel also argued that Pollak linked political and military history far too closely with the 
211Kende, Bauer, Schmidt-Breitung and Lowe, 263-268; A. Hofbauer,  “Das Schülerbuch für den 
Geschichtsunterricht an Bürgerschulen,” Der Neue Weg 6 (June, 1927): 299.
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notion of dynastic history.  He asserted that history teachers could certainly still present 
students with a patriotic view of political and military history which did not fall prey to 
the sort of dynastic fetish which Pollak abhorred.212
In a similar manner, Franz Scheidl took aim at the vogue for cultural history, 
arguing that while such a historical focus sounded appealing, most educational theorists 
had not actually bothered to define what exactly “cultural history” actually encompassed.  
Scheidl noted that too frequently cultural history simply seemed to be used by pedagogical 
theorists as an excuse to neglect political history.  In reality political developments were 
too important, and indeed too inextricably linked to cultural developments, to be left out 
of any classroom accounts of Austrian history.213
Karl Woynar, writing in 1927, agreed.  He argued that despite the efforts of 
Austrian teachers to emphasize the history of the people as whole at the expense of the 
lives dynastic rulers, such a strategy could not really do a good job of presenting Austria’s 
historical development because the people were so often influenced by their rulers.  
Furthermore, he noted that the textbooks from the last decades of the Monarchy which so 
many postwar educators had criticized as overly deferential to the interests and reputation 
of the dynasty in fact had generally provided a far more impartial view of dynastic figures 
than their critics gave them credit for.  Indeed, Woynar cautioned that modern history 
education needed to strive for similar impartiality, to the point of avoiding judgements 
about the best form of government, even if, as he noted pointedly, some particular political 
212Richard Raithel, “Stellungnahme zu Pollaks ‘Grundforderung eines modernen Geschichtsunterrichts,’” 
Volkserziehung, Pedagogical Section  (November 1, 1920): 415-18.
213Scheidl, 394-400.
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system happened to be enjoying success in the present.214
Clearly political ideology played no small part in these disputes over how to teach 
history in Austrian schools.  Still, some educators issued pleas to maintain a non-partisan 
educational system in Austria in which no one set of political beliefs dominanted.  Such 
calls in fact at times came from partisans in both major political camps.  Pollak, for 
example, despite his leftist orientation, argued that both the more traditional historical 
approach of Leopold von Ranke and  Marxist materialism had a place in Austrian history 
education.  Pollak argued that history teachers ought to be open about their individual 
political beliefs, although they should never impose those beliefs upon students or allow 
their ideology to supersede a dedication to historical truth.  In similar manner, piously 
Catholic educators such as Rudolf Hornich avowed that there should be a balance between 
different of points of view and approaches in Austrian history education.215
Yet at the same time, some politically oriented educators avowed that they did 
indeed hope to use education to disseminate their views.  In a 1933 article in the Socialist 
pedagogical journal, Die Sozialistische Erziehung, Desider Hort disagreed with the 
premise that education should or even could be de-politicized, arguing that many 
educational endeavors were inherently and unavoidably ideological.  Hort declared that 
the bourgeoisie was simply afraid that any real social analysis presented by the 
educational system would inevitably lead children toward socialism, and thus sought to 
preserve their hegemony by spreading their own propaganda in classrooms even as they 
214Woynar, 41-43.
215Pollak, “Grundforderungen eines modernen Geschichtsunterrichts,” 201-203; Rudolf Hornich, 
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issued shallow calls for non-partisan education.216
Scheidl, 391-403.
216Desider Hort, “Erziehung zum politischen Denken,” Die Sozialistische Erziehung (December 1933): 
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Similar accusations came from the Catholic conservative educational camp as well.  
For example, Arnold Winkler argued that Socialist educators and historians had used the 
first years of the Republican era to produce books and articles which lauded democracy 
and popular sovereignty as the natural outcome of historical development.  According to 
Winkler, any arguments which presented one form of government organization as the 
inevitable end point of history transformed education into political propaganda, and he 
noted that the Socialists themselves had habitually denounced similar teleological views of 
history which presented the old Monarchy rather than democracy as the “goal” of history.  
Winkler argued that such denunciations were evidence of Socialist hypocrisy when it 
came to Austrian educational policy.217  Of course by 1933, the Catholic educational 
community would itself participate in the transformation of Austrian education into an 
overtly propagandistic ideological mouthpiece for the conservative, authoritarian 
government which ultimately replaced the First Republic.
The Austrian pedagogical community was thus bitterly divided over matters of 
political ideology, and charges of bad faith flew from all sides.  It was in this politically 
charged environment that educators and theorists debated exactly which vision of  
Austria’s Habsburg past ought to be presented in history classrooms.  Unsurprisingly, the 
issue was a controversial one, and continued to be a matter of acrimonious disagreement 
throughout the Fist Republic.
Socialist educators of course, argued that the old Monarchy had been an oppressive 
and reactionary entity which had stood in the way of the legitimate social and national 
217Arnold Winkler,  “Zur Methodik des Geschichtsunterrichtes, 1,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
(January, 1921): 4-5; “Zur Methodik des Geschichtsunterrichtes, 2,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
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aspirations of all of its various subject peoples.  They generally regarded the Austrian 
Republic as a new creation which had been forged by the Austrian working class, and they 
celebrated the fall of the old Monarchy as a positive achievement.  They argued that 
Austrian history education ought to reflect this point of view, and, as we have seen, they 
urged history teachers to highlight the experiences of ordinary Austrians in the past rather 
than the dynastic machinations of the House of Habsburg.
Glöckel used his position as Undersecretary of Education as a pulpit to advocate 
for the Socialist view of the Habsburg past.  During the imperial period, the Monarchy had 
been presented as if it were the natural and necessary culmination of Austria’s historical 
development.  Now, however, teachers and historians could see the Habsburg Monarchy 
for what it truly was: a conscious and intentional project which the Habsburgs worked to 
create, and which in reality had lasted only from the eighteenth-century reign of Joseph II 
to the death of Franz Joseph. Glöckel certainly acknowledged that a natural economic 
bond had existed between the lands of the Monarchy, but he argued that the political bond 
was a construction rather than a historical necessity.  Thus, teachers needed to modify or 
correct the old historical narrative to emphasize this new perspective.218
Glöckel urged teachers to focus first and foremost upon German-Austria, and 
secondarily upon Germany and the other German-speaking regions of Europe.  Of the 
former Habsburg lands, Glöckel argued that teachers ought to deal with Czechoslovakia in 
depth because of that state’s large German population and its role as an indispensable part 
(February, 1921): 3-7.
218Glöckel, “Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 10. September 
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of Austria’s economic geography.  The remaining regions formerly possessed by the 
Habsburgs, however, should merely be treated as part of the “rest of Europe,” as no 
important relationship remained between them and Austria.219
Writing in the first issue of the pedagogical journal Monatsheft für Pädagogische 
Reform, the journal’s editor Eduard Burger essentially agreed with Glöckel’s assessment 
regarding the Habsburg Monarchy, arguing that Austrians had previously placed far too 
much blind trust in the old state, which had seemed indestructible at the time, but which 
had ultimately crumbled due to the obstinance and highhandedness of the ruling dynasty.  
According to Burger, memories of the Monarchy were the path to the past; deliverance lay 
though an education which emphasized German cultural unity, republican values, and the 
reconciliation between Europe’s Völker in the context of a fair international settlement.220
Other educators and theorists on the political left took an even more radically 
critical view of the old Monarchy.  Socialist pedagogues charged that the old Monarchy 
had been a “Völkerkerker” (prison house of the peoples) which had been responsible for 
the catastrophic World War which had wracked Central Europe.  The people of Austria, 
fed up with the subjugation and suffering that had been their lot under the militaristic yoke 
of the Habsburgs, had finally risen up and destroyed the old Monarchy.  These leftist 
educators argued that while the Habsburg state had existed, it had attempted to perpetuate 
itself through propagandistic history education.  The Republic required no such crude 
artifice however; simple historical truth would suffice to give students an accurate view of 
Deutschösterreichs gegeben werden,” 162-163.
219Ibid., 164.
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the evils of Habsburg rule.221
Indeed, Socialist educators, like Socialist political leaders, regarded the new 
Austrian Republic as a clean break with the Habsburg past, and urged to teachers to teach 
their students to celebrate the birth of democracy out of the ruins of the old Monarchy.  
They argued that history teachers ought to use the example of the foundation of the First 
Republic to impart democratic values to school children, as well as to innoculate them 
against the forces of political reaction which still lingered in modern Austria.222  In one 
particularly vivid example, a 1930 article in Die Sozialistische Erziehung presented a 
sample political dialogue between an adult Social Democrat and a child which explained 
the Socialist stance concerning the First Republic.  In this dialogue, the adult, through a 
series of questions, leads the child toward the conclusion that the end of the old Monarchy 
had served the interests of the majority of the Austrian people, and that those who wished 
to restore the Monarchy, such as the wealthy, the aristocracy and the Heimwehr militia, 
wanted to do so in order that they might return to the system of exploitation of the 
working class which had been characteristic of the old Habsburg state.223
Of course, not all educators who wished to commemorate the foundation of the 
First Republic did so out of an overt commitment to Socialist ideology.  Some Austrian 
teachers simply regarded the new Austrian state as something which ought to be 
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celebrated in their class rooms in a non-partisan manner in order to cultivate loyalty and 
devotion to the Republic on the part of their students.  As one article marking the 
Republic’s fifth anniversary put the matter, students needed to be taught to appreciate the 
positive aspects of “our free, German Fatherland, our beloved Austria!”224  Indeed, for 
many  members of the Austrian pedagogical community, loyalty to the new state was not 
equivalent to a repudiation of the legacy of the old Habsburg Monarchy.  Many teachers 
and educational theorists presented the First Republic as the genuine heir to the great 
culture and positive achievements of the Habsburgs’ multinational state.  For them, 
modern Austria did not represent a clean break with the Habsburg past so much as it did a 
continuation of much that was valuable in the old state.225
Some educators went even further, highlighting aspects of the Habsburg past 
which had been superior to the situation in which contemporary Austria found itself.  For 
example, in a 1927 article in the pedagogical journal Die Quelle, Otto Lehmann and Erwin 
Hanslick described the old Monarchy in unambiguously positive terms, arguing that the 
Habsburg state had represented the imperial heritage which the German Volk had inherited 
from the Roman Empire, and which had a served a critical economic, cultural and political 
role in the border region between Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the orient.  
Ultimately they argued that the old Monarchy and its valuable supranational ideals of 
cooperation between Völker had been foolishly dismantled by the Entente in 1918, leaving 
Sozialistische Erziehung. (January, 1930): 16.
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the relationship between cultures dangerously out of balance.226
Such positive portrayals of the Habsburg Monarchy were of course even more 
frequent and pronounced within the conservative Catholic community.  These educators 
and theorists generally maintained that the old dynastic state was an important part of 
modern Austria’s heritage, and that it had offered the German Volk in Austria protection 
and a privileged position which they certainly lacked in the new and relatively powerless 
modern Austrian state.  One Catholic theorist, Bernard Merth, writing in 1919, illustrated 
the extent to which German national sentiment and conservative loyalty to the old dynasty 
might go hand in hand.  Merth decried the subjugation of German-speaking minorities in 
the new Czechoslovak state, and argued that the unstable and straitened circumstances in 
Central Europe offered ample evidence of how beneficial the old imperial union had been 
not just for Austria, but also for Bohemia and Hungary as well.227  In a subsequent article, 
Merth turned to the issue of the demands for Czech language education of Czech 
minorities living in Vienna.  Merth was indignant, and argued that the Germans of Austria, 
as “Aryan” Europeans, had a duty to raise their children to be nationally conscious 
German students through the use of German language education, and that such education 
could only be beneficial to Czech minorities, who would become bilingual as a result.  
Merth still held out the hope, however, that Austrian German and Czech speakers, as 
“Christian brothers,” might abandon their unproductive squabbling and unite against the 
226Otto Lehmann and Erwin Hanslick, “Abriss der Weltkunde und Darstellung der Lage Wiens an der 
Weltkulturgrenz Europas,” Die Quelle (1927): 644, 732-734, 807.
227Bernard Merth, “Nationalismus und Humanität,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (April 5, 1919): 
49-50.
166
common threats facing them: communism, liberalism, and the “Jewish press.”228
For Merth, German nationalism and Austrian patriotism were complementary 
concepts rather than contradictory ones.  He was more than willing to refer to Austrians as 
“we Germans” and to proclaim his fierce dedication to Anschluß and his bitter resentment 
toward the Entente powers which had forced the German lands to accept blame for a war 
in which the German cause had been just.  Yet in the same breath, he also expressed his 
pride in Austria’s historical role as a leading cultural force in Central Europe, arguing that 
even though the old Monarchy was gone, the bond between Austria and the other 
successor states remained strong.  Indeed, even as he declared his support for Anschluß, he 
also proclaimed that “the eagle of Austria will exist until the end of days.”229  Such 
sentiments amply demonstrated that the German nationalism of the Catholic pedagogical 
community was a complex phenomenon which could also accommodate expressions of 
passionate Austrian patriotism, even as early as 1919.
Other Catholic educators, however, were less eager to proclaim their dedication to 
the House of Habsburg, especially during the early years of the First Republic.  Such 
reticence came in part as a response to the criticisms from the Socialist left that previous 
Austrian education had been slavishly devoted to the old dynasty.  One article in Die 
Pädagogishe Warte proclaimed that the Austrian right’s patriotism even before 1918 had 
been focused upon the Heimat and Volk, rather than on the dynasty itself.  In the postwar 
period, the author argued that Austrian Catholics ought to dedicate themselves to keeping 
Jews and Socialists from dominating the new state, rather than working to defend the 
228Merth, “Zur Frage der tsechischen Schulen in Wien,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (November 
1, 1919): 186-9.
167
reputation of a dynasty which had been deposed.230
As the First Republic wore on and the divisions between the political right and left 
grew more pronounced, however, conservative educators became increasingly willing to 
rally to the defense of the old Monarchy.  This tendency reflected the turn away from 
overt German nationalism and direct advocacy for Anschluß toward firm professions of 
Austrian patriotism by the Christian Social Party in the political arena.  More and more, 
conservative teachers and pedagogical theorists presented the Habsburg state as the 
embodiment of the Catholic ideals and traditional culture which they viewed as having 
come under attack by liberals and Marxists in modern Austria.  The defense of those 
ideals required these educators to look to the proud example of the old Monarchy as a 
potential source of new strength for Austrian conservatism, even if this newly potent 
Austrian patriotism came at the expense of the Catholic pedagogical community’s earlier 
enthusiastic German nationalism.
For example, a 1929 article in the Catholic educational journal, Die Pädagogsiche 
Warte, by Josef Krauter denounced the Enlightenment as an assault upon the Catholic 
Church which had had a devastating impact upon European culture.  Krauter singled out 
Voltaire, D’Alembert, and Frederick the Great of Prussia as the three historical figures 
who had helped lead this assault upon Christianity.  He was especially hostile to Frederick 
and north German Protestantism, and appeared to have little concern for the effect of his 
comments on German unity.  Krauter also lambasted the deleterious effects which 
Enlightenment ideas had upon Austria and Vienna, and he castigated Joseph II for 
229Merth, “Zum. 12. November,”  Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (November 1, 1919): 191-5.
230“Soll unsere österreichische Volks- und Burgerschule ausgebaut oder zestört werden?” Österreichische 
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abandoning the staunch Catholic piety of his mother, the Empress Maria Theresa.  In 
Krauter’s estimation then, Joseph had deviated from the traditional role of the House of 
Habsburg as defenders and nurturers of the Catholic faith.  While this deviation did not 
negate the positive view Krauter had of the Monarchy itself, his criticisms of Joseph, a 
popular figure among Central European German nationalists, illustrate the extent to which 
the Austrian right had become more concerned with opposing republicanism, liberalism, 
and socialism than with nursing German nationalist resentments about the postwar treaty 
system.231
Another article in the same journal on the Austrian baroque by Wilhelm Prastorfer 
demonstrates the same transition toward Austrian patriotism within the conservative 
Catholic camp.  Prastdorfer attributed the tremendous cultural flourishing in Austria 
between 1650 and 1750 to the Habsburg state’s successful defense of Catholic values from 
threats from both Protestantism and the Ottoman Empire.  In doing so, he highlighted the 
Catholic camp’s increasing emphasis upon Catholic religiosity as a defining element of 
Austria’s distinctive character.  While Prastdorfer still affirmed that Austrians were a 
German “tribe,” he lavished considerable attention on the elements which made the 
Austrian branch of the German Volk distinctive and worthwhile, and urged Catholic 
history teachers to present this view to Austrian children.  Such portrayals of Austria were 
relatively rare at the beginning of the era of the First Republic, but were increasingly 
Pädagogische Warte (Jan./Feb., 1920), 11-12, 28.
231Josef Krauter, “Die Aufklärung und ihre Folgen für die Kulturwelt,” Österreichische Pädagogische 
Warte (March, 1929): 64-66.  On Joseph II’s popularity among German nationalists, see Nancy M. 
Wingfield, “Statues of Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of 
Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, 
eds. (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 178_201.
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common by its end. 232
A more overt statement of the right’s reassertion of Austrian patriotism came from 
the Tyrolean educator Ambros Mayr, who in 1930 responded to critics who argued that 
the inhabitants of Tyrol had too often emphasized their own culture and distinctiveness at 
the expense of Austrian unity.  Mayr acknowledged that Tyroleans were proud of their 
culture, but he also noted that they had also been fervently loyal to the House of Austria 
throughout history.  He argued that the people of Tyrol, just like all of the inhabitants of 
Austria, had only recently rediscovered their “Austrian souls” after the upheavals and 
deprivations of the Republic’s first decade.  He then affirmed the loyalty of Tyrolean 
teachers to the “Ostmark-Austrian idea” and to imparting a sense of “Österreichertum” 
(Austrianness) to students in Tyrol.  Again, Mayr portrayed Austrians and Tyroleans as 
branches of the wider German Volk, but he also repeatedly emphasized Austrian 
distinctiveness and national pride in a manner which had been much rarer earlier in the 
Republican era.233
Such patriotic emphases were not universal, however, in the Catholic pedagogical 
community even in the later years of the First Republic.  For example, one article on 
history education in Die Pädagogische Warte from 1930 criticized the individualism, 
materialism, and political bickering in Austrian society and recommended the use of 
educational policy to help ameliorate these problems.  Yet at the same time, the author 
also proclaimed the “mission” of the German Volk to show the rest of the world the 
232Wilhelm Prastorfer, “Österreichischer Barok,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (September, 1929): 
217-22.
233Ambros Mayr, “Österreichertum und Tiroler Lehrer,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (December, 
1930): 310-11.
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solution to these difficulties and called for a revision in the post-war European order to 
correct the injustices perpetrated upon the Volk.234  By 1930, however, such expressions of 
German nationalism were somewhat out of step with the conservative pedagogical 
mainstream, which had come to regard the old Monarchy as a more important part of 
Austria’s heritage than Austria’s membership in the German Volk.
In 1931, the historian Heinrich Srbik published an article on Franz Joseph which 
bridged the extremes between the main ideological camps concerning the legacy of the 
Monarchy.  According to Srbik, Franz Joseph had been a hardworking, pious monarch 
who had genuinely desired the best for his subjects.  Despite his many admirable qualities, 
however, the Habsburg emperor had ultimately been too firmly embedded in religious and 
dynastic traditionalism to lead Austria successfully into the modern era.  Srbik argued that 
Franz Joseph was best understood as the last bearer of the Habsburgs’ centuries-old, 
supranational political principles and the dynasty’s determination to preserve Austria’s 
great power status, ideals which had ultimately been unable to stand against the tide of 
twentieth-century modernity.235
Such evenhandedness in dealing with the legacy of the Habsburgs was fairly rare 
in educational circles during the Republic.  By the last years of the First Republic, history 
education and the Habsburg past had increasingly become political tools that were used in 
the ideological struggle between the Social Democrats and the Christian Social Party.  The 
Socialist left in Austria regarded the old Monarchy as an oppressive relic of the past, and 
argued that students of history in Austrian classrooms needed to be taught the democratic 
234M. Florian, “Welche Forderungen stellt die heutige Zeit an den Geschichtsunterricht?” Österreichische 
Pädagogische Warte (November, 1931): 258-9.
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values and German national consciousness which Socialists viewed as incompatible with 
any positive assessment of Habsburg rule.  Conservative Catholic educators, on the other 
hand, regarded the Habsburg Monarchy as an important part of Austria’s historical 
heritage, and as an entity which had usually served to safeguard the religious faith and the 
traditional Austrian culture which they cherished.  This turn toward an Austrian patriotism 
on the part of the Catholic educational community came at the expense of that group’s 
previous enthusiastic professions of German nationalism. While this group certainly never 
abandoned the premise that Austrians were Germans, their increasingly intense 
professions of pride in Austria’s distinctive history and culture meant that they no longer 
emphasized those national ideals to the extent they once had.
If the political aspect of Austria’s Habsburg past was a matter of ideological 
dispute within the First Republic’s educational community, then other aspects of the 
history of the old Monarchy were less controversial.  Most Austrian teachers and 
pedagogical theorists, regardless of their political orientation, could at least agree that the 
Habsburg Monarchy had presided over an impressive set of cultural and artistic 
achievements in Austria during its last several centuries.  In particular, many educators 
highlighted the distinguished group of classical and romantic musical composers who had 
flourished in Austria, and especially in its capital, Vienna, as examples of a historical 
heritage which the modern Austrian state might embrace.
For example, Karl Kobald portrayed Vienna as the musical capital of the world, 
and in important part of Austria’s cultural identity.  Kobald provided brief descriptions of
the careers of Vienna’s most important musical artists such as  Haydn, Schubert, 
235Heinrich  Srbik, “Franz Josef I.– Wie er wirklich war,” Die Quelle (1931): 952-3.  
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Bruckner, Strauß, Mahler, Schönberg, and especially Mozart, whom he described as a 
cultural treasure of global stature, comparable to the ancient Greeks, Shakespeare, Goethe,
or Wagner.  Indeed, Kobald also associated the German composer Wagner with Viennese 
music, and noted that his opera Parsifal had been received with more enthusiasm in 
Vienna than in any other European city.236  An entire 1924 issue of the pedagogical journal 
Die Quelle dedicated to the history and culture of Vienna made a similar set of arguments, 
as a number of authors celebrated the music, Baroque architecture, and immense political 
influence of the Austrian capital, and gave considerable credit for those developments to 
Habsburg rulers.237
Other educational authors focused more on individual composers and their 
significance to Austrian culture.  In 1931, the one hundred and fortieth anniversary of the 
death of Mozart was commemorated in Austria, and a number of articles in Die Quelle 
urged educators to pay more attention to him as a figure of enormous importance to 
Austria’s culture.238  Similarly, 1928 marked the one hundredth anniversary of Schubert’s 
death, and the journal published a host of pieces lauding his contributions to Austrian 
music, including one which portrayed him as the symbol of the “eternal Austrian mission” 
for world culture as part of the German Volk.239
At least one other specialist in the history of music discussed two prominent 
236Karl Kobald, “Wien als Musikstadt,” Die Quelle  6 (1924): 589-594.
237H. Montzka, “Zur Geschichte von Wiens politischer Bedeutung,” Die Quelle  6 (1924): 540-53; Max 
Eisler, “Das Barocke Wien,” Die Quelle  6 (1924): 557-66; Karl Kobald, “Wien als Musikstadt,” Die 
Quelle  6 (1924): 589-594.
238“Das Jahr 1931.  Ein Mozart-Jahr,” Die Quelle (1931): 111-112; Mena.Blaschitz, “Mozart und unsere 
Jugend,” Die Quelle (1931): 243-247.
239Hans Rupprich, “Franz Schubert und die Literatur seiner Zeit,” Der Neue Weg 4 (1928): 175; Ferdinand 
Soeser, “Die Schubertfeier in der Schule,” Der Neue Weg 4 (1928:, 199-207; Leopold Vockenhuber, 
“Franz Schubert.  Eine Lebensschilderung für die Schule,”  Der Neue Weg 4 (1928):  208-12.
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composers who worked in Vienna, Ludwig van Beethoven and Joseph Haydn, in terms of 
their significance to German, rather than to Austrian culture.  In a 1927 article, Alfred Orel 
presented Beethoven as an example of the greatness of the German Geist and Volk, and as 
a figure who sprang from German culture, even if he had also had a profound influence on 
musical developments throughout the world.  Yet Orel also dwelled upon the decisive 
influence of the Viennese environment, and of such great Austrian composers as Mozart 
and Haydn upon Beethoven’s work.  For Orel, there was no conflict between the 
presentation of Beethoven as a German cultural product and a discussion of his work in 
the context of the Viennese milieu: Austria was simply a German land.  Indeed, Orel 
devoted no attention to whether Beethoven was best considered German or Austrian, but 
rather noted the debate concerning whether the composer was defined more by his career 
in German lands or by the Dutch background of his family.240  Similarly, Orel discussed 
Haydn in the context of German culture and claimed that the composer had freed German 
music from Italian influences.  At the same time, however, he presented Haydn as the 
leading figure in a “south German” musical movement centered on Vienna which was 
distinctive, and referred to him as a seminal figure of the “Austrian-German Volkstum.”241
Indeed, many Austrian educators were also quite willing to celebrate cultural 
figures such as Goethe and Wagner as part of Austria’s historical heritage despite the fact 
that those artists had spent their careers entirely outside of Austria.242  Such celebrations 
240Alfred Orel, “Beethoven,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (March, 1927): 55-61. 
241Orel, “Joseph Haydn,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (March 15, 1932): 57-61; For a similar 
portrayal of Hadyn, see Franz Trczka, “‘Papa’ Haydn?” Die Quelle 3 (1932): 290-293.
242Daniel Siebert, “Siegfrieds Werdegang in Richard Wagner’s ‘Ring des Nibelungen,’” Der Neue Weg 2 
(1933): 59-66; Heinrich Peter, “Goethe und Österreich,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (February 
15, 1932): 35-7; A. Jalkotzy, “Goethe,” Die Sozialistische Erziehung (March, 1932): 50; Joseph Jung, “Zur 
100. Wiederkehr von Goethes Todestage,” Die Quelle 2 (1932): 174-178.
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were not solely the work of individual educational authors either.  The First Republic’s 
Ministry of Education set aside time for the commemoration of the one hundredth 
anniversary of Goethe’s death in Austrian classrooms in much the same way as it 
instructed teachers to celebrate significant anniversaries for such prominent Austrian sons 
as Schubert and Haydn.243  Such support for prominent non-Austrian German cultural 
figures was not a partisan issue.  Goethe was claimed as part of the conservative right’s 
vision of Austrian history just as he was by the Social Democrats in their leftist view of 
the past.  Clearly, teachers in the First Republic saw Austria’s historical heritage as 
encompassing all of German history, above and beyond specifically Austrian cultural 
movements.
Thus, all of the First Republic’s teachers and pedagogical theorists saw Austrians 
as Germans, and viewed Austrian history as part of German history.  In a similar manner, 
they could agree that at least some aspects of the Habsburg past, and particularly elements 
of Austria’s cultural history, were valuable and worth preserving as part of a modern 
Austrian identity.  There was no consensus concerning the political aspects of the 
Habsburg past.  Conservative educators saw the Habsburgs as the symbol of their own 
modern struggles against liberalism, Marxism, and secularism, and they argued that 
students needed to be taught to appreciate the Habsburg legacy which the new Austrian 
state had inherited.  Leftist and nationalist teachers, on the other hand, saw only national 
oppression and absolutist rule in the Habsburg past, and they thought Austrian children 
ought to be educated in the democratic principles which had supplanted Habsburg rule in 
243“100. Todestag Franz Schuberts,”  Volkserziehung, Official Section (April 1, 1928): 85; “Goethe-
Gedenkfeier,” Verordnungsblatt (January 1, 1932): 7; “Haydn- Gedenkfeier,” Verordnungsblatt (February 
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1918.  Not all educators saw the Habsburg past in such black and white terms, but by the 
end of the Republican era, history education in Austria had become intensely politicized.  
Beyond a broad agreement on Austrian Germanness and the importance of history 
education, the Austrian educational community could not agree upon how Austria’s 
Habsburg past ought to be presented to the next generation of Austrian citizens.
iii. The First Republic’s History Textbooks and the Habsburg Past 
Despite the acrimonious ideological debates between the First Republic’s various 
political factions concerning the appropriate content of history education in Austria, the 
new state did oversee the production of several new or revised history textbooks.  It is 
perhaps unsurprising given the depth of the disagreement in Austria regarding the 
meaning of its past that the authors of these history texts frequently did not agree with one 
another, but rather provided students with a contradictory views of Austrian history.  This 
diversity in fact reflected the deep divisions within Austrian society concerning the 
meaning of the Habsburg past for contemporary life, and the lack of consensus among 
these textbook authors meant that state history education could ultimately offer little help 
in bridging the ideological divide in Austria about the Habsburg legacy.
The one area where most of the new history textbooks did agree was on the subject 
of Austrian national identity.  The First Republic’s history texts all portrayed Austria’s 
history as part of the larger history of the Germany, and portrayed Austrians as part of the 
German Volk.  Beyond such professions of Austrian Germanness, however, the new 
textbooks offered students a number of different narratives of Austria’s past.  Some 
1, 1932): 27.
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essentially recast material from history education before 1918 in a slightly newer form, 
portraying the Habsburgs as leading German dynasty which had done its best to safeguard 
German interests and to advance Austria’s unique culture in central and eastern Europe 
throughout the centuries.  Others, however, provided a more critical view of Habsburg 
rule, and argued that Habsburgs had at times worked against the project of German unity 
in the name of its own selfish dynastic interests.  The remainder of the First Republic’s 
history texts fell somewhere in between these two extremes, and took a more neutral point 
of view regarding the role of the Habsburgs in Austrian history.  All of these works 
attempted to trace the historical development of the German Volk in Austria from the early 
Middle Ages to the First Republic, but the manner in which individual authors presented 
that Austrian historical narrative varied considerably.
The First Republic’s History Textbooks and Austrian Germanness
After the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, Austrian educational policy makers 
realized that the First Republic required a set of new history textbooks which would help 
students grasp Austria’s new circumstances in the postwar era.  Almost all Austrian 
educational leaders and pedagogical theorists agreed that the old history texts which had 
been used during the last decades of the imperial era were simply no longer appropriate, 
and needed to be revised or even replaced entirely.  In 1919, the Socialist Undersecretary
of Education Otto Glöckel argued that the old Monarchy’s history textbooks were out of 
step with the pedagogical ideals of the modern era and had been used by the imperial 
government to inspire loyalty to the Habsburgs.  Now that the Habsburgs had been 
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deposed, Glöckel urged historians and authors to move as quickly as possible to produce a 
round of more modern textbooks for all educational levels which would discard the 
outdated emphasis upon political, military, and dynastic history of previous texts in favor 
of cultural history and Austrian Germanness.  Glöckel of course recognized that such 
revisions could not be made immediately, and in the interim he recommended that history 
teachers supplement the old textbooks with material which would reflect Austria’s 
contemporary situation more accurately.244  Other educators agreed, but even in 1927, 
there were still some Austrian educational theorists who argued that the process of 
revising Austria’s history textbooks had proceeded far too slowly, and urged more 
vigorous work on this enterprise.245
It is worth noting that these criticisms regarding history textbooks used in Austrian 
classrooms during the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy appear to be exaggerated.  
While such textbooks did indeed present a view of Austria’s political history which 
emphasized the role of the old Habsburg dynasty, their basic content was not dramatically 
different from the texts used during the First Republic.  They did not ignore cultural 
history, nor did they fail to portray Austrians as part of the German Volk.246  Still, by the 
end of the republican era in Austria, a set of new or revised history textbooks had indeed 
244Glöckel, “Erlaß des deutschösterreichischen Unterstaatssekretärs für Unterricht vom 10. September 
1919, Z. 19557, betreffend mit welchem Richtlinien für den Gebrauch der deutschen Lehrbücher und für 
den Unterricht in der Geschichte und Vaterlandskunde an den dem Staatsamt unterstehenden Schulen 
Deutschösterreichs gegeben werden,” 259-264; “Ausführungen über den Stand der Schulreform in der 
Sitzung des Ausschusses für Erziehung und Unterricht am 22. Oktober 1919,” Volkserziehung, Pedagogical 
Section (1919): 1-3.  For a similar call to reform textbook contents, see also “Ein Jahr republikanische 
Schulreform in Deutschösterreich,” Monatsheft für Pädagogische Reform 69 (1919): 370.
245Kende, Bauer, Schmidt-Breitung and Lowe, 252-254.
246See for example Emil Hannak and Hermann Raschke, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Neuzeit für 
Oberklassen der Mittelschulen, eighth ed. (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1907), 70-80, 115-122; Gustav Rusch, 
Alois Herdegen and Franz Tiechl, Lehrbuch der Geschichte (Vienna: Pichlers, 1911), 246-257; Karl 
Woynar, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die Unterstofe der Mädchenlyzeen, vol. 3 (Vienna, 1919), 70-87, 94-
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appeared, and these new texts at least partially reflected the new views regarding Austrian 
history and national identity of the First Republic’s various ideological groups.
The First Republic’s federal administrative structure makes it difficult to discern 
exactly where and how extensively individual textbooks were used in Austria.  While the 
Republic’s Ministry of Education instituted general curricula for the entire state, and 
reserved the power to approve which textbooks were acceptable for use in Austrian 
schools, it fell to Austria’s federal provinces and local boards of education to select which 
specific works their schools would use from the list of approved materials.  Thus, 
educational authorities on the local level had a significant amount of latitude to choose 
texts in order to reflect the political and national views of the dominant political party of 
their region.  Vienna, for example, was governed by a solid Social Democratic majority 
throughout the First Republic, and its provincial educational system reflected the SDP’s 
progressive and egalitarian pedagogical aims even after the Party lost its ability to 
dominate the Republic’s educational agenda as a whole when it lost its parliamentary 
majority in 1920.  In a similar manner, German nationalist parties enjoyed strong support 
in the provinces of Styria and Carinthia, and undoubtedly influenced the content of history 
education in the classrooms of those regions.247  All we can say for certain, however, is 
that the First Republic’s Ministry of Education approved a body of textbooks which 
contained a wide variety of views regarding Austria’s Habsburg past, and that individual 
school boards were able to select materials from this body of approved works as they saw 
98. 
247Timothy Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” in The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A 
Reassessment, eds. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2003), 15.
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fit.248
All of the Republic’s new textbooks, however, did emphasize a consistent view of 
national identity which portrayed Austrians as part of the German Volk, and which cast 
Austrian history as part of the history of Germany.  Some of these textbooks’ statements 
regarding Austrian Germanness were fairly explicit.  For example, Oscar Kende in his 
1928 text for lower level Haupt- and Mittelschule students, Einführung in den 
Geschichtsunterricht, stated that Austrians “are German, and belong to the German Volk.”  
He also discussed what he saw as the difference between the common linguistic 
distinction between “Germans” and “Austrians,” and the actual German Volk, who were 
“one of the greatest in the world” and comprised not just Germans living in Germany, but 
also in Austria, Switzerland, and other parts of Europe.   Kende noted that Germans had 
different traditions and even dialects, but these differences did not change the essential 
fact of their national unity.249  Other textbook authors where perhaps not quite so explicit 
as Kende in their statements regarding the German character of the Austrian people, but 
they nevertheless clearly stated that they regarded Austrians as a “Stamm” (tribe) of the 
German Volk.250
These textbook authors typically located the beginning of Austria’s history in the 
settlement of the Alpine and Danubian regions of Central Europe, or the “Ostmark,” by 
248Papnek, 85-107; Zeps, 69.
249Oskar Kende, Einführung in den Geschichtsunterricht, für die unterste Klasse der österreichischen 
Mittelschulen und Hauptschulen (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1928), 6-8.
250Karl Czerwenka and Alfred Bohmann, Lehr- und Lesebuch der Geschichte für die Unterstufe der 
Mittelschulen, vol. 1 (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und 
Kunst, 1930), 61-65; Heinz Obendorfer, Fritz Herndl and Hans Ernst Butz, Aus Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart.  Ein Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch für den Geschichtsunterricht an österreichischen Hauptschulen, 
vol. 4 (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst,1931), 
24; Andreas Zeehe and Adam Schuh, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die oberen Klassen der Mittelschulen,
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Germanic settlers in the tenth century.  Several of the authors explicitly referred to these 
Germanic migrants as the “forefathers” of modern Austrians, and Karl Czerwenka and 
Alfred Bohmann referred to the old Ostmark as the “nucleus” of the modern Austrian 
Fatherland in their 1930 history text for lower level Mittelschule students.251  The author of 
several Mittelschule textbooks featuring an especially pronounced vision of German 
nationalism, Uto Metzer, made a particular point of emphasizing the role of early 
medieval Germanic migrations in the foundation of Austria, and he took pains to highlight 
the manner in which the Ostmark was created as a bastion of Germanic civilization against 
the Slavs and “predatory” Magyars who also inhabited the region at the same time.252  All 
of these descriptions of the origins of Austrian history served explicitly to emphasize 
Austrian Germanness to students, and to link the history of Austria with that of the 
German Volk as a whole.
The First Republic’s textbook authors used other periods of Austrian history to 
portray the intimate link between Austria and the other German lands of Europe as well.  
Many authors cast the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century, for example, as a time 
of trouble and disunity not only for Austria, but for the entire German Volk, as France and 
vol. 4 (Vienna: Ed. Hölzel, 1933), 16-17.
251During the era of National Socialist Rule in Austria, the term “Ostmark” would assume a definite 
political implications, as it was this term which Hitler’s government used to replace the name “Austria” in 
its attempts to completely integrate the territories of the former Austrian state into the Third Reich.  Before 
1938, however, the “Ostmark” label lacked such connotations, and was used interchangeably with 
“Austria” to describe the German-speaking lands in the Alps and on the Danube during the medieval 
period.  Karl Czerwenka and Alfred Bohmann, Lehr- und Lesebuch der Geschichte für die Unterstufe der 
Mittelschulen, vol. 2 (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und 
Kunst, 1930), 138; Heinz Obendorfer, Fritz Herndl and Hans Ernst Butz, Aus Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart, vol. 2 (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und 
Kunst,1929), 52-53. 
252Uto Metzer, Kurzes Lehrbuch der Geschichte, Merk- und Wiederholungsbüchlein (Graz: Verlag der 
Alpenland-Buchhandlung Südmark, 1930), 15-17.
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a number of outside powers conspired to break German power in Europe.253  Likewise, 
many authors described the efforts of Eugene of Savoy and the House of Austria to turn 
back the Turkish invasions (abetted, of course, by a hostile French state) later in the same 
century as a successful defense not just of Vienna, but of all of Germany.254  These 
accounts also cast the early nineteenth-century wars against Napoleon in a similar light, 
and presented the efforts of the Habsburg Monarchy and Prussia to break the French 
emperor’s hold upon Europe not as a matter of state politics, but as a spontaneous uprising 
of the entire German Volk against French domination.255
The historical era which these history textbook authors used to argue most 
forcefully for Austrian Germanness was, of course, the recent world war.  Once again, 
most of them portrayed the conflict as one in which the Germans of Germany and Austria 
made common cause in a nationalistic struggle against France and its allies.  These 
accounts presented the German soldiers fighting for the Central Powers as valiant warriors 
overcome by the superior numbers of the Entente, betrayed by the treacherous Slavic 
nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy.256
Some of the textbooks managed to describe the postwar settlements in relatively 
253Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, Aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, vol. 3 (Vienna and Leipzig: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst,1929), 63-65; Metzer, Kurzes 
Lehrbuch der Geschichte, Merk- und Wiederholungsbüchlein, 22-3; Zeehe and  Schuh, Lehrbuch der 
Geschichte für die oberen Klassen der Mittelschulen, vol. 2 (Vienna: Verlag Ed. Hölzel, 1929), 172-173.
254Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 68-72; Zeehe and Schuh, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die oberen 
Klassen der Mittelschulen, vol. 3 (Vienna: Verlag Ed. Hölzel, 1930), 16; Czerwenka and Bohmann, Lehr-
und Lesebuch der Geschichte für die Unterstufe der Mittelschulen, vol. 3 (Vienna and Leipzig: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930), 128-133.
255Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 106-108; Zeehe and Schuh, vol. 3, 79-8; Metzer, Kurzes Lehrbuch 
der Geschichte, Merk- und Wiederholungsbüchlein, 25.
256Metzer, Kurze deutsche Geschichte für Bürgerschulen, vol 3, Vom westfälischen Frieden bis zur 
heutigen Zeit (Graz: Verlag der Alpenland-Buchhandlung Südmark, 1923), 64-68; Zeehe and Schuh, vol. 4, 
64-69.
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neutral terms, but the majority voiced their deep resentment of the treaties.257  Several texts 
specifically mentioned the manner in which postwar Austria had been forced to abandon 
the name “German-Austria” and the goal of union with the Germany, and a number even 
avowed that Anschluß remained the aim of the Austrian people, despite the opposition of 
the Entente powers.258  Andreas Zeehe and Adam Schuh provided a particularly vehement 
denunciation of the postwar state of affairs in their 1930 textbook for upper level 
Mittelschule students, which proudly proclaimed Austria’s commitment to Anschluß and 
railed against the peace settlement which had left so many of the Germans who had 
formerly been Habsburg subjects living under “foreign domination.”259
Even with such a firmly German nationalist outlook, however, some of these 
history textbooks also indicated the distinctiveness of the Austrian branch of the German 
Volk.  Several texts referenced the “Austrian mission,” albeit in a manner which was 
calculated as much to emphasize Austria’s service to the German Volk as a whole as it was 
to inspire Austrian patriotism.  The textbooks by Metzer and by Obendorfer, Herdl and 
Butz both prominently discussed Austria’s historical mission to protect all of the Germans 
of Central Europe against eastern invasions.260  Other texts highlighted the manner in 
which Austria had helped to spread German culture to the supposedly less developed 
257For a fairly neutral discussion on the war and its aftermath, see Hannak and Georg A. Lukas, 
Vaterlandskunde für die unteren Klassen der Mittelschulen (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky A.G., 1924), 
18-20; Karl Goll, Die Republik Österreich: Ein Behelf für den Unterricht in der Vaterlandskunde (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Schulbücherverlag, 1923), 38-39.
258Metzer, Kurze deutsche Geschichte für Bürgerschulen, vol 3, 69-70; Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 1, 
64-65;  Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 4, 65; Metzer, Kurzes Lehrbuch der Geschichte, Merk- und 
Wiederholungsbüchlein, 29-32.
259Zeehe and Schuch, vol. 4, 95.
260Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 68-72; Metzer, Kurzes Lehrbuch der Geschichte, Merk- und 
Wiederholungsbüchlein, 15-17.
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peoples of Eastern Europe throughout the centuries.261
One “Vaterlandskunde” (patriotic education) textbook for lower level Mittelschule
students which had been used in Austrian classrooms during the imperial era but had been 
subsequently revised in 1924 provided a particularly thorough description of the Austrian 
mission for young Austrians.  In this account, the authors described Austria’s geographic 
position at the crossroads between cultures in Central Europe, and argued that the 
inhabitants of the territory had served as both the defenders of the continent against 
invasions by the Avars, Magyars, Mongols, Turks, and Russians, and as  mediators 
between East and West.  The authors asserted that Austria had made the advantages of 
Eastern culture, never really defined, available to the West even as they helped spread 
German economic prosperity and “Geisteslebens” (spiritual life) to the peoples of the east.  
The authors made certain, however, to define this Austrian function in the context of 
German history, and called Austria a “room” within the German Vaterhaus (paternal 
house).262
Descriptions of distinctively Austrian qualities or characteristics were remarkably 
rare in the First Republic’s history textbooks.  A 1930 text by Karl Czerwenka and Alfred 
Bohmann, for example, contained a brief discussion which noted that many foreign 
observers had mistaken the Austrian love of spectacle for superficiality and hence had 
missed Austria’s deeper virtues and capability for work (Arbeitstüchtigkeit).263  That 
passage represented the entirety of their description of the Austrian character, however, 
261 Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 2, 160-161; Metzer, Kurze deutsche Geschichte für Bürgerschulen, vol 
3, 48-49.
262Hannak and Lukas, 1-3, 19.
263Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 3, 144.
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and the authors made no effort to contrast those characteristics with those of other 
Germans or to use them as an argument for Austrian national uniqueness.
Another, more peculiar discussion of Austrian distinctiveness can be found in 
Czerwenka and Bohmann’s description of Andreas Hofer’s unsuccessful early nineteenth-
century uprising against Napoleonic rule in the Austrian province of Tyrol.  The authors 
characterized Hofer’s struggle as a patriotic one, but they argued that it had been 
conducted not in the name of the German nation or the Habsburg Austrian state, but rather 
as a defense of his Tyrolean Heimat.  This textbook, itself published in Tyrol, portrayed 
Hofer as a true symbol of the “Tyrolean Volk.”  Such a description of Hofer was 
exceedingly unusual given the fact that so many other Austrian history textbooks written 
between 1918 and 1955 usually cast the Tyrolean leader as a symbol of either German or 
Austrian national or patriotic sentiment.  When considered alongside their professions of 
Austrian Germanness elsewhere, Czerwenka and Bohmann’s depiction of Hofer as a 
regional rather than a national patriot probably indicates the relative weakness of 
specifically Austrian national sentiment during the First Republic.264
Apart from rare statements of Austrian distinctiveness, the First Republic’s history 
textbooks all emphasized the Germanness of the Austrian people and invariably described 
Austrian history as part of the history of the German Volk as a whole.  From Austria’s 
medieval Germanic origins to such events of wider German significance as the Thirty 
Years War, the siege of Vienna, the Napoleonic wars, and World War I, these texts all 
took care to highlight the link between Austrian and German history.  Some even used the 
aftermath of the First World War as an occasion to emphasize Austria’s German character 
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and to urge students to support Anschluß as the only reasonable destiny for Austria.  While 
the First Republic’s history texts all agreed that Austrians were historically a German 
people, however, the appropriate portrayal of Austria’s Habsburg past was a more 
problematic issue.
The First Republic’s History Textbooks and the Legacy of the Habsburg Monarchy
There was little consensus among the First Republic’s history textbook authors 
over how to describe the old Habsburg Monarchy to students.  Certainly all of the authors 
agreed that the old Monarchy had been historically significant, and that its development 
and the actions of various Habsburg rulers needed to be taught to students.  They could not 
agree, however, upon whether the House of Habsburg and its multinational state had 
represented a positive or a negative force in the history of Austria.  Some textbooks 
continued the basic approach of the imperial era, depicting the old Monarchy as a 
benevolent entity which had served the interests of the German Volk in Central Europe.  
Other texts were considerably more ambivalent concerning the old dynastic state, though, 
and sometimes were even overtly hostile toward Habsburg rule.  Some authors lauded 
individual Habsburg rulers and the basic function of their Monarchy, but also criticized 
the Habsburgs vehemently when they stood in the way of democratic or national reform.  
The differences in historical interpretation of these textbooks did not correspond to any 
particular pattern in terms of their target audience, and various views could be found in 
either Hauptschulen or Mittleschulen, where the bulk of history education took place, as 
well as at both the lower and upper levels of those institutions.
264Ibid., 170-172.
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The authors who took a positive stance regarding the Habsburgs and their state 
tended to dwell upon individual Habsburg monarchs or their most distinguished political 
and military subordinates.  Their accounts crafted historical narratives which portrayed the 
old Monarchy as a benevolent institution which had worked to secure the interests of the 
German Volk in Central Europe while at the same time helping to increase the cultural 
level and material prosperity of the other Völker of the region.  These accounts put the 
Habsburgs at the forefront of such benevolent works, and often praised them for their 
dedication and good character.  Such a positive view of the old dynasty was generally 
presented in the context of serving the interests of the German Volk in Europe, however, 
and the authors made it clear they did not regard Habsburg rule as a positive end in itself, 
but rather saw it as something which was good only in so far as it served German interests. 
Medieval Habsburg emperors such as Rudolph I, Rudolph IV, and Maximilian I 
emerged in these narratives as generally praiseworthy rulers, albeit ones with significant 
flaws.  Oberdofer, Herndl and Butz, and Czerwenka and Bohmann praised these figures 
for their religious piety, sense of honor and personal courage, and their efforts to build 
their state into a culturally vibrant and economically prosperous force to safeguard 
German interests in a region full of other, potentially hostile national groups.  Their rule 
was patriarchal and heavily influenced by the Catholic faith, but it laid the groundwork for 
the next several centuries of Austrian prominence on the continent.265  Even Zeehe and 
Schuch, typically more critical of the dynasty, praised the reign of Maximilian I as one 
which laid the groundwork for the Habsburgs’ multinational state, which would dominate 
265Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 6-10, 22-25; Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 3, 6-8.
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Central European affairs for the next several centuries.266
Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II were another set of Habsburg monarchs 
frequently praised in the First Republic’s textbooks. Obendorfer, Herndl and Butz for 
example, depicted the Maria Theresa as a religious, dedicated, and shrewd “mother of her 
subjects” whose reforms helped modernize her territory.267  Czerwenka and Bohmann 
likewise provided a laudatory depiction of the Austrian empress, and focused on her 
efforts to centralize her government, encourage the growth of culture, and to defend her 
territory against the severe military challenges which faced it.268  In a similar manner, both 
of these narrative accounts praised Joseph II as a commendable if ultimately unsuccessful 
ruler who attempted to extend his mother’s reforms, and to put the Austrian state to work 
in the service of his subjects.  Interestingly, none of these authors emphasized Joseph II’s 
efforts to establish German as the language of administration throughout his realm, which 
made him a beloved figure for German nationalists in Czechoslovakia during this time.  
The Austrian right’s increasingly strident emphasis upon Catholic values during the  First 
Republic and its correspondingly diminished interest in German nationalism perhaps 
explains the more conservative authors’ lack of enthusiasm for Joseph, who had 
drastically weakened the position of the Catholic Church in Austria during his reign.269
These descriptions of Austrian history during the eighteenth century are notable, 
however, for their lack of animosity toward the Prussian monarchs who so often worked to 
oppose the foreign policy efforts of Maria Theresa and Joseph.  As we shall see, later 
266Zeehe and Schuh, vol. 2, 145.
267Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 73-80.
268 Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 3, 140-143; See also, Zeehe and Schuh, vol. 3, 49-53.
269Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 80-83; Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 3, 143-146; Wingfield, 
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Austrian textbooks that sought to inspire Austrian patriotism often crafted polemics 
against Frederick the Great and other Hohenzollern rulers as anti-Austrian aggressors.  
The First Republic’s authors, presumably interested in instilling German national 
sentiment in Austrian students, generally did not mount any such rhetorical attacks on 
eighteenth-century Prussia.  One exception to this tendency was the Marxism-tinged 
textbook of Zeehe and Schuch, which took a dim view of dynastic rulers in general, and 
castigated the Hohenzollerns for their lust for power and lack of understanding of German 
interests in Europe.270
The pro-Habsburg authors also praised the Habsburg leadership for its role in 
helping to end French oppression of the German Volk during the Napoleonic era, and for 
presiding over a period of peace, stability, and cultural development in Austria during the 
nineteenth century.  Czerwenka and Bohmann, and Obendorfer, Herndl and Butz even 
went out of their way to mention some of the positive cultural features of the reign of 
Emperor Franz and his foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, which was frequently 
portrayed in a far less sympathetic light by more critical authors.271  These authors, 
however, also portrayed the movement toward German national unity during Metternich’s 
era and during the subsequent Revolution of 1848 in an extremely positive light, and they 
emphasized these aspirations as part of a larger awakening of the German Volk.  
Ultimately, of course, the Habsburgs themselves had opposed the German nationalists, 
“Statues of Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity,” 178_201.
270Zeehe and Schuch, 43-53.
271Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 3, 169-170, 179-180; Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 104-1, vol. 4, 
7-19.
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and here these authors indulged in some muted criticisms of the dynasty’s policies.272
The authors who presented the Habsburgs in a more favorable light cast the demise 
of Austria’s dynastic Monarchy in 1918 as a tragedy for the German people.  They argued 
that Habsburgs in general had done their best to serve the interests of the German people, 
and they approvingly noted the attempts of the last Emperor, Karl, to reform his 
multinational state along federal lines in order to preserve the Monarchy’s positive 
functions in Central Europe.273  Ultimately, however, 1918 was a catastrophe for the 
German Volk not so much because of the collapse of the Habsburg state, but rather 
because of the straitened circumstances in which so many of the Monarchy’s German 
subjects found themselves after the war.  Ultimately for these authors, although the 
Habsburgs had served the cause of the German nation admirably throughout the centuries, 
it was that national cause itself which was the appropriate focus of Austrian history, not 
Habsburg rule.
Other textbook authors were far less charitable when it came to the subject of 
Habsburg rule in Austria.  In particular Uto Metzer, and Andreas Zeehe and Adam Schuch 
tended to criticize the Habsburgs and their policies throughout Austrian history.  Whereas 
Czerwenka and Bohmann, Obendorfer, Herndl and Butz, and even Karl Goll saw the 
Habsburgs as a princely house which had done its utmost in the service of German 
interests, this other group of textbook authors generally argued the opposite point, and 
charged that the old Austrian dynasty had habitually done what it could to stymie the 
cause of German national unity in favor of its own selfish political interests.  In making 
272Czerwenka and Bohmann, vol. 1, 60-61; Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, vol. 3, 24-25.
273Goll, 5-7; Obendorfer, Herdl and Butz, part 4, 47.
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these arguments, Metzer generally reflected the point of view of the German nationalist 
political faction in the First Republic, while Zeehe and Schuch presented a more Marxist 
view of history which harmonized well with the Social Democrats’ vision of the Habsburg 
past.
Metzer’s textbooks provided Austrian students with an ardently nationalistic 
account of Austrian history which frequently portrayed the Habsburgs as the enemies of 
the German Volk.  Metzer’s narratives displayed many of the key traits of Austrian 
German nationalist views of history, including anti-Catholicism and hostility towards the 
non-German nationalities of the old Monarchy.  For Metzer, the German people were the 
true protagonists of Austrian history, and he evaluated their dynastic leaders according to 
how well they had served German interests.  Such an interpretation of the past meant that 
Metzer did occasionally have some kind words for Habsburg rulers such as Maximilian I 
if he felt they had served the cause of the German Volk.  More often, however, he 
castigated the Habsburgs, and indeed other German dynastic houses in Europe, for what 
he saw as their tendency to put their own political interests ahead of those of the German 
nation as a whole.274
Metzer was most critical of Habsburg conduct during the nineteenth century, the 
era when German nationalism flourished in Central Europe.  In Metzer’s estimation, the 
House of Austria had been the dedicated enemy of German nationalism and of the 
movement toward German unity.  For example, he excoriated Metternich for his 
274 Metzer, Kurze deutsche Geschichte für Bürgerschulen, vol. 2, Von der kaiserlos Zeit bis zum 
westfälischen Frieden (Graz: Verlag der Alpenland-Buchhandlung Südmark, 1922), 32-3; Metzer, Kurzes 
Lehrbuch der Geschichte, Merk- und Wiederholungsbüchlein, 24.  Metzer’s books were published, and 
probably used, in Styria, a hotbed of German nationalist sentiment.  Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” 
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implacable opposition to German national ideas and the cause of German freedom.  In a 
similar manner, he also railed against the conduct of the Habsburg Monarchy’s other 
national groups during the Revolution of 1848, and presented a particularly venomous 
view of the efforts of the Magyars to expand their cultural and political influence within 
the old state at the expense of the German Volk.  According to Metzer, the Habsburg rulers 
of the nineteenth century were far too willing to sacrifice the interests of their German 
subjects in order to mollify the increasingly strident demands of the Monarchy’s other 
national groups, and too proud to accept any Prussian assistance which might have helped 
to keep the non-German peoples at bay.275
Indeed, Bismarck and the other Prussian leaders who presided over the creation of 
a unified north German state emerged in a much more positive light in Metzer’s account 
of Austrian history than did the Habsburg Emperor of the same era, Franz Joseph.  Metzer
lauded Bismarck’s relatively mild treatment of the Habsburg Monarchy in the aftermath of 
the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and he praised the German state which the Prussian 
Chancellor helped found in 1871 for its economic prosperity, its progressive social 
legislation, and its military might.  For Metzer, Bismarck was a true servant of the German 
Volk, defending its interests and increasing its standing in Europe in a way that the 
Habsburgs had rarely done.  In comparison, Metzer argued that the Habsburgs’ German 
subjects had continually demonstrated their willingness to make sacrifices for the interests 
of the old Monarchy as a whole, only to be repaid with disloyalty from the state’s non-
German Völker and indifference from the dynasty itself.  It was no surprise that, according 
15.
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the Metzer, the Germans of Austria often felt a strong affinity for Bismarck’s German 
state and had supported it vocally even when the Austrian government had not.276
Zeehe and Schuch presented a somewhat different version of Austria’s history, but 
their narrative also focused upon the German Volk living in Austria and frequently 
portrayed the Habsburgs in a negative light.  Their textbook displayed a Marxist approach 
to history in which class conflict and economic interests frequently appeared as the driving 
forces behind past events.277  These authors generally displayed little affinity for any 
dynastic rulers, whether in Austria or in other German lands, and they were quick to 
criticize various monarchs for policies which opposed the interests of the German Volk.
At times, however, Zeehe and Schuch were willing to make positive comments 
about individual Habsburg rulers so long as their policy choices were progressive and 
designed to improve the lot of the people, rather than calculated to bolster their own 
dynastic power.  For example, the authors praised Prince Eugene of Savoy for his 
successes in defending the Germans of Europe against French and Turkish invasions, even 
as they acknowledged that his achievements also served to orient the Habsburg Monarchy 
away from Germany toward southern and eastern Europe.  Likewise, Zeehe and Schuch 
lauded the centralizing and modernizing reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II for the 
manner in which they helped improve the situation of all of the subjects of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.278
Like Metzer, Zeehe and Schuch critiized Habsburg policies during the nineteenth 
Geschichte, Merk- und Wiederholungsbüchlein, 28-29.
276Metzer, Kurze deutsche Geschichte für Bürgerschulen, vol. 3, 43- 49.
277For example, they cited capitalistic and imperialistic competition between the European great powers as 
one of the primary causes of World War I.  Zeehe and Schuch, vol. 4, 62-63.
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century.  They cast Metternich as a canny statesman who was nevertheless a committed 
enemy of “Volksfreiheit” (freedom of the people), and portrayed his Habsburg patron 
Franz I as an arch-reactionary opposed to any and all political reforms.  For these authors, 
the Revolutions of 1848 in Austria represented a flowering of national sentiment and 
liberal politics, and they argued that the movement toward German national unity had 
ultimately failed because of the dynastic rivalry between the ruling houses of Austria and 
Prussia.  In the aftermath of the uprising, the national aspirations of the Monarchy’s 
Völker gradually undermined the stability of the Austrian state, and the Habsburgs 
demonstrated themselves powerless to stop this process.  While Zeehe and Schuch did 
note the impressive cultural development over which the Habsburg government presided 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, they argued that the Habsburgs ultimately 
represented a medieval style of rule incapable of coping with the needs of a modern 
society, and which had long fostered disunity within the German lands of Europe.  For 
these authors, the end of Habsburg rule in 1918 represented the end of an state which had 
too often acted against the true interests of the German Volk.279
The new history textbooks produced in the First Republic all declared that the 
Austrian people were part of the German Volk and that their history was a German one, 
but beyond that consensus they did not present a uniform view of Austria’s Habsburg past.  
Some texts lauded the Habsburgs as the true defenders of German interests in Central 
Europe while others charged that the House of Austria had historically only been 
concerned with its own political power and had often worked against the cause of German 
278Zeehe and Schuch, vol. 3, 14-16, 49-53.
279Zeehe and Schuch, vol. 3, 101-103, 113-118, vol. 4, 41-64.
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national unity.  Each of the major ideological factions of the First Republic, whether 
conservative Catholic, Social Democratic, or German nationalist, saw its views of 
Austrian history represented in individual history textbooks, but no one political camp’s 
historical vision predominated in Austrian classrooms.  The meaning of Austria’s 
Habsburg past as portrayed in the First Republic’s history textbooks was a profoundly 
contested topic, just as it was in the realm of Austrian politics.
The debate on how state education ought to present Austrian national identity and 
Austria’s Habsburg past to students occurred as part of the wider and increasingly 
acrimonious dispute over education in general in the First Republic.  The wrangling 
between the Christian Social Party and the Social Democrats over the appropriate 
relationship between the Church and the state, and the relative merits of a more egalitarian 
social order provided the political backdrop for these educational discussions.  All of the 
First Republic’s ideological groups agreed that Austria was a German land, and that 
Austrian history ought to be taught to students as part of the history of Germany.  There 
was no agreement, however, on how the old Monarchy ought to be portrayed in Austrian 
classrooms, or whether the new Republic ought to be presented as the inheritor of the 
Habsburg Monarchy’s positive legacy or as a clean break with an oppressive and 
reactionary dynastic state.  The First Republic’s educational laws and curricula show that 
Austria’s political leaders could agree on a broad set of pedagogical principles, but an 
examination of the contents of the Republic’s educational journals and history textbooks 
reveals the extent to which Austrian educators vehemently disagreed with one another 
concerning the meaning of the Habsburg past.
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These educational documents demonstrate the extent to which the First Republic’s 
political leaders from various ideological camps were successful in disseminating their 
ideas regarding national identity and the meaning of Austrian history to the Austrian 
public in a practical sense.  They show that the initial consensus among Austria’s major 
political parties concerning Austria’s essential Germanness was indeed imparted to 
students, and some educational materials even urged young Austrians to regard Anschluß
as the most natural eventual outcome of Austrian history.  The lack of agreement among 
the First Republic’s political factions concerning the meaning and legacy of the Habsburg 
past was similarly reflected in these educational documents.  All of the major ideological 
groups were able to provide some representation of their views on Austria’s history in 
Austrian classrooms, but no one faction was able to secure the predominance of its 
preferred historical narrative.  History education in the Austrian First Republic was thus 
just as much an occasion for fractious and impassioned debate as was Austrian politics in 
general.
The one ideological principle which was notably not reflected in the First 
Republic’s debates on history education was the Christian Social Party’s increasingly firm 
profession of Austrian patriotism toward the end of the republican era.  Some articles in 
the Party’s pedagogical journal reflected the conservative Catholic camp’s patriotic turn 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s, but the Republic’s educational curricula and history 
textbooks generally continued to espouse ardently nationalistic German ideals which were 
significantly out of step with the newer stance of the CSP.  Textbook reform had really 
only just begun by the final years of the First Republic, and the CSP’s change in tone was 
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still too recent to have had an effect on the content of Austria’s history texts.  The fall of 
the First Republic and the creation of the conservative and authoritarian Ständestaat in 
1933, however, ultimately served to bridge this gap between the traditional Austrian 
right’s historical and patriotic ideals and the visions of Austrian national identity and 
history presented in the state’s classrooms.  With the creation of a new political system in 
Austria, the conservative right cut through the Gordian knot of divisive partisan 
parliamentary debate by dismantling Austrian democracy entirely.  The Ständestaat
defined the Social Democrats and the Austrian German nationalists, who were 
increasingly represented politically by the Austrian Nazi Party, as enemies of the Austrian 
state, and it would subsequently work to exclude the historical and national views of these 
ideological groups from the state’s educational system.  After 1933, a staunch Austrian 
patriotism which presented the Habsburg Monarchy as the pious and benevolent 
representative of the very finest German ideals would be the order of the day in both 
Austrian politics and education.
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Part II.  The Past as a Patriotic Foundation: The “Second German 
State,” 1933-1938
Chapter 3. Politics and the Habsburg Past in the Ständestaat
In March of 1933, the simmering political rivalries which had plagued Austria 
since the collapse of the old Monarchy in 1918 finally reached a boiling point.  The 
Christian Social Party (CSP), which had been ruling on the basis of an extremely narrow 
parliamentary majority in coalition with the paramilitary Heimwehr (Home Guard) faction 
since 1932, suddenly found itself faced with an strange set of circumstances when the 
Austrian parliament’s president and his deputies resigned on March 4th, leaving the 
legislature without a presiding officer.  Instead of calling for new elections, the Christian 
Social Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuß, used the opportunity to declare that the parliament 
had dissolved itself, effectively ending the Austrian First Republic.280
280Barabara Jelavich, Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 195; Walter Goldinger, “Der geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Österreich 
von 1918 bis 1945,” in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik, 1954), 199-201.
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This action came at a time of tremendous economic hardship and political 
uncertainty in Austria.  The Great Depression had robbed Austria of what little economic 
progress it had made since the First World War, and in the early 1930s the Christian 
Social Party had lost the electoral support necessary even to maintain its narrow 
parliamentary predominance, let alone to purse its legislative agenda effectively.  The CSP 
had always been skeptical about the merits of democracy during the First Republic, and 
Dollfuß regarded republican rule as incapable of protecting the religious and social values 
which he and other Austrian conservatives cherished.  Thus, the events of March 4th
offered him the chance to replace the First Republic with a system which he felt would be 
better able to guide Austria through the challenges with which it was faced.281  Afterwards, 
Dollfuß, and, after his murder in July 1935, his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, presided 
over a new, authoritarian government, the so-called Ständestaat.
This new Austrian government claimed to establish a “new” or “real” democracy 
which would replace the partisan strife and political obstructionism of the old 
parliamentary order with a byzantine system of indirectly elected advisory councils which 
theoretically represented the major sectors or “professions” (Berufstände) of the Austrian 
economy.  This form of political organization was based upon the views of the Viennese 
intellectual Othmar Spann, whose work had profoundly influenced not just Dollfuß, but 
also right-wing authoritarianism throughout Europe.282  In practice, the Ständestaat was a 
281Timothy Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” and James William Miller “Engelbert Dollfuss and 
Austrian Agriculture,” in The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, eds. Günter Bischof, 
Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 10-31, 
122-142.
282Miller, 125-126; Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995), 247; Othmar Spann, Der wahre Staat.  Vorlesungen über Abbruch und Neubau der 
Gesellschaft, gehalten 1920 in Wien (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1921).
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dictatorship which represented the combined interests of the Christian Social Party and the 
Heimwehr, and which sought to build an independent Austria which was Catholic, 
patriotic, and anti-Marxist.  From its very beginning, the Dollfuß regime saw itself as 
fighting a two front battle for power in Austria.283  On the one hand was the Austrian’s 
right’s old opponent, the Social Democratic Party, which the new government still 
suspected of harboring the ambition to destroy the traditional order and replace it with a 
proletarian dictatorship.  On the other front was a more recent enemy, the Austrian 
National Socialist Party, which had been making steady gains on both the state and 
provincial levels during the early 1930s.  The corporatist regime feared that the Austrian 
Nazis would seize control of the state, and move to unite it with the recently born Nazi 
regime in Germany.  Thus, the new government pursued economic policies which it hoped 
would undercut the support of the working class for the Socialists, while at the same time 
it attempted to inculcate the Austrian population with a sense of Austrian patriotism which 
the regime hoped would neutralize the German nationalistic appeal of National 
Socialism.284
In pursuing this second task, the leaders of the Ständestaat built upon the view of 
Austrian national identity which had been espoused by many on the Austrian right during 
the era of the First Republic.  The new regime presented a vision of Austrian national 
identity which was complex, conservative, and ultimately based upon Austria’s historical 
traditions.  The new leaders held that Austria was indeed essentially a German state, as 
283“Bundeskanzler Dr. Dollfuß vor dem Wiener Christlich sozialen Parteirat,” Reichspost (Vienna), March 
14, 1933, 3.
284Jelavich, 195-200; Kirk, 10-31; Payne, 250.  On Austrian Nazism during the Ständestaat, see Bruce F. 
Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism (Chapel Hill: University 
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had many conservatives previously, but at the same time they also affirmed Austria’s role 
as a special and distinctive part of the German nation.  Austria was smaller and less 
powerful than its northern German neighbor, and it possessed its own distinctive historical 
heritage and mission, but it was no less German for all that.  Indeed, the Ständestaat’s 
vision of national identity saw Austria’s place in the world as one which was based upon 
Austria’s historical traditions and which was nested in a hierarchy of concentric cultural 
“circles.”  First and foremost Austria was Austrian as a cultural and political entity, but it 
was also part of the German cultural nation, and, beyond that, part of Western 
civilization’s deeply rooted Christian heritage.  All three of these “cultural circles” were 
part of Austria’s identity, and the Ständestaat committed itself to defending Austria’s role 
and membership in all three.  The leaders of the Ständestaat were also quick to argue that 
Austria in many ways represented the true essence of Germanness, an essence which was 
Christian, Western, diverse, peaceful, and “free,” in contrast to the brutal, dogmatic, racist 
and anti-Catholic corruption of German values found in Nazi ideology.
In order to make its case for an Austrian national identity which was patriotically 
Austrian, yet also Christian, German, and Western, the Ständestaat’s leadership relied 
heavily upon the memory and the symbols of Austria’s Habsburg past.  The government 
portrayed the new Austrian state and political system as the heir of the Habsburg legacy.  
In drawing upon a traditional view of religion’s place in society and upon old notions of 
social hierarchy, the new regime attempted to ground its foundational ideology in 
Austria’s past stretching back to the Middle Ages.  On a symbolic level, the new 
government restored the second head which the First Republic’s founders had lopped off 
of North Carolina Press, 1981), 104-192.
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of the old Monarchy’s double-headed eagle insignia.285  On less superficial level, however, 
the Ständestaat’s leaders strived to kindle Austrian loyalty to the Fatherland by reminding 
the Austrian people of their state’s deep historical past.  The new government’s public 
statements made frequent references to the legacy and achievements of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, and drew upon the familiar ideas of the “Austrian man” and the “Austrian 
mission” in order to bolster support for Austrian independence in the face of the Nazis’ 
aggressive German nationalism.  The corporatist regime also aggressively reformed 
Austria’s educational system, redrawing curricula for historical and civic education and 
rewriting history textbooks, so as to educate Austrian children to be patriotic Austrians 
who were throughly aware of Austria’s rich and distinctive historical inheritance.  In all of 
these efforts, the new government portrayed the old Monarchy as a bastion of Western, 
Christian, German, and Austrian culture, and argued forcefully that the Ständestaat
represented the fulfillment of this Habsburg legacy after a failed republican interregnum.
The new Austrian government was an authoritarian one which repudiated the free 
political culture of the First Republic and suppressed opposition from the Austrian 
National Socialists, Communists, and Social Democrats.  The regime’s restrictions on 
political speech were not absolute, however, and there was some room for those not 
affiliated with the regime to present alternative arguments concerning Austrian identity 
and the Habsburg past.  First of all, there was a group of Austrian Catholic intellectuals 
such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Ernst Karl Winter, who, while sympathetic in 
many ways to the goals and values of the new regime, made arguments concerning 
285As pictured on the title page of the new corporatist Constitution of 1935, among other places.  Die 
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Austrian identity which were independent and sometimes dramatically different from 
those coming from the government itself.286   The aristocratic Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
conservative Pan-Europeanism and Winter’s overt yet patriotic opposition to the 
Ständestaat’s suppression of the Austrian workers’ movement in many ways stemmed 
from the same ideas that underlay the ideology of the ruling regime.  Yet these men used 
those ideas to make arguments which did not always harmonize with the majority view 
within the body of Austrian conservatism.  The Social Democrats also voiced their 
opposition, overtly until their failed rebellion in February of 1934, and afterwards from 
underground, illegal groups as well as from exile in Czechoslovakia.  The Social 
Democrats, represented most vigorously and prolifically by their political and intellectual 
leader, Otto Bauer, maintained their basic stance from the republican era that Austrians 
were Germans whose destiny lay in a unified and Socialist German state, and they 
criticized the new Austrian government for its attempt to return to what the Austrian left 
viewed as the essentially oppressive methods of the reactionary Habsburg state.  Finally, 
the Austrian Communists, also suppressed by the corporatists and operating secretly, 
combined the anti-Habsburg rhetoric of the Social Democrats with firm advocacy of a 
distinctive Austrian national identity apart from Germany, a sense of identity which they 
hoped would help avert what they saw as the gravest danger facing Austria: Anschluß with 
Nazi Germany.287
These alternative views concerning Austrian national identity and the Habsburg 
Styria Verlag, 1934).
286Kirk, 23.
287The Austrian National Socialist Party also obviously presented a vision of a Germanist national identity 
and a hostility toward the Habsburg past that was profoundly at odds with that of the views of the leaders 
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past, while significant, were generally suppressed by the authoritarian regime, however, 
and thus were far less visible to the Austrian population than the statements coming from 
the government itself.  Ultimately, the leaders of the Ständestaat sought to create a 
political system in Austria which would safeguard the historical traditions of Austria 
against Marxism, while at the same time preserving Austrian independence in the face of 
the rising tide of aggressive German nationalism promoted by Nazis in both Austria and 
Germany.  Indeed, the threat posed by the Nazis to Austria’s independence inspired the
Ständestaat’s leaders to declare their Austrian patriotism in a far more firm and 
unequivocal manner than the leading figures of the First Republic ever had.  References to 
Austria’s Habsburg past played a crucial role in this corporatist endeavor.  In the end, the 
Ständestaat was unable to prevent Anschluß with Nazi Germany, but its efforts to 
articulate a vision of Austrianness which was simultaneously Austrian, German, Christian, 
Western and grounded in the legacy of the Habsburgs laid a partial foundation for the 
reawakening of Austrian patriotism in the Second Austrian Republic, which rose from the 
rubble of the Third Reich’s Ostmark after Hitler’s defeat in 1945.
i. The Rise and Fall of the Ständestaat
The transition from the First Republic’s parliamentary democracy to a 
conservative dictatorship was not a premeditated step by Dollfuß, but rather happened as a 
result of an unusual concatenation of circumstances.  Consequently, although Dollfuß 
moved swiftly in March of 1933 to suspend parliamentary rule, he essentially improvised 
of the Ständestaat.  That political faction, however, took its ideological directives from the Hitler regime in 
Nazi Germany, and will be discussed as part of the Nazi seizure of power in Austria in Chapter 5.
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his seizure of power.  Dollfuß initially ruled on the basis of the wartime Economic 
Enabling Act of 1917 passed by the old Monarchy, a fitting beginning for a regime which 
would ultimately base its legitimacy upon the legacy of the Habsburg dynastic state.  It 
took the Dollfuß government more than a year to draft a new constitution which cemented 
Austria’s authoritarian and corporatist course.  Until then, Dollfuß proceeded in a 
somewhat piecemeal manner, ruling by decree with the support of the Austrian army, the 
Heimwehr, and the patronage of Fascist Italy.288
Indeed, leftist critics at the time frequently charged that the Dollfuß government 
was “fascist,” and some subsequent historians have also applied the label of “Austro-
fascism” to the Ständestaat’s government.289  Such a description of the regime is not 
entirely accurate.  It is certainly true that the regime abandoned democracy in favor of 
authoritarian rule, and shared a tendency toward strident anti- liberal and anti-Marxist 
rhetoric with the genuinely “fascist” governments or political factions of the day in Europe 
such as the Italian Fascists (from whom the label derives), the German and Austrian 
National Socialists, the Romanian Iron Guard, and the Hungarian Arrow-Cross.  At the 
same time, however, the corporatist regime which seized power in Austria did not share 
the virulent nationalism, the anti-conservatism, or the goal of completely transforming its 
society which were the hallmarks of the truly radical fascist right throughout Europe.  
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Rather, the new government had a vision of Austrian society which was not far removed 
from the conservative ideals espoused by the CSP during the First Republic.  The 
Ständestaat sought to maintain order, secure economic prosperity for the Austrian people, 
and preserve the Christian and Western traditions and values that it saw as the historical 
essence of Austria.  Dollfuß was pressured by his Italian patron, Mussolini, and by the 
government’s junior partners, the relatively more radical Heimwehr militia movement, to 
move the Austrian state in the direction of a fascist vision of society.  Ultimately, 
however, his relatively mild dictatorship always had more in common with the 
governments of other conservative authoritarians such as Francisco Franco, Józef 
Pilsudski, and Miklós Horthy than with the “totalitarian” right-wing radicalism of 
Mussolini or Hitler.290  The Dollfuß government ultimately adopted some of the aesthetic 
trappings of fascism, such as its endorsement of a uniformed paramilitary force and its 
strident use of patriotic symbols and slogans, but the fact that it also so vehemently 
opposed National Socialism and ultimately dismantled the Heimwehr as an independent 
movement lends credence to the argument that the Ständestaat was a conservative, 
authoritarian entity, rather than a genuinely fascist one.
Given the new government’s commitment to conservative social values, its distaste 
for republicanism, and its continual references to the Habsburg state as the source of many 
of its ideals, it is perhaps surprising that the Ständestaat made no attempt to restore the 
Monarchy.  As we shall see, many of the new regime’s leading figures portrayed the end 
290For a discussion of the difference between fascism and conservative dictatorships in Europe during the 
interwar period, as well as an overview of Austrian corporatism, see Payne, 14-19, 245-252; and Kirk, 10-
31.  The American scholar of the Heimwehr, C. Earl Edmonson basically agrees with Payne’s assertion that 
the Ständestaat’s government was different from real fascism, even as he argues that the Heimwehr itself 
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of the old dynastic state as a catastrophe for Austria, and continued to venerate the 
memory of the Habsburg rulers.  Ultimately, however, all of the Ständestaat’s leaders 
recognized the practical impossibility of any attempt to restore the House of Habsburg.  
Not only would  the regime’s opponents within Austria have received such an act with 
outrage, but many of the Monarchy’s other successor states and especially Nazi Germany 
would also have seen it as a threatening and provocative move.  As a state which was 
involved in a precarious diplomatic balancing act to maintain its very existence in the face 
of Nazi expansionism, the Ständestaat simply could not afford the risk of a restoration.  
Indeed, both Schuschnigg and the Heimwehr leader Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg 
mentioned in their memoirs that, while they personally were sympathetic to the idea of 
placing Otto von Habsburg upon the Austrian throne during the 1930s, they recognized 
that such ambitions were not realistic given Austria’s diplomatic position.291  Of course, 
some conservative intellectuals such as August Maria Knoll and Ernst Karl Winter did 
indeed openly support a return to Habsburg rule, but they spoke as individuals and were 
not actual political leaders responsible for making policy in Austria. 
Even if the new Austrian government did not restore the Habsburgs, however, it 
did move quickly to dismantle the trappings of Austrian democracy which had been the 
result of so much struggle and debate since 1918.  The new government based its claims to 
legitimacy upon the argument that the parliamentary government of the First Republic had 
failed to represent the wishes and best interests of the Austrian Volk.  The new 
was indeed fascist.  C. Earl Edmondson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918-1936 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1978), 3-6, 233-234.
291Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot_Weiß_Rot, trans. Franz von Hildebrand (New York: G. P. Putnam, 
1946), 88-89, 152-153, 194-196; Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, Memoiren (Vienna and Munich: Amalthea 
207
government’s leaders, and their  mouthpieces in the conservative press, repeatedly made 
the claim that the liberal and capitalistic values which had been expressed in Austria’s 
republican constitutions had ultimately served to create a system of political demagogy 
and obstructionism in which the political parties fought for their own interests rather than 
those of the Austrian people.292  In an address on September 11, 1933, Dollfuß argued that 
Austria’s people had lost confidence in the old Republic, and yearned for a return to 
authority in which leaders, motivated by a sense of responsibility and self-sacrifice, would 
return Austria to the proper values of community, Christian neighborly love, and social 
harmony.  Such leaders would transcend the class conflict and empty materialism of the 
old era and return Austria to its true, traditional self.  The Austrian dictator also warned 
that while his government would not use force arbitrarily, neither would it fail to defend 
the Austrian Fatherland from those who wished to do it harm.293
Dollfuß was of course not merely speaking rhetorically; he had two key “anti-
Austrian” factions in mind.  First, the new regime blamed the old ideological antagonists 
of the Austrian right, the Social Democrats, for the country’s recent history of social strife 
and argued that the Socialists possessed no loyalty to the Austrian Fatherland.294  While 
Dollfuß acknowledged that the workers in Austria did have legitimate interests which the 
government would protect, he declared that he would not tolerate the class strife which 
constituted Marxism’s response to the old capitalist order.295  The other faction that the 
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new government viewed as a threat was the Austrian Nazi party.  Dollfuß asserted that 
National Socialism sought to erase the diversity, creativity, religiosity, and freedom which 
were the essential features of Austrian Germandom, and to replace these beneficial 
qualities with its own narrow and oppressive nationalistic dogmas.296  Dolfuß viewed the 
Austrian Nazis as a grave danger to the continued independence of Austria, and while he 
was always careful to proclaim his desire for friendly relations with Nazi Germany, he 
also bluntly warned that state to stay out of Austria’s internal affairs, including its 
relationship to the Austrian National Socialists.297
The new regime’s main tactic for dealing with its opponents was to restrict, and 
ultimately to prohibit their political activities entirely.  In May of 1933, the Ständestaat
outlawed the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), the smaller but more militant of 
Austria’s two Marxist political parties.  The official prohibition of the Austrian Nazi Party 
followed in June of the same year.  The government allowed the Social Democrats to 
operate for a time, although it ordered them to dissolve their paramilitary wing, the 
Schutzbund, prohibited them from holding public meetings and parades, and heavily 
censored their official daily newspaper, Die Arbeiter-Zeitung.  For a group which was at 
least rhetorically still committed to the cause of proletarian revolution, the Austrian Social 
Democrats were curiously passive in the face of Dollfuß’ progressively harsher 
restrictions and his abandonment of the democratic, parliamentary system which they had 
helped create.  The Socialists did eventually revolt against the regime in February of 1934, 
but even this uprising was unplanned, poorly coordinated, and easily crushed by the 
296Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs Weg in die neue Zeit,” in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 50-57.
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regime with only minimal bloodshed.  After this failed revolt, the regime finally outlawed 
the Social Democratic Party as well.298  All three opposition parties continued to operate 
both secretly and from exile in other states, but their official dissolution left Dollfuß with 
no legal challengers to his regime.
On May 1, 1934 the Dollfuß regime proclaimed a new constitution for Austria 
which enshrined the new government’s authoritarian power and moved in the direction of 
a “corporate” Austrian state organized according to the anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, and anti-
capitalist ideals of Spann and the Catholic Church’s 1931 papal encyclical, Quadragesimo 
Anno.  The Constitution of 1934 replaced the old parliamentary system with a new 
political order in which the Chancellor ruled with strong executive authority in 
consultation with several complex and relatively powerless layers of political councils, 
which in turn were elected by seven “corporations” representing Austrian economic and 
social sectors including agriculture, industry, manufacturing, commerce, banking, public 
service, and the free professions.  Austrian citizens were theoretically able to elect 
representatives, but they were organized according to their economic professions rather 
than on the basis of their political beliefs.  In reality, however, the new Austrian political 
system actually eliminated any meaningful political participation on the part of the 
Austrian people and basically placed all executive, legislative, and, to a great extent, local 
authority in the still nominally federal state in the hands of the chancellor and his cabinet.  
The constitution also eliminated the last vestiges of the old party system, as the Christian 
70-71.
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Social Party merged with Dollfuß’ allegedly non-partisan Fatherland Front, the only 
recognized political association in Austria other than the Heimwehr.299
The Constitution of 1934 opened with the words, “In the name of God almighty, 
from whom all that is right derives, the Austrian Volk proclaims the constitution for its 
Christian German federal state on a corporate basis,” a preamble which amply indicated 
the ideological direction of the new state.300  The architects of the new constitutional order 
claimed that Austria finally had turned its back on the liberalism, capitalism, materialism 
and class conflict which had characterized the First Republic.  They argued that the new 
system would nurture social harmony and the sharing of economic burdens, and truly 
represent the interests of the Austrian people, while at the same time safeguarding the 
independence of a state which was true to Austria’s historical heritage.301  The 
Ständestaat’s leaders saw Catholicism as a key component of the renewed Austria, and the 
government also signed a new concordat with the Vatican in 1934, affirming 
Catholicism’s status as the primary religion in Austria and undoing much of the 
secularizing work of the Socialists during the First Republic.  The new regime depended 
upon the Church in Austria as an ally, and enhanced its role in education and matrimonial 
law.  The state, however, continued to uphold the First Republic’s previous guarantees of 
Austrian citizens’ freedom of religion for Protestants and Jews, and it did not actually 
share political power with the Church to any meaningful degree.302  Kurt von Schuschnigg, 
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the Minister of Education and the man who would eventually succeed Dollfuß as 
chancellor, asserted that the new constitution, in keeping with the government’s vision of 
an organic, universalistic approach to society and culture, returned the old balance 
between individual freedom and communal responsibility which had been upset by the 
First Republic’s rampant and selfish individualism.  The newfound emphasis upon 
religion, especially in Austrian schools, would serve as a key component of this restored 
social balance.303
The restrictions placed upon Austrian political and social life by the new 
constitution did not, however, eliminate opposition to Dollfuß’ government.  On July 25, 
1934, a cabal of Austrian National Socialists, operating with the covert approval of Nazi 
Germany, attempted to seize control of the state by attacking a meeting of the Austrian 
cabinet.  The attempted coup ultimately failed, but in the melee, Dollfuß was fatally 
wounded.  The chancellor’s murder sharpened relations between Austria and Germany, 
and prompted the new Austrian leader, Schuschnigg, to tighten the regime’s control upon 
the state and to present Dollfuß as a patriotic martyr for the cause of Austrian 
independence.304  After a protracted power struggle with the Heimwehr following Dollfuß’ 
death, Schuschnigg was gradually able to exclude the leaders of that organization from 
positions of power, and eventually to disband it in October of 1936, leaving the 
government and its Fatherland Front as the sole locus of political power in the state.  
Needless to say, the Ständestaat’s persecution of the now underground Austrian Nazi 
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movement intensified after Dollfuß’ murder.305
In reality, however, the Ständestaat was never powerful enough to completely 
determine its own fate.  Since the time of Dollfuß’ initial seizure of power, Austria had 
sought protection and economic aid from Mussolini’s Fascist Italian state.  The Italian 
dictator for his part saw corporatist Austria as a satellite state which could be molded in 
the Fascist image and used to curb any desires by Nazi Germany for expansion into East-
Central Europe.306  In October of 1936, however, Mussolini concluded an alliance with 
Germany in response to Italy’s ostracism by the liberal democracies of Western Europe 
following his invasion of Ethiopia.  By 1937, the Duce had essentially offered Hitler a free 
hand in Austria in exchange for a German renunciation of any claims to the linguistically 
and culturally German region of South Tyrol in Italy.  The foundation of the “Rome-
Berlin Axis” meant that Austria had lost its major source of international protection 
against a Nazi German regime which had plans to absorb Austria into the Third Reich.307
Schuschnigg’s freedom of action was profoundly circumscribed by the new 
balance of power in Central Europe, and he found himself repeatedly forced to make 
concessions to Hitler’s government.  In July,1936, after being told by Mussolini to reach 
an accommodation with Nazi Germany, Schuschnigg acquiesced to the coordination of his 
foreign policy with that of Germany in exchange for a German recognition of Austrian 
independence and sovereignty.  In order to smooth tensions between the two states, 
Schuschnigg allowed moderate German nationalists such as Edmund Glaise-Horstenau 
Walter Adam, “Trauer und Zuversicht,” Reichspost (Vienna), July 25, 1935, 2.
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and Odo Neustädter-Stürmer into his cabinet, and eased his persecution of the Austrian 
Nazis.  Such measures did not satisfy Hitler, however, and in January, 1936, the German 
dictator summoned Schuschnigg to a meeting in Berchtesgaden, Germany, where he 
angrily berated the Austrian leader, and demanded amnesty for Nazi political prisoners, 
freedom of expression for Nazi political ideas in Austria, and the inclusion of Austrian 
Nazis in Schuschnigg’s government.  The final chapter of the Ständestaat came in March 
1938, when Schuschnigg announced his plan to hold a plebiscite in Austria on the issue of 
Austrian independence.  Hitler threateningly denounced the move, and on March 11, 
Schuschnigg resigned in favor of a new, Austrian National Socialist Chancellor, Arthur 
Seyss-Inquart.  The next day, the German Wehrmacht crossed the Austrian border after an 
“invitation” from the new government to help “restore order.”308  Both the authoritarian 
Ständestaat and Austrian independence were at an end.
The Ständestaat represented an attempt by Austrian conservatives to protect their 
state’s independence and its vision of Austria’s traditional heritage and values from 
perceived enemies on both the political right and left.  This conservative dictatorship 
failed in its mission in large part because it lacked any sustained international support 
which might have kept Nazi Germany from invading.  At the same time, as several 
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Austro-Nazi and Austro-Nationalist?” in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today, F. 
Parkinson, ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 57-71.  For Schuschnigg’s perspective on 
these events see, Schuschnigg,  Ein Requiem in Rot_Weiß_Rot, 3-57.
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contemporary critics of the regime noted, the corporatist government was probably unwise 
to forcefully crush the anti-Nazi left in Austria, which still commanded a great deal of 
popular support from the Austrian working class, and which could have been a potent ally 
against Nazism.  In the end, however, the regime decided to strike at both camps of its 
perceived enemies, and saw the failure of its ultimate goal as a consequence.  While it still 
existed, however, the Ständestaat government attempted to forestall Anschluß with Nazi 
Germany through a vigorous presentation of Austrian patriotism, both in public statements 
and in educational policies and materials.  Such efforts to inculcate Austrian patriotism 
invariably depended upon the invocation of the legacy and memory of the old Habsburg 
Monarchy. 
ii. The Ständestaat and the Habsburg Past 
In its efforts to deal with the grave difficulties facing Austria in the mid-1930s–
unemployment, inflation, social unrest, class conflict, and the lure of Anschluß with 
Germany– the corporatist regime attempted to create an atmosphere of Austrian patriotism 
so that it might better preserve both Austria’s new political order and its independence.  
The government hoped that by encouraging the Austrian people to be proud of their state 
and its heritage, it could lay the foundation for a stronger, more stable and more 
harmonious Austrian state, and avert the Nazi-led Anschluß which it feared might occur.  
In its attempts to create this desired surge of Austrian patriotism and loyalty, the 
Ständestaat’s leaders explicitly sought to link the small post-1918 Austrian state to old 
Habsburg dynastic state, and to portray modern Austria as the legitimate heir of the 
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Monarchy’s conservative values, grandeur, and great achievements.  As we shall see, the 
new government used educational policy in its attempts to establish this sense of 
identification with the Habsburg past in the minds of Austria’s people.  No less important, 
however, were the public statements made by the regime’s leaders and representatives in 
the state-sanctioned press.  Such statements made continual reference to the greatest 
figures and events of the Habsburg era, and sought to portray the new political order in 
Austria as the natural heir of the old Monarchy’s values and ideas.
The Ständestaat and Austrian National Identity
In order to bolster Austrian patriotism, however, the leaders of the new 
government first had to grapple with the issue of who Austrians were in a national sense.  
During the First Republic, many Austrian politicians and intellectuals, and indeed a large 
portion of the Austrian population, felt that Austrians belonged to the German nation.  
Many of these individuals used this sense of Germanness to argue for the desirability of an 
Austrian union with Germany after 1918.  Austrian conservatives, however, were always 
more comfortable than the other political parties with the idea of Austrian independence, 
and they argued that Austria’s distinctive cultural heritage and tradition of pious 
Catholicism were just as important a part of its identity as its membership in the German 
nation.  After Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany in 1933, the patriotism of Austria’s 
conservative leaders deepened still further, and they committed to preserving Austrian 
independence against the threat of union with a German state dominated by a racist and 
anti-religious ideology which they abhorred.  At the same time, however, those 
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conservative leaders were never willing to abandon the notion that Austrians were also in 
some sense Germans.  
As a result, the Ständestaat’s government presented the Austrian people with a 
complex vision of Austrian national identity which essentially conceived of Austrians as 
Germans while at the same time emphasized  Austria’s unique qualities.  The new 
government argued that Austria was a “second German state,” which shared historical, 
cultural, and linguistic ties to the rest of the German Volk.  The Ständestaat’s leaders, 
however, saw no contradiction between Austria’s basic Germanness and the distinctive 
culture, history, and Catholic heritage which set it apart from other German lands.  Indeed, 
the new government not only presented Austrians as special Germans, but in many cases 
portrayed them as the “real” Germans, who stood for all that was best in the German 
tradition at a time when such great qualities had been eclipsed by National Socialism in 
Germany.  Furthermore, the representatives of the Ständestaat also took great pains to 
present Austrian culture as part of the wider circle of Western and Christian culture, and to 
define continuing Austrian independence as necessary to defend Western civilization from 
both internal and external threats.  
The regime’s definition of the essential qualities of the German Volk and its 
Austrian branch also conspicuously lacked the völkisch or racist element which was such a 
prominent feature of the Nazis’ portrayal of Germanness.  Indeed, the Ständestaat’s 
conservative leaders found National Socialism’s racist conception of national identity, 
along with its hostility toward Christianity (and especially Catholicism), repugnant.  
Neither the presence of a sizable number of Catholics within the Third Reich, nor indeed 
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Hitler’s own nominally Catholic religious background affected the opinion of Austrian 
conservatives about National Socialism.  For them, Nazism was an incorrigible, anti-
Christian ideology which sought to eclipse the cultural and religious heritage which 
constituted the greatness of the German Volk with its own crude, racist vision of 
nationhood.  Ethnicity certainly played a role in the Ständestaat’s vision of Germanness, 
but it never trumped the other qualities which corporatist leaders saw as more important to 
any genuine description of the German Volk.  The new regime’s definition of Austrian 
Germanness as a product of not just ethnicity and language, but also of culture, history, 
and religion was certainly not completely new; Ignaz Seipel and other conservative 
Austrians had argued along similar lines during the First Republic.  Yet under the 
corporatist government, these ideas were forcefully emphasized and repeated with a zeal 
that was indeed new.
Naturally enough, Dollfuß took the lead in arguing for a vision of Austrian 
nationhood which was simultaneously Austrian, German, Western, and Christian.  Dollfuß 
never questioned the idea that Austrians were Germans.  Even in 1932, before the end of 
parliamentary rule, he had argued that if Austria was able to solve the daunting social and 
economic problems which faced it, that achievement would represent a “German deed” 
which would resonate far into the future.309  As Austrian dictator, Dollfuß affirmed in 
various public statements that Austria was “self-evidently” a German state, connected to 
its great “brother Reich” by the  bonds of  language, history, and culture, and he 
committed his government to the advancing the cause of the German Volk and Deutschtum
309Dollfuß,  “Eine deutsche Tat,” in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 79.
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in Europe generally.310  In his view, Austria’s history had begun when it had first been 
settled by a “pure” German population of immigrants whose descendants had affirmed 
their Germanness throughout Austria’s many centuries of history, and it was Austria’s 
continuing duty to look after the interests of German minorities in the Monarchy’s various 
successor states.311
At the same time, however, Dollfuß was quick to declare that the fact that the 
Germans of Austria lived in a small state did not mean that they were in any way “second 
rate” Germans in comparison to the Germans of the Third Reich.  On the contrary, he 
asserted that Austrians possessed a distinctive historical legacy which made them special, 
and which set the apart from Germans living elsewhere in Europe.  First of all, he argued 
that being a German in Austria also meant being a Christian.  For Dollfuß, Christianity as 
embodied in the teachings and institutions of the Catholic Church, and indeed in the 
traditions of Western civilization, was just as integral a part of Austria’s heritage as its 
Germanness, and as such was well worth defending and preserving.312  Likewise, Dollfuß 
emphasized the diversity within German national culture, noting that just as the individual 
German “tribes” (Stämme) were culturally different from one another, so too were the 
cultures of even the individual Austrian provinces remarkably distinctive.  For Dollfuß, 
this variety of culture within the German nation was advantageous and something to be 
celebrated.  He contrasted his vision of German diversity with the narrow and dogmatic 
German nationalism propounded by the Nazis in order to make the argument that 
310Dollfuß, “Oesterreichischer Patriotismus,” 36-44; “Das neue Oesterreich,” 70-71; “Für ein unabhängiges 
deutsches Oesterreich,”  in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 86-87.
311Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs Weg in die neue Zeit,” 50-57; “Deutsche Freiheit in Oesterreich,” in Dollfuß an 
Oesterreich, 82-83.
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Anschluß with Nazi Germany would inevitably represent a threat to Austria’s distinctive 
brand of Germanness.  He proclaimed that it was the duty of all Austrians, as “good 
Germans,” to eschew any form of exaggerated nationalism and to cling to the history and 
traditions which made Austria great.313  Indeed, while his own regime was certainly a 
dictatorship, Dollfuß saw a very meaningful difference between his own Ständestaat and 
the Nazi regime.  Dollfuß conceived of the Ständestaat a means of providing Austria with 
a firm, authoritarian leadership which would protect its cultural, social, and religious 
traditions in the face of liberalism and Marxism, but he still viewed his government as one 
which preserved Austrian freedom and which was based upon the rule of law.  In contrast, 
he saw National Socialism as an ideology which had no regard for either tradition or 
freedom, and which was founded on naked violence.314   Thus, Dollfuß defined Austria not 
only within the context of the German nation, but also as part of a long and unique legacy 
of Austrian, Christian, and Western culture which was at odds with the crude and racist 
German nationalism and political brutality of Nazi Germany.
The other leading figures of the Ständestaat basically followed the template of 
Austrian national identity set down by Dollfuß.  Dollfuß’ successor as chancellor, 
Schuschnigg, was if anything even more fervent than his predecessor in his identification 
of Austrian identity with Catholicism, and he argued that Austria’s national culture was as 
firmly bound to Catholicism as it was to Germany.  In fact Schuschnigg noted that 
Austria’s sense of law, duty, individual freedom, and communal responsibility was 
312Dollfuß, “Gleichmacherei ist undeutsch,” 88-89; “Deutschtum und Christentum,” 92-93; “Deutsche 
Freiheit in Oesterreich,” 82-82.
313Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 36-44; “Für eine österreichische-vaterländishe Front,” in Dollfuß an 
Oesterreich,, 72-73.
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derived from the combination of its German heritage and the Catholic faith.  He regarded 
any attempt to break with such a notion of Austrian culture as a “crime against our 
national spirit.”315  Similarly, the prominent Heimwehr leaders Ernst Rüdiger von 
Starhemberg and Emil Fey also expressed their commitment to a vision of Austria as a 
German, Christian state which possessed a unique historical heritage which set it apart 
from Nazi-style German nationalism.316
314Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs Weg in die neue Zeit,” 50-57; Dollfuß, “Gleichmacherei ist undeutsch,” 88-89.
315Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österriech, 210-211.
316Starhemberg, Memoiren, 78-80; “Oesterreichs Wehr in Isonzo und heute,” Reichspost (Vienna), 
November, 1, 1933, 5.   
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Catholic intellectuals not overtly affiliated with the regime also joined their voices 
to the government’s chorus in defining Austrians as not merely members of the German 
nation, but also as a distinctive and valuable cultural group in their own right.  For 
example, in a work published by the government-sponsored Pedagogical Institute of 
Vienna, professor of geography at the University of Vienna, Hugo Hassinger, affirmed 
that modern Austrians were essentially the descendants of members of the Bavarian 
“tribe” who had settled in the Danube valley a millennium ago.  Yet, according to 
Hassinger, those original settlers, by the force of their new geographic position in Europe 
developed beyond their initial Bavarian roots into a unique group of German-speakers 
committed to the cause of cooperation between the Völker of their region.317  Likewise, the 
legitimist Catholic intellectual August Maria Knoll argued that Austria was a German 
state, rather than a mere German “Gau,” and noted that while Austrians did indeed have 
“mother-love” for Germany, that affection was necessarily subordinated to their Austrian 
“Father Geist” to be the bearers of the German spirit of order in the Danubian region.318
The “Austrian Man” and the “Austrian Mission”
The Ständestaat’s leaders further clarified their general position concerning 
Austrian nationhood through repeated references to two ideas which sometimes had been 
used by Austrianists during the First Republic: the “Austrian man,” and the “Austrian 
mission.”  By restating, and, in many cases, modifying these familiar themes, the leaders 
of the new Austrian state sought to describe exactly how Austrians were different from 
317Hugo Hassinger, “Oesterreich im mitteleuropäischen Raum,” Schriften des Pädagogischen Institutes der 
Stadt Wien 7 (1935): 9-11.
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other Germans, and, more importantly, how Austria’s unique history obligated an 
independent Austria to perform a special function on the Europe continent.  As always, the 
Ständestaat’s representatives used Austria’s Habsburg past in order to define the Austrian 
man, and the mission of his Fatherland for the German Volk and Western civilization. 
The new government’s desire to preserve Austrian independence and to kindle a 
sense of Austrian patriotism within the Austrian people was given a particular sense of 
urgency by the success of National Socialism in Germany, and by the concurrent surge in 
activism and popularity of the Austrian Nazi Party. This urgency also underlay the 
statements of the regime’s representatives concerning the “Austrian man.”  For the first 
time in postwar Austrian history, defining the “Austrian man” after 1933 was not merely a 
matter of sorting through the stereotypes which marked out the differences between 
Austrians and other Germans; now, the Austrian man had a dangerous new counterpart in 
the form of the “Nazi man.”  Commentators at the time never used the specific term, “Nazi 
man,” but nevertheless their descriptions of the qualities of the true Austrian were always 
implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, juxtaposed with the sorts of values and 
characteristics which the Nazis supposedly embodied.  
As we have seen, Dollfuß drew a sharp distinction between Austria’s heritage and 
the ideals of Nazism.  According to the Austrian chancellor, Austrians celebrated German 
diversity and valued Western traditions and Christian piety while National Socialists 
turned their backs upon tradition and religion, insisting upon a narrow, brutal cultural 
conformity which trampled upon the ideals of German freedom.  The Austrian sought 
peace and cooperation between peoples, but the Nazi emphasized militarism and 
318August M. Knoll, Ziel und Glaube, der Weg einer Generation, (Vienna: Reinhold-Verlag, 1936), 24.
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chauvinism.319  Echoing Dollfuß, many supporters of the regime presented Austrians as the 
embodiment of a broader ideal of German nationhood which stood opposed to more 
radical formulations of German nationalism.  For example, in a 1933 speech Ernst Hoor 
defined the Austrian an as a cosmopolitan citizen of the world, who was nevertheless a 
proud patriot and loyal to his own national culture.  This Austrian saw chauvinism and all 
other forms of nationalistic excess as fundamentally foreign ideals.  Ultimately for Hoor, 
the Austrian man was one who recognized that there were other peoples with their own 
legitimate national interests beyond his state’s borders.  Moreover, a great Austrian was 
also simultaneously a true German, contradicting the habitual Nazi accusation that 
Austrian patriotism amounted to treason against the German nation.320
Unsurprisingly, after his assassination, the Ständestaat  presented Dollfuß himself 
to the Austrian people as an exemplary model of what it meant to be a true Austrian.  A 
Reichspost article commemorating the anniversary of Dollfuß’ murder dubbed the fallen 
dictator “the Austrian,” a man in whom all the unique qualities of the Austrian national 
character were to be found: a Mozart-like brightness and easiness of spirit, an unshakable 
instinct in distinguishing truth and genuineness from falsity and rhetorical pompousness, 
and German honesty and honor paired with a moderate, “southern” temperament.  The 
piece further praised Dollfuß as a leader who had reminded the Austrian people of the 
importance of their millennium of history and of their special calling to serve as the 
representatives of Deutschtum in southeastern Europe, a leader who had restored Austria 
to its previous position at the center of Europe.  Indeed, Dollfuß appeared as a good 
319Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs Weg in die neue Zeit,” 50-57; “Das neue Oesterreich,” 36-44.
320“Schwedische Anteilnahme an Oesterreichs Erneuerung,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 1, 1933, 3.
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European as well, following in the old Austrian tradition which combined moderate 
German nationalism with a dedication to defending the Christian character of the West.  
The article described Dollfuß as a man from “German peasant” stock, a front fighter and a 
pious defender of Christian ideals against relativism.    It also explicitly placed Dollfuß 
alongside Austria’s other great historical statesmen– the Babenberg and the Habsburg 
monarchs, Kaunitz, Stadion, Metternich, Felix Schwarzenberg, Lueger, and Seipel– as the 
heir to a long lineage of principled and dedicated Austrian leaders. The author of this
piece concluded by reminding his readers that the ideals which Dollfuß fought for lived 
on, even as the fallen leader had given his own life for the Austrian cause.321
Just as the leaders of the Ständestaat were eager to define the distinctive and 
worthwhile qualities which made the “Austrian man” special, so too were they interested 
in presenting arguments concerning the necessary mission which an independent Austria
was called upon to perform in the service of both the German nation and Western 
civilization as a whole.  The government’s statements concerning the “Austrian mission” 
were calculated to remind the Austrian people of the historical achievements of their state, 
and to encourage all Austrians to rededicate themselves to the conservative and religious 
ideals of the Habsburg Monarchy which the Ständestaat claimed to have restored to 
Austrian life.  Such statements also explicitly stood as an argument against Anschluß with 
Nazi Germany, which would allegedly render Austria incapable of performing its 
historical mission in Europe.  
The leaders of the government frequently discussed the “Austrian mission” in 
terms that had been used by Austrianists during the First Republic.  The vision of Austria 
321“Engelbert Dollfuß, der österreichische Mensch,” Reichspost (Vienna), July 25, 1935, 1-2.
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as a “bulwark” against threats to Germany and Western Europe, as representative of 
German culture to the non-German Völker of Central and Eastern Europe, and as a cultural 
“bridge” between East and West were all familiar to the Austrian people, and the 
government now officially endorsed these arguments.  The regime’s emphasis upon these 
ideas as part of the official ideology of the Austrian state was something new, however, as 
previous Austrian governments had tended to avoid strong statements concerning an 
Austrian mission, mostly leaving such arguments to independent Austrian intellectuals.  
The Ständestaat’s spokesmen formulated their presentation of the “Austrian mission” in a 
manner which emphasized not only Austria’s service to the German nation, but also  to 
Western civilization and Christendom.  Such an emphasis had certainly not always been 
so blatant in earlier articulations of the  “Austrian mission.”322
The Ständestaat’s insistence on an Austria mission to serve as a bulwark against 
threats to Germany and Europe inevitably harked back to role the old Monarchy had 
played in stemming the advance of various invasions from the East throughout its history.  
An article in the conservative newspaper Reichspost commemorating the anniversary of 
Dollfuß’ murder noted that the fallen chancellor had returned Austria to its historical 
mission to function as a “dam” against the forces of negation and destruction.  The piece 
argued that Austria had been founded one thousand years earlier to serve as a bulwark of 
the Christian West against the Mongols and the Huns, and had stood throughout its long 
history against attacks on Christendom from Islam and even against the decidedly non-
Eastern but no less threatening assaults upon the traditional order from the Protestant 
322For a discussion of conservative views on the “Austrian mission” during the First Republic, see Chapter 
1.
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Reformation and the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.323
The regime used the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the breaking of the 
Turkish siege of Vienna on September 12, 1683 to celebrate this aspect of the Austrian 
mission.  In a 1933 speech, Dollfuß himself praised this successful defense of Europe and 
German-Christian culture from the Turks.324   A Reichspost article from September 12, 
1933 explicitly identified the ideals of the new “corporatist, Christian, German, and 
Austrian state” with those of the seventeenth-century defenders of the city, and reported 
that Dollfuß had invoked the “Spirit of September 12” to remind Austrians of their duty to 
defend their Fatherland against the new dangers it faced.325  Indeed, the new government 
made the argument that just as Austria had been called to protect Europe from the Turks in 
the past, so too was it now summoned to join the struggle to defend the West’s traditional, 
conservative ideals against new, revolutionary threats such as Marxism and National 
Socialism.326  Thus the Dollfuß and his government translated the old defensive Austrian 
mission into a contemporary task to preserve the traditional culture of the West against 
new ideological rivals.
While the Ständestaat’s leaders made references to the old Austrian mission to 
serve as a defensive bulwark for Western civilization, they devoted even more attention to 
the idea that part of Austria’s mission was to stand as a representative of German culture 
and as a transmitter of that culture to the other Völker of Central and Eastern Europe.  
Dollfuß, as always, took the lead in presenting such a conception of the Austrian mission, 
323“Der Ueberwinder der Revolution,” Reichspost (Vienna), July 25, 1935, 3.
324Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 19-20.
325“Neues Österreich,” Reichspost (Vienna), September 12, 1933, 1
326“Der Ueberwinder der Revolution,” 3.
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and noted that Austria, even in its new, smaller form, was the heir to a glorious history, 
and could serve as a bearer of German culture to the other Völker of Europe, thus 
continuing the old Monarchy’s service to the cause of all Deutschtum.  Obviously, 
Dollfuß’ conception of Deutschtum must be seen in the light of his comments concerning 
German diversity and freedom.  Germanness for him was something broader than the 
nationalistic chauvinism of the Nazis, who indeed opposed the Deutschtum embodied in 
Austria’s history.327
For Dollfuß, the Austrian mission involved more than just serving the cause of the 
German nation; it involved performing a service for all of Europe by using the diversity of 
German culture to foster cooperation between peoples.  According to the Austrian 
dictator, an important part of Austria’s mission was to continue to assert a uniquely 
beneficial Austrian variety of Germanness in Central Europe, and indeed on the continent 
as a whole, in order to foster economic and cultural cooperation between Völker.  Such a 
task was part of the Habsburg legacy since the Monarchy had served as a facilitator of 
cooperation between nations, cultures and peoples in the Danubian region.  Dollfuß 
explicitly contrasted this vision of a German nation which encompassed cultural and 
political variations and which sought to bring Völker together in a spirit of cooperation 
with Nazi-style Gleichschaltung (coordination) which aimed to eradicate differences of 
opinion and spark national conflicts in Europe.328
In a speech in New York in November of 1933, Dollfuß addressed Austria’s 
European mission in even more explicit terms.  He argued that contemporary Austria still 
327Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 43-44; “Für eine österreichische-vaterländishe Front,” 72-73
328Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs Weg in die neue Zeit,” 50-57.
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had the same calling that it had throughout its many centuries of history: to serve as a 
mediating force between German culture and the cultures of other realms.  He asserted 
that Austria had been the oldest and most distinguished bearer of German culture in 
Europe and had always been at the center of the most important events in the continent’s 
history.  Austria had always attempted to foster understanding among the various peoples 
of Europe.  After all, for more than six centuries the Holy Roman German emperor had 
ruled from Vienna in the service of both German interests and the cause of peaceful 
coexistence between Völker.  Dollfuß also mentioned Austria’s military, artistic, and 
musical achievements as evidence of its profound cultural importance to Europe.  In order 
to pursue this necessary historical mission, Austria needed to preserve its independence 
and the purity of its distinctive culture.  The collapse of the old Monarchy had deeply 
shaken Austria, on both economic and spiritual levels, but Dollfuß declared that the 
Ständestaat’s renewal of Austria’s sense of its true self and its historical mission put it in a 
position to resume the mediating work that had always been central to the old Habsburg 
state.329
Kurt von Schuschnigg built upon the arguments of his predecessor, proclaiming in 
a 1935 speech that his government had an interest in preserving Austria’s distinctive 
culture, which indeed stood as the last true representative of Western culture in Europe.  
This culture represented the harmonious blending of the traditions of Greek and Roman 
antiquity, Catholic Christianity, and the culture of the old German tribes of Europe.  
Schuschnigg argued that if any one of these elements were to be lost, Austrian culture 
would cease to be truly Western (and clearly Schuschnigg’s implication was that such a 
329Dollfuß, “Oesterreichs europäische Aufgabe,” in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 63-69.
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fate had befallen Nazi Germany).  He declared that Austria’s centuries of service as both a 
defender and transmitter of the West’s cultural and religious heritage made it uniquely 
qualified to serve that same function in a modern world infected by liberalism, Marxism, 
and Nazism.  Preserving Catholicism in Austria was of  particular importance for 
Schuschnigg, who thought that a pious population would help Austria to perform its age-
old functions.  He also argued that a firm Austria attachment to its traditional religion 
would also serve to counteract the recent tendency on the part of rabid European 
nationalists to “deify” the Volk and the state.330
In his 1936 memoir, Schuschnigg asserted that there was still a way for Austria to 
perform its old historical function in the area formerly ruled by the Habsburg Monarchy.  
He allowed that the Austrian mission certainly could not now be accomplished through the 
old method of imperial rule, and affirmed that Austrian had abandoned any ambitions to 
once again reign over the lands of the old Monarchy.  Yet at the same time, he asserted 
that the Monarchy’s mission could still live on in a new form.  The new Austria, so small 
in terms of territory and political power, might still help lead the region in the realm of 
Geist (spirit).  Ultimately, Schuschnigg’s conception of the “spiritual” component of the 
Austrian mission was familiar.  He argued that Austria had a calling to serve as the 
representative of German culture and civilization, functioning as a cultural mediator in a 
region which contained many different languages and nationalities.  Such a mission would 
now be accomplished through diplomacy and advocacy, however, rather than through 
political power.331
330Schuschnigg, “Oesterreichs abendländische Sendung,” Reichspost (Vienna), November 11, 1935, 2.
331Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österreich, 15-23.
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Even the Heimwehr leaders, frequently less systematic in their pronouncements 
about the ideological foundations of Austrian nationhood, made some attempt to deal with 
the idea of an Austrian mission.  Starhemberg, for example, argued that Austria had 
historically stood as the protector of Central Europe, and hence of all of European 
civilization, which was for him defined by a combination of classical and Roman imperial 
ideals and the Christian world view of the Catholic Church.  As such, Austria was 
obligated to perform a “mission” in Danubian Europe, which for Starhemberg involved 
serving as an unselfish defensive bulwark for both Germany and all of Christendom and 
Western civilization.332  Similarly, Emil Fey noted that Austria had a mission to serve as 
an outpost of Christian and German culture in the Danubian region which it has not lost 
even after being shorn of much of the old Monarchy’s territory and population.333
Catholic intellectuals who supported the regime also offered descriptions of an 
“Austrian mission” involving a duty to mediate between the peoples of East-Central 
Europe.  Hugo Hassinger, always the geographer, argued that such a mission had evolved 
naturally for the German Austrians of Central Europe as a result of their physical location 
at a cultural crossroads between various Völker in the Danubian region.  Princely houses 
from both Bohemia and Hungary had tried to create a supranational state in the region, but 
it was only the Habsburgs who had succeeded.  After doings so, the old Austrian 
monarchy had been called to serve the cause of European peace by facilitating 
communication between Germans and non-Germans, and by helping the various national 
groups within their territory to cooperate for mutual advantage.  Hassinger argued that 
332Starhemberg, Memoiren, 78-80; 180; “Die österreichische Idee,” in Österreich, Volk und Staat (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1936), 113-117.
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such a mission was still the appropriate goal for contemporary Austria, which continued to 
sit astride the same crossroads, even after the old Monarchy, which had first given rise to 
such aspirations, had collapsed.334
August Maria Knoll put an interesting metaphorical spin on the idea of an Austrian 
mission by invoking the old double headed eagle which had been the symbol of the 
Habsburg Monarchy for so many centuries.  He argued that each head of the eagle 
represented a different aspect of the Austrian mission.  One head looked from the Danube 
northward to the Rhine river, and stood for the Austria’s role as the old German Ostmark
to protect Germandom from invasions from the East, whether in the form of the Ottoman 
Empire centuries ago, or in the guise of more contemporary threats, such as Bolshevism.  
The other head looked from the Danube downstream, and represented the Austria’s 
function as a “bridge” or “gateway” between cultures.  Whereas other advocates of an 
Austrian mission often emphasized Austria’s role as a mediator just between East and 
West, Knoll’s formulation presented Austria as the heart of all of Europe.  For Knoll, 
Austria had always been the ground where the French, Italian, Slavic, and Germanic 
cultural circles met one another and intermingled.  Thus Knoll argued that the “bridge” of 
Austria did not just link east and west, but also north and south.  Austria was indeed 
primarily a German land, but to Knoll it represented a different type of German culture 
than the German Reich to the north, one which was more open to other cultural influences 
than the rest of Germany.  Knoll argued that Austrian independence was vital so it could 
serve in this particular cultural role.  Austria served German interests, but it simply could 
333“Oesterreichs Wehr in Isonzo und heute,” 5.
334Hassinger, 9-13.
232
not be part of a larger Germany and still maintain the particular variety of Germanness 
which made it unique.  Knoll asserted that even Bismarck had recognized this reality, and 
thus had attempted to maintain the independence of a strong Austria even as he excluded 
that state from his newly unified German Reich in 1871.335
Knoll argued that Austria’s two missions had ultimately served the cause of both 
Germany and Europe as whole.  Thus, whoever served the cause of Austria also helped 
Germany and Europe to be stronger.  Knoll asserted that these Austrian functions were 
ultimately the true expression of the House of Habsburg’s own imperial ideals.  The old 
dynasty was, in Knoll’s estimation, simultaneously Austrian, German, and European, in 
the best senses of all of those terms.  The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 had attacked 
that imperial ideal, and was as much an anti-European document as it was anti-German 
and anti-Austrian.  The small Austrian state which remained after the war was still, 
however, the core of the old Habsburg territories, and could still serve the same functions 
as the old state had.  Knoll asserted that Austria remained what it had always been: the 
imperial sword of the German Volk, which had been wielded from the quintessential 
European capital of Vienna to assure that Germans and the other Völker of the Danubian 
region could live together peacefully and to mutual benefit.336
The Ständestaat’s Historical Narrative
Beyond their arguments concerning the “Austrian man” and the “Austrian 
335Knoll, 5-7.  For a nearly identical argument see the work of another conservative Catholic, Hans Karl 




mission,” the leaders and representatives of the Ständestaat made frequent references to 
Austria’s Habsburg past in more general terms as well.  Their portrayal of the old 
Monarchy was for the most part unambiguously positive, and they attempted to cast the 
new corporatist state as the inheritor of all that was good in the Habsburg state.  The 
Ständestaat’s ideologues presented a historical narrative which emphasized three 
particular eras of Austria’s past.  This narrative began with a highly romanticized vision of 
the medieval period in Austria as an ideal model for society and as the source of the new 
regime’s corporatist ideals.  The Ständestaat’s leaders and supporters, however, did not 
employ the term “medieval” with any particular historical precision, but often used it to 
refer to Austrian society from the early Middle Ages up into the Theresian age in the early 
eighteenth century.  Their narrative presented the eighteenth-century Enlightenment as the 
beginning of more than a century of catastrophic social corrosion as capitalism, liberalism, 
Marxism, and nationalism gradual disrupted the old harmony of Austrian life.  For these 
corporatist commentators, the collapse of the Monarchy in 1918 represented the triumph 
of these destructive forces in Austrian history, which were themselves supposedly 
vanquished by Dollfuß in 1933.  The architects of this corporatist historical narrative 
sought to use Austria’s  rich historical legacy to inspire the Austrian people to renewed 
patriotism and fervent support for the Ständestaat.  As Dollfuß proclaimed in 1933, “Our 
state does not merely desire to be valued as a museum of admirable historical memories.  
Rather we wish to be recognized through our work as a worthy member of the European 
family of Völker and thus to be able to contribute to the necessary rebuilding of 
Europe.”337
337Dollfuß, “Lebendiges Oesterreich,” in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 60-61.
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While many liberal or socialist Austrians generally saw the old Monarchy during 
the medieval era as an oppressive, reactionary entity which only began to struggle toward 
modernity after the Enlightenment, the corporatist government argued that the Middle 
Ages represented a golden age of social harmony and Catholic piety in Austria.  The new 
regime invariably portrayed the medieval Monarchy as a benevolent realm, in which order 
and social harmony had been guaranteed by religion and an appropriate sense of hierarchy.  
The feudal order, far from being oppressive, had been a system in which every Austrian 
had known his place in the economic and social fabric of the state through membership in 
a Berufstand, and had had no thought to turning against his countrymen to disrupt the 
system.338  For the leaders of the Ständestaat, Austria’s medieval past had been an era in 
which Catholic piety and German culture had combined to produce a truly harmonious 
society, a society which the new government sought to restore after its destruction by 
disruptive and toxic modern ideologies.
Dollfuß frequently alluded to the Habsburg Monarchy’s medieval period in order 
to argue for the legitimacy of his own dictatorship.  For example, 1933 marked not only 
the 250th anniversary of the siege of Vienna but also the 500th anniversary of the building 
of St. Stephen’s cathedral in the Austrian capital.  Dollfuß used the religious symbolism 
and imposing Gothic architecture of this medieval edifice as a example of the German 
culture and Catholic values which Austria had defended from the Turks in 1683.339
Dollfuß argued that his corporatist government represented an attempt to recapture the 
338The German word Berufstand may be loosely translated as a “profession” or “trade,” but in the sense of 
Austria’s medieval past connotes an individual’s economic position and function in the social hierarchy 
more than simply his or her vocation, and is thus better rendered as “estate.”  It was from the old medieval 
Berufstände that the Austrian “Ständestaat” of the 1930s derived its name.
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social harmony and the Christian and German traditional values of the medieval Habsburg 
state.  The Constitution of 1934, he noted, expressed these ideals of the old “German 
Ostmark” which had provided the foundation for all of Austria’s subsequent history.  
More than any document in Austria’s recent history, the new corporatist constitution, 
according to Dollfuß, harked back to old Germanic law and the harmonious coexistence of
the social and economic Berufstände which had dominated Austrian life during the 
medieval period.  Dollfuß even argued that the Constitution of 1934 allowed the mayors of 
towns in contemporary Austria to perform a similar function to that of the princely 
electors of the old Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, helping to chose the 
Austrian president just as the electors chose the German emperor.  Despite the actual 
powerlessness after 1934 of the Austrian presidency, which was in a practical sense a 
symbolic office subordinate to the chancellor, the comparison between the nominal 
Austrian head of state and the old German imperial title, which the House of Habsburg 
usually possessed, was of course no coincidence.340
The monarchist intellectual Knoll, in a rare case of disagreement with the regime, 
did not share Dollfuß’ opinion about  the close correspondence between the medieval 
Habsburg system of Berufstände and the modern Ständestaat.  Knoll agreed that an 
authoritarian Ständestaat represented Austria’s best hope to transcend the social pitfalls of 
both liberal capitalism and its Marxist antithesis.  He traced the lineage of corporatism in 
the Austrian right from Karl von Vogelsang through Karl Lueger to Ignaz Seipel and 
Othmar Spann, and finally to Dollfuß and Schuschnigg.  This new, but thoroughly 
339Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 20-26.
340Dollfuß, “Der 1. Mai 1934,” 233-240.
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Austrian, form of government, could deliver the Austrian state from the evils of 
obstructionist parliamentarism and class conflict into a new era of community and 
solidarity.  Yet he differed from the Ständestaat’s government precisely because he argued 
that corporatism was indeed new.  Unlike other proponents of corporatism, Knoll argued 
that this form of government was not in fact very similar to medieval social organization.  
Knoll denounced the feudal order as a form of oppression by the nobility, which had been 
every bit as bad as the liberal-capitalist order which had replaced it.  Corporatism was, 
according to Knoll, a form of social organization which replaced the old societies of 
privilege, whether noble or bourgeois, with a new Catholic communal vision of society.  
Knoll’s distaste for feudalism did not translate into outright antagonism toward the 
Monarchy as a historical entity, however.  He merely noted that the old Reich had been a 
basically benevolent state which had nevertheless had its flaws.  Indeed, Knoll’s 
description of corporatism as a modern theory of government was certainly a much more 
realistic view than that of those who presented it as the rebirth of a highly romanticized 
vision of medieval society.  In the end, however, Knoll supported the modern Ständestaat
enthusiastically, even if he presented its roots differently than the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg 
government.341
Another Catholic intellectual, Hans Karl Zetzner-Spitzenberg, described the 
medieval and early modern  Monarchy in more unambiguously positive terms, arguing 
that as early as the Babenberg period, the Austrian state had fulfilled a special function in 
Europe to preserve the peace and to defend the Christian West against outside threats.  
Zetzner-Spitzenberg reserved most of his praise for Rudolf IV and other members of the 
341Knoll, 9-17.
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House of Habsburg, however, and argued that the imperial family’s drive to craft a 
multinational, Catholic state in the heart of Europe had not been the result of dynastic 
ambitions, but rather had come in response to the needs of the continent as a whole.  For 
Zetzner-Spitzenberg, the Habsburg Monarchy had been a “historical necessity” for Europe 
and had stood firm against Turkish invasions, separatist German religious uprisings, and 
destabilizing Prussian and French military adventurism.  Through it all, the old Monarchy 
had acted not in the cause of its own political power, but rather to advance economic 
prosperity and cultural development throughout its lands.342
Schuschnigg also sang the praises of the medieval Monarchy as a benevolent 
institution, although he focused more closely upon its system of national balances than 
upon its purported social harmony.  In his memoir, Schuschnigg argued that the old 
dynastic state had never been the oppressive, reactionary entity its critics had charged.  
Instead, he noted that the Habsburg rulers of the state had always felt obligated to use their 
power to unite and peacefully govern their subjects of numerous different nationalities and 
cultures, and to spread German culture and Catholicism throughout their realm.  
Schuschnigg regarded this Habsburg function not as hegemonic or imperial, but rather as 
patriarchal, with the dynasty as the guardian of the best interests of all the various national 
groups.  According to Schuschnigg, most of the Monarchy’s inhabitants had not really 
understood how important this Habsburg mission had been.  Only after 1918 did the 
Austrian people truly begin to appreciate what had been lost when the Monarchy 
collapsed.343
342Zetzner-Spitzenberg, 1-21.
343Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österreich, 15-23
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Hassinger too argued that the Monarchy had been impressive in its ability to work 
for harmony among the various nationalities.  Indeed the Monarchy’s particular genius 
according to him lay in the fact that a state dominated by Germans had been able to use its 
power in medieval and early modern Europe to forge a genuinely supranational 
community, in which the interests of all nationalities were protected and advanced.  This 
felicitous situation existed not despite German predominance, but rather because of the 
empathetic, mediating features that were integral to the German Austrian national 
character.  Hassinger argued that only in the modern era did such a harmonious balance 
between patriarchal German dominance and the interests of the Monarchy’s other Völker
start to break down.344
Supporters of the corporatist regime also sought to make clear the historical 
linkages between the old dynasty and the Catholic faith.  In a Reichspost article in 1933,  
Max Hussarek, a former imperial prime minister, emphasized the Catholic character of the 
dynasty since the reign of  Ferdinand III during the Middle Ages.  He argued that the 
German “religious revolution” of the Protestant Reformation had seriously damaged 
Christian unity, especially in Bohemia, and that it was only through the Counter-
Reformation led by the Habsburgs and the Jesuits that Austria regained the religious 
harmony necessary to fulfill its historical mission defending Europe against the Turks.  
Hussarek asserted that even the Enlightenment-based absolutism of Joseph II had been 
widely misunderstood as anti-religious, when in reality that monarch had been a pious 
man who had sought to regularize and strengthen the position of Catholicism within the 
Austrian state.  Even in the modern era, the link between the Catholic faith and the ruling 
344Hassinger, 10-13.
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imperial House had remained unshakable.  Hussarek praised Franz Joseph’s efforts to 
conclude a concordat with the papacy after 1848, even if that document had been 
repudiated by the liberal Austrian government in 1870.  Only Franz Joseph’s wisdom in 
reaching an agreement with the anti-Catholic liberals had allowed Austria to escape a 
disruptive Kulturkampf like the one which had destabilized Wilhelmine Germany.  
According to Hussarek, this agreement had mollified the liberals while still preserving 
much of the Church’s  influence in Austria, and had given the conservative-Catholic right 
a period of calm in which to rebuild its political strength.  Hussarek affirmed that even 
Karl, the last Habsburg monarch, had been a very pious Catholic, just like his dynastic 
forebears.  For Hussarek, Austria was, and remained a Catholic state, despite the efforts of 
liberals and Socialists to deny that fact.345
Indeed, all of the new corporatist regime’s leaders and supporters agreed with 
Hussarek that the beneficial qualities of the old Monarchy began a steady disintegration 
with the advent of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789.  Whereas liberal 
and Marxist commentators had generally seen the Revolution and the ideas which had 
inspired it as the beginning of Europe’s development toward a more free, more egalitarian 
form of society, the Austrian conservatives had always seen the modern era in a more 
negative light.  The representatives of the Ständestaat were no different, and asserted that 
the rise of capitalism and political liberalism had upset the harmonious balance of the old 
medieval social order, even as the rising tide of modern nationalism had inspired the 
peoples of the supranational Monarchy to demand new rights and privileges from the 
dynastic state.
345Max Hussarek, “Oesterreichs geistiger Urgrund,” Reichspost (Vienna), September 12, 1933, 4-5.
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Dollfuß asserted that the era of Maria Theresa in the early eighteenth century had 
represented a particular high point of Austrian power and prestige. In accordance with 
corporatist ideology, he also argued that during the Theresian period there had been no 
class conflict of the sort that  had plagued Austria during the modern age.  Nevertheless, 
the Berufstände had become ossified and overly formalistic by the end of the eighteenth 
century, and, Dollfuß argued, this rigidity had encouraged the popularity of capitalism and 
Enlightenment rationality, which some saw as a means of breaking free from the 
increasingly burdensome old order.  The next century had brought considerable and 
beneficial technological progress, but only at the expense of the soul and Christian values.   
Dollfuß asserted that political liberalism, the natural ideological offspring of capitalism 
and the Enlightenment, disguised a tendency toward the arbitrary use of political and 
economic power beneath its rhetoric of liberty and freedom.  Liberal abuses of power had 
caused class divisions, which in turn gave birth to the brutal materialism of Marxism.  
World War I represented the destructive culmination of the fetishism of technology and 
rationality in Europe.  Thus, Austria had gained certain material benefits since the late 
eighteenth century, but only at the price of the religious and moral awareness which had 
given its history real meaning.  Now it was time for Austrians to return to the old social 
order which so many of them had ill advisedly abandoned rather than reformed.346
Schuschnigg too lamented the rise of class conflict and social unrest in the last 
century of the old Monarchy, but argued that the problem of the balance between the 
nationalities was an even more pressing problem for the Habsburg state.  Indeed, in 
346Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 20-26, 32. For a similar argument, see also Zetzner-Spitzenberg, 22-
25.
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Schuschnigg’s estimation, it was precisely these problems that had led to the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s demise, and he allowed that even if World War I had not occurred, the old 
supranational state might still have crumbled.   The 1867 Ausgleich and dualism, although 
crafted to save the Monarchy by mollifying the Magyars, ultimately prevented national 
reform in the rest of the state, especially vis-à-vis the relationship between ethnic Czechs 
and Germans.  Schuschnigg also criticized German nationalists in Austria for being too 
attached to their nationality to see the real benefits provided by the Monarchy.  In an 
interesting point, he noted that if Austrian Germans, as the dominant nationality of the 
Monarchy, had not been able to subordinate their national interests to those of the state as 
a whole, then they could hardly have expected any of the Monarchy’s other, less 
privileged Völker to abandon their own national demands.347
Ultimately, however, Schuschnigg saw no basic incompatibility between loyalty to 
both the Habsburg state and the German nation which transcended state boundaries.  
Schuschnigg saw Austria as a German state, and maintained that even though the old Holy 
Roman Empire had collapsed, there had been a natural connection between Austrians and 
the Germans of the Wilhemine Reich, which had obviously been mirrored in the Austro-
German alliance of the late nineteenth century.  He reminisced about the various colors 
flown in the pre-war Monarchy, and noted that the Slavic peoples sometimes displayed the 
blue, white, and red banner which symbolized their nationality just as Austrian German-
speakers often flew the black, red and yellow of Germany.  Yet such displays, according 
to Schuschnigg, had never represented disloyalty to the black and gold flag of the dynasty, 
347Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österreich, 24-49.
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which was also often proudly flown by these groups as well.  So Schuschnigg did not see 
differing national loyalties in and of themselves as detrimental to or incompatible with the 
existence of the Habsburg Monarchy.  The eventual elevation of such principles above the 
interests of the state was what ultimately had doomed old Austria in his eyes.  
Schuschnigg also noted that before the war, even those national groups least satisfied with 
Habsburg rule had not seriously imagined their future outside of the confines of the 
Monarchy.348
For Austrian conservatives then, 1918 represented the cruelest blow of all, the 
dismemberment of the old Monarchy.  It was bad enough that Austria had been shorn of 
most of its territory and large segments of its German-speaking population.  Far worse, 
was the replacement of the old monarchical system with a new republic which was tinged 
with socialism and which displayed little dedication to the notion of preserving an 
independent Austrian Fatherland.  For the conservatives who supported the Ständestaat, 
the First Republic represented a decisive victory for just the sorts of negative forces which 
had undermined the benevolent old dynastic state in the first place: liberalism, Marxism, 
and excessive German nationalism.349
348Ibid., 24-49.
349Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 20-26, 32; Hecht, “Volksvertretung und Staatsführung in der neuen 
Verfassung,” 3; “Wahre Volksgemeinschaft,” 1.
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 Schuschnigg was especially forceful in laying the blame upon Otto Bauer and the 
Austrian Social Democrats for the end of the Habsburg state and its replacement with the 
First Republic.  He argued that even though the Socialists had been quick to argue that the 
working class itself had driven the “Revolution of 1918,” the workers had known that their 
economic well being was best secured through law and order, and thus actually had not 
actively sought the end of the Habsburg state.  According to Schuschnigg, it was the 
Austrian Socialists who, animated by their fanatical hatred of the Habsburgs, had acted 
against the interests of the working class in creating a new, anti-religious government in 
place of the old German-Christian Monarchy. Indeed, Schuschnigg argued that the 
Socialists had been extremely hostile to the very  idea of an Austria independent from 
Germany, and would have dissolved the Austrian Fatherland into the German Reich if the 
Entente powers had allowed them.350
The Heimwehr leader, Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, described the events of 
1918 in a particularly gripping manner in his 1938 memoir, presenting its effects from his 
perspective as a young, kaisertreu soldier returning home after the war.  He characterized 
the collapse of the old monarchy as the “first great tragedy” of his young life.  This young 
scion of an ancient aristocratic family with intimate historical relations with the old 
dynasty recounted how he had been thoroughly immersed in old Austrian patriotism as a 
child.  He had regarded the emperor Franz Joseph with a nearly religious sense of awe as a 
youth, and he claimed that he could not then imagine a time when the Habsburg empire 
might not exist and command the heartfelt loyalty of all of its subjects.  Starhemberg was 
shaken to the core by the disintegration of the Habsburg state, and thrown into a profound 
350Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österreich, 50-65.
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spiritual crisis which ultimately led him to embrace pan-Germanism and National 
Socialism for a time. While he later called his nationalistic dalliance an error, he argued 
that many young Austrian soldiers had experienced a crisis of patriotic faith similar to his 
own.  Even when he was involved with Hitler’s nascent Nazi movement in Munich, 
however, Starhemberg claimed to have nursed a secret hope than the Habsburg heir would 
eventually be restored to the throne as the head of a new, großdeutsch monarchy.351
As for the First Republic, Starhemberg argued that the new democracy had never 
actually commanded the support of the major Austrian political factions.  The Social 
Democrats had merely seen the Republic as the first step on the path to a Soviet-style 
proletarian dictatorship, while the Bismarck-venerating liberal-bürgerlich intelligentsia 
wanted to place Austria under the domination of Germany.  The Christian Social Party had 
only accepted the new state reluctantly, and out of fear of more radical solutions.  The old 
officer corps, the old imperial bureaucracy, and the landed aristocracy for their part had 
fervently hoped that the new Republic would be a brief interregnum which would end 
with a Habsburg restoration.  Thus, Starhemberg presented the destruction of the 
Habsburg Monarchy as the work of those who had hated the old state and who had no 
intention of supporting democracy, and argued that their efforts had the grievous effect of 
shaking the Austrian patriotism of even those who had earlier been absolutely dedicated to 
the Austrian cause.  For Starhemberg, the Ständestaat thus merely replaced a sham 
republic with a form of government which was more in line with what the truly loyal 
Austrian political factions had always desired, and which would renew the Austrian 
351Starhemberg, Memoiren, 33, 37-38, 48.
236
people’s lost faith in their Fatherland.352
Ultimately it was Knoll who best summarized the corporatists’ attitudes toward the 
past century of Austrian history.  He argued that the old Monarchy had represented the 
noble, Christian, and German character which was the true soul of Austria, and it had done 
its best to serve Austria’s European and German mission of cultural communication and 
cooperation between Völker.  The Habsburg state had, however, been gradually 
undermined by liberalism, Marxism, and nationalism.  Now the Ständestaat had created a 
new order which aimed at restoring Austria to its true, historical path, dedicated to 
fighting the poisonous, materialistic, and anti-Austrian ideals of 1848, 1871, and 1918.353
The supporters of the corporatist regime naturally glorified several figures from the 
Habsburg past as representatives of the traditional order which had been eroded after the 
Enlightenment.  They portrayed dynastic figures such as Maria Theresa, Joseph II, Franz 
Joseph, empress Elisabeth and even Karl, the star-crossed last emperor of the old 
Monarchy, as pious defenders of Austria’s Christian German character and its European 
mission.354  Likewise, they lauded other great Austrian leaders who had served the throne 
such as Kaunitz, Stadion, Metternich, Lueger, and Seipel.355  They singled out Eugene of 
Savoy, the victorious general who helped turn back the Turks from the gates of Vienna in 
1683, for special emphasis during the celebration of that event in 1933.  Knoll in particular 
held up Eugene as the very personification of the Austrian mission.  He remarked that the 
general had been the “paladin” of three “German-European” emperors.  For Knoll, Eugene 
352Ibid., 184-185.
353Knoll, 20.
354Karl Emmerich Baumgärtel, “Unvergeßliches Erlebnis,”  Reichspost (Vienna), September 12, 1933, 2-3; 
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combined Italian blood, French culture, and the German Geist (spirit), representing the 
very best of these three European peoples in his defense of the continent against the Turks.  
Knoll also noted rather wryly that it had occurred to no one during Eugene’s era to accuse 
the great general of treason to any of the Völker whom he represented, as narrow 
twentieth-century nationalists might have done had Eugene been a contemporary figure.  
Knoll also saw Eugene a symbol of the hope that contemporary Germany, France, Italy 
and Austria might put aside their mutual animosities in favor of European unity.356
Thus, the leaders and supporters of the Ständestaat used the memory of the old 
Monarchy continually in order to argue for the legitimacy of their new political regime 
and for the continuing independence of an Austrian state in the face of the threat of 
Anschluß with Nazi Germany.  They invoked the leaders of the Habsburg dynastic state, 
and the qualities and mission which that state supposedly represented, in order to make the 
case for a new Austria which was called to stand against the contemporary threats of 
liberalism, Marxism, and National Socialism.  In many ways, the spokesmen of the new 
government portrayed their corporatist reorganization of Austria as the rebirth of the 
Western, Catholic, German, and Austrian ideals which they thought the Habsburg 
Monarchy had represented before it was shattered by these corrupt modern ideologies.  
iii. Opponents of the Ständestaat and the Habsburg Past
The Ständestaat had its opponents, however, and these opponents not only 
attacked the new regime, but also disputed its narrative of the Habsburg past.  Certainly, 
355“Engelbert Dollfuß, der österreichische Mensch,” 1-2; Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 20-26; Knoll, 9-
17.
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given the dictatorial nature of the corporatist government, overt opposition to the regime 
was circumscribed.  Yet the government’s opponents did have some opportunity to spread 
their messages, whether from exile, through illegal, underground publications, or by 
carefully making use of the few remaining legal outlets for the public expression of 
dissent. In order to criticize the government’s policies, dissenters also had to grapple with 
the manner in which the regime invoked the memory of the old Habsburg state in order to 
support its arguments.  One group, the rather small Catholic opposition, essentially agreed 
with the Ständestaat leaders about the positive aspects of the old Monarchy, yet they often 
disagreed with the regime about how to apply the lessons of Austria’s dynastic past.  The 
Social Democrats and the Communists, on the other hand, disputed the corporatist 
argument that the old Monarchy had been a benevolent entity, arguing instead that it had 
opposed the progress of freedom and social equality as embodied by the working class.  
Yet these groups used their shared critique of the Habsburg past to make diametrically 
opposing arguments concerning Austrian national identity.  The Socialists continued to 
maintain, even in the face of the Nazi domination of Germany, that Austrians were 
Germans whose destiny ultimately lay in a German nation-state, while the Communists 
argued that Austrians had developed into a distinctive national group despite lingering 
linguistic affinities with other German-speakers of different nations.   A fourth group, the 
Austrian National Socialists, also vigorously opposed the corporatist regime and portrayed 
the Habsburgs as anti-German oppressors who, out of lust for dynastic power, had 
prevented the Germans of Austria from fulfilling their dream of völkisch unity in a great-
356Knoll, 3-4.  See also Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” 19-20.
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German state.357
Conservative Dissent and the Habsburg Past
The conservative Catholic right tended to align itself with the leaders of the 
Ständestaat, and generally affirmed the regime’s new form of government and vision of 
the Austria’s past.  Two notable exceptions to this trend were Richard Coudenhove-
Kalergi and Ernst Karl Winter.  Coudenhove-Kalergi, the descendent of an old aristocratic 
Austrian family, was the architect of the Pan-European movement, which advocated the 
construction of a federal, continent-wide European government.  In many ways, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas prefigured the system of economic and political treaties 
which would ultimately lead to the creationMay 30, 2006 of the European Union in the 
late twentieth century.  Coudenhove-Kalergi’s movement was very much a product of its 
own times, however, and the Pan-Europeanist leader shared many ideals with the Austrian 
conservative-Catholic camp from which he had emerged.  From the very beginning, for 
example, he was critically concerned with protecting Western and Christian civilization 
from both the internal threat of destructive nationalism, as well as from the “Eastern” 
danger of Bolshevik revolution, just like the leaders of the Ständestaaat.  He also thought, 
just as they did, that the solution to protecting both Austria and the West from such threats 
lay in the example of Austria’s Habsburg past.  He differed with the Austrian regime 
significantly, however, in his proposed solution.358
357The Austrian Nazi view of the Habsburg past was identical to that of the National Socialist German 
government which seized control of Austria in 1938.  See Chapter 5.
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While the leaders of the corporatist regime found the key to the defense of the 
West against Nazism and Marxism in the creation and maintenance of an independent, 
authoritarian Austria, Coudenhove-Kalergi saw the salvation of the West in the foundation 
of a unified European state, which he loosely compared to the Swiss example of 
heterogeneous national federalism.  Only such a European state could prevent a second 
catastrophic European war in the space of a generation, which had the potential to plunge 
the continent into a period of destitution and chaos much like the era after the collapse of 
Charlemagne’s empire.  Such a united federal Europe would also enable the West to stave 
off the expansion of Russian Bolshevism, and to allow Europe to compete economically 
with Russia, the United States, East Asia, and the British Empire.359
The real model for Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas was not Switzerland, but the old 
Austrian Monarchy.  He argued that the Habsburg state, with its centuries of supranational 
government, uniting numerous nationalities in peaceful cooperation for mutual benefit, 
had set the model for Europe’s future.  Indeed, according to Coudenhove-Kalergi, it was 
only Austria, and its storied capital, Vienna, which could provide the basis for the future 
Pan-Europa.  Only Vienna was a metropolis great enough, yet still relatively untarnished 
by French or German nationalistic and hegemonic aims, to provide the necessary center 
for a federal Europe.  Only the “Austrian man” with his mixed ethnic background and his 
innate talent for understanding “foreign cultures, foreign souls, and foreign Völker” could 
shepherd such a movement to successful completion.  Only the imperial Austrian past, in 
which the Habsburg emperor had been a sort of “Emperor of Europe,” successfully 
defending the continent against Eastern invasions from the Avars, Magyars, and Turks, 
359Ibid., 8-9.
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could serve as the template for a Europe unified in the face of external rivals.  
Coudenhove-Kalergi also invoked the notion of the “Austrian mission,” arguing that 
Austria’s very essence had represented a millennium-long defense of Europe, 
simultaneously protecting the West from external threats while cultivating internal 
cooperation among the continent’s Völker.  In the contemporary era, this continuing 
mission could best be served by moving toward the rebirth of the old Holy Roman Empire 
in a new form: Pan-Europa.360
Coudenhove-Kalergi was quick to note the benefits of his plan for Austria itself.  
As matters stood during the mid-1930s, Austria’s “German question” could really only be 
settled in two ways: through Anschluß with Germany or through Anschluß with all of 
Europe.  Coudenhove-Kalergi asserted that any union with Nazi Germany would 
inevitably place Austria and Europe upon the path to yet another apocalyptic war.  
European unity, however, would preserve Austria’s unique blend of German and 
European traditions and values, while simultaneously safeguarding peace on the continent 
as a whole.  Indeed, Coudenhove-Kalergi was careful to proclaim his support for the 
preservation of the national cultures of all of the European Völker, arguing that a 
continental union would in fact deepen national distinctiveness by removing the threat of 
destructive nationalistic wars.  In such a future state, Europe’s Völker would be free to 
cultivate their own unique qualities to the fullest without fear that their distinctive cultures 
would be erased by belligerent neighboring national groups.  Coudenhove-Kalergi also 
affirmed that his ideal of European collective security was apolitical, able to accommodate 
the democratic, fascist, or monarchical governmental forms of its various members with 
360Ibid., 4-12.
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ease so long as all agreed to a common community based on free trade, the protection of 
ethnic minorities, and the federal independence of its component states.361
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideals obviously differed from those of the leaders of the 
Standestaat, but that fact did not prevent him from using Vienna as the center for his 
movement during the 1930s.  The corporatist regime for its part allowed Coudenhove-
Kalergi to disseminate his ideas freely, as they harmonized to an extent with an image of 
Austria which it wished to encourage.  Indeed, Schuschnigg himself at times encouraged 
the movement, even if its vision of unified Europe did not exactly correspond to his own 
foreign policy goals.362  In the end, however, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European 
movement did not draw much substantial support in either Austria or Europe during the 
1930s, despite its clear anticipation of much of Europe’s subsequent history.
Another conservative Austrian who demonstrated a prescient understanding of the 
forces at work in Austria, yet whose advice was largely ignored by the Ständestaat, was 
the scholar and political polemicist Ernst Karl Winter.  Like both Coudenhove-Kalergi and 
the leaders of the Ständestaat, Winter venerated the memory of the old Habsburg 
Monarchy, convinced that Austria’s Habsburg past offered a model through which 
contemporary Austria might escape its profound troubles.  Indeed, for a time Winter 
actually worked as an agent of the corporatist government, serving as the deputy mayor of 
Vienna and as the head of the regime’s attempt to attract the support of the Austrian 
working class, known, appropriately enough, as the “Aktion Winter.”363  Yet Winter was 
361Ibid., 11-24.
362Alexander Novotny, “Österreich unter Europäischen Geschichtswinkel in der Schule,” Pädagogischer 
Führer (1935): 538.
363Winter’s motto for his “Action” was “to stand on the right, and think to the left.”  For a summary of the 
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from the very beginning deeply and vocally critical of the regime’s authoritarian course, 
and his frequent condemnations of its policies and his dogged articulation of his own 
peculiar brand of liberal monarchism unsurprisingly caused him to fall out of favor with 
the regime by 1936.  Winter was indeed a rather marginal figure in Austrian politics 
during the Ständestaat era, yet over the course of his several years of writing editorials in 
the pages of the Aktion Winter’s official newspaper, Die Aktion, and in his own 
independent weekly, Wiener Politische Blätter, he proved himself to be an exceptionally 
penetrating and articulate analyst of Austria’s political situation.  He was also more 
prolific and more articulate in his discussions of the meaning of the Habsburg past for 
contemporary Austrian identity than any of his more influential contemporaries.  
Ultimately, Winter’s ideas went largely ignored, both by the authoritarian regime and by 
the Austrian working class which he wished to influence.  Yet subsequent events in 
Austria would demonstrate the worth of Winter’s arguments, and many of his 
recommendations would belatedly find their expression under the Austrian Second 
Republic, albeit only after the catastrophic European war and Nazi subjugation of Austria 
which Winter had so desperately desired to prevent.
Winter remained committed to the ideals of conservatism, Catholicism, and 
monarchism throughout his life, and he was deeply sympathetic to many of the goals of 
the Ständestaat.  Above all, he was an Austrian patriot who had fought for the old state in 
World War I, and was profoundly shaken when it collapsed in 1918.364  He shared the 
corporatist regime’s abhorrence of National Socialism, and joined them in their critique of 
Aktion Winter’s main goals, see Winter, “Unser Zehn Punkte,” Die Aktion (Vienna), October 6, 1934.
364For Winter’s own description of his background, see “Die österreichische Idee,” Wiener Politischer 
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Marxism.  Yet Winter differed sharply with the new government about how best to 
preserve Austria’s independence and historical traditions.  Whereas the regime saw 
Austria as beset by two equal ideological foes, National Socialism and Marxism, Winter 
argued that Nazism was by far the greater threat.  Indeed, despite his repudiation of 
Marxism doctrine, Winter was sympathetic to the aims of the Austrian workers’ 
movement, and his understanding of Marxism was scholarly and subtle.  Unlike the 
corporatist regime, he distinguished between the truly democratic ideals of the Austrian 
Social Democrats and the dictatorial tactics of Soviet-style Communism, and he 
continually argued that the Ständestaat had made a grave error in outlawing the Socialist 
Party at a time when it desperately needed allies in the struggle against Nazism.  Indeed, 
Winter was in many ways more critical of the Austrian right than he was of the left, and he 
repeatedly argued that the anti-Marxism which the right had embraced since the era of 
Ignaz Seipel had led Austria down the path of dictatorship at a time when a democratic 
system which embraced a loyal opposition offered the state its only real hope of resisting 
Nazism.365  Thus, although he was deeply conservative, Winter advocated a liberal form of 
government in order to preserve Austrian independence.  Even when he eventually came 
to the conclusion that a restored Austrian monarchy offered the last hope of preventing a 
forcible Anschluß with Nazi Germany, Winter envisioned a “social monarchy” which 
would combine the Catholic piety and true conservatism of Austria’s Habsburg past with a 
socialism-tinged concern for egalitarianism and social justice which would hopefully 
secure its future. 
Blatter (August 27, 1933): 1-2.
365Winter, “Die Staatskrise in Österreich,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, April 16, 1933, 1-12.
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Despite his personal idealism, Winter was very pragmatic in his analysis of 
Austrian politics, and in his efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the forces of 
Austrian conservatism and the Austrian working class. Winter’s most pressing goal was 
the preservation of Austrian independence, and in order to accomplish that aim, he 
advocated the abandonment of ideological squabbling between the left and the right.  For
him, the state was in fact the highest ideal, and was “eternal” and “religious.”  Notions of 
the nation or the Volk were for him always necessarily subordinate to the state.366
Catholicism too was deeply important to him, but Winter warned of the dangers of 
politicizing Christianity, and he viewed faith as personal matter rather than as a political 
banner to rally around.367
Ultimately, Winter regarded National Socialism as the greatest danger to Europe.  
He saw Nazism as an brutal, anarchistic form of naked oppression which would ultimately 
trample all that was of value in the Western tradition.  Not only did National Socialism 
displace the primacy of the state, it also functioned as a secular religion which competed 
with Christianity itself for the spiritual loyalties of Germans and Austrians.  Ironically 
enough, Winter asserted that Nazism was itself deeply indebted to Judaism’s concept of 
the divine “chosenness” (Auserwählung) of the Jews as the special people of God, which 
the Nazis had transfigured into German national terms in order to portray the German Volk
as a nation destined for greatness.  Winter also fiercely criticized Nazi irrationalism, which 
allowed the Nazi leaders to affirm various contradictory ideas simultaneously.  Thus, Nazi 
leaders claimed fidelity to German law while they overtly pursued a “putschist” policy of 
366Winter, “Für ein freies, unabhängiges Oesterreich,” Die Aktion (Vienna), September 14, 1934, 1-2.
367Winter, “Monarchie und Arbeiterschaft,” in E.K. Winter.  Ein Katholik zwischen Österreichs Fronten, 
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governance, and Hitler professed goodwill and peace toward other European nations like 
France and Poland, even while he portrayed their efforts to protect their own security as 
grave insults to German honor and grounds for a coming, horrific war.  Ultimately, Winter 
found National Socialism to be a noxious, anti-Christian ideology which represented an 
unparalleled danger to both Austria and the West as a whole.368
Winter had a much more positive view of Marxism, which the corporatist regime 
abhorred as vehemently as it did National Socialism.  For Winter, while Marxism 
undeniably had its flaws, it was ultimately grounded in a legitimate concern for the real 
oppression faced by the working class at the hands of capitalism.369  Winter approved the 
social legislation enacted by the Austrian Social Democrats, and he even argued that 
socialism was a necessary force in Austrian society, serving to counterbalance any 
excesses on the part of the Catholic Church or conservative state authority.  Indeed, 
Winter expressed a certain personal sympathy with the Socialist leader Otto Bauer (in 
marked contrast to Winter’s deep personal antipathy to the much lauded, late conservative 
leader Ignaz Seipel), and went so far as to compare Bauer’s decisions in 1933 with those 
of the Emperor Karl in 1918.  Just as Karl had abdicated the imperial throne against his 
better judgement, and realized his error too late to reclaim his title, so too did Bauer 
hesitate too long between the establishment of an authoritarian state in Austria in 1933 and 
the Socialist revolt in February of 1934.370
Winter even found Bolshevism, which he regarded as a vulgar corruption of 
1933-1938 (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau, 1984), 317-320.
368Winter, “Österreich und der Nationalsozialismus,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, December 3, 1933, 10-13.
369Winter, “Die Krise des Marximus,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, June 16, 1933, 2-11.
370Winter, “Die Katastrophe des Austromarxismus,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, May 20, 1934, 1-3.
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Marx’s original ideals, less objectionable than Nazism.  In 1936, Winter argued that the 
Soviet Union’s Leninist ardor for a revolutionary transformation of society had gradually 
cooled into a dictatorial, but relatively more stable Stalinist government.  Bolshevism’s 
previous anarchistic tendencies had been replaced by what he described as a sort of 
Russian “neo-conservatism” which saw the Soviet Union pursuing foreign policy goals 
which were recognizably grounded in Russia’s traditional diplomatic aims.371  Winter saw 
no such evolution toward stability in the policies of Nazi Germany, and he thus regarded it 
as a far more dangerous antagonist for the West than the Soviet Union.  Indeed, he even 
held out the hope that the USSR might be enlisted in an alliance with the West order to 
combat the common Nazi enemy.372
Despite his nuanced view of Marxism, Winter criticized the Social Democrats for 
their passivity in the face of corporatist restrictions and for the ideological squabbling 
which had destabilized the final years of the First Republic.  More importantly, he argued 
that the Austrian Socialists had never demonstrated any real loyalty to the Austrian state 
after 1918, misguidedly believing that the state was the enemy of the working class.  On 
the contrary, Winter asserted that the state was a necessary medium for any efforts to 
improve the lot of the Austrian workers, as the Social Democrats themselves had 
demonstrated through their political achievements over the previous half century, which 
he noted never would have been possible in Nazi Germany. Austrian Socialists had too 
much class resentment to ever provide for the “deliverance” of the Austrian working class.  
371The similarity between Winter’s ideas concerning the evolution of Soviet foreign policy, and those of the 
American diplomat George Kennan as described in his celebrated “X Article” of 1947, is striking.  Winter, 
“Monarchie and Arbeiterschaft,” 333-335; “Die Krise des Marximus,” 1-13.
372Winter, “Dollfuß,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, December 23, 1934, 15.
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Only Christianity, with its emphasis upon forgiveness and reconciliation could offer the 
workers a means out of the angst characteristic of the modern era.373
If the Socialist left in Austria had an appropriate commitment to democracy and 
social justice, but lacked any loyalty to the Austrian Fatherland, Winter argued that the 
authoritarian right had the opposite problem.  Winter appreciated the corporatist 
government’s firm support of Austrian independence and Dollfuß’ unflagging personal 
efforts to reawaken a sense of patriotism in the Austrian people.374  Such measures were 
undoubtedly necessary if Austria were to resist Nazism. Yet Winter argued that in 
abandoning democratic rule in favor of oppressive state power, the regime had deprived 
itself of its best defense against the Nazis.  By giving in to crude anti-Marxism and fascist-
style, authoritarian government, the new regime was left with little which clearly 
distinguished it from Hitler’s political system in Germany.375  More to the point, the 
Ständestaat’s suppression of the workers’ movement had alienated precisely the faction 
best equipped to help it stand against the Nazis.  Winter argued that it was not enough for 
Austria to be a Ständestaat; it was also necessary for it to be a Rechtstaat (state of law).  
Only an Austria which combined loyalty to the Fatherland with a government which 
incorporated a loyal, leftist opposition within a legitimate constitutional framework could 
truly be strong enough to prevent a National Socialist seizure of power.376
Just like the leaders of the Ständestaat, Winter believed that correct understanding 
of both Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past were vital to any attempts to 
373 “Die Katastrophe des Austromarxismus,” 1-14.
374Winter, “Die österreichische Nation,” Die Aktion (Vienna), May 4, 1935, 1-3; “Dollfuß,” 4-10.
375Winter, “Die Stunde des Konservatismus,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, June 18, 1933, 1-3, 10-14.
376Ibid., 7- 9; Winter, “Die Staatskrise in Österreich, Wiener Politischer Blätter, April 16, 1933, 1-7; 
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rescue Austria from its precarious contemporary position.  Yet Winter argued that the 
government had failed to really comprehend the true legacy of the old Monarchy, and to 
articulate a clear vision of Austrian national identity.  According to Winter, these twin 
failures ultimately threatened to undermine the very Austrian independence that the 
corporatists claimed to defend.
In his 1936 work on Austrian politics and national identity, Monarchie und 
Arbeiterschaft, Winter argued that there were basically two distinct theories of Austria.  
The first, which he supported, and which he rested on a solid political, sociological, and 
historical basis, held that Austria was a nation, a nation state even, like any other in 
Europe.  It was composed of German-speakers, but had its own distinct history, culture, 
and folklore.  This theory acknowledged a common origin in the Middle Ages which 
Austria shared with Germany, but held that the intervening centuries had witnessed the 
separation of Germany and Austria, and their differentiation into two separate national 
groups.  The other theory of Austria held that Austrians merely formed a German Stamm
with no distinct culture, history, or folklore.  This was the ideology of the “Ostmark,” 
which saw Austria as a piece of Germany, politically separate only through an accident of 
history, and destined to return to the German national fold.377
Winter charged that both Dollfuß and his successor Schuschnigg had been far too 
ambivalent about Austrian national identity.  He argued that both leaders had ultimately 
been unwilling simply to affirm that “Austria is not Germany,” and had attempted to play 
both sides of the national question for political advantage.  According to Winter, there 
“Monarchie und Arbeiterschaft.”  306-316; “Was is die Aktion Winter?” Die Aktion (Vienna), October 6, 
1934, 1-4.
250
could be no equivocation on this issue without risking a dangerous ambiguity which might 
encourage Nazi activism in Austria.  One simply could not simultaneously emphasize both 
Austria’s national distinctiveness and its Germanness.  He warned that the hour of 
decision was approaching, and Austria had to make a clear pronouncement concerning its 
national identity.378
Ultimately, however, Winter was no less ambivalent concerning Austrian national 
identity than were Dollfuß and Schuschnigg.  Even Winter acknowledged that Austria 
shared a culture, language, and history with Germany, and that Austrians in general were 
proud of their Deutschtum.  Indeed, in an article in Die Aktion immediately following 
Dollfuß’ assassination, Winter gave the fallen dictator credit for forging a strong and 
distinctive Austrian sense of national identity where none had existed before!379  It seems 
that despite his criticisms of the regime’s vision of Austrian nationhood, Winter’s position 
was not especially different.  He argued that Austria had a unique culture and history of 
which it should be proud, and he firmly supported the state’s continued independence. Yet 
at the same time, he did repeatedly admit that Austria was part of the German cultural 
circle, and indeed had a “mission” to serve as the representative for all German-speakers 
outside Germany and to stand as an example that German culture was not defined by the 
377Winter, “Monarchie und Arbeiterschaft,” 333-341.
378Ibid, 333-341; Winter, “Österreich und der Nationalsozialismus,” Wiener Politischer Blätter, December 
3, 1933, 24-30. 
379Winter’s apparent inconsistency in this instance might be ameliorated by noting that Die Aktion was a 
government-sponsored newspaper in which Winter was generally less critical of the government than in his 
other publications.  This fact, combined with the emotional environment following Dollfuß’ murder, might 
account for the effusive praise which Winter here devoted to a person toward whose statements about 
national identity he was previously and subsequently so critical.  Winter, “Die österreichische Nation,” Die 
Aktion (Vienna), May 4, 1935, 2-5.
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crude chauvinism of the National Socialists.380
Winter’s differences with the corporatist regime concerning the meaning of the 
Habsburg past were more well defined, however.  Winter argued that the old Monarchy 
had not simply been the creation of a hegemonic, Germanic dynasty, but rather 
represented a unique historical blending of the interests and fortunes of the Austrian, 
Bohemian, and Hungarian crownlands.  The union of these lands, the Austrian system, 
arose as the result of a set of historical imperatives which were economic, social, and 
political as well as dynastic.  This process of unification was not different in Winter’s eyes 
from the forces that brought other European states, such as Great Britain, a union of 
England, Scotland, and Wales, into existence.  The Austrian system itself also served an 
important function in Europe as a south-central node of power with strong ties to Spain 
and Italy as well as to Germany, and had helped to counterbalance French power in the 
West.  Indeed, it was this function which had made Austria valuable to Prussia (and later 
to the unified Germany), rather than the German ethnicity of some of its inhabitants.  
Austria had its roots as a German “tribe,” but it developed into a necessary and integral 
part of the European state system independent of Germany. The dynasty, and with it, the 
inhabitants of the imperial city of Vienna, represented the faction of the monarchy which 
most properly understood what Austria actually was, and the vital role which it served.  
This faction did its best to communicate this understanding to the rest of the Monarchy.381
Indeed, Winter argued that the representatives of the regime were mistaken when 
they argued for the existence of one “Austrian man.”  Winter asserted that what the regime 
380Winter, “Die österreichische Idee,” 19-24; “Die Staatskrise in Österreich,” 2-4; “Monarchie und 
Arbeiterschaft,” 269-272. 
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had not realized was that there were really two sorts of “Austrian man:” the “old Austrian 
man,” conditioned by the old, large-empire Habsburg tradition, and the “Alpine Austrian 
man,” a more provincial sort.  These two varieties had little in common with one another 
other than their name, and the “Alpine man” rejected the cosmopolitanism, culture, 
bureaucratism, and affinity for the traditional trappings of Austria displayed by the “old 
Austrian” variety.  The “old Austrian” man was most at home in Vienna, the great capital 
city, and Winter argued that Austromarxism, despite its traditional hostility toward the 
Habsburg state, was the faction which has done the most to cultivate this variety of 
Austrian humanity.382
In suppressing the Socialist opposition, then, the regime had trampled on part of 
the very Austrian identity which it wished to cultivate, and placed too much faith in the 
hands of provincial Austrians who were more susceptible to Nazi propaganda than left-
leaning Viennese.  Indeed, it was precisely in this area that the old Monarchy had 
possessed a genius that the Ständestaat conspicuously lacked.  Winter argued that the old 
state had pursued an “Austrian course” of politics which involved the ability of the 
Habsburg regime to co-opt various opposing interests, and to use their power to drive the 
state.  By paying attention to the needs and demands of, for example, capitalism and 
feudalism, or the church and worldly concerns, without completely giving in to any of 
them, the governments of old Austria were able to forge workable, realistic government 
policies.  So long as it excluded the Social Democratic left, ignoring the demands of 
workers and the interests of red Vienna in favor of its traditional foundation in the 
381Winter, “Die österreichische Idee,” 3-6.
382Winter, “Die Stunde des Konservatismus,” 2-4.
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provinces, Winter argued that the regime would be doomed to fail.  No matter how much 
it emphasized its links to the old Monarchy through the revival of Habsburg symbols, the 
regime ultimately had missed the real character and strength of the Habsburg past.383
For Winter, the strength of monarchism lay in the fact that it was able to balance 
between demands for democracy and authority, two interrelated ideas with deep historical 
roots in Western civilization.384  Indeed, according to Winter, it was only the institution of 
monarchy in Europe which allowed ideals of liberty and democracy to fully develop, 
despite the claims of the left to the contrary.  Winter argued that absolute monarchy had 
been necessary in order to break the power monopoly of the Church, and to set the stage 
for the building of the modern state.  Without this function, parliamentarism and 
democracy would not have been able to bloom, nor could capitalism and its 
counterweight, socialism, have appeared.  Indeed, constitutional monarchies such as 
England, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark were quite stable and even in areas 
that had undergone recent political crises, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and 
Greece, only monarchy had served to ameliorate the inveterate bickering of the political 
parties.  Thus, Winter argued that Austria’s traditional roots lay in monarchical institutions 
which had nurtured democracy while balancing such freedom with firm authority.  He 
ultimately argued the Austria’s Habsburg past had more in common with the democratic 
West than with Fascist authoritarianism, and he warned that the Austrian corporatist 
government was unwittingly aligning itself more closely with Nazism than with the 
383Winter, “Österreich und der Nationalsozialismus,” 38-45.  
384Winter, “Für eine Neue Demokratie,” Die Aktion (Vienna), October 6, 1934, 1-3.
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traditions which it claimed to represent.385
The old Monarchy had another great strength beyond its ability to balance 
democratic impulses and provide a stabilizing authority.  The Habsburg Monarchy had 
embodied “the Austrian idea.”  This idea, simply put, was the principle of 
multinationalism which advocated the cooperation between Völker in order to pursue 
mutual interests.386  Unfortunately, the old Monarchy had been dismantled by its own 
citizens, who had not realized the value of its mediation between its member nationalities.  
Yet Winter asserted that the Austrian idea was as important during the 1930s as it had 
been before World War I.  Interestingly, Winter argued that the Austrian idea was just as 
much a part of the heritage of the Monarchy’s other successor states as it was of the 
Austria  itself.  Indeed, the Bohemian lands, which had been so unjustly and unwisely 
frozen out of the power structure of the state in the last fifty years of the old Monarchy, 
were now in the postwar era reasserting the “Austrian idea” in south-Central Europe, 
building the “Little Entente” into a “Fifth Great Power.”  Prague, which had previously 
been the disadvantaged focal point in the Austria-Hungary-Bohemia monarchical axis, 
was, now, with the help of France, doing its best to reconstitute Old Austria’s role in the 
European balance of power.387
Winter argued, however, that Austria could still play a necessary role in the 
postwar order.  The crownlands of the old Monarchy were now divided in to two camps: a 
Franco-Czech liberal-democratic alliance and a Magyar-Italian fascist block.  In addition 
there was also the new Polish state, which was also historically  linked to Habsburg 
385Winter, “Monarchie und Arbeiterschaft,” 321-324.
386Winter, “Die österreichische Idee,” 1-3.
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legacy, and which had strong reasons to be suspicious of Germany.  Austria, according to 
Winter, had to shake off the passivity and reactivity which had characterized its postwar 
foreign policy.  It should become a mediator in the region, bridging the gap between the 
liberal, fascist, and Polish camps, uniting them as a bulwark against Nazi Germany.  
Austria’s historical connection with Latin Europe, that is, with Spain, France, and Italy, 
left it uniquely equipped for such a task.  Such a mission was imperative for independent 
Austria, and also served the needs of Europe as a whole.388  Cooperation between the lands 
of the old Monarchy was also crucial in this endeavor.  In a 1934 article in Die Aktion he 
argued that Czechoslovakia and Austria, along with Hungary, should put aside their 
lingering animosities and work closely together to secure the combined patronage of Italy 
and France in a Central European alliance to stand against Nazi Germany.  Winter hoped 
that such a Central European block could convince Germany to rejoin the peaceful 
community of European nations, but if such efforts failed, the states of the old Habsburg 
Monarchy had a common interest in opposing German predation on the continent.389
Winter saw the renewal of a Danubian confederation, aligned with France and 
Italy, as the only means of preventing German aims in southeastern Europe.  Germany 
might tempt the various states of the region into alliances through the prospect of trade 
with the Nazi state, but in the end, such German “peaceful penetration” of the region could 
only conceal the imperial ambitions of the Third Reich, which represented the antithesis of 
the mutually beneficial community of nationalities embodied by the Habsburg Monarchy.  




territory, then southeastern Europe would be defenseless against his hegemonic advances.  
If, on the other hand, Austria could lead the other states of the region into an economic 
and diplomatic system of alliances, then the “Austrian idea” would truly be reborn, and 
would immunize southeastern Europe from Nazi aggression.390
In the aftermath of his dismissal by the corporatist government and the dissolution 
of the “Aktion Winter,” in 1936 Winter shifted his position from one which called for 
Austria to emulate the best aspects of the old Monarchy to one which advocated the 
outright restoration of the Monarchy itself.  Winter had simply lost hope that the 
Schuschnigg regime would ever realize the folly of its authoritarian, anti-Marxist course, 
and he now argued that a new, “social monarchy” represented the last chance for Austria 
and Europe to prevent the coming Nazi catastrophe.  Such an institution would build upon 
the foundations of the old Habsburg state, with the Habsburg heir, Otto, sitting upon the 
throne.  The new Habsburg Monarchy, however, would combine the traditions of the old 
dynastic state with a pronounced concern for the plight of the working class, and it would 
enact social legislation derived in large part from Social Democratic demands.  Indeed, 
Winter thought that such a course would be in line with the ideas that the last Habsburg 
Emperor, Karl, had hinted that he supported, and that his son Otto likewise advocated.  
Winter’s vision of a reborn Habsburg state comprised only the territory of contemporary 
Austria, but he hoped that the new Monarchy would be able to sit at the center of his 
proposed anti-Nazi Danubian economic federation, and thus stem the advances of the 
Third Reich.  Winter knew that such a proposal would be difficult for both the Austrian 
389Winter, “Prager Eindrücke,” Die Aktion (Vienna), February 23, 1934, 1-3.
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left and the old Monarchy’s successor states to accept, but he argued that it was ultimately 
in their own self interest to set aside their suspicions and join a new Habsburg Austria 
against a mutual mortal enemy.  Indeed, Winter cited a number of Nazi sources which 
worried about Habsburg restoration as evidence of the soundness of his plan.391
However perceptive Winter’s political and historical insights might have been, his 
plan was profoundly unrealistic.  None of the old Monarchy’s successor states, let alone 
Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, were willing to tolerate the notion of a Habsburg 
restoration.  In Austria, Winter became the object of suspicion of both the left and right, as 
he himself noted on a number of occasions.392  Neither his plan for a new Monarchy at the 
center of a Danubian federation, nor even his more modest goal of an Austrian 
government which balanced the concerns of both conservatives and the working class in 
order to combat Nazism found an audience with those in power. Still, even as a voice in 
the wilderness, Winter was able to present a clear vision of the traditions of the Habsburg 
Monarchy as the ultimate antidote to National Socialism in Austria and Europe, and his 
discussion of the interrelationship between the Habsburg past and Austrian national 
identity was thorough, articulate, and clearly foreshadowed the debates about these 
matters which would be held in Austria after 1945.  In the short term, however, Winter 
was a political failure, and he immigrated to the United States in 1938 to flee the Nazi 
catastrophe which he had so desperately wished to avert.
Austrian Marxists and the Habsburg Past During the Ständestaat




dissenters in formulating its attacks upon the corporatist regime.  While figures like 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and Winter generally agreed with the leaders of the Ständestaat that 
the old Monarchy had been a benevolent entity which offered a potential model Austria 
could follow to escape its contemporary problems, but disagreed with the regime’s official 
interpretation of the Habsburg past, the Austrian left argued that the Habsburg state had 
been an oppressive, reactionary force in Austrian history.  In doing so, the leftist 
opposition basically agreed with the new government’s claims that it represented the 
essence of the Habsburg legacy.  In the eyes of Austrian Marxists, the difference between 
the modern Ständestaat and the old Monarchy was merely one of degree and 
circumstance.  Both the corporatists and the Habsburgs were reactionary oppressors, and 
both were the enemies of the working class.  Indeed, many leftists made little distinction 
between the old Monarchy’s oppressive tendencies and those of the decidedly anti-
Habsburg National Socialists.  Interestingly, the Social Democrats and the Communists 
both used their similar portrayals of the Habsburg past to make diametrically opposing 
arguments concerning Austrian national identity.  The former asserted that Austrians were 
Germans, and they hoped to see the union of Austria and Germany in a socialist, great-
German state, while the latter presented a vehement defense of an Austrian nation separate 
from Germany. 
The Austrian Social Democratic Party had been the major party of the left in 
Austria for nearly half a century, and during the First Republic it had represented the 
greatest competitor of the Christian Social Party.  Given its long history of opposition to 
the forces of Austrian conservatism, it is somewhat surprising that the Social Democrats 
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offered so little resistance to the dismantling of the First Republic’s democratic system.  
After a belated and feeble attempt to mount an armed uprising against the Ständestaat in 
February of 1934, the leaders of the party for the most part fled the country.393  The Party’s 
leadership operated out of Brno in Czechoslovakia for the remainder of the regime’s 
existence, while much of the organization’s membership continued to operate illegally in 
Austria under the new name of the Revolutionary Socialist Party.394
While the Austrian Socialists still counted many distinguished leaders from the last 
decades of the old Monarchy among their ranks, such as Karl Renner and Max Adler, as 
well as a younger generation of rising stars such as Oscar Pollack, the party’s leading 
political and intellectual figure undeniably remained Otto Bauer.  Indeed it was Bauer, 
writing from exile in Brno in the pages of the party’s official newspaper, Die Arbeiter-
Zeitung, and in its ideological monthly, Der Kampf, who provided the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party with the most frequent criticisms of the corporatist regime in Austria and 
with the most extensive discussion of national identity and the meaning of the Habsburg 
past.  Bauer was ultimately a tragic figure, who had seen considerable success in 
advancing the party’s aims under his leadership after 1918, only to witness those gains 
erased by Dollfuß and Schuschnigg after 1933.  He did live to see the Anschluß with 
Germany for which he had so long argued before his death in 1938, but only under the 
auspices of a Nazi regime in Germany which represented the antithesis of his most 
393Anson Rabinbach, “Red Vienna: Symbol and Strategy,” in The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social 
Democracy and Austromarxism, 1928-1934, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Boulder and London: Westview, 
1985):187-194.
394The name change of the Party indicated the leadership’s position that after 1934, there could be no 
question of merely restoring a “bürgerlich” democracy which had proven itself to be a failure.  A true 
revolutionary and socialist democracy was now to be the Party’s ultimate goal.  “Um der Namen der 
Partei,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), May 27, 1934, 1.
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cherished ideals.
The Social Democrats simply argued that the corporatist regime was fascist.  Bauer 
and the other Socialist leaders invariably described the Austrian right after 1933 not only 
as  “clericist” and “reactionary,”–pejorative terms which they had long used–but also as, 
in a newly minted turn of phrase, “Austrofascist.”395  They argued that the Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg regimes were oppressive and anti-democratic, and the Austrian working class 
thus had to oppose them with revolutionary force.  Indeed, it was perhaps a critical error 
of the Austrian Socialist movement that its leading theorists so frequently failed to draw 
any meaningful distinction between the Austrian corporatists and National Socialists in 
Austria and Germany.  As early as 1933, Oscar Pollack, a young party functionary, 
proclaimed in Der Kampf that the Austrian working class was trapped “between two 
fascisms,” and he argued vehemently that the Social Democrats must refuse to give in to 
pressure to chose between the lesser of the two evils, Dollfuß or Hitler.396  Such 
denunciations became even stronger after the failed uprising and legal proscription of the 
Social Democratic Party in 1934, as the Party’s leadership was forced underground or into 
exile.  While the corporatist government admittedly gave the Socialists little reason to 
suspect that their assistance would be welcomed or even permitted in the struggle against 
any Nazi threats, the Social Democrats for their part frequently repudiated any notion that 
the workers should help the authoritarian Austrian government in its efforts to stave off 
395Otto Bauer, “Die Verfassung des Austro-faschismus,” Otto Bauer, Werkausgabe, vol. 7, ed. Hugo 
Pepper et el. (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1979), 737-740.
396Oscar Pollack, “Zwischen zwei Fascismus,” Der Kampf, Sozialistische Monatsschrift 26, no. 7 (July, 
1933): 276-281.
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such dangers without a full return to democracy and freedom in Austria.397
The Social Democrats were most critical of the regime’s repudiation of 
democracy, which they argued  had left it completely unable to prevent Austria from 
falling prey to the predations of Nazi Germany.  In 1933, the Socialist theoretician Karl 
Kautsky argued that what set Socialism apart from fascism was its firm commitment to 
democracy, and he asserted that true socialism would only occur through democratic 
means.398  Bauer concurred, and noted that the Austrian workers’ movement had always 
been committed to using constitutional, legal means to pursue its aims, as evidenced by 
the peaceful transition from the old Monarchy to the First Republic in 1918.399  The 
corporatists on the other hand, had brazenly discarded democracy in 1933 in the name of 
security and Austrian independence.  In doing so, they had gained neither, as evidenced by 
both Dollfuß’ assassination and Schuschnigg’s increasingly close alignment with Nazi 
Germany after 1936.  Bauer also criticized the corporatist state’s dependence upon anti-
democratic, Fascist Italy, which had only served to drive Austria toward the arms of Nazi 
Germany at a time when the Austrian state would have been much better served aligning 
itself with the bourgeois but still dependably anti-Nazi Western democracies.  Bauer 
ultimately echoed Winter’s lament that the corporatist government had deprived itself of 
the most powerful adversary of National Socialism in Austria by suppressing the workers’ 
movement.  Indeed, Bauer feared that the regime might actually have driven some 
397Bauer, “Die Revolution geht weiter!” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), July 29, 1934; idem, “Starhembergs 
Sturz,” Der Kampf 27, No. 6 (1936): 234; idem, “Österreichs Ende” Der Kampf 5 (January, 1938): 121-
131.
398Karl Kautsky, “Demokratie und Diktatur,” Der Kampf 6, No. 2 (February, 1933) 45-58.
399Bauer, “E. K. Winter gegen die AZ,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), July, 8 1934; Der Aufstand der 
österreichischen Arbeiter, seinen Ursachen und seine Wirkungen, in Otto Bauer, Werksaufgabe, vol. 7 
(Vienna: Europe Verlag), 961-963.
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Austrian workers to embrace Nazism simply out of their shared hatred of Dollfuß. Bauer 
argued that in the end, “only a free people can protect its independence,” a fact which in 
his view explained Schuschnigg’s eventual failure to accomplish his most basic aim of 
forestalling a Nazi Anschluß.400
Even in the face of Nazi domination of Germany, the Austrian Social Democrats 
never abandoned their support for the prospect of an eventual Anschluß between Austria 
and Germany.  Bauer’s stance remained the same as it had been throughout the the First 
Republic.  He considered Austrians to be members of the German nation, and he did not 
regard Austrian independence as something which was worth preserving except under 
exceptional circumstances.  The existence of a National Socialist government in Germany 
did naturally constitute just such a circumstance for Bauer, and he and his party did devote 
considerable energy toward advocating Austrian independence.401  This stance did not, 
however, mean that the Social Democrats did not still fervently hope for the day when the 
severed German nation might become whole as a democratic, socialist, great-German 
state. 402  Another Austrian Socialist in exile, Karl Czernetz, concurred with Bauer, and 
denounced efforts by the Austrian Communists to martial Austrian nationalistic opposition 
to Nazism by specifically rebutting their arguments.  In this rebuttal, he proclaimed that 
Austria was not its own nation, and never had been.  Czenetz too hoped for an Austrian 
union with Germany after Hitler was vanquished.403
In his advocacy of Austrian independence before the Anschluß, Bauer still 
400Bauer, “Österreichs Ende,” 131; “Die Revolution geht weiter!”; “Kann Österreich noch gerettet 
werden?” Der Kampf 5 (January, 1938): 181-190
401Bauer, “Österreichs Ende,” 121-131.
402Bauer “Der Sozialismus und die deutsche Frage,” Der Kampf 4 (Jan.1937): 1-9 
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emphasized the Austrian state’s continuing Germanness.  In an article in Der Kampf, 
Bauer argued that Austria could only be saved if it abandoned the authoritarian “path of 
Dollfuß” and instead proceeded in a more democratic fashion.  Bauer envisioned this 
democratic path as a “German Piedmont” which would stand for the best of Germany’s 
democratic traditions in the face of Hitler’s oppression.  This Austria would have to be 
committed to defending itself through purely constitutional means, as the natural heir of 
the members of the anti-Prussian German national council of 1838 to 1865.  Bauer argued 
that such an Austria would command the support of both Austrian conservatives and 
Austrian workers, and thus would be able to present a strong defense against Nazism.404
In an earlier article, Bauer also expressed his fear that the inevitable war between 
Nazi Germany and the democratic West would have grave consequences for the German 
Volk.   Bauer admitted that a victory for Nazi Germany would be a near fatal catastrophe 
for European socialism, democracy, and freedom.  But he also cautioned that a victory by 
the “imperialist-capitalist powers” could be almost as bad, and would only lead to the 
ultimate destruction and dismemberment of Germany as the West endeavored to make 
sure a large German state could never embark on any further catastrophic wars.  The only 
solution, according to Bauer, was for German workers to use the coming war as an 
opportunity for socialist revolution in much the same way as Russian workers started a 
revolution during World War I.  Then a red coalition of Germany and the Soviet Union 
would be able stand against the imperialist powers and prompt the other workers of the 
403Karl Czernetz, “Gibt es eine oesterreichische Nation?” in Alfred Klahr zur österreichischen Nation, eds. 
Walter Baier and Winfried R. Garscha (Vienna: Globus Verlag, 1994), 157-180.
404Bauer, “Kann Österreich noch gerettet werden?” 181-190.
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continent to rise, thus bringing about a socialist Europe.405
Bauer also argued that German events invariably influenced what happened in 
Austria, citing how the failed Revolution of 1848, the brief triumph of political liberalism 
during the 1860s, the conservative turn from liberalism during the 1870s, the 
implementation of social welfare legislation in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
and the collapse of the monarchies in 1918 all seemed to happen in both regions more or 
less simultaneously.  Bauer argued that such developments explained the Austrian 
dictatorship of 1933, which followed on the heals of Nazi success in Germany.   While the 
corporatist regime was aristocratic rather than National Socialist, it was undoubtedly 
influenced by Hitler’s anti-Marxism in its attempts to crush the Austrian workers’ 
movement.406  Thus for Bauer, both the forces of progress and those of reaction tended to 
move simultaneously in both Germany, and Austria.  A socialist victory over the Nazis in 
Germany would thus lead almost inevitably to the sort of peaceful socialist Anschluß
which Bauer envisioned. 
The Anschluß which did occur in 1938 simultaneously confirmed Bauer’s worst 
fears and suggested a path toward his fondest dream.  In evaluating this situation shortly 
before his death, Bauer argued that too often in German history the forces of 
counterrevolution had coopted the drive toward German unification in order to achieve 
things which the agents of progressive revolution had been unable to attain on their own.  
Bismarck’s success in creating a small German state in 1871 after the failure of the 
revolutionaries of 1848 to carry through such a project was but one example of such a 
405Bauer “Der Sozialismus und die deutsche Frage,” 1-9.
406Bauer,  Der Aufstand der österreichischen Arbeiter, 992.
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tendency.  Now Bauer argued that Hitler’s success in building a great German state after 
the revolutionaries of 1918 had been stymied by the imperialistic ambitions of the Entente 
powers represented a similar example.  For Bauer, however, 1938 brought not a real 
Anschluß, but rather a brutal annexation at gunpoint.  Still, the situation was not without 
its opportunities, and he reacted scornfully to the notion that the Austrian conservatives 
who had been driven from power in Austria might go abroad and try to mount campaigns 
to restore Austrian independence.  He argued that such activities were foolish.  Now that 
the future of the Austrian working class lay with their German brethren, and they would 
never again be separated.  The Austrian workers could only be free if all of the German 
workers were free.  Thus for Bauer and many other Social Democrats observing the events 
of 1938, the future of the “German-Austrian” working class seemed to be the future of the 
German socialist revolution, and they assumed that Austrian independence was a thing of 
the past.407
Bauer was no less vehement in his denunciations of the old Habsburg Monarchy 
than he was in his criticism of the corporatist regime or his proclamation of Austrian 
membership in the German nation.  In response to the efforts by the leaders of the 
Austrian government to invoke the legacy of the old Monarchy in order to legitimize the 
new social order, Bauer painstakingly assaulted their positive presentation of Austria’s 
dynastic past.  Bauer countered their assertions most forcefully in a 1934 article in Der 
Kampf entitled “Habsburg vor den Toren?” (A Habsburg at the Gates?) with a summary 
of what he viewed as the House of Habsburg’s real historical legacy.  In the modern 
407Bauer, Österreichs Ende,” 121-131.  Karl Renner made a similar argument.  Karl Renner, Karl Renner in 
Dokumenten und Erinnerungen, ed. Seigfried Nasko (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1982), 132-
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period, he argued, Austria’s economic development had continually lagged behind that of 
the rest of Europe and the Monarchy had been the most backward state on the continent.  
Moreover, the Monarchy frequently suppressed political reform, liberalism, and the rights 
of its national minorities, and had brutally quashed the 1848 Revolution.  That year, which 
had brought democracy to so many regions of Europe brought only reaction in Austria.  
Indeed, Bauer insisted that during its last century and a half the Monarchy had been an 
incorrigible police state which censored the press and persecuted the workers’ and the 
national movements.  Austria also had lagged significantly behind France, England, and 
Germany in terms of voting rights.  In the late nineteenth century, these other regions had 
achieved universal manhood suffrage or at least greatly expanded voting rights, but only a 
narrow sector of Austrians, the traditional elites and the upper middle class, had any real 
electoral power.  Only in 1905, when Emperor Franz Josef considered instituting full 
manhood suffrage in Hungary to curb the power of anti-Austrian magnates, did the 
German workers’ movement finally assert itself, demanding that the reluctant monarch 
grant them the same privileges which he contemplated using to mollify his Magyar 
subjects.  Indeed, according to Bauer, it was really the Russian revolution of 1905 which 
prompted Franz Josef finally to give in on Austrian suffrage two years later in order to 
avoid similar upheaval in his own realm.408
Likewise, Bauer noted that social reforms such as health care and shorter working 
hours came to Austria only long after such reforms had been established elsewhere in 
Europe, and again only due to the prompting of the Social Democrats.  Indeed, he 
137. 
408Bauer, “Habsburg vor den Toren?” Der Kampf 2 (May 1934), 97-111.
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remarked that the Monarchy had been able to resist the Socialists’ 1899 plan for federal 
reform to ameliorate the nationalities issue until the last days of the old state, when the 
young emperor Karl had realized the wisdom of the proposal far too late to save his 
crown.  Thus, the old Monarchy had been reactionary in every sense of the word, never 
allowing social or political progress unless the workers forced the issue.  Bauer urged 
Austrian workers not to forget the “oppression, exploitation and torment” to which the 
House of Habsburg had subjected them.409
Bauer did have a few positive things to say about the old Monarchy, at least in 
comparison to the corporatist regime.  In 1934, he argued that the regime’s new 
constitution actually provided less freedom than the Habsburg constitution enacted in 
1867 (which had indeed been the basis of the First Republic’s Constitution of 1920).  In 
Bauer’s opinion, the 1867 constitution had represented the high point of liberalism in the 
Monarchy, protecting a number of important liberal rights which the Socialists regarded as 
positive achievements.  By contrast, the new corporatist constitution, while nominally 
guaranteeing civil liberties such as freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the 
equality of citizens under the law, also in every such instance added a subsequent sentence 
or two to the previous language which actually abrogated those very freedoms.  Thus the 
new regime gave the appearance that it was enshrining the liberties which the Habsburg 
state had protected, while in reality it was repealing them.410  A younger Socialist theorist, 
Oskar Pollack, agreed, arguing in 1933 that Dollfuß had already succeeded in overturning 
the work of the Revolution of 1918, the real achievement of the workers’ movement.  
409Ibid, 99-111; “Österreichs Ende,” 127-131; see also Czernetz, 166-167.
410Bauer, “Die Verfassung des Austro-faschismus,” 738-740.
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Pollack charged that the corporatists’ ultimate goal was to turn back the clock of liberty to 
Metterrnich’s reactionary era.411
Bauer even accused the corporatist regime of conspiring to resurrect one of the 
more reprehensible acts of the Monarchy: the so-called Holy Alliance between the 
Habsburg state, Prussia, and Tsarist Russia during the first half of the nineteenth century 
to preserve a conservative order in Europe.  In 1935  Bauer charged that Mussolini, with 
the willing participation of the Ständestaat, was attempting to create a Fascist version of 
the Holy Alliance comprised of Italy, Hungary, and Austria to use as a barrier against Nazi 
expansion in Central Europe.  Bauer argued that a Socialist victory over Austrian Fascism 
would provide a far surer path to European peace than an Italian fascist renewal of old 
aristocratic ideals in a new Holy Alliance.412
In contrast to his intensely negative portrayal of the old Monarchy’s policies, and 
of the attempts by the Ständestaat to emulate or even exceed those policies, Bauer 
presented a vision of the Austrian workers’ movement as the real bearer of progress in 
Austria’s past.  Whereas the old Monarchy and the new authoritarian regime which 
invoked it represented reaction and oppression in Austrian history, the workers, and of 
course their leaders in the Social Democratic Party, had forced the decrepit old aristocratic 
order to move in the direction of liberty and social justice. Contemporary Austrian 
Socialists could be justifiably proud to be the heirs of Viktor Adler’s generation, which 
had fought for universal suffrage, trade unions, and reduced working hours.  Indeed, 
according to Bauer, this same generation of Socialists had chased the Habsburgs from 
411Pollack, “Zwischen Zwei Faschismus,” 276-281.
412Bauer, “Eine Heilige Allianz für Mitteleuropa,” Der Kampf 4 (January 14, 1935): 251-253.
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power in 1918, founding an Austrian Republic based on political freedom and social 
legislation to the benefit of the working class.  Now in more dire straights, Bauer called 
for a “Second Hainfeld” to restore the unity and sense of purpose of the working class 
which Adler first brought together under one banner at the Hainfeld Congress of 1888. 413
Bauer hoped that even the Austrian Communists would join this struggle, and he fervently 
wished that the failed revolution of 1934, like the “glorious” but similarly unsuccessful 
Paris Commune of 1870 or the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905, would be the defeat 
that spurred Austrian workers to ultimate victory.414
Thus, in response to the Ständestaat’s narrative of Austria’s Habsburg past, Bauer 
presented the Social Democrats’ version of Austrian history in which the workers’ 
movement had opposed the reactionary and oppressive Monarchy.  This movement, united 
in the Social Democratic Party by Viktor Adler, had mounted a fifty year campaign to 
fight for basic political and economic liberties, democracy, and social welfare legislation.  
The culmination of this progressive movement was the dismantling of the Monarchy itself, 
and its replacement by the First Republic in 1918.415  Now the Ständestaat was attempting 
to erase those achievements, and the Social Democrats argued that the workers needed to 
rally around the true legacy of Austria history, not merely to restore the status quo of the 
First Republic, but to create a socialist great-German state within a peaceful, socialist 
Europe.
413Bauer, “Zu einem zweiten Hainfeld,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), July, 8 1934, 1-2.
414Bauer,  “Neue Wege zum alten Ziel,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), March 18, 1934, 1-2.
415Bauer, Der Aufstand der österreichischen Arbeiter, 961-963; Pollack, 281; Other Social Democratic 
theorists noted that the other nationalities of the old Monarchy also deserved a fair amount of credit for 
ending the old Monarchy.  For example, Emil Strauß described how democracy in Czechoslovakia was 
relatively stronger than in Austria or Germany in part due to the Czech state’s roots in a progressive “war 
of liberation” against the Habsburg Monarchy.  See Emil Strauß, “Demokratie in der Tschechoslovakei,” 
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With such a goal, the Austrian Socialists presented themselves as the successors to 
a great movement toward progress which had begun in Europe in 1789.  Indeed, the pages 
of Socialist periodicals contained not just approbation for Adler and the Revolution of 
1918, but also invocations of the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, and Marxism in 
general.416  For example, in March of 1933, Der Kampf celebrated the seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the publication of Marx’s Communist Manifesto, featuring numerous 
articles by various theoreticians and commentators on the significance of Marx’s work for 
the proletarian cause in Austria, Germany, and Europe as a whole.417
At the same time, the Socialists felt the need to distance themselves from their 
main political competition for the loyalties of the Austrian working class on the left, the 
Austrian Communist Party.  The Social Democrats criticized the Communists on a number 
of fronts.  First of all, the Austrian Communist Party was affiliated with the Soviet Union, 
which the Socialists regarded with some ambivalence.  Bauer cautiously supported of the 
efforts of the USSR to forge a revolutionary new socialist society in Russia, and 
sympathized with the great difficulties in doing so in the face of the hostility of the 
capitalist and fascist powers of Europe, but he worried about the abuses of democracy and 
workers’ rights in Russia since 1917.418  Kautsky went further, attacking Bolshevism as 
Der Kampf 26 (June, 1933): 252-253.
416Schiller Mamorek, “Robespierre und die Nachwelt,” Der Kampf 26 (February, 1933): 69-79; Heran 
Wendell, “St. Robespierre,” Der Kampf 26  (May, 1933): 226-228; Bauer, “Neue Wege zum alten Ziel,” 1-
2.
417Heinrich Leonard, “Zur Geschichte des Kommunistischen Manifest,” Der Kampf 26 (March/April, 
1933): 171-174; Karl Kautsky, “Marx und seine Schüler,” Der Kampf 26 (March/April, 1933): 155-154; 
Karl Renner, “Marxismus und Anti-Marxismus,” Der Kampf 26 (March/April, 1933): 81-90; Edgar Zisel, 
“Die gesellschaftlicher Wurzeln der romantischen Ideologie,” Der Kampf 26 (March/April, 1933): 154-
164.  See also Bauer, “Friedrich Engels, ein Lehrer unserer Zeit,” Der Kampf 2 (1935): 337-345.
418Bauer, “Der Moskauer Prozeß,”  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), August 30, 1936; “Nach Zwanzig 
Jahren,” Der Kampf  4, No. 11 (1936): 45-57.
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another form of dictatorship which the forces of Social Democracy had to oppose, just like 
National Socialism.  So the Austrian Communist Party’s ties to the Soviet Union were 
problematic at best for the Socialists.419  More disturbing to Bauer, however, was the 
Communist Party’s failure to give aid to, and indeed its readiness to mock, the efforts of 
the Socialists to oppose the Dollfuß regime in their 1934 uprising.420  Such a position, 
along with the Communists’ support for Austrian nationalist sentiment, generally caused 
the Austrian Socialists to regard the KPÖ as an adversary rather than an ally.421
419Kautsky, “Demokratie oder Diktatur,” 45-56.
420“Der Kampf gegen die Nazis in Österreich” Der Kampf 3 (January, 1936), 346-359.
421This rivalry between Marxist factions mirrored the lack of cooperation between Social Democratic and 
Communist Parties all over Europe during the 1920s and early 1930s.  Comintern, the Soviet-dominated 
international Communist organization, did shift its stance in 1934, urging Communists throughout Europe 
to cooperate with Social Democratic and liberal parties in order to prevent the spread of fascism.  This shift 
in policy came too late, however, to offer any opportunity for the Marxist parties in Austria, which had 
already been suppressed by the Ständestaat, to craft a “Popular Front” movement like the one found in 
France during the mid-1930s.  On Comintern policy and the French Popular Front, see Francois Furet, The 
Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999): 209-266.
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Bauer also had to deal with at least one Social Democrat whom he considered an 
apologist for the Habsburg Monarchy: Emil Frankel, a German-speaking Socialist member 
of parliament in Czechoslovakia.  Frankel had published a book in 1935 entitled 
Abendländische Revolution (Revolution in the West) in which he claimed that the roots of 
real Socialism were to be found in the traditions of discipline and organization of the 
Germanic tribes of antiquity as well as in medieval Christianity’s emphasis upon 
neighborly love and human equality.  Frankel held that the old Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation, and the Habsburg dynasty which had held the imperial title for so long, 
had historically encouraged these proto-socialist values.  The rise of capitalism and with it, 
liberalism, however, gradually had eroded such beneficial social ideals.  Bauer argued that 
Frankel was a “Romantic Socialist” of the sort derided by Marx in The Communist 
Manifesto, and he also criticized Fankel for his opposition to Protestantism and Prussia 
and for his sympathies for the old Habsburg Monarchy.  Bauer reiterated that the 
Monarchy had been a repressive, feudalistic force, even if the liberal movement which 
accompanied the rise of capitalism had achieved certain civil and political rights for the 
citizens of Central Europe, rights which Socialists cherished.  Bauer allowed that the 
bourgeois liberal order was not an entirely beneficial development in human history, but 
he asserted that in the Marxist tradition Socialists viewed liberalism as progress from the 
feudal order, and as an important step toward socialist society.  Frankel’s contempt for 
liberalism left him powerless to help Social Democracy defend the achievements of 
political liberalism against the fascists who desired a more noxious form of capitalist 
hegemony.   Ultimately for Bauer, Frankel’s romantic nostalgia for medieval monarchy 
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put him outside the bounds of Marxist orthodoxy.  Indeed, according to Bauer, Frankel 
had more in common with socially-minded conservatives such as Ernst Karl Winter than 
with Social Democracy’s mainstream.  422
Bauer regarded Winter and those like him as almost as grave a threat to Austria as 
the Nazis.  Despite the fact that Winter’s proposals for a restored Habsburg Monarchy 
were never well received by the leaders of the Ständestaat, Bauer apparently thought that 
such a restoration was the ultimate goal of the corporatist regime  According to Bauer, the 
corporatists’ bloody suppression of Marxism in Austria had removed the only  major 
obstacle to the Monarchy’s rebirth.  Bauer argued that the Austrian government was 
completely dominated by a loose coalition of “monarchist-Habsburgist oriented” 
aristocrats, the old “k. und k.” generals who commanded the Heimwehr, and the hierarchy 
of the Church, who had all aspired to make Austria the center of a Catholic imperial 
restoration in Central Europe.  Thus, Bauer asserted that the leaders of the Ständestaat
desired not only to dominate Austria, but also to advance the Catholic cause in Central 
Europe at the expense of Prussian Protestantism, Magyar Calvinism, and democratic rule 
in Czechoslovakia.  This monarchist faction had dynastic designs on those areas, as well 
as on Yugoslavia.  In order to accomplish their goals, conservative forces in Austria, 
which did not have a political ideology per se, were relying an a “surrogate ideology” 
based upon Habsburg traditions, history, and memory, in order to create the basis for their 
dominion.  If such a restoration were to occur, Bauer argued that it would have to include 
Hungary, and Hungary’s revisionist territorial claims would inevitably lead to war with 
422Bauer, “Marxismus oder Romantik?” Der Kampf  3, No. 5 (1936): 119-128.  
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the Little Entente powers which had so recently thrown off the Habsburg yoke.423  Even 
those who merely advocated a Danubian economic federation without Habsburg 
participation were nevertheless “black-gold monarchists,” nursing a reactionary, utopian 
dream.  For Bauer Anschluß was the desire of all of the progressive, democratic and 
socialistic forces in Austria, and any other solution was not acceptable.424
Bauer took pains to rebut the argument that the Western powers and the members 
of the Little Entente, which had collectively dismembered the Monarchy in 1918, would 
never allow a Habsburg restoration to occur.  He argued that those states were currently 
far more concerned with the threat to European peace provided by Nazi Germany than 
with Austria itself.  In addition, the West had devoted its energies to international peace 
and disarmament conferences, and had few resources to use in an intervention in Austrian 
affairs.  Ultimately Bauer thought that the revocation of the laws prohibiting Habsburg 
rule in Austria would, at first, be an internal Austrian concern.  Indeed, he noted that the 
corporatist constitution of 1934 had already repealed some republican laws confiscating 
the property of the old imperial house as well as that of many of the old state’s aristocratic 
families, giving some substance to his fears.425  He warned that the monarchists in Austria 
recognized that their path was relatively open, and were trying to win the support of the 
Austrian people for the restoration through the reintroduction of Habsburg symbols and 
nostalgia for the old Monarchy.  He likewise noted the appeal that legitimists such as 
Winter made to the old Monarchy’s supposed progressive tendencies as well as their 
423Bauer, “Österreich und Europa,” in Otto Bauer, Werkausgabe, vol. 7, 729-732; “Der Sozialismus und 
die deutsche Frage,” 1-9; “Habsburg vor den Toren?” 97-111.
424Bauer, “Österreichs Ende,” 121-131.
425Bauer, “Die Verfassung des Austro-faschismus,” 737-740.
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attempts to present Franz Josef as the benevolent Wahlrechtkaiser who had  introduced 
universal male suffrage and various other social reforms designed to improve the lot of the 
working class to Austria.426
Bauer of course had nothing but contempt for both Winter and his sometime 
corporatist patrons.  He regarded Winter’s proposals for a democratic, “social monarchy” 
as a thinly veiled Trojan horse for the Austrian working class, who would only be 
subjected to a combination of the old Monarchy’s reactionary oppression and the newer 
domineering tendencies of Austrofascism once Otto was restored to the throne.  Such a 
reborn monarchy could never be an effective deterrent to Nazi Germany, and indeed 
would only bring war more rapidly to Central Europe.427  Thus, the Arbeiter-Zeitung in 
Brno noted with approval the anti-Habsburg tenor of working class Austrian protests 
against the Schuschnigg government in 1936: “Neither Hitler nor Habsburg!  Neither 
brown nor black fascism!”428  Bauer summarized the Socialist position concerning the 
Habsburg past with similar succinctness himself in an article in Der Kampf in the same 
year, writing that while the Austrian workers were mortal foes of Nazism, they still 
refused to ally themselves with the “Beelzebub” of the old Habsburg dynasty in order to 
fight the “devil,” Hitler.429
The Austrian Communist Party agreed with the Social Democrats about the 
Habsburg past and the Schuschnigg regime but they made quite a different argument about 
Austrian national identity.  The KPÖ had first been organized in 1918, in the aftermath of 
426Bauer, “Habsburg vor den Toren?,” 97-111.
427Ibid., 107-111; “Der Kampf gegen die Nazi in Österreich,” 346-359.
428Brown was the color of the Nazis’ paramilitary organization, the Sturmabteilung (Stormtroopers), while 
black was the color commonly associated with the Habsburg dynasty and the Austrian conservative 
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the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russian in 1917 and the widespread strikes in 
Vienna which had threatened to topple the Habsburg government.  The Party had been 
founded to advocate Soviet-style armed revolution in the name of the working class, 
behavior which the more reform-minded Austrian Social Democrats had never been 
willing to pursue.  Indeed, the Austrian Communists, like Communists throughout Europe, 
regarded the Social Democracy with intense hostility, and at times seemed more intent on 
attacking their rivals on the left than their adversaries on the right.  Despite the patronage 
of the Soviet government, however, the Austrian Communists lacked significant political 
influence in the First Republic, and were never even able to garner enough electoral 
support to be represented in parliament, let alone mount a broadly based workers’ 
revolution.  Nevertheless, the crackdown by the corporatist government upon the Austrian 
left (indeed, the Communists were the first political faction banned by that regime in May 
of 1933) combined with the economic ravages of the Great Depression and the Nazi 
seizure of power in Germany, prompted a surge in support for the KPÖ.  In the face of the 
authoritarian government’s use of force against the left, the Communists’ activist stance 
was apparently more appealing to many leftist radicals and workers than the relatively 
more passive activities of the Social Democrats.  By all accounts, the KPÖ’s ranks swelled 
throughout the Ständestaat and Nazi periods in Austria, although it is impossible to tell be 
exactly how much, given the illegal status of the Party.  While the Communists’ strength 
certainly never rivaled that of the Socialists, the KPÖ vigorously opposed the corporatist 
regime and became a much more significant force within the Austrian political spectrum 
factions.  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Brno), July, 29 1936.
429Bauer, “Starhembergs Sturz,”  234.
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during the 1930s than it ever had been before.430
Given its close ideological dependence upon the Bolshevik orthodoxy of the Soviet 
Union, the Austrian Communist Party produced few dynamic original thinkers or leaders 
of its own.  One exception to this tendency, however, was the young Party activist and 
theoretician Alfred Klahr.  Klahr, the well-educated child of a poor Viennese Jewish 
family, made a name for himself as the preeminent Austrian Communist theorist of 
Austrian nationhood.  He was involved with Communist organizations from his earliest 
days as a student, and by the time  Dollfuß seized power in 1933, he had become one of 
the Party’s leading figures.  Imprisoned and subsequently released by the corporatist 
regime in 1933, he fled the country to spend the period between 1935 and 1937 as a 
lecturer in Moscow, before moving to Prague to write for the underground Communist 
movement in Austria.  From there, he penned a number of short, but highly influential 
articles in various Communist publications which defined the position of the KPÖ on 
Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past.431
Klahr argued that Austria was its own nation, with a national identity, history, and 
culture, distinct from Germany.  Klahr obviously wrote in the Bolshevik tradition 
concerning nationalism, and based his ideas on Josef Stalin’s Marxism and the National 
430Jelavich, 162-168, 230-231; Goldinger, 25-26; Walter Baier and Winfried R. Garscha, “Vorwart,” in 
Alfred Klahr zur österreichischen Nation, 7- 10; Hans Hautmann, Die verlorne Rätererupublik: Am Bespiel 
der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs (Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1985); Adam 
Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, vol.6 (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 359-360.
431Günther Grabner, “Zur Biographie von Alfred Klahr,” in Alfred Klahr zur österreichischen Nation, 190-
195; Klahr was not the only Party member to advocate Austrian indepence and nationhood. For similar but 
less systematic statements from Austrian Communists in 1937 and 1938, see Johann Koplenig, “Nationaler 
Kampf gegen die drohende Annexation;” idem, “Die nationale-fortschrittliche Bedeutung des 
Unabhängigkeitskampfs;” Erwin Zucker-Schilling, “Grundlagen und Aufgaben der 
Unabhängigkeitskampfes;” Ernst Fischer, “Die Entwicklung des österreichischen Volkes nach 1866,” in 
Die Kommunisten im Kampf für die Unabhängigkeit Österreichs (Vienna: Stern Verlag, 1955), 13-25, 45-
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Question (which, fittingly enough, had been written during the future Soviet dictator’s 
brief residency in Vienna in 1912).   Klahr argued that Stalin had been the thinker who 
had really defined the concept of the nation according to the terms of true “Marxist 
historical materialism.”  This materialistic definition identified territory, language, 
economic and political development, culture, and historical circumstances as the 
fundamental components of nationhood, and provided the ideological foundation for the 
cultural autonomy which the Soviet Union had allowed its constituent nationalities during 
the 1920s and 1930s.432  Klahr argued that too many Austrians had mistakenly equated the 
nation with a mere community of language, or a vaguely defined notion of culture, and 
had thus ignored the other key elements of national belonging in order to classify 
Austrians as Germans.  While language was indeed a keystone of nationality, Klahr 
asserted it was not itself sufficient to define a nation apart from other more decisive 
factors such as culture and history, as evidenced by the examples of Switzerland and the 
USA.  Klahr was particularly interested in rebutting Bauer’s ideas of national identity, 
which he argued were “idealistic,” “unhistorical,” and therefore “thoroughly un-
Marxist.”433  Indeed, Klahr argued that the Austrian working class, despite Bauer’s claims, 
had never really felt itself to be German, and had been at best “indifferently cool” toward 
the prospect of Anschluß, even in 1918.434  Of course, Klahr’s Stalinist definition of 
44.
432Josef Stalin, Marxismus und nationale Frage (Vienna: Stern-Verlag, 1949), 10-11; Schlomo Avineri, 
“Marxism and Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History 26, No. 3/4 (September, 1991): 653-654; 
Heinz Gärtner, ed., Zwischen Moskau und Österreich: die KPÖ, Analyse einer sowjetabhängigen Partei
(Vienna : Braumüller, 1979).
433Alfred Klahr, “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich (I).” Weg und Ziel. Monatschrift für Theorie und 
Praxis des Marximus-Leninismus 2, no. 3 (1937):126-133.
434Klahr, “Die nationale Frage und die Stellungnahme der Kommunisten in Österreich,” in Alfred Klahr zur 
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nationhood was not in fact dramatically different from that of Bauer, who also emphasized 
the significance of culture and historical experience.435  In the end, the decisive difference 
between the Communist and Austromarxist conceptions of Austrian national identity lay 
not in their theoretical approach, but rather in the opposing conclusions which each faction 
reached about Austrian Germanness.  Ultimately, the Communists’ proclamations of 
Austrian nationhood probably depended more upon the Soviet Union’s increasingly 
desperate efforts during the mid-1930s to contain the threat of Nazi Germany than they 
did upon genuine nationalistic or patriotic sentiment.  It was simpler for Stalin and his 
clients in the KPÖ to fight Anschluß by denying Austrian Germanness that it was for them 
to oppose such an expansion of Nazi influence in Central Europe while maintaining that 
Austrians were still in some sense part of the German Volk.
Klahr did allow that there had certainly been a relationship in the past between 
Austria and Germany.  Indeed, his ideas displayed the same sense of ambiguity which 
plagued the work of even the most “Austrianist” of national theorists, as he grappled with 
the question of whether or not Austria had at some point in the past been part of the 
German nation.  Klahr seemed to affirm that at one point there had at least been the 
potential for Austria and Germany to be part of the same nation, and he admitted that 
Austria had participated in the nineteenth-century drive toward German unity.  Yet he 
argued that the failure of Austria to unite with Germany proper during that era had had the 
effect of encouraging the development of  a distinctive Austrian national consciousness. 
He also asserted that Austria had never really been an actual part of Germany in the past, 
but had always been oriented toward its own concerns, which were different than those of 
435Avineri, 652-653.
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northern German-speakers.  Klahr also vigorously disputed the notion, advanced by 
Bauer, that German unity, as a bourgeois project, was a necessary first step toward a 
proletarian revolution, which allegedly had to follow the historical stages outlined by 
Marx.  Klahr argued that the working class could adapt to contemporary circumstances, 
and that the separate historical paths of Germany and Austria during the nineteenth 
century had served to solidify the differences in character which had already existed due to 
Austria’s particular culture.436
Indeed, Klahr believed that 1848 had been the decisive year in the final separation 
between Germany and Austria.  It was at that point when the unification of all the 
German-speakers of Europe had been a real possibility.  There had been three options for 
those who pursued such a project.  The first, which Klahr termed the only “real 
großdeutsch path,” involved the unification of all German Stämme in a democratic, 
republican, progressive great-German state, a move which would have allowed the other 
nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy to pursue their own republican interests 
separately.   The remaining options, which Klahr termed the kleindeutsch-great-Prussian, 
and the great-Austrian paths, respectively, would have seen the partial unification of 
various parts of Germany and the Habsburg state under the reactionary hegemony of either 
the Hohenzollerns or the Habsburgs.  Klahr asserted that history had taken the path it had 
because the bourgeois classes in both Germany and Austria had allied themselves with 
reactionary interests rather than with the progressive goals of the working class, which on 
its own still was too weak too accomplish democratic unification.  The defeat of Austria 
436 Klahr, “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich (II),” Weg und Ziel 2, no. 3 (1937):173-181; “Gegen der 
Pangermanismus in die Arbeiterbewegung,” Weg und Ziel 4, No. 1, (1939): 3-4.
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by Prussia in1866 had thus represented a triumph for reaction, as the way was cleared for 
a Prussian, kleindeutsch solution to the German problem.437
Writing in the months following the March 1938 Anschluß with Nazi Germany, 
Klahr argued that the Nazi’s success in forging a great-German state at gunpoint
represented the bitter fruits of the selfishness and abandonment of the appropriate 
progressive historical mission of both the Austrian and German middle classes.  Yet Klahr 
also noted that in 1848 the Austrian farmers had shown a burgeoning progressive 
consciousness which he hoped ultimately would prove useful in forming a modern 
coalition of progressive interests in Austria to combat Nazi domination and win back 
Austrian independence.  According to Klahr, the real progressive path in 1938 involved 
support for Austrian independence and self-determination, which was inextricably linked 
to the independence of the other states of the Danubian region.  He viewed Bauer’s 
continuing support for a union of the “entire German people” even after the Anschluß as 
serving the interests of Nazi Germany.  Such rhetoric could not advance the cause of 
socialism if it played so directly into Hitler’s hands. Klahr compared the promise of March 
of 1848 to the tragedy of March of 1938, and proclaimed his faith in the future victory of 
the Austrian working class with the hopeful statement that,  “All Marches have not yet 
come.”438   Interestingly, however, Klahr did allow in other writings that someday 
Austrians might voluntarily choose to join Germany, albeit never under the auspices of 
437Klahr, “März 1848- März 1938- Noch sind nicht alle Märzen vorbei” Weg und Ziel, 3, no. 3/4 
(March/April, 1938): 138-139
438Ibid., 134-141; Klahr, “Zur Diskussion über die Annexion” Weg und Ziel 3 No. 8 (August, 1938): 304-
314.
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fascist oppression.439  Thus, even though Klahr was among the most forceful proponents of 
his time of the existence of a distinctive Austrian national identity, he still displayed some 
lingering notion of a national kinship between Germans and Austrians. 
Klahr and the Austrian Communist Party firmly opposed not just the Austrian 
Social Democrats and the National Socialists, but also the Ständestaat.  For him, the 
corporatist state was clearly fascist, and he denounced the authoritarian government for its 
suppression of the workers’ movement.  He also inveighed against the government’s 
portrayal of the old Habsburg state as a benevolent institution.  On this matter at least, 
Klahr was in full agreement with Bauer.  He argued that the old Monarchy had been a 
force of oppression, and the corporatist regime was merely demonstrating the reactionary 
roots of the new Austrian order by invoking the Habsburg legacy.  The old Monarchy had 
invariably stood against the forces of progress, whether by opposing the peasant revolts of 
1526 and 1626, or by stifling the more recent uprisings by the working class in 1848 and 
1918.440  He also disputed the claims of the Ständestaat’s leaders that the dynasty had been 
sympathetic to the interests and demands of the state’s various nationalities, proclaiming 
that “the Habsburgs are equally foreign to, and equally the enemies of all nations, and 
stand as the oppressors of all nations, including that of German Austrians. Therefore, 
‘never [again] will the fate of Austria be united with the Habsburg crown.’”441  According 
to Klahr, any steps toward progress in terms of democracy, social justice, or national 
rights had occurred despite the efforts of the dynasty, and what little had been achieved in 
439 Klahr, “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich (II),” 173-181; “Österreichs Freiheitskampf und die deutsche 
Revolution,” in Alfred Klahr zur österreichischen Nation, 95-109.
440Klahr, “Die nationale Frage und die Stellungnahme der Kommunisten in Österreich,” 55-56.
441Klahr, “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich (II),” 176.
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those matters had come through the brave efforts of the working class and the freedom 
fighters of the subject nations. 442
Klahr, like Bauer, feared that the ultimate aim of the corporatist regime was to 
restore a Habsburg to the throne, and to create a reactionary, south German, Catholic 
monarchy in Central Europe.  He argued that any claims that a new dynastic state would 
be a “social Volksmonarchie,” were merely attempts by monarchist agitators to seduce the 
working class into permitting the return of a noxious institution which had devoted 
centuries of effort to stifling progress and justice in the region.  Indeed, at times, Klahr 
was willing to characterize the old dynasty and its successors in the Ständestaat as part of 
the same reactionary movement as National Socialism.  Klahr argued that “the 
[Communist] Party sets the propaganda of proletarian internationalism against the 
chauvinism of the Habsburg and Hitler agitators, and sets the solidarity of the struggle of 
the Austrian Volk with the anti-fascist forces in Germany and neighboring states against 
Schuschnigg and Habsburg, Hilter and Mussolini.”443  Yet, in general, Klahr and the 
Austrian Communist Party were frequently more realistic in their stance than the Social 
Democrats, and despite this rhetoric, Klahr proclaimed that Austrian workers were willing 
to help the Schuschnigg regime oppose the Nazi threat.444
Thus, Klahr presented on the behalf of the KPÖ an interpretation of the Habsburg 
past which was remarkably similar to that of Bauer and the Social Democrats.  Both 
factions within the Austrian left agreed that the old Monarchy had been an oppressive 
442Ibid, 175-176; Klahr, “Die nationale Frage und die Stellungnahme der Kommunisten in Österreich,” 55-
56.
443Klahr, “Die nationale Frage und die Stellungnahme der Kommunisten in Österreich,” 55.
444Ibid., 45-47.
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force, which had been opposed by the true agents of progress in Austrian history, and 
especially by the working class, once it developed during the nineteenth century.  Klahr 
used this vision of Austria’s past to make a strikingly different argument concerning 
Austrian national identity, however, as he asserted that Austrians were not Germans, and 
possessed their own distinctive history and culture which ought to preclude any thought of 
Anschluß.  Klahr of course was no more successful then Bauer when it came to actually 
preventing the forcible unification of Austria and the Third Reich in 1938, and he was 
murdered at the Nazi extermination camp at Auschwitz in 1944.  Still, Klahr’s convictions 
concerning Austrian national identity provided a template for the Austrian Communist 
movement’s official views after his death, and he stands with Winter as a figure whose 
ideas would resonate more strongly in Austria during the era of the Second Republic than 
in his own time.445
Thus, although the leaders of the Ständestaat were successful in restricting the 
public debate concerning Austrian national identity and the meaning of the Habsburg past, 
they were not able to suppress it completely.  Individual Austrian conservatives and the 
leaders of the illegal Austrian left still could advance opinions about Austrian identity and 
the appropriate lessons of Austria’s history that differed significantly from the official 
view.  Still, the corporatist government held an impressive advantage in its competition 
between these alternative viewpoints due to the fact that it controlled the entire legal and 
state apparatus in Austria.  This was an advantage which the leaders of the Ständestaat put 
to good use between 1933 and 1938.  One area of state power which those leaders put to 
445Grabner, 190-195.  For discussions of the enduring influence of Klahr’s ideas, see Baier and Grascha, 7-
10; Michel Cullen, “E. K. Winter, A. Klahr et des origines de la culture politique de la seconde 
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particular use was the government’s domination of the Austrian educational system.  
During the time which it was in power, the corporatist regime used the educational system 
to advance its views about Austrian nationhood and the meaning of Austrian history.  It is 
to these efforts in transforming education in Austria into an outlet for corporatist 
propaganda that we now turn.
République,” Austraica (July, 1978): 171-184.
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Chapter 4.  Education and the Habsburg Past in the Ständestaat
The leaders of the Austrian Ständestaat knew that they were facing an uphill battle 
when it came to building popular support for their government and its official ideology.  
Despite their claims to represent the interests and ideals of the majority of the Austrian 
population, the leaders of the corporatist regime had been forced to seize power because 
they were unable to cement a durable and stable majority under the First Republic’s 
parliamentary system.  The fact that the corporatist government moved within the first year 
of its existence to outlaw the Austrian National Socialist, Communist, and Social 
Democratic Parties amounted to an implicit admission of the fact that it lacked broad 
support from the Austrian population.  The Ständestaat thus mounted an intensive campaign 
of public propaganda to convince Austrians of the legitimacy of the new corporatist order.  
They crafted a vision of a religiously Christian, culturally German, and Western Austrian 
state anchored in the history of the old Habsburg Monarchy.
The corporatist government was not content merely to rely upon public propaganda 
and the restriction of dissent, however.  The Ständestaat also looked to the state educational 
system as a vital means of insuring that Austrian children would be molded into a generation 
of mature Austrian patriots loyal to corporatist ideals and willing to defend Austrian 
independence.  Thus, the corporatist government embarked upon a series of ambitious 
reforms of Austrian education which sought to indoctrinate Austrian students with the 
regime’s official views concerning patriotism, government, social organization, and religion, 
as well as with its cultural conception of Austrian Germanness and its reverence for the 
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Habsburg Monarchy and its legacy.  These reforms included new provisional and, in 1935, 
heavily revised official curricula for education, as well as new laws concerning the behavior 
of teachers and students in the classrooms, and revised standards for textbooks to be used in 
the Austrian school system.  This flurry of reforms was also accompanied by vigorous 
discussion within the Austrian pedagogical community concerning how best to implement 
the regime’s vision of Austrian education.446
It is unsurprising given the manner in which the Ständestaat attempted to ground its 
legitimacy in Austria’s Habsburg past that policy makers and educators focused most 
intently upon history education.  The regime’s new educational laws and curricula 
emphasized historical instruction as one of the most important means of helping Austrian 
students to internalize official views concerning Austria’s traditions and special character 
and calling.  Austria’s pedagogical theorists likewise focused upon history education as a 
crucial tool in achieving the government’s educational goals, and by the last years of the 
corporatist regime’s existence a new series of history textbooks and readers had begun to 
appear which reflected the official view of Austria’s past.  Ultimately, the Ständestaat was 
not successful in preserving Austrian independence in the face Nazi Germany’s nationalist 
expansionism, and it is indeed unlikely the government’s educational reforms had enough 
time to effect any appreciable ideological change in the Austrian population.447  Yet the 
446On the efforts of the Ständestaat to reform Austrian education, see Carla Esden-Tempska, “Civic 
Education in Authoritarian Austria, 1934-1938,” History of Education Quarterly 30 (Summer 1990):187-
211; R. John Rath, “Training for Citizenship, Austrian Style,” Journal of Central European Affairs 3 
(April, 1943): 132-140; Ernst Papanek, The Austrian School Reform: Its Bases, Principles and 
Developments– The Twenty Years Between the Two World Wars (New York:Frederick Fell, Inc., 1962), 
107-116; Michael J. Zeps, Education and the Crisis of the Fist Republic (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1987), 167-186.
447Carla Esden-Tempska argues that the corporatist regime had largely failed to inspire patriotism and 
loyalty to the government in the Austrian population by the time of the 1938 Anschluß.  She asserts that 
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corporatist government was at least successful in achieving an impressive shift in the content 
of Austrian history education in a relatively short period.  By the end of Austrian 
independence in March of 1938, the state’s educational system did indeed, on an official 
level at least, reflect the ideals of the corporatist leadership.448  More importantly, the 
Ständestaat’s efforts to reform the content of Austria’s education clearly foreshadowed the 
Second Republic’s own efforts after 1945 to present a view of history in schools which 
this failure was due to the regimet’s equivocation between Austrian patriotism and German cultural 
nationalism, a position which did not present a clear enough argument concerning why Anschluß with 
Germany was undesirable.  The fact that so many Austrians warmly greeted the Anschluß with Germany 
seems to confirm her argument, but it is still worth noting how little time (a mere five years) the 
Ständestaat had in order to attempt to achieve a substantial transformation of Austrian public opinion.  As 
Esden-Temska admits, it is simply impossible to tell with any certainty whether or not the government’s 
educational reforms were too inherently flawed to achieve their goals, or if they might have been more 
effective had they be given more time.  Esden-Tempska does not deal with the role which invocations of 
the Habsburg past played in the Ständestaat’s educational reforms  Esden-Tempska, 187-188, 210-211.
448The matter of whether such reforms were actually faithfully implemented by Austrian teachers is of 
course a different issue. The scholar of Austrian education during the Nazi era, Herbert Dachs, notes that a 
significant number of Austrian students and teachers embraced National Socialism and anti-Austrianist 
German nationalism during the era of the Ständestaat, despite the official stance of the Austrian 
educational system.  As we shall see, a number of the corporatist regime’s own laws and statements seem 
to indicate that the system did suffer from significant opposition from within the ranks of Austrian 
teachers.  Still, in terms of actual policy and the official content of instruction, by 1938 the regime had 
succeeded in transforming Austrian education.  See Herbert Dachs, “Schule und Jugenderziehung in der 
‘Ostmark,’” in  in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938-1945, Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang
Neugebauer, eds. (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1998), 239.
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emphasized Austria’s national distinctiveness.
i. The Ständestaat’s Educational Reforms 
From the very beginning of the new order in Austria, the Ständestaat’s leaders 
argued that education was central to their goal to raise a generation of Austrians which 
would be patriotic, Christian, and loyal to the corporatist government.  Dollfuß proclaimed 
on a number of occasions that the children of Austria were the state’s greatest treasure and 
that it was vital for them to be educated in manner which helped them to love their 
Fatherland and to be willing to defend it.  Indeed, Dollfuß argued that education was a 
matter of the state’s very existence.449  Schuschnigg, a former Minister of Education, 
likewise repeatedly emphasized education’s critical importance for Austria’s survival both 
before and after he became the state’s leader.450  Such breathless proclamations concerning 
the need for appropriate education were not confined to the Ständestaat’s leadership.  Robert 
Krassner, an Austrian pedagogical theorist and teacher, for example, also warned that the 
correct sort of education was not just a matter of producing knowledgeable Austrian adults, 
but was rather a question of life or death for the Austrian state.451
All of the leaders of the Ständestaat agreed that religion was a crucial element in 
their efforts to transform the state’s educational system.  The Catholic character of the new 
order had been enshrined in the new constitution and concordat of 1934, and the government 
449Engelbert Dollfuß, “Worte des Kanzler Dollfuß,” Die Österreichische Schule, österreichische 
Monatsheft für pädagogische Forschung und Bildung, 12 (1935): 403;  “An die Jugend Oesterreichs,” in 
Dollfuß an Oesterreich, Eines Mannes Wort und Ziel, ed. Edmund Weber (Vienna: Reinhold-Verlag, 
1935), 245-252.
450Kurt von Schuschnigg, “Geleitwort,” Die Österreichische Schule, 11 (1934): 153-154; “Führer-Worte 
zur österreichischen Schulen,”  Die Österreichische Schule 12 (1936): 1-3.
451Robert Krasser, “Ständestaat und Schule.  Grundsätzliches zur österreichischen Schulererneuerung,”  
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sought to make sure that this religious viewpoint was reflected in its educational reforms.  
Thus, the Ministry of Education once again made religious education compulsory for 
Catholic children, just as it had been in the Monarchy.  Despite its strong emphasis upon 
Austria’s Catholic character, the Ständestaat did not restrict or persecute Austria’s religious 
minorities to any significant degree.  The Ministry did , however, require that children of 
these faiths receive religious instruction in their own respective religious traditions.  More 
importantly, the regime made it clear that religion was not restricted only to actual religious 
education courses; rather, it was an integral part of all Austrian education, to be studied in 
history and patriotic education classes as well.452  Dollfuß himself proclaimed that it was a 
betrayal of Austria’s children to give them a purely secular education without any references 
to a higher power and to their responsibility to their community, as the First Republic 
allegedly had done.  He asserted that religious education was a necessity for the new 
Austrian order.453
Just as important to the leaders of the Ständestaat as religious education was the idea 
that Austrian schools should inculcate students with a love for their Austrian Fatherland.  A 
January 8, 1934 decree in the official journal of the Austrian Ministry of Education, 
Verordnungsblatt für den Dienstbereich des Bundesministeriums für Unterricht, stated that 
the Austrian state was responsible for transmitting the ideals of both the “Fatherland” and 
the Catholic religion to students, and subsequent educational laws demonstrated that 
Schriften des Pädagogischen Institutes der Stadt Wien 7 (1935): 4.
452Esden-Tempska, 193-195; “Religiöse Ubungen an den Mittelschulen und an den Lehrer- und 
Lehrerinnenbildungsanstalten,” Verordnungsblatt für den Dienstbereich des Bundesministeriums für 
Unterricht  (January 8,1934): 6; “Vaterländische Erziehung der Jugend; Beitritt der Lehrer zur 
Vaterländischen Front,”  Verordnungsblatt (January 8,1934): 7.
453Dollfuß, “Das neue Oesterreich,” in Dollfuß an Oesterreich, 28-29. 
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corporatist leaders took this obligation quite seriously.454  The final revisions to the state’s 
official educational curricula in 1935 proclaimed these goals openly, stating that Austrian 
children were to be educated to “feel, think, and act in a manner which was religious-moral, 
social, and true to the Volk.”455  The new Austrian educational guidelines emphasized love of 
Heimat, Fatherland, and the Austrian people, and it glorified Austrian contributions to both 
German culture and the culture of the world.  Such an education also sought to give Austrian 
children a sense of social solidarity with their fellow citizens at the same time as it urged 
obedience to the law and the transcendence of Marxist class conflict.456
As a means to this end, the regime placed patriotic symbols in Austrian schools and 
urged both teachers and students to join its patriotic Fatherland Front.  In 1934, every school 
had to create its own flag in order to affirm its allegiance to the Fatherland.  These flags 
might display either the traditional symbols and colors of the individual province in which 
the school was located, or those of the state as a whole, but the emphasis of the law was 
clearly upon the patriotic value which might be attached to such banners.  The regime also 
required Austrian teachers to wear the insignia of the Fatherland Front, and indeed, in 1936, 
the Ministry saw fit to remind Austrian educators that only official patriotic insignias 
produced with the approval of the government were permitted, and that unofficial 
454“Vaterländische Erziehung der Jugend; Beitritt der Lehrer zur Vaterländischen Front,” Verordnungsblatt 
(January 8,1934): 7.
455It is impossible to tell from the context of this statement whether it intended to refer to the Austrian Volk 
or the German Volk.  Given the Ständestaat’s insistence that Austrians were both part of the German Volk
and a distinctive group in their own right, this ambiguous language may well have been intentional.  
“Lehrplan für die österreichischen Hauptschulen,” Verordnungsblatt (June, 1935): 68-69; “Lehrplan für 
die Mittelschulen,” Verordnungsblatt (July, 1935): 124-125.
456“Lehrplan für die österreichischen Hauptschulen,” 68-69;  “Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 124-125; 
Mittelschulen, neue Lehrpläne, übergangs maßnahmen,” Verordnungsblatt (July, 1935): 531.
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reproductions of such insignias were expressly proscribed.457  In a 1934 statement clearly 
directed against the Austrian Nazis, the government likewise prohibited student membership 
in any “anti-Fatherland” groups, and warned teachers that they were not allowed to 
disseminate any “anti-Austrian propaganda” in classrooms.458  In 1937, the Ministry of 
Education even went so far as to restrict state financial aid at the university level to students 
who were demonstrably loyal to Austria and its government.  Taken collectively, these 
measures certainly testify not only to the Ständestaat’s efforts to inspire loyalty in its 
schools, but also to the fact that the regime thought that disloyalty to the regime was a 
persistent problem there as well.459
Beyond such broad patriotic and religious goals, the new curricula which the regime 
introduced were explicitly designed to reverse many of the educational changes which had 
been instituted by left-leaning educational officials during the First Republic.  Perhaps the 
most significant reversal was the Ständestaat’s abandonment of the First Republic’s attempt 
to create a somewhat more unified and egalitarian school system, a project which had long 
been unpopular among the conservatives who now completely dominated the Austrian state.  
The Ständestaat now returned to the Monarchy’s old system, which tracked students into 
academic or vocational education relatively early in their academic careers.  As we have 
seen, the Ständestaat likewise restored the education system’s previous emphasis upon 
457“Vaterländische Erziehung in der Schule,” Verordnungsblatt (July 7, 1934): 152-3; “Vaterländische 
Erziehung der Jugend; Beitritt der Lehrer zur Vaterländischen Front,” 7; “Vaterländisches 
Schülerabzeichen,” Verordnungsblatt (October 28, 1936): 135.
458“Vaterländische Erziehung der Jugend; Beitritt der Lehrer zur Vaterländischen Front,” Verordnungsblatt 
(January 8,1934): 8.
459“Studiengeberührenbegünstigungen an den Hochschulen, vaterlandstreues Verhalten als 
Voraussetzung,” Verordnungsblatt (February 15, 1937): 15.
293
religious education.460  The new educational guidelines also drew a clear distinction between 
male and female students, arguing that Austrian girls should be educated with an eye toward 
their future as Austrian mothers and homemakers, leaving such subjects as gymnastics, 
geometry, and pre-military education to the boys.  The government’s new educational 
framework was thus designed to reverse the First Republic’s policies, and to return Austrian 
education to its pre-1918 form.  Moreover, the Ständestaat infused Austrian education with 
its own ideology in order to transform students into loyal Austrian patriots and supporters of 
the regime.461
After the introduction of the new state educational curricula in 1935, the corporatist 
Ministry of Education also sought to revise the textbooks used in Austrian classrooms.  In a 
December decree, the Ministry reminded teachers of their duty not to use textbooks which 
worked against the goals of Austria’s new educational guidelines, or which had been 
prohibited by the government.  It also required them to abandon previous editions of texts, 
revisions of which had since been approved by the state.  The Ministry singled out history 
textbooks for special scrutiny since history was central to building student patriotism.  The 
decree exempted arithmetic texts and German and foreign language readers from the need 
for specific approval.  At the end of each issue of the Ministry’s published journal of 
educational decrees, a list appeared of new texts and teaching materials  which had been 
460“Die neuen Lehrpläne für die Abschlussklassen der Volkschule und für die Hauptschule,” 
Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 915-916; For a discussion of education during the First Republic, see 
chapter 2  and Papanek, 46-106; Zeps, 25-166.
461“Lehrplan für die österreichischen Hauptschulen,” 69-70; “Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 131.  
Private schools in Austria, most of which were religious, also had to comply with state curricula and 
regulations involving instructional materials in order to obtain accreditation.  See “Verordnung der 
Bundesregierung vom 23. März 1934, betreffend die Mittelschulen,” in Lehrplan für die Abschlussklassen 
der Volksschule und die Hauptschule, ed. Anton Simonic (Vienna and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlag für 
Jugend und Volk, 1935), 6-7.
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approved by the government.   The Ministry also cautioned teachers that only educational 
materials produced in Austria, including maps, were permitted in Austrian classrooms.462
Such laws once again provide testimony to the fear of the corporatist government that its 
official standards for education would be subverted by teachers who disagreed with the 
regime’s stance on Austrian national identity.
In terms of content, the new educational system which the Ständestaat created 
introduced a number of new policies.  Concerning national identity, the Ministry of 
Education avowed that there was no opposition between Austrianness and Germanness, but 
rather proclaimed that the two qualities were complimentary.463  Such a declaration was 
certainly in keeping with the views of the state’s leaders that Austria was a German state.  
Yet at the same time, the regime moved to introduce material into Austrian education which 
emphasized the positive aspects of Austria as a particularly worthy German land.  Such an 
emphasis necessarily required the Austrian educational system to eliminate its previous 
focus upon the German Reich, especially given the Nazi domination of Germany after 1933.  
For example, in 1934, the Ministry announced that classes in civics would no longer present 
students with a detailed discussion of both the Austrian and German federal constitutions, 
but would rather give a brief historical overview only of Austria’s constitutional 
development, no doubt pending the regime’s efforts to craft a more suitable constitutional 
document to reflect its own authoritarian and patriotic ideals.464  With the implementation of 
462“Lehrbücher an allen dem Bundesministerium für Unterricht unterstehenden Schulen,” 
Verordnungsblatt (September, 1935): 575-6; “Verordnung der Bundesregierung vom 23. März 1934, 
betreffend die Mittelschulen,” in Lehrplan für die Abschlussklassen der Volksschule und die Hauptschule, 
5; “Noch immer antiösterreichische Schulbücher!” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (May 5, 1935): 
120; “Anbot nicht approbierter ausländischer Lehrmittel,” Verordnungsblatt (December 1, 1936): 205.
463Verordnungsblatt (January 8,1934): 7.
464“Bürgerkundlicher Unterricht an Mittel- und Hauptschulen,” Verordnungsblatt (February 6, 1934): 34.
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that new constitution in 1934 and the new official educational curricula in 1935, the 
corporatist government established its position on how Austrian Germanness would be 
reflected in the Austrian educational system.  The new curriculum for Mittelschulen
provided the most comprehensive statement on this issue.  The introduction to this document 
avowed that Austrian students needed to learn about the Austrian contribution to German 
culture and to the German Volk as a whole, but at the same time underlined the 
government’s desire for children to gain an appreciation of Austrians as a “special group” of 
Germans.  The same document also explicitly cast the Austrian Mittelschulen within the 
long Western tradition of humanistic education, and proclaimed Austria’s dedication to 
Western civilization, which linked it not only to Germany, but also to England, France and 
Italy.465  Thus, the curriculum reflected the regime’s ideas concerning an Austria which was 
culturally German, but also part of Western Christendom, and unique in its own right.
German language instruction in Austrian schools represented an area of some 
difficulty for the regime in terms of its ideals of Austrian nationhood.  Such difficulties were 
unsurprising given the fact that the German language was one of the topics which Austrian 
“Germanist” nationalists emphasized in order to argue that Austrians were Germans who 
were destined one day to join a great-German state.  The Provisional Curriculum for 
Austrian Hauptschulen for the 1934/1935 school year set forth guidelines for the study of 
the German language which recommended that students be exposed to old Germanic folk 
tales and sagas, and especially those which described life in Austria.   Yet the Ministry of 
Education was also careful to warn teachers not to include nationalistic German propaganda 
when they taught folklore, and recommended that instructors instead focus purely on matters 
465“Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 125-7.
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of grammar and linguistic style.466  Such a warning seems to indicate that the Ministry 
suspected that German language classes were in fact being used to spread nationalistic ideas 
which were at odds with the government’s desire for Austrian independence.  Interestingly, 
the 1935 curriculum for Mittelschulen made a special point of reserving instruction about the 
history and culture of Austria’s earliest Germanic forebears mostly to German language 
classrooms.  The curriculum ordered history teachers to present only a brief overview, 
leaving detailed presentations on such more folkloric topics to German language instructors.  
Thus, Austrian German language classes included material which history education in Nazi 
Germany emphasized, while actual history courses in Austrian schools focused on the 
classical Greek, Roman, and Christian roots of Austria’s history, a focus which was 
certainly more in line with the official ideology of the Ständestaat.467
Indeed, the government concentrated on history education especially closely, and 
designed the new guidelines for the teaching of history to disseminate the Ständestaat’s 
ideals of Austrian distinctiveness.  The new curricula, again taking history education before 
1918 as their guide, heavily weighted history classes toward political and military matters, 
portraying the old Habsburg Monarchy as the bearer of a special sort of Germanness which 
defined Austria’s continuing role in the contemporary world.  The provisional curricula for 
all Austrian schools for the 1934/1935 school year recommended that historical instruction 
begin the narrative of Austrian history in Roman antiquity, emphasizing the development 
and expansion of Christianity.  Instruction on Austria itself began with the founding of the 
466“Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Hauptschulen,” Volkserziehung, 
Nachrichten des Österreichischen Unterrichtesamtes, official section (August 15, 1927): 
130.“Vaterländische Erziehung in der Schule,” Verordnungsblatt (July 7, 1934): 152-3.  For an overview 
of historical instruction in Nazi Germany, see Chapter 5.
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Ostmark, and included descriptions of the lives of the various Babenberg and Habsburg 
monarchs, as well as the biographies of the “great men” of the Austrian past.  The curricula 
also described the origins of Austria’s red-white-red flag during the Babenbergs’ 
participation in the crusades, highlighting the historical link between dynastic rule in Austria 
and Christianity.468
The official revised curricula of 1935 discussed history education in more detail.  
The new guidelines for all levels of Austrian education certainly emphasized Austrian topics 
to greater degree than those of the First Republic, but they also maintained a certain focus 
upon German historical topics as well.  For example the new curricula listed “The 
Christianization of the Germans,” and “The German City in the Middle Ages” as important 
themes.  Likewise, they urged teachers to present Austrian children with a description of the 
Austrian contributions to the German Volk and culture.  On the other hand, the curricula 
enjoined teachers to make a special effort to acquaint students with the achievements and 
personalities of “great Austrians” in order to awaken in them a love of the Austrian 
Fatherland.  The curricula described the time of the Turkish siege of Vienna as “Austria’s 
heroic age,” and emphasized the heroism of Austrian soldiers during the Napoleonic wars 
and World War I.  They also highlighted Austria’s musical tradition and contributions to 
Baroque art and culture as areas for specific focus within history education.  The curriculum 
for Gymnasien, the elite secondary schools that focused on the classics, placed a particular 
emphasis upon Austria as part of Western Civilization dating back to the Roman era, an 
467“Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 170.
468“Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Hauptschulen.” 130-134.  “Vorläufiger 
Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Mittelschulen, gültig für das Schuljahr 1934/1935,”
Verordnungsblatt (May 18, 1934): 85; “Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die Abschlußklasse an Volkschulen, 
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emphasis which was present, but less explicitly defined in the curricula for the other 
Austrian secondary schools.469  Even in the Austrian Handelsakademien (business schools), 
institutions in which history education focused almost totally upon economic history, the 
new curricular framework briefly discussed how trade had served the Fatherland throughout 
history, and how history education might strengthen patriotic sentiment among commercial 
students.470
One particular innovation which the Ständestaat initiated in education involved the 
transformation of the class in Staatsbürgerkunde (civics) in the oldest cohort of  Mittelschule
students into a course in Vaterlandskunde (patriotic education).  The civics course in the 
First Republic had generally focused on topics such as Austria’s constitution, administrative 
structure, and legal system.  The new class was much more overtly ideological, however, 
and sought to transform the brightest Austrian students into proud patriots.  There was 
considerable overlap in subject matter between Vaterlandskunde and history and geography, 
but the former explicitly lauded Austria’s special character and great qualities.  Indeed, the 
guidelines for instruction in Vaterlandskunde amounted to a restatement of the Ständestaat’s 
views concerning the “Austrian mission,” even employing the term “mission” in describing 
Austria’s role in the contemporary world.  This program of study cast Austria as the 
defender of Europe against eastern invasions throughout history, describing it as “the 
borderland of Germany against the east”, “a supporter of Catholic culture,” and “a bulwark 
against the [Islamic] crescent.”  The Babenbergs and Habsburgs emerged as benevolent 
gültig für das Schuljahr 1934/1935,” Verordnungsblatt (June 18, 1934): 120.
469“Lehrplan für die österreichischen Hauptschulen,” 82-84; “Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,”168-170, 
259-262; 341-347, 407-409; “Lehrplan für die Abschlußklassen,” 452-3.
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ruling dynasties which had helped create a state which had always defended the West 
against outside threats.  The curricula particularly lauded the Habsburgs for their efforts to 
protect Central Europe and to encourage German unity, even in the face of the destructive 
and selfish German nationalism of the nineteenth century which had sought to dismantle the 
Habsburg state and to sabotage its historical mission.  Above all, the new curricula for 
patriotic education described Austria as state with a unique culture, history, and calling, and 
as a place which was linked with Europe and the West no less than with Germany.471
The government also revised the educational standards for the study of geography to 
conform with its ideals concerning Austria’s place in the world.   The provisional curricula 
of 1934 and 1935 replaced the presentation of Austria as part of Germany so typical of the 
educational guidelines of the First Republic with a program emphasizing Austria in a 
broader European context.472  In expanding the Ministry’s guidelines concerning geography, 
the official curricula of 1935, however, revealed that the old German emphasis had not 
entirely disappeared.  For example, the fourth class of Austrian Hauptschulen received 
instruction concerning the geography of Switzerland, the German Reich, Czechoslovakia, 
and Hungary, a combination which not only focused upon Austria’s immediate territorial 
neighbors, but also emphasized Austria’s continuing ties to both the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
most important successor states and to Germany.473  The curriculum for Handelsakademien, 
however, simply mandated that students learn about the “former Austro-Hungarian 
470“Lehrplan für die Handelsakademien,” Verordnungsblatt (July, 1935): 501.
471“Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 174-175, 265-266, 347-348, 413-414; “Mittelschulen, neue Lehrpläne, 
übergangs maßnahmen,” Verordnungsblatt (July, 1935): 531.
472“Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Hauptschulen,” 134; “Vorläufiger 
Lehrplan für die erste Klasse der österreichischen Mittelschulen, gültig für das Schuljahr 1934/1935,” 85; 
“Vorläufiger Lehrplan für die Abschlußklasse an Volkschulen, gültig für das Schuljahr 1934/1935,” 120.
473“Lehrplan für die österreichischen Hauptschulen,” 85; “Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” 171-172, 261-
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Monarchy as an economic realm.”474  The new geography guidelines thus conformed to the 
regime’s view of Austria as the heir to a history which was German and at the same time 
imperial and Western.
The Ständestaat instituted a wide variety of educational reforms which were 
designed to accomplish a number of specific goals.  First, these reforms rolled back a 
number of the educational innovations of the First Republic, giving Austria a school system 
which resembled that of the old Monarchy which the new government so frequently invoked 
in order to bolster its own legitimacy. Second, the corporatist reforms emphasized the 
importance of religion in the new Austrian state and aggressively sought to instill a sense of 
Catholic piety in students.  Finally, while the new educational reforms never denied Austrian 
membership in the German nation, these measures sought to emphasize Austria’s 
distinctiveness, attempting to transform school children into Austrian patriots who would 
support Austria’s independence and resist the lure of the Anschluß advocated by the 
National Socialists.  These reforms consisted mainly of attempts by the regime to transform 
Austrian education into an intensively ideological enterprise.  History education, German 
language instruction, geography and patriotic education represented a crucial tool in this 
educational transformation, and the corporatist government attempted to invoke the legacy 
of the Habsburg Monarchy in Austrian education for the same reasons that it did so in its 
public rhetoric: to enforce a vision of Austria which was culturally German, religiously 
Christian, and historically Western.  
262, 410-412; “Lehrplan für die Abschlußklassen,” 452-3.
474“Lehrplan für die Handelsakademien,” 501.
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ii. The Pedagogical Community and the Habsburg Past in the Ständestaat
In its attempts to reform Austrian education to reflect its official ideology, the 
Ständestaat enlisted the aid of educators and pedagogical theorists.  In doing so, of course, 
the authoritarian government was careful to ensure that this pedagogical community truly 
reflected corporatist ideals.  Although the corporatist regime did not embark upon a 
thorough purge of Austria’s educational ranks in quite the same zealous manner as the Nazi 
dictatorship did in Nazi Germany or in Nazi Austria after 1938, it did take measures to make 
sure that Austrian teachers and pedagogues conformed to its official ideological standards.  
For example, in 1934 the corporatist regime removed the sitting leaders of the school board 
and dissolved the various teachers’ and parents’ associations in Vienna, which had long 
been bulwarks of Socialist education during the First Republic.  The government 
reorganized these organizations with new leaders who belonged to the regime-sanctioned 
Fatherland Front.  Likewise, in 1935 the central government assumed jurisdiction over the 
appointment of personnel for Austrian schools, previously a matter controlled by Austria’s 
provincial governments, and required that new applicants’ patriotism and ideological fitness 
be certified by the Fatherland Front.  The corporatist regime also replaced the editorial 
boards of various Austrian pedagogical journals with educators who were loyal to the 
government and its ideology.475 Thus, by 1935 the Ständestaat had asserted its dominance 
over the Austrian educational community, excluding expressions of overt dissent, and 
putting in place a group of pedagogical leaders who would disseminate its ideals.
The corporatist government did not have to look especially hard to find a cadre of 
educators and theorists sympathetic to its cause.  The Ständestaat’s educational ideas 
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resembled those espoused by conservative and Catholic teachers and politicians during the 
First Republic, and many of the leading figures within the Austrian educational community 
during the 1930s were Catholic-conservative stalwarts from that earlier era.  The new 
educational leadership in Austria embarked upon its task with enthusiasm, and the new 
state’s various pedagogical publications soon contained articles arguing in favor of 
corporatist ideology and discussing the best way to ensure that Austrian students adopted the 
ideals of the new government.  Naturally, these publications sought to spread the 
government’s views of Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past, and they discussed 
the manner in which such ideas were most effectively to be presented to Austrian 
schoolchildren.
From the very beginning of the Ständestaat, the state-sanctioned pedagogical 
community advocated a style of education which helped students grasp and internalize the 
basic values of the new corporatist order.  Various educators defined these ideals in different 
ways, but there was general agreement among pedagogical theorists that Austrian 
corporatism sought to emphasize community, order, honesty, heroism, self-sacrifice, 
religion, and an ideal of authority based upon Christian notions of responsibility to God and 
love of one’s neighbor.476  In their discussions of corporatism, however, Austrian educational 
theorists not only defined its values, they also invariably contrasted the ideals of corporatism 
with those of the liberal republican order which the Ständestaat had replaced.  These 
theorists argued that liberalism had placed far too high a premium upon the needs of the 
475Esden-Tempska, 190-193.
476Karl Schimka, “Vaterländische Erziehung und Bildung in der Schule,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 
606-608; M. Laireiter, “Vom Wesen der echten Autorität,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (March, 
1937): 81-86.
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individual, and had not paid sufficient attention to the religious and communal interests of 
the Austrian population.  Likewise, they argued that the First Republic had not made any 
real effort to cultivate Austrian patriotism, so that the Austrian people had little pride in their 
Fatherland, and insufficient patriotic motivation to defend Austrian independence.  Austria’s 
new pedagogical leaders rejected the alleged materialism and relativism of liberal education 
and argued that the educational efforts of the Ständestaat would address these failings and 
produce a new generation of patriotic, religious, and loyal Austrian citizens ready to do their 
duty for the Fatherland and for Western civilization.477
A 1934 article in the pedagogical journal Die Österreichische Schule by Kurt Dra 
articulated these arguments most succintly.  Dra argued that the Ständestaat’s new 
educational order held that teaching was based on “Gesinnung” (basic convictions) and 
world view, and should impart the ideals of religiosity and patriotism to students.  
Ultimately such notions depended not just upon love and a positive appreciation of certain 
values and ideas, but upon hatred of and opposition to various precepts as well.  Teachers 
thus needed to explicitly repudiate relativism, individualism, and the substitute religion of 
Socialism in favor of Catholicism, communal solidarity, and loyalty to the Fatherland.  Dra 
noted that an authoritarian state was far better suited to such a goal than a democracy.478
Other educational theorists such as Ludwig Hänsel and Ernst Görlich took such arguments a 
step further, asserting that Gesinnung could never be a matter of neutrality for a strong state.  
They argued that liberal states were too entangled with their fetishism for neutrality, 
477Schimka, 606-608; Laireiter, 83-86; Anton Simonic,“Die österreichische Schule,”  Die Österreichische 
Schule 11 (1934): 155-161; “Heimat und Vaterland als Wertbegriffe in der Pädagogik,” Pädagogischer 
Führer (1935): 502-504.
478Kurt Dra, “Weltanschauung und Gesinnung.”  Die Österreichische Schule 11 (1934): 550-553.
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objectivity, and the desire for a balance of opinions to provide an effective political 
education.  The Ständestaat, however, could and would provide such instruction to its 
students, moving beyond mere civics into an education which truly indoctrinated students 
with corporatist ideals and Austrian patriotism.479
Corporatist educators did not just oppose the old liberal order, however, but also 
vehemently criticized the political and educational ideals of Nazi Germany, which they 
found to be chauvinistic and tyrannical.  For example, Hänsel argued that Austrian education 
stood not just against liberalism, but also against nationalistic totalitarianism which sought 
to enforce compliance with a narrow ideology, and which elevated racial notions above 
Geist (spirit) in order to deny fair and equal treatment to non-German Völker of Europe.  
Another educator, Robert Krasser, concurred, and asserted that there was indeed a vital 
distinction to be made between totalitarianism, which grounded power in one narrow group 
or leader, and benevolent corporatist authoritarianism which derived responsible authority 
from God’s laws.  According to Krasser, Austria, with its Christian concept of authority 
wielded with a sense of responsibility and neighborly love, had opposed Prussia’s princely 
absolutism in the past, and now stood against liberalism, Marxism, and Nazism.480  Thus, 
corporatist educational theorists drew a fine distinction between their own dictatorship’s 
ideals of education and more oppressive Nazi views.
479Ernst Joseph Görlich, a young man in the 1930s, became a conservative intellectual and educator of 
considerable prominence during the first decade of the Austrian Second Republic.  By that time he had of 
course abandoned his disdain for democracy and vigorously defended the new postwar liberal order in 
Austria.  Ernst Görlich, “Politische Bildung,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (September 15, 1935): 
185-6; Ludwig Hänsel,“Vaterländische Erziehung,” Schriften des Pädagogischen Institutes der Stadt Wien 
6 (1935): 7-9.
480 Hänsel, 8-12; Robert Krasser,“Ständestaat und Schule.  Grundsätzliches zur österreichischen 
Schulererneuerung,” 8; Friedrich Wotke, “Ständestaat und Schule,” Pädagogischer Führer (1936): 257-
260.
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The ideological character of corporatist education depended heavily upon a deeply 
conservative view of society, which encompassed notions of gender as well as politics.  The 
Ständestaat sought to educate girls to become wives and mothers, and it designed their 
educational path to differ from that of male students.  Nevertheless, education for females 
still focused corporatist ideals, and sought to produce young Catholic women dedicated to 
the government and the Fatherland, even if the methods used to achieve such an end 
depended more on home economics than upon the military training which Austrian boys 
received.481  Educators even sought to indoctrinate the youngest Austrian children with 
corporatist ideas.  For example, a 1937 issue of the pedagogical journal Die Österreichische 
Schule published the rules of a game in which young Austrian children, each representing a 
part of one of Austria’s corporate Berufstände, would stand in a circle and sing verses 
regarding the role that each Stand played in the harmonious functioning of Austrian 
society.482  Thus, education in the Ständestaat attempted to present all students, young and 
old, male and female, with an education which inspired loyalty to the government and to its 
vision of an independent, corporatist Austria.
All educational theorists agreed, however, that the state could not accomplish such 
aims on its own.  It required the help of a dedicated corps of teachers who would serve as 
examples of loyalty and good character to students.  Austria’s educational leaders argued 
that teachers could not be content to be mere transmitters of knowledge; they also had to 
exemplify the regime’s value system and inspire their students to take the Ständestaat’s 
481Peter Schmitz,“Das Pfleghafte in der vaterländischen Erziehung der Mädchen,” Österreichische 
Pädagogische Warte (February 15, 1935): 27-32; Schimka, “Vaterländische Erziehung und Bildung in der 
Schule,” 610.
482Erich Stenutz, Österreichs Stände: Ein Spiel für Schuljugend (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 
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ideology to heart.  The new state thus prioritized the character and personal qualities of 
teachers over their scholarly expertise.  
Richard Schmitz, an educational official in Vienna, asserted that even outside the 
classroom, the Austrian teacher needed to demonstrate good character and dedication to the 
community in order to serve as an example to impressionable students.  Objectivity was of 
no use to teachers when it came to presenting the correct view of Heimat and the Austrian 
Fatherland to students.  Instructors could not be dispassionate, but rather had to inflame the 
patriotic ardor of their young charges.  In such an enterprise textbooks could provide an aid, 
but never a substitute for the inspirational qualities and good judgement of the teacher.  
Teachers, and especially teachers of history, needed to have “a real German, real Austrian 
heart,” and be able to inspire students, as well as to transmit information to them.483  Grete 
Wiesinger further argued that Austrian teachers also had to be fully aware of the traditional 
deficiencies and virtues of the Austrian character and needed to provide a good model which 
discouraged the former and encouraged the latter.  Wiesinger noted that Austrians were 
prone to nervousness and a lack of national consciousness, but they were also traditionally 
tactful, courteous, informal, and tasteful.  More importantly, Austrians had historically been 
a moderate people, well suited to science, art, and understanding other Völker.  According to 
Wiesinger, teachers had the duty to embody these positive Austrian qualities.484
Needless to say, all of these educational theorists reminded instructors that such 
1937), 1-8.
483Richard Schmitz,  “Die Bedeutung der Schule für den Neuaufbau Österreichs,” Pädagogischer Führer
(1935): 11-14.  See also Michael Klieba, “Vaterländische Erziehung,” Die Österreichische Schule 11 
(1934): 163-166; Wilhelm Goigner, “Erziehender Unterricht,” Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 327; 
Kaspar Enthofer, “Vaterländische Erziehung der Landjugend,” Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 12; 
Hänsel, 16-17; Krasser, 24; Dra, 552-3; Dollfuß, “Worte des Kanzler Dollfuss,” 403;
484Grete Wiesinger, “Wie erziehen wir unser Schüler zu rechten Österreichern?” Pädagogischer Führer
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teachings had to be in line with the state’s official corporatist principles.  Indeed, Anton 
Simonic argued that teachers who were liberals or relativists lacked the necessary qualities 
to teach in Austrian schools, no matter how knowledgeable they might be.  Correct ideology 
and values were simply more important to the government than mere expertise.485
Corporatist pedagogical theorists all wanted to instill a sense of Austrian patriotism 
in students.  This goal went beyond just providing a defense of corporatist values in the 
school system, and depended heavily upon presenting a view of Austria as a distinctive 
region of German culture which, while unique in its own right, also had  historically 
provided, and indeed continued to provide, a valuable service to both the German Volk and 
to Western civilization as a whole.  Corporatist educators recognized that history classes 
would provide the ideal setting for disseminating the Ständestaat’s view of Austria as 
German, Christian, and Western in Austrian schools.  Thus many such educators argued that 
teaching Austrian history was important not just to acquaint Austrian students with the past 
history of their state, but to inspire them toward a passionate love of their Fatherland, a 
quality which had been conspicuously absent in Austria since 1918.486
Not all educators agreed on exactly how to accomplish this aim.  Hugo Klotzinger 
argued that teachers needed to emphasize the significance of the Babenburg and Habsburg 
houses and their importance for all of Germandom.487  Michael Klieba, on the other hand, 
(1936): 126-130.
485Anton Simonic, “Die österreichische Schule,”  Die Österreichische Schule 11 (1934): 161.
486Ernst Butz, “Der neue Lehrplan für Geschichte an Hauptschulen,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 1040-
1041; “Geschichte und Heimat,” Die Österreichische Schule 13 (1936): 371-373; Gustav Rotter, 
“Österreich. Grundlagen der vaterländischen Erziehung,” Pädagogischer Führer 87 (1937): 34; Ferdinand 
Tremel, “Der Geschichtsunterricht an der österreichischen Arbeitermittelschule,” Pädagogischer Führer
87 (1937): 646-9; Heinrich Kotz,“Der Geschichtsunterricht in der Landschule mit Abteilungsunterricht,” 
Die Österreichische Schule 2 (1938):102.
487 Hugo Klotzinger, “Wege der Praxis im Geschichtsunterrichte der Hauptschule,” Die Österreichische 
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asserted that history education should not in fact focus on just the history of the ruling 
houses, but rather needed to emphasize the past of the Austrian branch of the German Volk, 
which he argued represented the “real story” of Austria.488  Such minor differences of 
opinion were not unusual within the corporatist educational community, and Austrian 
educators differed slightly about which individuals and what events needed to be 
emphasized in Austrian history courses.  Nevertheless, all of these educational theorists 
agreed that history education could and should be used to inflame a sense of patriotism in 
Austria’s young people and to spread the government’s ideas about Austria’s role in Europe. 
Corporatist pedagogues also recognized that the new class in patriotic education 
provided them with a natural opportunity to help awaken a sense of patriotism in Austrian 
students.  Wilhelm Illing was quick to sing the praises of this new program of patriotic 
instruction, and argued that it, along with the restored classes in religious education, 
represented the Ständestaat’s most important contribution to a better sort of education for 
Austria’ children.  After all, in such a class students would trace the development of the 
Austrian “state idea” and Austria’s dedication to German culture and to the German Volk
from antiquity to the present.489  Another educational theorist, Karl Enthofer, thought that the 
new course might be especially useful in recapturing the patriotic allegiance of rural youth.  
The Austrian peasantry, he insisted, had traditionally been the most loyal and most Austrian 
faction within the state, even when they lacked the education to express their ideals 
systematically.  In order to rekindle the patriotic spirit of rural youth, Enthofer 
Schule 11 (1934): 258.
488Klieba, 163-166.
489Wihelm Illing, “Die Vaterlandskunde im neuen Lehrplan für die Mittelschulen,” Pädagogischer Führer
(1935): 1016-1018.
309
recommended an emphasis upon religion, Austrian Germanness, and repeated reference to 
the heroic deeds of individuals from students’ own specific Heimat, including those of 
soldiers during World War I.  In this manner, he argued, the new regime could regain the 
loyalty of a solidly conservative and traditional group which had always provided the 
firmest foundation for the Austrian state.490
Yet not all corporatist theorists unambiguously praised the new class.  In a review of 
the first year of the patriotic education course, Josef Neumair expressed his fears that the 
class could not succeed in its aims because Austrian teachers lacked experience in teaching 
such a subject.  Moreover, the class spent too much time on narrow provincial matters and 
on Austria’s place in the German nation.  He wanted teachers to focus on Austria itself, in 
all its cultural uniqueness.  He urged teachers to use the new textbooks which the state had 
prepared in order to fulfill the goals of the course more completely.491  Such criticism did not 
deny the potential usefulness of the new class; it merely sought ways to optimize its 
effectiveness in patriotic indoctrination of students.
Teachers and educational theorists also wanted the explicit use of the corporate 
state’s symbols as teaching aids in Austrian classrooms.  One such symbol was Austria’s
red-white-red flag, which supposedly had its origins in the Babenberg dynasty’s 
participation in the crusades to recapture the Christian holy sites from the Muslims.  
Pedagogical theorists argued that teachers could use this symbol to inspire students to live 
up to their proud historical heritage.492  Austrian educators also noted that the “Kruckenkreuz
490Kaspar Enthofer, “Vaterländische Erziehung der Landjugend,” Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 8-
12.  See also Kotz, 101-9.
491Josef Neumair, “Zur Vaterlandskunde,” Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 601-603.
492Alois L. Sedlaczek, “Gedanken zur Vaterländeischen Erziehung,”  Pädagogischer Führer (1936): 349; 
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(crutched cross),” the insignia of the Fatherland Front, was another symbol which should be 
used inspire patriotism in students.  In a 1935 article, Karl Grauer provided a brief historical 
background for this symbol, arguing that it had deep roots in Christian history.  He argued 
that the Kruckenkreuz had been used first by the Ostrogoth leader Theodoric as the emblem 
of a “Christian-supranational imperial idea,” an idea later enthusiastically adopted by the 
Habsburg Monarchy.  The Western crusaders and Rudolph von Habsburg, the first Holy 
Roman Emperor from the Habsburg house, later had also used this symbol.  For Grauer, the 
Kruckenkreuz ultimately stood for Western, Christian, and German knightly ideals, which he 
contrasted with the pre-Christian, “eastern” paganism embodied by the Hackenkreuz
(swastika), the emblem of the Nazi movement.493  Maria Vettori discussed both of these 
symbols, as well as the double eagle, first used by Friedrich Barbarrosa as the symbol of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and later adopted by the Habsburgs and the 
Ständestaat.  The one-headed eagle of the Austrian First Republic, which had grasped a 
sickle in a nod to Marxist symbolism, had represented a repudiation of Austria’s traditions, 
but she asserted that the Kruckenkreuz, the Red-White-Red banner, and the double eagle 
stood for Austria’s Christian, Austrian, and German heritage, respectively.  The new 
government’s restoration of these emblems would serve as a reminder to young Austrians of 
the great historical legacy which they had inherited.494
Corporatist educators went beyond the discussion of classes and symbols to provide 
somewhat more tangible suggestions to inspire greater Austrian patriotism.  For example, in 
Maria Vettori, “Die Symbole des neuen Österreich,” Die Österreichische Schule 13 (1936): 31.
493Karl Johann Grauer, “Das Kruckenkreuz: seine Bedeutung in Geschichte und Gegenwart,” 
Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 828-830; Vettori, 29-30.
494Vettori, 29-31; Sepp Strasser, “Der Doppeladler in der Schule,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
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May of 1935, Viennese educators sponsored a “Fatherland Week” in Viennese schools
which featured the display of patriotic emblems, patriotic readings in German language 
classes, celebrations of Austria’s natural beauty, presentations on “Austria, the lebenfähig
(viable) state,” and musical programs based upon the Austrian musical tradition.495  Such 
efforts, largely symbolic, reveal the pedagogical community’s commitment to encourage 
patriotic sentiment among young Austrian students.
The Austrian pedagogical community in the Ständestaat also discussed Austrian 
national identity.  Obviously, these discussions were related to the regime’s efforts to use 
education to help forestall a Nazi Anschluß.  Ultimately most of the educators who 
commented on such topics agreed with the government’s argument that Austria was a 
German state, but one with a distinctive heritage and mission.  Such support is certainly 
unsurprising given the fact that the two main factions which argued against Austrian 
independence, the Austrian National Socialist and Social Democratic Parties, had been 
outlawed by the government in 1933 and 1934.  Still, not all conservative educators agreed 
about the precise balance the schools should strike between Austrian Germanness and 
Austrian distinctiveness.
All of the Austrian educators who voiced their opinions publically in the state’s 
pedagogical journals agreed that Austrians were part of the wider body of the German Volk.  
Some commentators simply made note of Austria’s historical contributions to German 
culture and to the defense of the German people and territory.  They believed that loyalty to 
(February 15, 1935): 37-8.
495Karl Schimka, “Vaterländische Erziehung und Bildung in der Schule,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 
603-613; Viktoria Fenzl, “Die ‘Vaterländische Woche’ in der Volkschule,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 
527-529. 
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an independent Austrian Fatherland and loyalty to the German Volk were complementary 
positions, rather than contradictory ones, as critics of Austrian independence argued.  For 
these educators, it was Austria’s duty to remind the world that Nazi Germany did not have 
the right to stand as the sole representative of Germanness, and they argued that Austria was 
no less German for its stubborn opposition to Nazi expansionism.496  Apart from such 
apologetics, though, Austria was simply a German land.  Hans Ernst Butz, for example, 
portrayed Austrians as Germans from the very founding of the Ostmark by the Germanic 
Franks, and argued that Austrians had defended German interests up until the German Volk
had “lost its freedom” with the collapse of the old Monarchy in 1918.497  Dra made similar 
arguments, even if he also made a point of emphasizing Austria’s Catholic character.  For 
him, one of contemporary Austria’s major tasks was to simply to return the German Geist
and soul to the world in an era when National Socialism had corrupted the true meaning of 
such concepts.498  The pedagogical journal Die Österreichische Schule supported such 
positions by periodically printing patriotic poems which emphasized Austria’s 
Germanness.499  These points of view, as we have seen, were thoroughly consistent with the 
Ständestaat’s stance on Austria’s essential German character.
Other corporatist pedagogues were not content merely to defend Austria’s German 
character, however, even if they did agree that Austria was a German state.  These 
educational theorists thought that the schools had to present students with a forceful 
496Hänsel, 14; Krasser, 17; Schimka, 608; Matha Grohmann, “Die österreichische Lehrerin von heute als 
Erzieherin,” Pädagogischer Führer (1936): 351; Sepp Burgstaller, “Die Lehrwanderung im Dieste der 
Erziehung zu Volk und Staat,” Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 265-269.
497Hans Ernst Butz, “Der Geschichtsunterricht an Hauptschulen und an Abschlussklassen und das 
Wehrwesen,” Pädagogischer Führer 87 (1937): 710.
498Dra, 553.
499See for example Heinrich Waldeck, “Österreichisches Freiheitslied,” Die Österreichische Schule 12 
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definition of Austria’s unique qualities in order to convince them of the necessity of 
Austrian independence.  Their definitions still acknowledged that Austrians were part of the 
German Volk, but they also took pains to describe the unique qualities which served to 
distinguish Austrians from other Germans.  According to these theorists, the unique qualities 
embodied by the Austrian branch of the German Volk made the existence of a separate 
Austrian state a precious commodity well worth preserving and defending.  These 
definitions of the Austrian character generally included values based upon Austria’s past at 
the core of the Habsburgs’ multinational state, such as toleration and understanding of other 
Völker, which were allegedly lacking in other, more northerly German lands.500
Ludwig Battista’s work provides a good example of this sort of argument.  In a 1937 
article, Battista used Vienna as an emblem of the sort of Germanness which the regime 
wished to encourage, as he traced the capital’s cultural achievements from its initial 
foundation to the present day.  Battista argued that Vienna had always possessed a 
distinctively German character, despite the numerous immigrants of different nationalities 
who had made their home there more recently.  Yet at the same time, as a result of its 
geographic location and the efforts of the Habsburg monarchs, Vienna had become a great 
cultural center for the whole world.  For Battista, Viennese culture was cosmopolitan and 
adaptable, much more so than the culture of other German cities, and this unique culture 
served as a unifying force even for the city’s non-German inhabitants such as Slavs or Jews.  
Thus, Battista’s discussion of Vienna’s German qualities constituted an implicit repudiation 
(1935): 245.
500Klieba, 163-164; Eduard Buxbaum, “Vaterländische Gesinnungsbildung,” Die Österreichische Schule
11 (1934): 382; Josef Neumair, “Deutsche Dichtung in Österreich,” Die Österreichische Schule 13 (1936): 
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of the Nazis’ racial notion of German culture as something which could not, by definition, 
ever be truly adopted by non-Germans.501
The corporatist civil servant and education theorist Oskar Benda provided perhaps 
the most detailed and sophisticated description of what was unique about the Austrian 
branch of the German Volk.  To begin with, Benda avowed that Austrians were not in fact 
Germans in a biological or ethnic sense, but rather were the product of ethnic mixing 
between the Völker of the old Monarchy.  Benda warned his readers in a 1935 article in the 
Pädogischer Führer that they needed to avoid crudely materialistic or racial conceptions of 
nationhood such as those espoused by the Nazis.  Indeed, Benda even eschewed such widely 
acknowledged markers of nationhood as state, history, and geography in favor of a theory of 
nationalism which was based upon Geist (spirit). Even then, he was careful to distance 
himself from what he regarded as caricatures of national spirit, such as the facile 
identification of Austria with baroque art, or the presentation of regional stereotypes as the 
definition of the Austrian Geist.  For Benda, Geist was something ephemeral and difficult to 
express, a quality which resisted naive generalizations.  He simply asserted that it existed, 
and that it served to distinguish the inhabitants of Austria from other Germans.  In the end, 
Benda still accepted the premise that Austrians were Germans, but he argued the German 
nation was broad enough to encompass numerous, even contradictory ethical and spiritual 
points of view.502
Benda also dismantled the common stereotype that Austrians were superficial 
pleasure seekers, arguing that the legendary charm, chivalry and lust for life of the Austrian 
501Ludwig Battista, “Die Kultur Wiens und die Schule,” Pädagogischer Führer 87 (1937): 609-17.
502Oskar Benda, “Was heist österreichischer Geist?” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 22- 35; “Erziehung und 
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masked the deeper struggles within his soul.  According to Benda, the Austrian man 
ultimately possessed a unique stability and flexibility which was alien to the restless 
romanticism of the Prussian character. He argued (in manner which indeed seems perilously 
close to the sort of stereotyping he wished to avoid) that the Austrian Geist was best 
expressed by the Catholic humanism and universalistic love of the sort found in the 
examples of Francis of Assisi and Rilke, and proclaimed that such an ideal was more 
valuable to the world than the more individualistic humanist north German or Prussian Geist
exemplified by George and Nietzsche. For Benda, this Austrian Geist represented the best 
tradition within Germandom, and, together with Austria’s millennium old “state idea,” had 
to be the foundation of Austrian education.503
One education theorist took great pains to define Austria not just as a German land, 
but also as one that was thoroughly European.  In conjunction with the meeting of the fourth 
Pan-European Congress in Vienna in 1935, Alexander Novotny presented a brief description 
of Austria’s vital links with the Christian, Western tradition.  In doing so, he argued that the 
great statesmen of Austria– Maximilian I, Maria Theresa, Metternich and Seipel – had 
always been dedicated Europeans as much as they had been Austrians and Germans.  
According to Novotny, this European orientation offered a potential solution to the issue of 
Austrian identity, which had always been culturally distinctive, but which unfortunately had 
also generally lacked a strong patriotic aspect.  He argued that the European outlook of the 
great leaders in Austria’s past, and of the Pan-European movement in the present, could 
provide an alternative to destabilizing conflicts between France and Germany and help 
Bildung in österreichischem Geist,” Schriften des Pädagogischen Institutes der Stadt Wien 9 (1936): 3-23.
503Benda, “Erziehung und Bildung in österreichischem Geist,” 11-15.
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contemporary Austria return to its traditional historical function.504
Indeed, corporatist educators vigorously discussed Austria’s historical function or 
mission.  The notion of an Austrian mission remained central to the corporatist 
government’s rhetoric about Austrian nationhood and patriotism.  Naturally then corporatist 
educators used it in their discussions about the Austrian schools.  The precise definition of 
the Austrian mission differed from theorist to theorist, and these differences generally 
mirrored the variations in emphasis in educational discussions concerning Austrian 
Germanness.  Some Austrian educators presented the Austrian mission as a German one, 
while others argued that such a mission took place in the broader context of Christendom 
and Western civilization.  Once again, both of these versions of the Austrian mission were 
consistent with the Ständestaat’s public stance on such matters, and both depended heavily 
upon references to Habsburg past.
Many Austrian educators defined Austria’s historical mission as an effort to defend 
both the German Volk and the West as a whole.  Such arguments inevitably referred to the 
Austrian territory’s medieval status as the “Ostmark” (eastern march) of the Germanic 
Carolingian Empire which had stood against successive invasions by the Avars and 
Magyars.  The Habsburg state’s more recent successes in repelling the advances of the 
Ottoman Turks into Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries likewise 
featured prominently in such descriptions.  Some educators argued that these actions had 
been undertaken to protect the territory and interests of the German Volk,505 while others 
504Alexander Novotny, “Österreich unter Europäischen Geschichtswinkel in der Schule,” Pädagogischer 
Führer (1935): 536-538.
505Schimka, 608-9; Buxbaum,382; Hänsel, 13; Hans Gamper,“Staatspolitische Schulung an Beispielen,” 
Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 92-96.
317
portrayed them as part of a more broadly based attempt to protect all of the Christian West 
from Islam.506  One historian, Arnold Winkler, even asserted that Habsburg Austria had 
served to protect German Central Europe not just from Turkish invasions, but also from 
French military adventurism which likewise threatened the security of the German Volk.507
While such arguments emphasized different aspects of the Austrian mission, they agreed 
that Austria, first under the rule of the Babenbergs and then under the Habsburgs, had served 
a vital defensive function throughout its history.
Discussions of the Austrian mission among educators sometimes also cast the old 
Austrian Monarchy as a force for cultural development and cooperation between the Völker
of the Danubian region.  Once again, some of these formulations of the Austrian mission 
emphasized the German character of Austria’s activities, while others argued for a broader 
European or Western context for such functions.  Those theorists who emphasized the 
specifically German character of such a mission, argued that Austria’s German culture had 
represented the medium through which the Monarchy had encouraged the economic and 
intellectual development of non-German Völker.  These educators portrayed the old state as 
the historical “bridge” through which German culture had spread to southeastern Europe.508
Arnold Winkler, for example, argued that the late medieval Habsburg rulers had done a 
great service for the cause of Germandom by creating a multinational state in the Danubian 
region under German auspices at a time when both Czech and Magyar princes were trying to 
create a similar state under the domination of their own respective Völker.  In doing so, 
506Illing, 1017-1018; Kotz,101-9.
507Arnold Winkler, Österreichs Weg.  Die ideellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen des Staates (Mainz: 
Verlags und Universitäts-Buchbehandlung, 1936), 68-75.
508Schimka, 608-9; Karl Reishofer, “Die kulturpolitisches Bedeutung des österreichischen Buches,”  Die 
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Austria had not only secured the borders of the German lands of Europe, but had also 
created a benevolent state which spread the benefits of German culture throughout the 
region.509
Other pedagogical theorists were simply content to note that the old multinational 
Monarchy had represented a beneficial entity which had encouraged all of its subjects, 
whether German or non-German, to live together in a state of mutual cooperation and 
understanding.510  Werner Tschulik presented precisely such a picture of  the old Habsburg 
state, arguing that what he termed the “Austrian imperial idea” had been a force which 
bound the Monarchy’s various Völker together in peace.  Tschulik argued that old Austria 
ultimately had created a Christian community in Central Europe, embodied in such 
organizations as the Holy Roman Empire and the nineteenth-century Holy Alliance, 
forerunners to the modern Pan-Europa movement and the League of Nations.511
All of these various presentations of the Austrian mission corresponded to the 
corporatist government’s official view that Austria was a German, Christian, and Western 
land which had historically served its own interests and those of the German Volk, and all 
Christendom simultaneously.  Indeed, none of the differing conceptions of the Austrian 
mission really contradicted any of the others, and individual Austrian educators sometimes 
argued for some, or even all, of these views simultaneously.  No matter their exact stance, 
however, all of these educational theorists agreed that such a mission had represented a 
vitally important part of Austrian history which continued to define what it meant to be 
Österreichische Schule 12 (1935): 100-101.
509Winkler, 54-55,64-68, 73-75.
510Gamper, “Staatspolitische Schulung an Beispielen,” 92-96; Krasser, 6; Hassinger, 10-11.
511Werner Tschulik, “Grillparzer als Erzieher zu Oesterreich,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
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Austrian.  As such, the notion of an Austrian mission needed to be presented by teachers in 
Austrian history and patriotic education classes in order to help students to realize the proud 
lineage which they had inherited, and thus to adopt the appropriate patriotic outlook desired 
by the government.512
The Austrian mission as a concept obviously depended to a large extent upon 
Austria’s past as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and as we have seen, the leaders of the 
Ständestaat portrayed their new political and social order as the direct heir of the old 
Habsburg state.  Therefore, Austrian educators concerned themselves with exactly how to 
portray Austria’s Habsburg past in the schools, and particularly in history courses.  In terms 
of the Habsburg state itself, conservative educators eagerly agreed with the regime that the 
old Monarchy had been a benevolent state that had sought over its many centuries of 
existence to uphold the ideals of multinational cooperation, Christian community, and 
German culture.  They asserted it had fulfilled this role in the face such noxious modern 
ideas as liberal individualism and relativism, Marxist materialism, and chauvinistic 
nationalism which had struck at the very heart of Western civilization.  Corporatist 
educational theorists thus argued that historical instruction in Austrian classrooms ought to 
portray the Habsburg Monarchy, and through its lineage, the contemporary Ständestaat, as 
the representatives of the West’s best ideals, and as institutions which always served the best 
interests of Europe’s German population.513
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Indeed, many Austrian education theorists during this period took particular pains to 
argue against historical narratives which cast the House of Habsburg as a princely family 
which, concerned with its own power above all, had undermined the movement toward 
German unity.  Such an interpretation of Austrian history formed an important component of 
the Nazi historical world view, and constituted an argument against the very legitimacy of 
Austrian independence.  Thus, Austrian educators felt compelled to challenge this 
interpretation, and to rebut it with a vision of Austrians generally, and of the Habsburgs 
more specifically, as the most dedicated servants of the German Volk.  Such arguments 
invariably took aim at Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern, the frequent historical 
antagonists of the Habsburgs and the customary heroes of the “Germanist” view of history.
Hans Gamper in particular tried to rebutt what he viewed as mistaken or even 
deliberately misleading conceptions of Austrian history which cast the House of Habsburg 
as a family concerned purely with dynastic power that had transformed Germans within their 
territory into a persecuted minority.  In reality, Gamper argued, the Habsburgs had done far 
more for the German Volk than any other German princely family.  He was particularly 
critical of Prussian monarchs such as Frederick II who had indeed put the interests of their 
own power ahead of those of Germans as a whole, even setting the unfortunate precedent for 
the carving up of German territories in Austria in 1918 with his seizure of Silesia during the 
eighteenth century.  For Gamper, the old Habsburg state had represented a unique cultural 
entity which had always served the cause of the West, defending it from the gravest of 
geschichtlichen Grundlagen der österreichischen Verfassung, ein Beitrag zur gedeihlichen Gestaltung des 
Geschichtsunterrichtes an Hauptschulen,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (November, 1936): 298-
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threats.  He even cast Austria after 1918 as having fulfilled the same purpose, as it stood 
against the Bolshevik revolutions which had threatened to engulf Central Europe.514
Arnold Winkler advanced a similar anti-Hohenzollern polemic, arguing that the 
eighteenth-century Habsburg monarchs Maria Theresa and Joseph II had worked to secure 
the interests of the German Volk against the assaults of Louis XIV’s France, but also against 
the efforts of Prussia to upset the balance of power in the German lands of Europe. Winkler 
argued that Frederick II of Prussia had hated Austria, and that his efforts had ultimately 
served to severely damage Germany’s ability to defend itself against outside threats.  
Subsequent Habsburg emperors such as Franz I (whom Winkler argued was too often 
unfairly demonized in historical literature as a reactionary tyrant) and Franz Joseph had 
attempted to carry on in defense of the German lands even in the face of continued French 
predation and Prussian selfishness. Thanks to the persistent efforts of the Habsburgs, 
Winkler argued, the catastrophic fruits of Frederick II’s campaign against Austria were not 
fully apparent until the twentieth century, when the German lands finally proved unable to 
stand against French assaults during the First World War.515
Ludwig Hänsel, however, advocated a reconciliation among Germans by avowing 
that while Austrians could be proud of their history as a German people, they still should not 
accuse even enemies of the Austrian state such as Frederick II of actually betraying the 
German Volk.  Hänsel thus attempted to emphasize the brotherly bond between all Germans 
and repudiated any attempts to transform the historical conflicts between Austria and Prussia 




into a polemic about which state was most authentically German.516   Hänsel was definitely 
in the minority, though, and many corporatist theorists used historical arguments against 
Prussia in order to bolster patriotic education in contemporary Austria in the face of the 
increasingly aggressive nationalistic advances of the man whom they considered to be 
Frederick II’s anti-Austrian heir, Adolf Hitler.517
Austrian educational theorists generally agreed that one particularly effective means 
of using the Habsburg past to inspire patriotism in Austrian students was for teachers to 
invoke the example of great Austrians from that past.  As Oskar Benda argued, “just as we 
do not reduce the Prussian Geist to its Piefke518 caricature, but rather to Frederick II, Kleist, 
Menzel, Moltke, and Fontane, so may one only boil down the mass of the Austrian Geist to 
its great representatives: a Maximillian, a Maria Theresa, a Mozart, a Grillparzer, a 
Schubert, a Bruckner and similar figures.”519  Ernst Butz, agreed, noting that a focus upon 
the great personalities from Austria’s past, particularly in a the context of Austrian cultural 
achievement, was a promising means of bolstering patriotic sentiment, and corresponded 
well to the regime’s authoritarian Führerprinzip (leader principle).520   Thus, Austrian 
516Hänsel, 14.
517See also for example, Herndl,  639-642; Benda, “Deutschnational Bildung. 1,” Österreichische 
Pädagogische Warte (February 15, 1935): 25-7; “Deutschnational Bildung. 2,” Österreichische 
Pädagogische Warte (March 15, 1935): 51-3; “Deutschnational Bildung. 3,” Österreichische 
Pädagogische Warte (April 5, 1935): 74-77.
518“Lout,” or “damn German,” an Austrian pejorative term for Prussians.
519Benda, “Erziehung und Bildung in österreichischem Geist,” 10.
520Ernst Butz, “Der neue Lehrplan für Geschichte an Hauptschulen,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 1040-
1042.  Neither Butz nor any of the Ständestaat’s other educational theorists mentioned Joseph II’s efforts 
to forcibly make German the main language of administration throughout the Monarchy, which made the 
eighteenth-century emperor a popular figure with German nationalists.  Given the Ständestaat’s dedicated 
opposition to the political agenda of those nationalists, the corporatist pedagogical community’s collective 
lack of interest in that aspect of Joseph’s reign is unsurprising.  See Nancy M. Wingfield, “Statues of 
Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in 
Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, eds. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West 
Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 178_201.
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education theorists recommended students study biographies of notable Austrians, especially 
figures from the old dynasty and their servants such as Rudolph I, Maximilian I, Karl V, 
Eugene of Savoy, Maria Theresa, Joseph II, the Archduke Karl, Andreas Hofer, Klemens 
von Metternich, Joseph Radetzky, Felix von Schwartzenberg, and Franz Joseph, as well as 
notable cultural figures such as Haydn, Mozart, Schubert, Bruckner, Grillparzer, and 
Raimund.521  Some of these recommendations even took on a slightly more populist cast, 
recommending that teachers use the examples of the nameless patriotic soldiers who had 
fought for Austria against the Turkish and Magyar invasions during the early modern period 
or more recently in the trenches of World War I.522  Of course, the corporatist educational 
system did not merely restrict itself to drawing upon the legacy of famous Austrians, but 
was also willing to celebrate figures from the German Reich such as Johann Sebastian Bach 
or Friedrich Schilling as part of Austria’s broader German heritage.523
Thus, the leadership of Austria’s pedagogical community in the Ständestaat served 
as a vigorous advocate for the corporatist government’s educational reforms.  They argued 
for an intensively ideological educational system which would rectify the liberal failings of 
521Kotz, 107; Günther Buxbaum, “Österreichs Geschichte in der Erzählung,” Die Österreichische Schule
13 (1936): 652-663; Josef Tille, “Prinz Eugen, zum 200. Todestag des österreichischen Feldherrn und 
Staatsmannes,” Die Österreichische Schule  13 (1936): 240-251; Hugo Hofmannsthal,“Maria Theresa,” Die 
Österreichische Schule 13 (1936): 159; Maria Lang-Reitstatter, “Bedeutende Österreicher,” 
Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 216-221; “Das neue Geschichtsbuch für Hauptschulen,” Pädagogischer 
Führer (1936):639-43; Robert Konopassegg, “Heldengedenkrede,”  Die Österreichische Schule 14 (1937): 
541-543; Werner Tschulik, “Unsere österreichischen Klassiker und die neue österreichische Schule,” Die 
Österreichische Schule 12 (1935): 410-419; Werner Tschulik, “Grillparzer als Erzieher zu Oesterreich,” 
Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (January 15, 1935): 1-4; Oskar Wolfschneider, “Vater Radetzky,”  
Die Österreichische Schule 2 (1938): 165-7.
522Enthofer, 10; Robert Konopassegg, “Vaterländische Geschichte und wir,” Die Österreichische Schule
12 (1935): 34-42.
523Mena Blaschitz argued that Austrians had appreciated Bach’s cultural significance earlier and more 
completely than other Germans, in essence claiming him as an Austrian cultural figure.  Mena Blaschitz, 
“Johann Sebastian Bach zum Gedächtnis,” Pädagogischer Führer (1935): 252-255; “Schulfeieren 
anläßlich des 175. Geburtstages Friedrich Schillers,” Verordnungsblatt (October 17, 1934): 195.
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Austrian education under the First Republic, and which would impart the principles of 
corporatism, Catholicism, and Austrian patriotism to Austrian children.  They likewise 
supported the government’s goal of using historical and patriotic instruction in order to 
present students with a vision of an Austria which was culturally German, religiously 
Christian, and traditionally Western, and which continued to have a historically defined 
mission on the European continent.  Educational portrayals of Austria’s Habsburg past 
represented an important means to achieve these goals, and the corporatist educational 
community argued forcefully in favor of historical interpretations of that past which cast the 
old Monarchy in a positive light as a benevolent, multinational, socially harmonious empire 
which had defended the best ideals of both Germany and the West.  Ultimately, however, 
the public writings of the corporatist educational community can give only a suggestion of 
the material which was actually being taught in Austrian classroom.  For a more complete 
view of what students were really learning about Austria and its past, we must now examine 
the series of history textbooks and readers produced under the auspices of the Ständestaat. 
iii. History Textbooks and the Habsburg Past in the Ständestaat
The corporatist government in Austria had very little time to supervise the writing of 
new texts which supported its distinctively ideological vision of education, especially 
considering the fact that it only implemented new official curricula for Austrian schools in 
1935, a mere three years before the Anschluß with Nazi Germany.  Nevertheless, a number 
of textbooks and readers did appear in these years which reflected the government’s goals.  
As we have seen, both the corporatist regime and the leaders of the state-sponsored 
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pedagogical community considered historical instruction to be an especially important 
component of the Ständestaat’s educational efforts, as they sought to use the legacy of the 
Habsburg Monarchy to inspire a generation of young Austrians toward proud support for an 
independent, corporatist Austrian state.  The new series of history textbooks and readers 
show that the regime was at least partially successful in its efforts to present Austrian 
students with material which accurately reflected its ideas about national identity and the 
Habsburg past.  In most cases, these new educational materials conformed with the 
corporatist government’s stance on these matters, and offered school children a vision of an 
authoritarian and independent Austrian state grounded in the old Monarchy’s Catholic, 
German, and Western traditions.
The authors of the state’s new history textbooks and readers essentially agreed with 
the view of the corporatist leadership that the old Monarchy, which had been a force for 
peace, Christianity, and German culture throughout history, had been undermined and 
finally destroyed by the various ideologies unleashed in the aftermath of the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution.  Some of these textbooks also attacked the efforts of 
Hohenzollern Prussia beginning in the eighteenth century to usurp the leadership of 
Europe’s Germans from Austria, although such arguments appeared less frequently.  The 
ultimate goal of these textbook narratives was to present a view of Austrian history which 
portrayed the Ständestaat as the final victory over the Enlightenment ideals and materialistic 
Marxism embodied by the First Republic.  Some of these narratives also cast both Habsburg 
Austria and the modern Ständestaat as the  firm opponents of the dangerous, Prussian-
flavored German nationalism, expressed in its ultimate form in the Nazi German state.  All 
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of these educational materials tended to use specific Austrian monarchs and political figures 
as positive examples which would hopefully inspire Austrian school children toward a 
firmer, more dedicated sense of Austrian patriotism.
The new history textbooks tended to locate Austria’s historical roots in the German 
settlement of the Alpine and Danubian territories during the early medieval period.  A 
number of these texts and readers argued that the defensive function performed by German 
settlers ultimately set the precedent for all of Austria’s subsequent defense of Germany and 
the Christian West from both the Ottoman Turks and other threats in Europe such as Prussia 
or revolutionary France.524  Yet while these initial settlers, as well as the Babenberg dynasty 
which soon came to rule the Austrian territory, provided the opening chapters of the 
Austrian narrative, the Habsburg dynasty, which inherited the Austrian lands during the 
thirteenth century, was the main focus of these textbooks’ historical narrative.
Thus, Rudolph I von Habsburg, the first Holy Roman Emperor from the House of 
Austria, provided a particularly attractive figure upon which the textbooks could focus.  
Rudolph, with his chivalrous values and Catholic religiosity, represented the sort of 
character that the textbooks typically associated with the Habsburg monarchs, and many 
authors praised his efforts to bring peace, stability, and German cultural hegemony to 
Central Europe.  For example, Hans Leo Schleicher, Leopold Lang, Karl Janhuber and Josef 
Prüger, the authors of the 1936 history text for Hauptschulen, Zeiten und Menschen (Eras 
and Men), emphasized Rudolph’s religious piety and knightly values, and lauded the first 
524Wilhelm Schier, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für österreichische Hauptschulen, vol. 1, Einführung: Unser 
Vaterland im Wandel der Zeiten (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, 
Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1935), 34-37; Hans Leo Schleicher, Leopold Lang, Karl Janhuber and Josef 
Prüger, Zeiten und Menschen.  Handbuch für Hauptschulen, vol. 1,  4th ed. (Vienna: Österreichischer 
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Habsburg ruler of Austria for defeating the Slavic King Ottokar of Bohemia and for rescuing 
Germany from a dark era of leaderlessness and disorder.  They also explicitly contrasted 
Rudolph’s patriarchal medieval Monarchy and the harmonious Ständestaat of the Middle 
Ages with the despotic absolutism of Louis XIV of France and Frederick II of Prussia.525
Alexander Novotny, the author of a selection on Rudolph in the reader Helden der Ostmark
(Heroes of the Eastern March), similarly presented Rudolph as a true man of the people, 
who was simple, dutiful, and practical, and who had shared the same unshakable piety that 
all of his Habsburg successors had possessed.526
Indeed, many textbooks presented Rudolph as the founder of the unique, 
multinational Danubian state which would endure for so many centuries.  The textbook 
author Franz Eibelhuber portrayed the early Habsburg period as a struggle for benevolent 
German dominance in this region of many Völker.  Eibelhuber argued that the centuries after 
Rudolph featured notable attempts by Habsburg rulers to follow his example and to solidify 
their control over the lands of alpine Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary, which culminated in 
the achievement of what he called the “Austrian state idea.”  Eibelhuber noted that there had 
been a real threat that such a Danubian Völkerstaat might occur under Czech or Magyar 
auspices, rather than German ones.  The fact that the Habsburg succeeded ensured that 
Germandom would be protected and that German culture would nurture prosperity and 
development for all the Völker of the region.527  Subsequent Habsburg monarchs, such as 
Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1936), 53-54; Hermann Zerzawy, “Zeite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens,” in Helden der Ostmark (Vienna: Verlag Zoller, 1937), 65; Winkler, 68-75. 
525Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 72-74, vol. 4, 3-5, 170. 
526Alexander Novoty, “Rudolph von Habsburg,” in Helden der Ostmark, 28.
527Franz Eibelhuber, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die Oberstufe der Mittelschulen, vol. 2, Geschichte des 
Mittelalter und der Neuzeit vom Anfang des fränkischen Merowingerreiches bis zum Beginn der 
französischen Revolution (Innsbruck, Vienna and Munich: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1936), 77-79; Novotny, 
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Rudolph IV “the founder” and Maximilian I, would continue to build upon the paternalistic 
multinational state model which Rudolph I had established, solidifying Austria’s regional 
power even as they introduced innovations which ultimately brought the state into the 
modern age of centralized government.528
 Many textbook authors also emphasized the role of Eugene of Savoy.  This general, 
who had broken Ottoman power in the Balkans and opposed the expansionism of Louis 
XIV, invariably appeared in these accounts as a true Austrian patriot and champion, despite 
his foreign birth and non-German ethnicity.  The author of a selection on Eugene in Helden 
der Ostmark, Ignaz Dengel, characterized Eugene as an example of the sort of German 
qualities that the modern Ständestaat sought to embody, despite the fact that the military 
leader had not actually been German by birth.  Dengel argued that Eugene had been deeply 
suspicious of Prussia, and dedicated to serving the Habsburg emperor and Christianity.   
Dengel avowed that, “Above all this foreigner who became the best of Austrians showed a 
German mind and German nature, not in a strong nationalist sense, but rather as a German 
and at the same time a European by conviction, who saw Germanness as epitomized by the 
Christian-Western imperial idea and the Habsburg imperial line.”529  Such portrayals of 
Eugene were fairly typical, and Eugene was clearly a felicitous example of precisely the sort 
of cultural or even spiritual Germanness that the corporatist leaders wished to contrast with 
the racist German nationalism of the National Socialists.530
The era of Maria Theresa likewise provided considerable material for historical 
“Rudolph von Habsburg,” Helden der Ostmark, 26-29; Winkler, 54-55,64-68, 73-75.
528Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 78; Eibelhuber, 81-83.
529Ignaz Dengel, “Prinz Eugen, der edle Ritter,” in Helden der Ostmark, 76.
530See also Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 87; Eibelhuber, 144.
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accounts which sought to juxtapose the qualities of Austrian Germanness with the proto-
Nazi militarism of Frederick II of Prussia.  Most textbook authors praised Maria Theresa as 
a skillful and pious empress, and as a “mother” to her people who displayed heroic courage 
and strength in difficult times.  They also frequently contrasted her virtues with the 
absolutism of Frederick II, who had allegedly sought only to expand his own personal power 
at the expense of the independence of the German Stände.531  Eibelhuber criticized Frederick 
II less than other authors, but he similarly lauded Maria Theresa as a courageous, dedicated, 
clearheaded, and motherly monarch who had defended Austrian interests and rekindled 
Austrian patriotism at a time when it was on the wane.  She also, he noted, continued the 
slow dismantling of the medieval corporatist order which had been underway since the 
sixteenth century, a process which he argued had produced both positive and negative 
results for Austria.532  No matter whether or not individual authors presented students with 
specific condemnations of the policies of Frederick II, their accounts always portrayed the 
era of Maria Theresa as a period when Austria flourished in the face of severe difficulties.  
Indeed the praise for Maria Theresa in textbook accounts was also frequently extended to 
the Empress’ clever chief diplomat, Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, for his successes in 
preserving Austria’s prestige and influence,  and to her son, Joseph II, who invariably 
appeared as a true Volkskaiser (people’s Emperor) and a well-intentioned, if largely 
unsuccessful, reformer.533
The wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France in the late eighteenth and 
531Schier, vol. 1, 73-74; Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 88-91; Heinrich Kretschmayr, 
“Maria Theresa,” in Helden der Ostmark, 88-96.
532Eibelhuber, 149-157.
533Alexander Novotny “Fürst Kaunitz,” in Helden der Ostmark, 97-100; Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and 
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early nineteenth centuries provided a similar opportunity for textbook authors to cast Austria 
in a heroic light, albeit against French antagonists rather than Prussian ones.  The figures 
from this era most frequently singled out for their contributions to Austrian history were 
Andreas Hofer and General Joseph Radetzky.  Hofer, the Tyrolean leader of an unsuccessful 
uprising against Napoleon, appeared in these narratives as a man who, along with his fellow 
Austrian patriots, Josef Speckbacker and Joachim Haspinger, had always remained loyal to 
the “beloved” Habsburg Emperor Franz I.  Various authors argued that, even after his 
execution, Hofer’s Catholic piety, undying loyalty, and unshakable will to fight against 
Napoleon’s tyranny had been an example which had helped inspire both Austrians and 
Germans to defeat the French Emperor, and which might also inspire Austrian patriotism in 
the contemporary Ständestaat.534  Various authors lavished similar praise upon “Father 
Radetzky” as a talented general and a paternal figure to his troops during the struggle against 
Napoleon and in Austria’s efforts to suppress the liberal Revolution of 1848.  These authors 
described both Radetzky’s military successes and his goodwill and understanding for 
common soldiers, and noted that the general had been celebrated by another great Austrian, 
Johann Strauß the elder, in the famous musical composition “The Radetzky March.”535
Wilhelm Schier even went so far in his history textbook as to remind Austrian students of a 
rather more unlikely Austrian heroine of the era of the French Revolution: Marie Antoinette, 
the French queen and daughter of Maria Theresa, whom he presented as yet another example 
Prüger, vol. 1, 94-96; Eibelhuber, 157-159.
534Schier, vol. 1, 79-81; Franz Kolb, “Tirols Heldenkampf im Jahre 1809,” in Helden der Ostmark, 133-
139.  German nationalists also venerated Hofer, but portrayed him as German patriot in the fight against 
the French, rather than a loyal Austrian.  See chapters 1, 2, and 5.
535Schier, vol. 1, 81-84; Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 104.  The “Radetzky March” is 
almost a second national anthem in Austria, and provided the title for Joseph Roth’s 1932 novel and elegy 
for the Habsburg Monarchy.  Joseph Roth, The Radetzky March, trans. Joachim Neugroschel  (Woodstock, 
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of Austria’s sacrifices in order to defeat the French threat.536
The Ständestaat’s textbook authors, however, could not agree on how to portray 
Count Klemens von Metternich, Austria’s foreign minister between 1815 and 1848.  As we 
have seen, the corporatist state counted Metternich among the great heroes of the Habsburg 
past.  Some textbook authors did not present the Austrian diplomat in such a positive light.  
For example, despite characterizing the Vormärz era as a time of relative peace and c ultural 
development, Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger condemned Metternich himself as the 
“dictator of Germany” who had favored disunity and princely rule over the legitimate 
demands for a single German state and constitutional rule that eventually drove him from 
power in 1848.537  Alexander Novotny, on the other hand, took a more sympathetic view of 
the Austrian foreign minister, and praised him for his keen diplomatic skills and his efforts 
to build a stable and peaceful European order.  Novotny did admit that Metternich had been 
unable to respond to the changes which were sweeping Europe, arguing that the diplomat 
had been unwilling to take the legitimate demands of the German Volk in Austria seriously 
thanks to his paternalistic and archaic outlook.  Above all, however, Novotny argued that 
Metternich had been far more just in concluding a peace with vanquished France in 1815 
than the vengeful French had been when the shoe was on the other foot in 1918.538  For his 
part, Schier simply presented Metternich as the opponent of the democratic and 
constitutional demands of the revolutionary “storm” of 1848 without providing much 
NY: The Overlook Press, 1995).
536Schier, vol. 1, 74-76.
537Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 4, 78.
538Novotny, “Fürst Metternich,” in Helden der Ostmark, 151-156.
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interpretive commentary on his personality or historical significance.539
The movement toward German political unity which began with the Revolution of 
1848 and which culminated in the creation of a German state under Prussian leadership 
without Austria in 1871 was no less controversial a topic for the Ständestaat’s history 
textbooks.  Both Schier’s and Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger’s textbooks basically 
agreed that the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 had witnessed a conflict between a großdeutsch
faction, which desired a state comprising all Germans led by the oldest, greatest German 
power, Austria, and a kleindeutsch group which wanted a limited German state under 
Prussian rule.  Schier, however, continued in his narrative to denounce Austria’s subsequent 
forcible exclusion from Germany in 1866 by its enemy, Prussia, despite the laudable valor 
of Austria’s soldiers in the conflict between the two states. Indeed, Schier noted that 
Bismarck had been a dedicated opponent of Austria since 1848, and, while the author did 
acknowledge the Prussian chancellor’s diplomatic skill, he argued that Bismarck’s creation 
of a Prussian-dominated small German state had actually harmed the position of the 
Germans living in Austria, who subsequently became minorities in a multinational state 
when Austria’s formal links with the rest of Germany were severed.540  Schleicher, Lang, 
Janhuber and Prüger, on the other hand, simply recounted the events between 1848 and 1871 
dispassionately, and did not provide any denunciations of Prussian conduct during that 
period.541
There was no such discord in the textbooks’ accounts of Franz Joseph, the 
539Schier, vol. 1, 84.
540Schier, vol. 4, 89-95.
541Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 4, 79-80, 88-91.  Indeed their textbook provided a more 
favorable view of Prussia and Germany than any of the others produced in the Ständestaat, and apart from 
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penultimate Habsburg monarch of Austria, and emperor-king of the old multinational state 
for the nearly seven decades between 1848 and 1916.  The authors unanimously portrayed 
Franz Joseph as a dedicated sovereign who had wished only the best for all of his subjects, 
no matter what their nationality, and indeed as a man who could truly understand his people 
given his mastery of so many different tongues.  Although Franz Joseph’s personal life was 
deeply troubled, most authors emphasized his positive contributions to Austria, arguing that 
his era had been one of peace and economic development.  Schier in particular asserted that 
the emperor had given Austria a constitution and representative government, and had 
encouraged the growth of Vienna’s splendor as a city of monuments to Austria’s past.  Franz 
Joseph’s reign saw the rise of numerous nationalist movements in Austria-Hungary, and 
Schier characterized their aspirations as “harmful and dangerous” for the old state.  Schier 
also noted in passing that the Christian Social mayor of Vienna during the Habsburg’s 
state’s twilight years, Karl Lueger, had been Franz Joseph’s best collaborator.542  Alfred von 
Baldass even praised Franz Joseph’s assassinated wife, Elisabeth, proclaiming in rather 
purple prose that the fallen Empress had been an “angel” for all the nationalities of the old 
Monarchy. 543
If Franz Joseph’s reign had represented an era of peace and prosperity for old 
Austria, the World War which ultimately destroyed the Monarchy was an unmitigated 
disaster.  Schier argued that the war had been a great catastrophe for Austria, which had 
ultimately faced too many enemies to emerge victorious.  These enemies were able to tempt 
its praise of the corporatist regime, it contained material which would have fit comfortably alongside texts 
produced during the First Republic.
542Schier, vol. 1, 84-87; Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 105-108; Richard von Schaukal, 
“Kaiser Franz Joseph I,” in Helden der Ostmark, 198-204; Heinrich Kretschmayr, “Kaiser Franz Josef,” 
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the nationalities with promises of independence in order to dismantle the Monarchy, despite 
the efforts of the “Friedenskaiser” (peace-emperor) Karl to save the old state.  Schier noted 
that when all was said and done, Austria in 1918 had been territorially smaller than even the 
lands of the medieval Habsburg Emperor Rudolph IV.  Still, Schier did allow that the heroic 
deeds of Austrian soldiers during World War I could inspire Austrians in the present.544
Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger’s description of the war contained no animosity 
toward the Monarchy’s non-German nationalities, but it too sympathized with Karl, and 
lamented his failure to save the old multinational state.   Their textbook tried to personalize 
the war for Austrian children.  Their account of the conflict contained an illustration of an 
Austrian soldier embracing his tearful wife and young child even as his unit rode off for the 
front on horseback, and it presented several anecdotes concerning life both in the trenches 
and on the home front, emphasizing, in order to inspire Austrian patriotism in students, the 
noble sacrifices which Austria had made during the conflict.545
Schier made no mention of any Austrian desire for Anschluß in 1918 after the 
collapse of the old Monarchy.  He did note however, that an Austrian union with Germany 
was a prominent goal of the Nazis, whom he in turn cast as the enemies of Austria.546
Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, on the other hand, highlighted the prohibition of 
Anschluß by the Entente powers, and in fact vehemently denounced the “enslavement” of 
the German Volk and the “theft” of German territories, a deed which the authors blamed 
upon a vengeful France.  Indeed, as if the point had not been made with sufficient 
Österreich, Volk und Staat (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1936), 89-93.
543Alfred von Baldass, “Kaiserin Elisabeth,” in Helden der Ostmark, 205-210.
544Schier, vol. 1, 87-91.
545Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 108-112, 113, vol. 4, 147.
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obviousness, the authors underscored their complaints by including an illustration of a copy 
of the Treaty of St. Germain resting underneath a fearsome armored fist. They argued that 
the First Republic had failed to establish order or build Austrian prosperity, leaving the 
conservative chancellor during the 1920s, Ignaz Seipel, and ultimately Dollfuß, to replace 
this failed liberal government with one better able to help Austrians be free, independent, 
and happy once more.547
Some of the regime’s new textbooks and readers also made direct references to an 
“Austrian mission” of the sort so often discussed by corporatist leaders and educational 
theorists.   Schier’s textbook in particular contained an explicit description of “Austria’s 
political and cultural mission,” which he argued remained the same for the Ständestaat as it 
had been for the Habsburg Monarchy.  Schier described this mission as one of spreading 
German culture to the Völker of Central Europe in order to foster peace, cooperation, and 
development.  Schier ultimately noted that both Austria and especially Vienna had been 
outposts of German culture for centuries, serving the cause of both Germany and Europe.548
In the reader Helden der Ostmark, Hermann Zerzawy likewise discussed the often described 
Austrian mission to transmit German culture from West to East and to defend Europe 
against Eastern threats.549  Even those educational materials which did not make direct 
references to such a mission still often reminded students that Austria’s great history was a 
living legacy for the Austrian Ständestaat which obliged students to serve their Fatherland 
546Schier, vol. 4, 164, 167-169.
547Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 115-116, vol. 4, 148-155.
548Schier, vol. 4, 172-173, 203.  See also Josef Nadler, “Österreichs kulturelle Sendung,” Österreich, Volk




The government’s  new educational texts contained material which supported the 
regime’s ideals on a symbolic level as well.  For example, Schier’s history textbook 
contained a notable discussion of Austria’s red-white-red flag’s purported origins in 
Babenberg participation in the Christian crusades against Islam.  Indeed, Schier went into 
gory detail in recounting the legend of how the flag supposedly represented the blood of 
slain Muslims splattered upon the stark white tunic of Duke Leopold of Babenberg, and he 
also used the episode to present that Austrian prince as a dedicated defender of Christendom 
who had put the military success of the West ahead of his own pride.551  Hermann von 
Rüling argued in Helden der Ostmark that this story of the banner’s origins was apocryphal, 
but then avowed that such a fact did not diminish the red-white-red flag’s power as a symbol 
which had been used by the Babenbergs, the Habsburgs, and the First Republic.552  Both of 
these works also provided a similar treatment of the Austrian national anthem, dramatically 
portraying the composition of the old Kaiserhymne by the great Austrian composer Joseph 
Haydn in response to Napoleon’s first real military defeat at the hands of Austria at Aspern 
in 1809.553  The reader for younger Austrian children, Mein Vaterland, Mein Österreich, also 
contained material on the symbols which the corporatist state had inherited from the 
Habsburg Monarchy.554
Finally, it worth briefly describing the contents of various anthologies of German 
language readers which presented students with numerous and varied references to the 
550Schleicher, Lang, Janhuber and Prüger, vol. 1, 118.
551Schier, vol. 1, 34-37.
552Hermann von Rüling, “Österreichs Farben Rot-Weiss-Rot” in Helden der Ostmark, 21-24.
553 Schier, vol. 1, 77; Felix Günther, “Das Kaiserleid,” in Helden der Ostmark, 120-122.
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Habsburg past, even if they did not contain continuous historical narratives in the same 
manner as history textbooks.  For example, Robert Lohan, Walther Maria Neuwirth, and 
Viktor Trautzl’s Das Herz Europas included patriotic songs and poems, and accounts of 
notable Austrian figures from the past such as Eugene of Savoy, Radetzky, Archduke Karl, 
Hofer, and, of course, Dollfuß. It also contained selections about Austria’s national symbols, 
its contributions to European music, and its German and European missions.  The authors of 
the selections indeed were frequently Austrians of note themselves, such as Grillparzer, 
Nikolaus Lenau, Anastasius Grün, Hermann Bahr, Hugo von Hofsmannsthal, Wilhelm 
Miklas, Seipel and, again, Dollfuß.  As an introduction, the reader also contained a lengthy 
selection by the conservative pedagogical theorist, Oskar Benda, which provided a 
characteristically detailed and theoretical discussion of Austrian culture and identity within 
the context of the German nation, presumably for the benefit of teachers.555
Franz Berger’s series of readers for students in Mittelschulen, Sonniges Jugendland, 
featured a similar selection of texts, including patriotic works, descriptions of Austria’s 
natural beauty, and passages on dynastic figures such as Leopold VI of Babenberg, Friedrich 
Barbarossa (a non-Austrian German monarch who fought in the crusades), Rudolph I, 
Eugene of Savoy, Maria Theresa, Radetzky, Hofer, and Franz Joseph.  The fourth volume of 
this reader even contained a number of selections which discussed the broad variety of 
characteristics and features of the German nation, in which Austria claimed a proud place as 
the historic defender of the German Volk.556
554Mein Vaterland, Mein Österreich (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1935), 4-15.
555Robert Lohan, Walther Maria Neuwirth and Viktor Trautzl, eds., Das Herz Europas.  Ein 
österreichisches Vortragsbuch (Vienna: Saturn-Verlag, 1935).
556Franz Berger, ed., Sonniges Jugendland, Lesebuch für österreichische Mittelschulen, vols. 1-4 (Vienna: 
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One particularly interesting work, which was designed to inspire patriotic fervor in 
the very youngest of students attending Austrian Volksschulen was the reader Mein 
Vaterland, Mein Österreich.  Like the other readers, this work contained a number of 
passages which presented brief anecdotes about various notable figures from Austria’s past 
such as Maria Theresa, Mozart, Dollfuß, and soldiers on the front during World War I.  This 
reader was unique, however, in its presentation of a sort of “patriotic alphabet” for Austrian 
school children, with different inspirational selections and illustrations for each letter in the 
German language.  This section of the work propounded upon such patriotic topics as 
“Adler” (eagle), “Christentum” (Christianity), “Deutschtum” (Germanness), “Eugene of 
Savoy, “Farben und Fahnen” (colors and flags), “Helden der Heimat” (heroes of the 
homeland), “Kruckenkreuz,” “Musik aus Österreich” (music from Austria), “ Österreich” 
(Austria), “Soldaten” (soldiers), “Stephansturm” (the spire of St. Stephan’s Cathedral), 
“Treue” (loyalty), “Volk und Vaterland” (people and Fatherland), “Wien” (Vienna), and 
“Zukunft” (the future).  Clearly then, the regime wanted to instill even Austria’s very 
youngest students with the precepts of corporatism and Austrian patriotism.
Thus, even though the Ständestaat did not have very much time in order to produce 
educational materials which reflected its ideology, it was able to oversee the creation of at 
least some textbooks and readers.  These texts presented Austrian students with descriptions 
of Austria and its history which accorded with the vision of the regime.  History textbooks 
presented the Habsburgs in an overwhelmingly positive light, and portrayed the old 
Monarchy as the embodiment of the Christian, German, and Western ideals which the 
Österrischischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1936), passim, and especially vol. 
4, 110-117, 281-283.
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corporatist government claimed to represent.  Readers contained selections which 
emphasized great political and cultural figures from Austria’s past, enjoined students to be 
patriotic, reminded them of their homeland’s natural beauties and German character, and 
above all urged them to be loyal to the new regime.  Some of these materials did from time 
to time display an affinity for German nationalism which clearly went a bit beyond the 
stated positions of the government, but for the most part they buttressed the Ständestaat’s 
basic ideology and called on students to be proud of Austria’s Habsburg past and its 
contemporary independent statehood.
Ultimately, however, the Ständestaat failed in its efforts to preserve Austria’s 
independence.  The attempts of the leaders of corporatist Austria to base a new authoritarian 
political and social order upon the legacy of the old Habsburg state ultimately proved to be 
no match for the increasingly overwhelming diplomatic predominance in Central Europe 
achieved by Nazi Germany in the late 1930s.  By the time of Schuschnigg’s last, desperate 
attempts to bolster Austrian independence through a proposed referendum on the issue of the 
Anschluß in the spring of 1938, it is doubtful whether Austria, isolated from any allies in 
Italy or the West it might have at one time depended upon for help, could have preserved its 
statehood even if it wanted to.  All subsequent indications, however, indicate that the 
Austrian people did not generally oppose the Anschluß which so many of them had desired 
since 1918.  The Nazi invasion of Austria in March of 1938 was greeted with celebration 
rather than resistance, a fact for which even the oppressive tactics of the new Nazi 
authorities cannot completely account.
It seems, then, that the Ständestaat’s attempts to promote a vigorous upsurge of 
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Austrian patriotism through the use public propaganda, ideological education, and the 
suppression of dissenting opinions must be counted as a failure.  It is certainly questionable 
whether a mere five years could have possibly been enough time to achieve a transformation 
of public opinion of the sort hoped for by the Ständestaat’s leaders.  It is also worth
pondering, however, whether the regime’s own ideology may have played a role in the 
state’s failure to preserve itself.  Certainly, many contemporary observers on the left (and, 
indeed a few on the right) were highly critical of the corporatist government’s suppression 
of the workers’ movement at a time when the regime may well have needed every available 
ally it could find in order to stand against the advances of National Socialism.  Likewise, 
some commentators at the time argued that the new government was unwise to dismantle 
democracy in Austria, using dictatorial measures to oppose another dictatorship and giving 
Austrian democrats no obvious reason to prefer corporatist tyranny over the Nazi variety.  
Other observers made the argument that the Ständestaat’s stance on Austrian national 
identity was simply too ambiguous to be effective in combating German nationalism.  For 
all of its leaders’ talk concerning Austrian patriotism and distinctiveness, the Ständestaat
always proclaimed that Austrians were part of the German nation, and that Austria was a 
German state.  Such statements certainly had the potential to feed precisely the German 
nationalist sentiment that the regime feared, especially in an era such as the interwar period 
in Europe when the idea of the nation state was so prevalent and widely accepted.
The Ständestaat’s vision of an Austrian state that was simultaneously religiously 
Catholic, culturally German, traditionally Western, and yet still uniquely Austrian, was 
undoubtedly a realistic reflection of how many Austrians had thought of themselves 
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throughout their state’s history.  Such ideas were thoroughly rooted in precisely the 
Habsburg past which the Austrian corporatist state claimed to embody.  In an era of waxing 
German nationalism and expanding National Socialist power, however, the Habsburg past 
was apparently not a firm enough foundation upon which to build and maintain an 
independent Austrian state.  We can never know for certain precisely what the state of 
public opinion concerning Austrian national identity was between 1933 and 1938, given the 
repressive nature of the corporatist regime.  Nor can we really discern exactly how effective 
the government’s attempts to influence such ideas were. All we can say for certain is that 
the efforts of the Ständestaat to preserve Austria’s statehood failed, and were not visibly 
mourned by the Austrian people until a new Austrian Republic mounted a similar effort to 
inspire Austrian patriotism in 1945, after the seven years of war, genocide, and racist 
dictatorship which were the ultimate fruits of the 1938 Anschluß with Nazi Germany.
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Part III. Repudiating the Past: The “Alpine and Danubian Reichsgaue,” 
1938-1945
Chapter 5. Politics, Education, and the Habsburg Past in Nazi Austria 
On March 12, 1938, the Anschluß with Germany which had been so long awaited by 
so many Austrians since 1918 finally occurred.  The Schuschnigg government had been 
under increased pressure from Nazi Germany for almost two years to curb its restrictions 
upon the Austrian Nazi party and to align its foreign policy with that of Germany.  In a last, 
desperate effort to maintain Austrian independence, Schuschnigg had planned a plebiscite 
for March 13 on the question of whether or not Austria should join the German Reich.  The 
announcement of the plebiscite backfired, however, and served as the impetus for a new, 
more aggressive stance on the part of Nazi Germany.  In the face of the threat of a German 
invasion, the Austrian President, Wilhelm Miklas, called for Schuschnigg’s resignation on 
March 11.557  The new government, led by the prominent Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-
Inquart, requested the assistance of the German military in order to “keep order” in Austria, 
and the next day, as the Nazi Wehrmacht flooded into Austria, it issued a declaration which 
announced that Austria was a part of the greater German Reich.558
557Christine Klusacek, Herbert Steiner and Kurt Stimmer, eds. Dokumentation zur Österreichischen 
Zeitgeschichte 1938-1945 (Vienna and Munich: Verlag Jugend und Volk, 1971), 20-21.
558“Eine Klarstellung,” Wiener-Zeitung (Vienna), 13 March 1938, 1. Despite the press reports at the time, 
Seyss-Inquart himself did not draft the invitation to the German government, but rather reluctantly 
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authorized the statement, written by Wilhelm Keppler, the liaison between the Third Reich and the 
Austrian Nazi Party.  The Austrian Party was confident in its ability to complete its seizure of power in 
Austria without any military assistance from Germany, and was taken by surprise by the swiftness of both 
the German decision to intervene and the subsequent Anschluß.  See below, and Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler 
and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1981), 210-215.
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  The Nazis held their own plebiscite on the Anschluß on April 10, which saw the Austrian 
voters approve the abnegation of their independence by the suspiciously overwhelming 
margin of 99.73 percent.559
Indeed, historians have good reason to doubt that an anti-democratic group such as 
the Nazis held a free plebiscite which accurately recorded the real level of support for the 
Anschluß on the part of the Austrian population.  Yet even if the Nazi authorities 
manipulated the vote, there is little doubt that there was widespread support in Austria for a 
union with Nazi Germany.560  As we have seen, Austria’s major political parties had all 
endorsed Anschluß until 1933, and the efforts of the corporatist regime to instil an intense 
sense of Austrian patriotism within the population seemed to have met with little success.  
The Austrian population received Hitler and the German military with enthusiasm and the 
Wehrmacht met no significant resistence on its march from the Austro-German border to 
Vienna.  The crowds of admirers which greeted the German Führer in the land of his birth 
were quite large, and it is doubtful that such a reception could have been completely 
manufactured through Nazi coercion.561  One historian of the Nazi seizure of power in 
Austria, John Bernbaum, even notes that marriage rates tripled in Austria between 1937 and 
1939, while the number of births in December of 1938 (that is, of children conceived during 
the immediate aftermath of the Nazi takeover), increased sixty-six percent from the previous 
559Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), April 11, 1938, 1-2; Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria, Empire and 
Republic 1815-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 223-224.
560Ibid., 224.
561Hans Haas, “Der ‘Anschluß’” in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch, ed. Emmerich Tálos, 
Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer, and Reinhard Sieder (Vienna: österreichische Bundesverlag, 2001), 
44-48.  Evan Burr Bukey argues that Austrians supported the Nazi regime from the initial Anschluß in 
March of 1938 up until the end of World War II.  Evan Burr Bukey,  Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment 
in the Nazi Era, 1938_1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 288-93.
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December.562  Such statistics reveal the optimism of Austrians about their future after the 
successful completion of a union between Austria and Germany.
Yet at the same time, such initial ebullience should not obscure the fact that support 
for the Anschluß in a general sense did not mean total support for all aspects of Nazi 
ideology.  The Nazi takeover in 1938 seems to have enjoyed the support that it did because 
most Austrians considered themselves Germans and had long thought that their state should 
be a part of a greater Germany.  The economic hardships and political instability which 
Austria had experienced since 1918 had done little to convince the general population that a 
small Austrian state was viable on its own, and they looked to a union with the resurgent, 
economically vigorous Nazi German state to put an end to those problems.  Certainly many 
Austrians did not object to the Nazis’ virulent racial anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevism, 
German chauvinism, and aggressive ambitions to dismantle the post-World War I 
international order.  Given the repressive, authoritarian nature of the Nazi regime in Austria, 
however, there are very few sources which indicate exactly how most of the Austrian 
population felt about specific aspects of Nazi ideology, or how those opinions changed in 
the face of the Third Reich’s efforts to indoctrinate the Austrian population.  The most we 
can say with confidence is that most Austrians supported the Anschluß with enthusiasm and
did not offer any active opposition to Nazi rule.563  Acquiescence is something different than 
ideological conviction, and even if most Austrians remained fairly satisfied with Austria’s 
membership in the Third Reich between 1938 and 1945, that fact does not mean that the 
562John Bernbaum, “Nazi Control in Austria: The Creation of the Ostmark, 1938-1940" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Maryland, 1972), 149.
563Bernbaum, 151-154; Bukey, 288-293; Haas, 44-48.  There was a small but significant Austrian 
resistance movement, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Nazi state was the Großdeutschland that most Austrians had longed to join since 1918. 
The Anschluß of 1938 represented the triumph of a specific kind of Germanist 
identity in Austria.  The diversity of Germanist sentiment in Austria after 1918 was 
subordinated in 1938 to the Nazi Weltanshauung, which comprised a specific cluster of
ideas and beliefs, not all of which were necessarily widely supported in Austria.  One need 
only compare the support for democratic rule, racial equality, and internationalist pacifism 
of the “Germanist” Austrian Social Democrats, or the staunch Catholicism of the Christian 
Social Party during the 1920s with the Nazis’ racism, militarism, anti-Catholicism and anti-
republicanism in order to illustrate the conflict between Nazi “Germanism” and other 
German nationalist presentations of Austrian identity.  Nevertheless, after 1938, Germanist 
conceptions of Austrian national identity in general came to be closely associated with the 
Nazi regime, and such national ideals ultimately were de-legitimized by their perceived 
linkage with the crimes of the Nazis once the second World War ended with the defeat of 
Nazi Germany.
During Nazi rule in Austria, the government mounted an attempt to erase all traces of 
Austrian independence by gradually dissolving all of the old Austrian state’s administrative 
divisions and functions, and by completely integrating the Austrian territory into the 
structure of the greater German Reich.  As with previous regimes in Austria, the Third Reich 
used educational policy as a tool, indoctrinating Austrian students with Nazi ideology and a 
strong sense of German identity.  Similarly, the Habsburg past represented as much of a 
focal point for the Nazis as it had for previous Austrian governments, as the Nazi 
government tried to replace any sense of Austrian particularism which might have lingered 
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among its new subjects with an absolute devotion to the Nazi German state.  National 
Socialist ideologues, from Adolf Hitler down to individual educators in the Third Reich’s 
Austrian territory, presented the Habsburgs as a foreign, decadent, anti-German dynasty 
which had done all it could to hinder German unity, and which had been a pestilential 
presence in Germany’s history.  Such anti-Habsburg rhetoric, almost universal in the 
curricula, pedagogical writings, and textbooks disseminated and used in the former Austria 
during the Nazi period, constituted a concerted effort on the part of the Hitler regime to 
impose its own unique vision of German identity upon its newest citizens.
Conversely, the small but still significant resistance movement in the Austrian 
territory, formed in opposition to the new regime, frequently presented its own arguments in 
a way that emphasized notions of Austrian patriotism.  Such efforts by the various factions 
within the Austrian resistance to portray the Nazis as foreign or “Prussian” invaders in 
Austria sometimes used the Habsburg dynasty and its historical relationship to Austria as a 
rallying point for resistance against the Nazis.  Furthermore, some of the plans for 
reestablishing Austrian independence proposed by the resistance groups and discussed by 
the Allies during the final stages of World War II often aimed not just to recreate the small 
Austrian state of the interwar period, but rather to recast Austria as the center of a larger 
Danubian or German Catholic federation which bore more than a passing resemblance to the 
old Habsburg state.  Thus, the debate on Austrian national identity and the meaning of the 
Habsburg past continued even under the authoritarian rule of a Nazi state which had 
officially eradicated Austria’s very existence.  On the other hand, the new context of this 
debate–the genocidal war between Nazi Germany and the rest of Europe–permanently 
348
transformed the discussion, as the crimes of the regime de-legitimized Austrian Germanism 
by association, even as they gave a new urgency and potency to the Austrianist conceptions 
of national identity which had been mobilized against the Nazi government by its opponents.
i. National Socialist Ideology and the Nazi Seizure of Power in Austria  
The ideals and doctrines of National Socialism which came to dominate Germany in 
1933 and Austria in 1938 were in an indirect manner themselves partially of Austrian origin.  
The leader and guiding ideological figure of Nazism was Adolf Hitler, who was born in 
Braunau in Habsburg Austria on April 20, 1889.  Hitler grew up and was educated in the 
Habsburg state, and was particularly influenced by the anti-Semitic political ideals of two of 
the most prominent Austrian politicians of that era, Georg von Schönerer and Karl Lueger.  
It was in old Austria that he came to believe in the distinctively odious mixture of 
chauvinistic German nationalism and virulent racism which would ultimately provide the 
basis of the Nazi ideology that later engulfed his homeland.  Hitler refined his political ideas 
further after he fought in the German army during World War I , and witnessed the defeat 
and political collapse of the German Reich which he had so admired.  After the war he 
joined and in short order became the leader of a small group of right-wing radicals in 
Munich called the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei- NSDAP).  After a number a fairly feeble attempts to seize political 
power in Germany during the 1920s, the economic depression which convulsed all of 
Europe provided the circumstances which allowed Hitler’s Nazi movement to win 
increasing successes at the ballot box, culminating with his appointment as chancellor of 
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Germany on January 30, 1933.  From that position of power, Hitler quickly moved to 
dismantle the democratic apparatus of the Weimar Republic, and to replace it with a one-
party, nationalistic, anti-Semitic dictatorship which five years later absorbed the land of his 
birth.564
The National Socialist ideology which Hitler decisively helped shape was most 
clearly defined by what it opposed: it was anti-Semitic, anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-
Marxist, anti-egalitarian and anti-conservative.  In the place of all of the ideas or groups 
which Hitler opposed, he supported a staunchly chauvinistic German nationalism which 
valued racial purity, an idealized conception of dictatorial leadership, military strength,
youthful energy, struggle as the crucible which produced true character, and the willingness 
of the individual German to sacrifice himself for the interests of the community of the Volk 
(Volksgemeinschaft).  Such ideas were hardly new.  Hitler derived them from the German 
Romantic movement of the early nineteenth century, the modern racial anti-Semitism of 
William Houston Chamberlain and Karl Eugen Dühring, and the aesthetic and philosophic 
works of Richard Wagner and Friedrich Nietzsche.565  Hitler’s National Socialism was 
unique, however, in the manner in which it synthesized these various influences into a 
successful political platform which ultimately shaped not only the destiny of Germany, but 
564For Hitler’s own autobiographical account of his youth and early career, see Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf,  
trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 1-372.  The most comprehensive scholarly 
biography of Hitler is Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889_1936: Hubris (London: Penguin, 1999); Hitler, 1936_45: 
Nemesis (London: Penguin, 2000).  See also Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1964); Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship (New York : Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
565On the intellectual background of Nazi ideology see George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: The 
Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Howard Fertig, 1964); Fritz Stern, The Politics of 
Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1963); Steven Ascheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 164-309; Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The 
Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1970).
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that of all of Europe.
Once in power, Hitler’s regime moved quickly in the direction of the goals which 
Hitler had set forth with remarkable frankness in his 1924 autobiography, Mein Kampf.  
Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, began a program of military rearmament in 
violation of the Treaty of Versailles, outlawed Marxist and liberal political parties, and, 
perhaps most significantly, used a series of laws to deprive German Jews of their citizenship 
and participation in German public life.566  Historians have long discussed the manner in 
which the Nazi dictatorship in Germany functioned.  One view, proposed by such scholars 
as Alan Bullock and William Sheridan Allen, presented Nazi Germany as a firm 
dictatorship, which insinuated itself into every facet of German life.567  Other historians such 
as Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat argued that Nazi Germany represented a fairly 
disorganized authoritarian regime which was characterized by numerous competing 
administrative structures, and which achieved its high degree of social control through local 
improvisation as much as through premeditated policies created by the Nazi leadership.568
If the Nazi regime in Germany was less well-planned and tightly controlled than 
historians of National Socialism first supposed, then the development of the Austrian Nazi 
Party was even more disorganized.  Despite Hitler’s own Austrian origins and the presence 
566V. R. Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 129-149.  For a detailed discussion on Nazi policy 
toward German Jews during the 1930s see Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, vol.1, The Years 
of Persecution, 1933-1939 (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 9-175.
567Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives (London: HarperCollins, 1991) 974-9; William Sheridan 
Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945 2d Ed. (New 
York: Franklin Watts, 1984), 293-306; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 2d. Ed. (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 389-459.
568Hans Mommsen, From Weimar to Auschwitz, trans. Philip O'Connor (Princeton, N.J : Princeton 
University Press, 1991); Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: the Foundation and Development of the Internal 
Structure of the Third Reich (London: Longman, 1981).
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in Austria of a relatively more potent tradition of political anti-Semitism than in Germany, 
the Nazi movement in Austria was always politically weaker than its German counterpart.569
The Austrian Nazi organization had actually been founded well before the German party, yet 
it lacked the sort of dynamic leadership that Hitler gave to the German Party after 1919.  In 
1926, Austrian Nazis acknowledged as much by voting unanimously to subordinate 
themselves to Hitler’s leadership as a wing of the German Nazi organization.570  Despite 
their affiliation with Hitler’s party, however, the Austrian branch never commanded much 
electoral support within Austria, even during the late 1920s, when the German party was 
increasingly successful.  Only after the Nazis seized power in Germany in 1933 did their 
Austrian wing become a major force in Austrian politics.  The Austrian Nazis subsequently 
made impressive gains at the ballot box, especially in the countryside, where they began to 
win control of many local governments 571
Just as the Austrian party began to win real support in Austria, however,  the 
conservative authoritarian regime of Engelbert Dollfuß outlawed it on June 19, 1933.  Hitler, 
who had guided the Austrian party from afar for almost a decade, decided to maintain 
amicable relations with the Austrian state for the time being, and so ordered the Austrian 
Nazis to obey Dollfuß’ edict and to cease terrorist activities against the Austrian government 
immediately.  This decision provoked a power struggle within the Austrian Nazi leadership, 
569On the strong tradition of political anti-Semitism in Austria, see Bruce Pauley, From Prejudice to 
Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 
1-11; Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988).
570The Austrian Party was founded in 1904 as the German Workers Party, and became the German 
National Socialist Party in 1918.  Andrew G. Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism Before 1918 (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 37-40, 101-122; Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, 16-35.
571Bernbaum, 22-25; Timothy Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” in The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in 
Austria: A Reassessment, eds. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick and 
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as the old fighters of the Austrian movement refused to go along with Hitler’s decision and 
end their activism against the Dollfuß regime.  Hitler’s appointee as leader of the Austrian 
party, Theo Habicht, wanted to stage a Nazi coup in Austria as a means of regaining the 
support of the lower level Austrian party leaders, and Hitler, with some reluctance, agreed.  
The attempted coup took place on July 25, 1934 and ultimately failed, although the Austrian 
Nazis did succeed in fatally wounding Dollfuß.572
In order to mollify Schuschnigg, the new Austrian leader, Hitler subsequently denied 
any responsibility for the uprising, and officially separated the Austrian Nazi Party from the 
German Party.  Extreme factionalism resulted from this decision, as a movement of Austrian 
“old fighters” under the leadership of Josef Leopold sought to take a more activist stance 
vis-à-vis the Austrian government, while other figures who still maintained close but covert 
ties to Berlin such as Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Friedrich Rainer, Hubert Klausner and Odilo 
Globocnik held to the more passive approach favored by Hitler and the German party.  
Ultimately the latter faction became the dominant one after Hitler succeeded in pressuring 
Schichnigg into an agreement with Germany in 1936.573
Yet even the Austrian Nazi leaders who had been most loyal to the German Party 
leadership were somewhat surprised by events leading up to the Anschluß.  The Austrian 
Nazis initially imagined that they themselves would seize power in an independent Austrian
state, and afterward move gradually toward a union with Germany which would at least 
partially preserve both Austrian autonomy and their own political prominence in the region.  
Instead, the German military invaded on March 12, 1938, without any prompting from the 
London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 10-31.
572Ibid., 28-43; Jelavich, 196-200, 207-208.
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Austrian Party and pursued Anschluß with surprising swiftness.574  Indeed, the rapid union 
between the two states yielded a hastily constructed power structure in Austria, featuring a 
number of overlapping and competing nodes of authority.  The Third Reich certainly did not 
neglect the Austrian Nazis, who subsequently held many positions of leadership at the Gau
level.575  At the same time, however, Germans from outside Austria filled the most decisive 
positions of leadership within the Austrian territories of the Third Reich between 1938 and 
1945, and the old Austrian state apparatus was gradually dismantled in favor of an 
administrative chain of command which linked important policy decisions to Berlin.576
The integration of Austria into the Third Reich was largely an improvised process, 
however, and there seems to have been little in the way of advance planning either by the 
German government or the Austrian Nazi leadership.577  Josef Bürckel, the German former 
administrator of the Saarland, oversaw the overall administration of the Austrian territories 
within the Third Reich for more than a year.  At the same time, however, the old Austrian 
governmental structure, presided over by Seyss-Inquart, remained intact, and competed with 
Bürckel for influence in the former Austria.  The old Austrian ministries of Interior and 
Cultural Affairs (which included responsibility for education), Economics and Labor, 
Finance and Agriculture all continued to exist within the Third Reich until June 1, 1940.  
573Bernbaum, 46-55.
574Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, 210-215; Maurice Williams, “Captain Josef Leopold: Austro-
Nazi and Austro-Nationalist?” in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today, ed. F. 
Parkinson (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 57-71.
575Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, 220.
576Bernbaum, 51-52, 106-108, 246; Jelavich, 224-228; Klusacek, Steiner and Stimmer, 54.
577Bernbaum, 66-67; Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, 220-222.  This preference undoubtedly 
reflected Hitler’s own frustration with and even contempt for the Austrian branch of the Party, which he 
never really trusted to follow his orders before 1938 .  The German dictator was of course willing to allow 
Austrian Nazis such as Odilo Globocnik, Alfred Frauenfeld, and Franz Schattenfroh to serve in positions 
of relative importance outside of Austria, but for the upper echelons of power within the Ostmark, he 
relied most heavily upon Reichsdeutsche.
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The territories of Austria themselves were transformed into seven “Reichsgaue” which 
basically corresponded to the old Austrian provinces, with the exception of Burgenland and 
Tyrol, which were both incorporated into other Gaue.578
In an especially important symbolic move, the Nazi authorities completely 
abandoned the name “Österreich” (Austria).  Immediately after the Anschluß, the Austrian 
territories were re-christened the “Ostmark,” (Eastern March), a label which harked back to 
Austria’s supposed past as one of the border territories of the medieval German Empire, and 
which lacked the connotations of independence and distinctiveness inherent in the region’s 
more common name.  Similarly, the new authorities transformed the former provinces of 
Upper and Lower Austria into the Upper and Lower Danube Reichsgaue.579
578Bernbaum, 129-130; Emmerich Tálos, “Von der Liquidierung der Eigenstaatlichkeit zur Etablierung der 
Reichsgaue der ‘Ostmark:’ Zum Umbau der politisch-administativen Struktur,” in NS-Herrschaft in 
Österreich: Ein Handbuch, ed. Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer and Reinhard 
Sieder (Vienna: österreichische Bundesverlag, 2001), 55-72.
579Völkisher Beobachter (Vienna), August 3, 1938, 1.
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  In 1942, the Third Reich even discarded the term Ostmark in favor of the unwieldy label 
“the Alpine and Danubian Reichsgaue.”580  On a symbolic level it was clear that the Nazi 
government wanted not only to assimilate Austria in the Third Reich, but also to erase any 
terms which might perpetuate feelings of Austrian particularism.  Hitler and his movement 
had regarded the independence of the Austrian lands as a historical aberration, and they saw 
Austria’s very name as a symbol of the division of the German Volk by its enemies.  In their 
attempts to erase that name from the map of Europe, the Nazis sought to ensure that the 
Volksgemeinschaft would never again be divided.
The Nazi regime also moved to curtail the power and influence of the Catholic 
Church in Austria, just as it had earlier in the rest of the Third Reich.  The new authorities 
did not generally attack the Church or its leaders, but they did eliminate the privileged 
position in Austrian public life which the Church had enjoyed during the Ständestaat, 
cutting off state financial support to the Church and removing it from its previous role in 
education and marriage law.  For their part, upper level Church leaders accepted their 
diminution of power and did not call for Catholics to resist the new government.  Some 
clergymen lower down in the Church hierarchy did openly oppose National Socialism, 
however, and were persecuted by the Nazi government.  Indeed, in 1938 Austrian Catholics 
even conducted the largest public demonstration ever held in the Third Reich to protest the 
Nazi regime’s treatment of the Church.  For the most part, however, Nazi and Church 
leaders in Austria  reached an uneasy truce in which the Nazis allowed the Church to 
continue its religious leadership of Austrian society in exchange for its acceptance and 
580Tálos, “Von der Liquiderung,” 64-69; Bernbaum, 212.
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support of Nazi rule.581
The Nazi government of the Austrian territories was basically a German creation, 
and the dictatorial nature of the Nazi system left little room for most Austrians to voice their 
opinions or to influence policy decisions.  Now it was the Nazi German leadership that made 
policy for Austria, including the determination of what was an acceptable view of Austria’s 
Habsburg past, and what version of that past should be taught in Austrian schools.582
ii. National Socialism and the Habsburg Past 
On March 15, 1938, just after German troops had seized control of Austria, Hitler 
gave a speech to a massive Austrian crowd from the balcony of the former Habsburg palace 
on the Heldenplatz in Vienna.  In this speech, Hitler described the differences between the 
recently toppled Schuschnigg regime’s vision of Austria and his own conception of his 
native land’s place within the Nazi Reich.  He proclaimed:
During recent years the heads of the regime which has now been overthrown have 
often spoken of the special “mission” which in their eyes this country had to fulfil.  
A leader of the legitimists sketched this mission in detail in a memorandum.  
According to this memorandum the task of this so-called independence of the 
country of Austria– an independence based upon the Peace Treaties and dependent 
upon the favor of foreign countries– was to hinder the formation of a really great 
German Reich and thus to bar the way leading to the future of the German people.  
Now I proclaim for this land its new mission, which corresponds with the command 
which in times past summoned hither the German settlers from all the Gaue of the 
Old Reich.  The oldest East Mark of the German people shall henceforth be the 
youngest bulwark of the German nation and thus of the German Reich.583
581Bukey, Hitler’s Austria, 130-134; Erst Hanisch, “Austrian Catholicism: Between Accommodation and 
Resistance,” in Conquering the Past, 165-176.
582Herbert Dachs, “Schule und Jugenderziehung in der ‘Ostmark,’” in  in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 
1938-1945, ed. Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna: Verlag für 
Gesellschaftskritik, 1998), 224; Völkischer Beobachter (Vienna), May 1, 1940, 1-2.
583Adolf Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, vol. 2, trans. Norman H. Bayne 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 1430, 1425-1426.
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Hitler’s statements, which received with thunderous applause from the assembled Viennese 
crowd, neatly encapsulated his views about his Austrian homeland.  According to Hitler, 
Austria had long been used as an implement by anti-German forces; now it was returning 
home to Germany and to its “true mission” as the eastern outpost of the German Empire.
Hitler had long yearned for Anschluß between Austria and Germany.  He had 
mentioned his desire to join his Austrian homeland with Germany on the very first page of 
Mein Kampf, a work in which he also sketched out the views about Austria’s Habsburg past 
which would become dogma in Nazi Germany.584  In Mein Kampf, Hitler portrayed the 
House of Habsburg as a decadent, anti-German force which had sought to maintain its 
power at the expense of the German Volk who were its most important and creative subjects.  
He argued that the Habsburgs had historically worked against the interests of German unity, 
and that Germans in Austria owed their loyalty to their Volk, rather than to the corrupt 
dynasty:
Here it suffices to state that even in my earliest youth I came to the basic insight 
which never left me, but only became more profound: that Germanism could be 
safeguarded only by the destruction of Austria, and furthermore, that national 
sentiment is in no way identical with dynastic patriotism. . . Even then I had drawn 
the consequences from this realization: ardent love for my German-Austrian 
homeland, deep hatred for the Austrian state.585
For Hitler, there was no such thing as an Austrian history separate from the history of 
Germany as a whole.  German history in Austria had been the story of how a dynastic house 
kept one segment of the Volk subservient and separate from the rest of the German nation.586
Early in his life, Hitler repudiated the Habsburg state which he saw as infected by 




Slavs, Magyars, and Jews, pledging his loyalty instead to Wilhelmine Germany.  In Mein 
Kampf he described how as a young boy he had raptly read an account of the Franco-
German War of 1870-71 in one of the volumes in his father’s library.  When he asked his
father why Austria had not participated in the conflict, he reportedly received the response 
that, “not every German was fortunate enough to belong to Bismarck’s Reich.”587  This 
emphasis upon Prussia rather than Habsburg Austria as the true representative of the 
German Volk characterized Hitler’s view of German history.  Indeed, most of the heros 
which Hitler singled out for praise in history such as Martin Luther, Frederick the Great, 
Bismarck, and Richard Wagner, were northern Germans rather than Austrians.588  The only 
Habsburg figure whom he portrayed positively was Joseph II, and even then, Hitler qualified 
his praise with a comment that it had been fortunate that the Austrian monarch’s 
“Germanization” policies had not worked because they would have diluted the racial purity 
587Ibid., 6-7; It is worth noting that at least one Nazi textbook recounted this episode from Mein Kampf. 
Christoph Herfurth, Die Ewige Strasse: Geschichtsbuch für die Hauptschule (Dortmund: Druck un Verlag 
von W. Cruwell, 1943), 9.
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of Austrian Germans.589
588Hitler, Mein Kampf, 213, 238, 655-6.
589Ibid., 73, 389-390; Joseph II was a popular figure for many other German nationalists in Central Europe 
as well.  See Cynthia Paces and Nancy M. Wingfield, “The Sacred and the Profane: Religion and 
Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1880-1920,” in Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe, 
eds. Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2005), 107-125; 
Wingfield, “Statues of Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of 
Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, eds. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. 
Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 178_201.
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  Other Habsburgs such as  Franz Josef and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand appear in the 
pages of Hitler’s autobiography as figures who sought to “exterminate” the German Volk in 
Austria with pro-Slavic, pro-Catholic policies designed to maintain their “mummy” of a 
state’s increasingly feeble grip on political power.590  For Hitler, only the Monarchy’s 
German subjects had accomplished anything of economic, political, or cultural value.  By 
1866 at the latest, the dynasty itself had ceased to fulfill its appropriate role as the protector 
of German interests in eastern Europe.591
590Hitler, Mein Kampf, 92-93, 141, 159.
591Ibid., 70, 94-95.
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Hitler did single out two other figures from Austria’s recent past for praise in Mein 
Kampf: the Pan-German Party leader Georg von Schönerer and the Christian Socialist 
Party’s guiding figure, Karl Lueger.  Hitler lauded Schönerer as a great ideological 
revolutionary who had clearly seen the anti-German character of the Habsburg dynasty.  
Schönerer’s only real fault according to Hitler was his regrettable inability to move past his 
theoretical preoccupations and create a successful mass political movement.  Lueger on the 
other hand, appeared in an opposite light in Hitler’s description.  Hitler praised the 
patriarchal Viennese politician as a man who truly knew how to create a broad political 
movement by playing on the anxieties and desires of the Austrian-German population.  
Lueger had erred, however, by remaining stanchly loyal to the Habsburgs, and Hitler 
charged that the Viennese mayor’s professed anti-Semitism was a “sham” because it was not 
based upon racial principles.  Thus, both men were flawed models.  Schönerer had an 
appropriate ideological understanding of Austria’s real place in the world, yet lacked 
political skills, while Lueger was a canny populist politician who ultimately failed to 
recognize the national flaws of the dynasty which he fervently supported.592
Thus, Hitler’s view of the Habsburg past was one in which the Habsburg dynasty 
opposed the interests of the German Volk, both within and outside of Austria.  He portrayed 
the dynasty as predatory and anti-German, interested in its own political power rather than in 
its proper national duties as a German princely house.  Above, all Hitler identified the 
Habsburg Monarchy as a supranational, indeed internationalist, entity which stood 
592Ibid., 100-120; Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, 22-23; John W. Boyer, Culture and Political 
Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power,1897_1918 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
26; Andrew G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-
Germanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 305-319.
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diametrically opposed to the sort of nationalistic and racial theories which National 
Socialism valued above all else.  Interestingly, Hitler’s characterization of the Habsburg 
state closely mirrors the apologetic descriptions of the old Monarchy given by proponents of 
“Austrianist” national identity during the 1920s.  If First Republic Austrian commentators 
such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Oscar Schmitz had loved old Austria for its 
supranational, peace-loving character, then Hitler hated the Habsburg Monarchy for 
precisely the same reasons.593  It is also worth noting that while neither Hitler nor any other 
Nazis overtly described the Habsburg Monarchy as being in any way Jewish, they did 
associate it with ideas or movements which they inevitably characterized as being linked 
with the Jews, such as internationalism or cooperation between Völker.594
Hitler expressed his animosity toward the Habsburg Monarchy in various ways once 
he came to power.  For example, during the 1930s, Nazi officials in Germany saw the 
restoration of the Monarchy in corporatist Austria as a potential, if somewhat unlikely, 
danger to their interests in the region.  German diplomatic correspondence during the mid-
1930s contains numerous references to such a possibility and reveals the efforts by the Nazi 
regime to inform the Schuschnigg government that the Third Reich would not tolerate any 
attempt to return to a monarchical system in Austria.595   Likewise, after the Anschluß, the 
593Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Österreichs Europäische Sendung (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1934), 
1-24; Oscar A. H. Schmitz, Der österreichische Mensch, zum Anschauungsunterricht für Europäer, 
inbesondere für Reichsdeutsche (Vienna: Wiener Literarische Anstalt, 1924) 1-68.  See Chapters 1 and 3 
for a complete discussion of “Austrianist” views of the Habsburg past during the First Republic and the 
Ständestaat.
594For a brief description of how the Nazis associated internationalism with the Jews, see Gilmer W. 
Blackburn, Education in the Third Reich.  Race and History in Nazi Textbooks (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1985), 143.
595See especially documents 157, 161,190 and 196 in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 
Series D, 1937-1945, vol. 1, From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937-September 1938), ed. US State 
Department (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1949).
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new Nazi authorities in Austria undertook a symbolic assault upon any lingering affinities 
for the old Monarchy.  In the town of Mödling, they re-christened Franz Josef-Platz as Adolf 
Hitler-Platz,596 while various townships in Burgenland revoked the honorary citizenship they 
had previously conferred upon Otto Habsburg, the son of the last Habsburg monarch.597
History education in Nazi Germany and Austria expressed Hitler’s view of history 
especially forcefully and it sought to indoctrinate students with National Socialism’s 
preferred interpretation of the Habsburg past.
iii. Educational Policy and the School System in Nazi Germany 
Any examination of educational policy in Nazi Germany must necessarily begin with 
the pedagogical ideas of Hitler himself.  On the one hand, Hitler was convinced that
education was a vital tool in the National Socialist quest to regenerate the German Volk and 
to prepare the German nation for the inevitable conflict for domination of the European 
continent.  On the other hand, he was deeply critical, and even contemptuous, of educational 
policy in Habsburg Austria, Wilhelmine Germany, and the democratic republics which arose 
in Central Europe following the First World War.  
Hitler set down his educational ideals in his 1924 autobiography, Mein Kampf.  
According to Hitler, the old style of education had been far too concerned with intellectual 
training and the simple accumulation of knowledge.  The sort of nationalistic and radically 
transformative education which he envisioned focused on teaching good character to 
German students, especially loyalty, a spirit of self sacrifice, discretion and, above all, a firm 
596Neues Wiener Abendblatt (Vienna), March, 15, 1938, 2.
597Klusacek, Steiner and Stimmer, 62.
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dedication to the German Volk and race.  Hitler personally disdained intellectualism of any 
sort, and he argued that military service rather than university study should be the necessary 
culmination of the education of any good German man.  For German women, Hitler 
substituted motherhood and a dedication to preserving the racial purity of the German family 
as the ultimate end of education.598
Hitler particularly emphasized the tremendous importance of history to the education 
of the next generation of German soldiers and mothers.  He avowed that history had been his 
favorite subject as a young student, and indeed the only academic topic which had truly 
captured his imagination.  His high school history teacher in Linz, Leopold Pötsch, provided 
a template for the sort of history education Hitler thought was best.  What had impressed 
Hitler about Pötsch was not merely the instructor’s command of the subject matter, but 
rather the emotionally inspiring manner with which he had delivered his lectures.  Hitler 
wrote in Mein Kampf that, 
Even today I think back with gentle emotion on this grey-haired man, who, by the 
fire of his narratives, sometimes made us forget the present; who, as if by 
enchantment, carried us into past times and, out of the millennial veils of mist, 
molded dry historical memories into living reality.  On such occasions we sat there, 
often aflame with enthusiasm, and sometimes even moved to tears.599
As we shall see, Nazi pedagogical theorists emphasized such inspirational talent as a 
necessary part of a teacher’s vocation.600
In addition to seeing history as a source of inspiration, Hitler thought that history 
education should inform students’ views of the present.  The past was not to be studied for 
its own sake, but rather for the lessons it could teach to a strong and unified German Volk.
598Hitler, Mein Kampf, 14-15; 408-427.
599Ibid., 14.
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Again, Hitler felt that Pötsch had excelled at such a use of history.601  Thus a clear, concise 
presentation of the past that was useful for the German nation was far more important than 
completeness or attention to detail.  He argued:
Especially in historical instruction, an abridgement of the material must be 
undertaken.  The main value lies in recognizing the great lines of development.  The 
more the instruction is limited to this, the more it is to be hoped that an advantage 
will later accrue to the individual from his knowledge, which summed up will also 
benefit the community.  For we do not learn history just in order to know the past, 
we learn history in order to find an instructor for the future and for the continued 
existence of our nationality.  That is the end, and historical instruction is only a 
means to it.602
Thus, the teaching of history was important insofar as it could be used to support the 
National Socialist ideology and to strengthen the resurgent national state which Hitler 
envisioned.
Hitler also emphasized the necessity of indoctrinating German students with the 
precepts of racism, precepts which he felt were the key to understanding human history.  He 
wrote, 
The crown of the volkisch state’s entire work of education and training must be to 
burn the racial sense and racial feeling into the instinct and the intellect, the heart and 
brain of the youth intrusted to it.  No boy or girl must leave school without having 
been led to an ultimate realization of the necessity and essence of blood purity.603
Hitler’s racial anti-Semitism formed one of the foundational concepts of National Socialist 
ideology.  It was an idea which would ultimately inform not just education in the Nazi 
600Blackburn, 34.




state,604 but also its legal structure, military policies, and the eventual extermination of most 
of Europe’s Jews.
However disorganized Hitler’s Nazi dictatorship might have been in practice, it 
seems clear that education was one area in which his ideological statements in Mein Kampf
and other sources became normative in the Third Reich.  Moreover, unlike other areas, such 
as his drive to exterminate the Jews, where it is difficult for historians to draw a clear and 
unambiguous line between Hitler’s vague public statements and the actual practices of the 
Nazi regime, there was a clear link between Hitler’s words and the style and content of Nazi 
education.  The historian of anti-Semitism and Nazi educational policy Gregory Paul 
Wegner argues that even though teachers and pedagogical theorists under the Nazi regime 
elaborated considerably on Hitler’s ideas, Mein Kampf remained the ideological guide for 
their work and they studiously followed it.605  Education was an important issue for Hitler, 
and the structure and content of educational policy was a matter of extreme significance for 
the Third Reich.
After the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the new Nationalist Socialist government 
moved quickly to remodel the educational system of Germany along lines which would 
enforce the ideological dominance of Nazism.  The key features of this transformation 
included the Third Reich’s efforts to thoroughly politicize education, to seize control of the 
education of teachers, to redraw curricula and to revise the content of education in Germany, 
to reapportion the division of classroom hours devoted to various subjects, and to inculcate 
604Gregory Paul Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling Under the Third Reich (New York and London: 
Routledge Falmer, 2002), 1-5.
605Ibid., 182; See also Blackburn, 25; Kurt-Ingo Flessau, Schule der Diktatur: Lehrpläne und Schulbücher 
des Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 1977), 22-26.
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racism and anti-Semitism in German students.606  As a means to this end, the Nazis 
dismissed overtly anti-Nazi instructors as well as teachers of Jewish background.  Efforts to 
revise the curricula and to publish new textbooks began soon after the Nazi seizure of 
power.607
Such efforts, however, were initially quite disorganized, and the Nazi state did not 
immediately attempt a systematic reshaping of Germany’s curricula and textbooks.  Instead, 
the Germany Ministry of the Interior and the administrations of various Länder issued 
isolated decrees which called for educators to devote their efforts to producing mature 
Germans devoted to the Nazi Weltanschauung.  Even these early measures awarded history 
pride of place.  These decrees increased the number of hours of historical instruction in 
classrooms in order to indoctrinate students in Nazi ideology, and urged history teachers to 
emphasize enthusiasm and inspiration rather than the tedious memorization of dates and 
names.608
Comprehensive revised curricula did eventually follow these piecemeal measures. A 
decree issued by the Third Reich’s Ministry of Education in 1937 and a set of “General 
Guidelines”set forth by the Education Minister, Bernard Rust, in 1939 gave German primary 
schools a new set of curricular principles.  German secondary schools received their own set 
of “General Guidelines” in 1938.   These decrees, which set forth detailed curricula, 
delineated in a systematic manner the same ideals found in the regime’s previous statements 
on education.  German education was to be throughly politicized and grounded in the racist 
and nationalistic principles of National Socialism.  History, German language instruction, 
606Flessau, 14; See also Blackburn, 177.
607Wegner, 185; Blackburn, 9.
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and geography emerged as the primary subjects in this ideological vision of education.609
Nazi textbook policy followed a similar pattern.  At first there was no central 
authority within the Nazi regime charged with issuing new educational texts.  The 
responsibility for such work rested with individual publishers.  At the same time, however, 
such publishers collaborated with both the National Socialist Teachers Union (NSLB) and 
the Ministry of Education, so that textbooks published during the first six years of the Third 
Reich consistently followed the guidelines preferred by the Nazi government. The 
government finally assumed exclusive control over this process in 1939, when a special 
commission under the leadership of Phillip Bouhler began to oversee and certify  the 
publication of all textbooks for use in German schools.610
Even as the new government moved to transform German education, it still built 
upon the educational and ideological foundations which it had inherited from the Weimar 
Republic.  Already in the 1920s German language textbooks contained the sort of 
glorification of the military conflict and the animosity toward the postwar international order 
which later became the hallmarks of Nazi ideology.  The main difference after 1933 was the
new regime’s conscious attempt to ground education in the Nazi Weltanschauung and 
obedience to Hitler’s government.611  In a similar manner, the racial anti-Semitism which 
Nazi education so emphasized built upon the less explicit but still very real currents of anti-
Semitism that had pervaded the Weimar era as well.  Hitler and the Nazis may have wanted 
to create a new educational system in order to forge a new sort of German citizen, but 
608Wegner, 117-118; Blackburn, 41, 87; Flessau, 19-20.
609Flessau, 55-83.
610Wegner 25, 183; Blackburn, 37; Flessau, 95-100.
611Joachim S. Hohmann, “Erziehung in ‘Stahlgewittern,’ Zur Konzeption und Wirkungsgeschichte des 
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German educators had already laid a partial foundation for this enterprise even before 1933.  
The Third Reich did not have to start its work from scratch.612
In the same manner as Nazi education between 1933 and 1938 drew on existing 
traditions within Weimar Germany, so too did Nazi education after the Anschluß find a 
fertile ground in Austria.  The previous regime had already dismantled democratic, non-
ideological education in Austria in favor of system which had emphasized community over 
the individual and which urged students to be obedient and loyal to the regime.  Of course 
the corporatist educational system had emphasized Austrian patriotism and Roman 
Catholicism, while the Nazi regime repudiated both in favor of racist German nationalism.613
deutschen Lesebuchs im NS-Staat,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 43, no. 1 (1995): 1-8.
612Wegner, 181-186; See also Flessau, 97-100.
613 Dachs, 339.
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  Furthermore, National Socialist ideals had been popular among Austrian teachers and 
students during the period between 1934 and 1938, despite the Ständestaat’s best efforts to 
indoctrinate the schools with its official ideology.  Thus, the Third Reich found fertile soil 
for its Weltanschauung in the Austrian school system.614
In the aftermath of the Anschluß, the new authorities in Austria moved swiftly to 
dismiss teachers who espoused anti-Nazi political ideologies, as well as teachers of Jewish 
origin, and all remaining teachers had to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler.  Because the 
curricula and textbooks could not be changed immediately, these teachers had to “correct” 
interpretations in the texts which were “false” (that is to say, at odds with the Nazi view of 
education and history).615  The new Nazi authorities set out to complete the distribution or 
production of replacement  textbooks in the Ostmark as soon as possible.616
As we have seen, the old Ministry of Education continued to exist in Austria until 
1940.  This administrative body became Division IV of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior 
and Culture.  After the dissolution of this organization, responsibility for education in the 
Reichsgaue of the Ostmark devolved to the administrative apparatus of the individual Gaue, 
under the supervision the Ministry of the Interior of the Third Reich as a whole.  The Nazi 
government also compelled schools within the Austrian territories to conform with the 
practices in the rest of Germany.  The Nazi government reduced from 52 to 16 the number 
of humanistic Gymnasien, which had been the foundational schools for academically gifted 
students in Austria.  The Nazis also almost totally liquidated the network of religious 
614Ibid., 218-221.
615Ibid., 221-224; Deutsche Volkszeitung (Vienna), March 30, 1938, 1.
616Klusacek, Steiner and Stimmer, 593.
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schools in Austria, which had been an important part of the old school system.617  All of 
these efforts were designed to eliminate schools which the Nazi leaders regarded as either 
unnecessary or even hostile to the military, national, and racial ideals of National Socialism.  
For a time, Austrian Nazi authorities discussed maintaining some of the old system’s 
Hauptschulen (middle schools), and even of exporting that system to the rest of Germany, 
but nothing ever came of such discussions.618  Finally, as in the rest of the Third Reich, Nazi 
authorities made membership in various Nazi youth organizations, such as the Hitler Youth 
and the Association of German Girls, mandatory for all Austrian children between the ages 
of ten and eighteen.619
For their part, many Austrian teachers appeared enthusiastic about the change in 
government.  While the new government purged some segments of the teaching population 
and discontinued most of the old state’s previous pedagogical journals, the remaining 
Austrian educators did work to further the ideological aims of the new leadership.  The 
Austrian territories’ only remaining pedagogical journal, Die Neue Weg, continued to 
publish, because, according to its new editors, it had been the only such publication which 
had never supported educational theories which harmed the unity and character of the 
German Volk.620  In the first edition after the Anschluß in April, 1938, the editors issued a 
call to Austrian teachers to dedicate themselves to the goals of the Nazi regime and to work 
617Dachs, 224-226; Such measures followed the near elimination of religious and classical education in the 
rest of Nazi Germany as well.  See Flessau, 20-21.
618Dachs, 224-226.
619Ibid., 230; The scholar Daniel Horn argues that the Nazi youth organizations were actually harmful to 
the cause of Nazi education in their emphasis on the priority of youthful leadership at the expense of the 
authority of and respect for the expertise of the older generation of teachers.  Daniel Horn, “The Hitler 
Youth and Educational Decline in the Third Reich,” History of Education Quarterly 16, No. 4 (Winter, 
1976): 425-447.
620“An die Lehrerschaft!” Der Neue Weg 1 (1940): 1.  This journal was discontinued later in 1940 due to 
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diligently to bring the Austrian school system in line with that of the rest of the Third 
Reich.621  This call seems to have been heeded.622
Thus, the Nazi educational system, both in Austria and in the Third Reich as a 
whole, followed Hitler’s vision of a new pedagogical structure which would serve to 
indoctrinate the German Volk with the ideological precepts of Nazism.  After 1933, the Nazi 
government moved swiftly, albeit in a characteristically disorganized manner, to realize this 
vision, and moved no less swiftly to bring these changes to Austria after 1938.  The Nazi 
government built on widely prevalent ideas and administrative structures which it inherited 
from the governments which had preceded it, and often had the active collaboration of 
teachers and students in its efforts.  This new educational system attempted to promulgate a 
specific view of Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past.
iv. National Socialist History Education 
The Third Reich’s leaders conceived of National Socialist education as an 
unabashedly ideological enterprise, designed to indoctrinate German students with the basics 
of the Nazi Weltanschauung.  Following Hitler’s lead, most Nazi pedagogical theorists and 
educators emphasized history as a particularly important topic for German children to study.  
As early as 1933, the Third Reich’s Interior Minister, Wilhelm Frick, increased the number 
of classroom hours devoted to historical studies in German schools, and declared that history 
should have a commanding position within the Nazi educational system.623  Indeed, many 
wartime shortages which prohibited its further publication.




Nazi educators acknowledged that history was especially important to National Socialist 
educational efforts, and ranked it alongside biology, German language, and geography as a 
critical topic for German children to study properly.624  Austrian educators after the Anschluß 
also believed that history education was critically important to the cause of reshaping their 
homeland as part of the Third Reich.  One sample curriculum from Vienna in 1938 
described the importance of history education in a manner reminiscent of Hitler’s own 
pedagogical views: 
History education is the foundation of national-political education.  Its goal is 
education of Germans who are always joyfully willing to act for the freedom and 
honor or our Volk, and who also understand how to draw out the usefulness of the 
history of the development of the German Volk and to use it to successfully 
participate in the shaping of the present and future of the Volk.625
Of course, the point of history education was not merely to study the past, but, more 
to the point, to study it correctly from the Nazi point of view.  According to most Nazi 
educators there was clearly a right way and a wrong way to teach historical topics.  In 1939, 
Dietrich Klagges, a Reichsdeutsch historian and one of the Third Reich’s most prominent 
and prolific textbook authors, wrote an instructional text for history teachers.   In this book, 
Geschichte als Nationalpolitische Erziehung (History as National-Political Education), 
Klagges discussed the appropriate methods and perspective which teachers were to use in 
order to successfully educate children.  
From the first, Klagges avowed that Nazi history education must represent a break 
from the liberal historical methodology which recently had been so dominant in Germany 
624For a Reichsdeutsch presentation of these views, see Dietrich Klagges, Geschichte als 
Nationalpolitische Erziehung (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diensterweg, 1939), 106.  For an 
example from Nazi Austria see Hugo Winkerlhöfer, “Die Änderung der Stoffepläne für Volks- und 
Hauptschulen im neuen Geiste” Der Neue Weg  7 (1938): 481.
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and the rest of the Western world.  He opposed such methodology not merely because 
liberalism, from the Nazis’ perspective, was a decadent, atomizing, Jewish ideology, but 
also because liberal history education eschewed the sort of teleological and ideological 
interpretations of history which Klagges and other Nazi theorists thought crucial to real 
education.626  Klagges objected to the liberal focus upon learning foreign languages and 
appreciating foreign cultures, and he argued that such educational emphases resulted in an 
“international education,” rather than a German one.  According to Klagges, the history, 
languages, and cultures of foreign Völker were to be viewed as valuable to the Nazi state 
only insofar as they bolstered the German sense of worth or served as a useful contrast to 
German qualities.627
Even more galling than internationalism for Klagges, however, was liberal 
education’s emphasis on upon “objectivity.”  Liberal pretensions to objectivity in history 
education were a sham which allowed liberal historians and teachers to pretend to be neutral.  
In reality, according to Klagges, the liberal historian was as much bound to his ideology as 
any other human being.  Even the pretense of objectivity when examining the past ultimately 
robbed teachers and historians of the ability to make moral judgements about the past and to 
draw historical lessons for the German Volk.  He claimed that such a view of history debased 
these necessary ethical and national judgements into sterile issues of mere “significance.”  
As Klagges wrote:
In all cases, objectivity is not an ideal for National Socialism, but rather a grave 
negative trait (“schwere Mangel”). . . For us there is only one standpoint which we 
625“Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” Der 




unshakably cling to, and from which we seize and experience all progress. . . We are 
objective if we are German.  The will and right of life of the German Volk builds the 
position from which we understand the course of history in the past and the present.  
It is from here we come to our view of history which is clear, unambiguous and 
unshakable.628
Thus, according to Klagges, all history had to be viewed from the perspective of whether or 
not a given event was good or bad for the German Volk.  For him that fixed perspective was 
the essence of the Nazi historical view.629
Klagges gave several examples of how to apply this Nazi vision of history education 
in German classrooms.  One such example is particularly relevant to the case of Nazi 
Austria.  Klagges argued that if teachers required their students to write essays about the 
1938 Anschluß, they should privilege the Nazi view of history.  Thus a theme like  
“Advantages and Disadvantages of the Anschluß of German-Austria and the Reich .” was not 
good Nazi methodology, but rather displayed a  “Jewish-liberal” tendency toward overly 
critical analysis.  It would be far better if students wrote essays on themes such as, “The 
Anschluß of the Ostmark– the Fulfillment of a Dream of Centuries,” or  “Great-Germany–
The Yearning of the Best Germans.”630
Klagges also noted that National Socialist education had resolved the liberal debate 
over the relative merits of cultural, economic, political, and military history.  The real focus 
of history education should be the development of the German Volk and the personalities 
and events which were good or bad for the Volk.  Thus Nazi education did not emphasize the 





groups who had served the interests of the German Volk.631
If Klagges drew a distinction between “heroic” history education and traditional 
political or military history, not all Nazi educators shared his views.  The Austrian Nazi 
pedagogical theorist, Hugo Winkerlhöfer, for example, simply stated that education in Nazi 
Austria should  focus upon political and military history, which he equated with the 
Nazism’s heroic ideals.632 Indeed, Nazi pedagogical theorists unanimously wanted history 
teachers to stress the ideals of heroism, particularly in terms of war and physical struggle.633
As we shall see, such “heroic” history generally corresponded to an emphasis upon political 
and especially military history at the expense of cultural, social, and economic history.
Racism was one other concept which Klagges and other Nazi educational theorists 
repeatedly stressed.  In fact several Nazi commentators on history education explicitly 
identified race as the real key to understanding the history of the world correctly.634
According to the Nazi view of history, there were enduring racial groups which gave various 
nations and national groups a set of indelible physical, moral, and spiritual characteristics.  
For the Nazis, the Nordic or Aryan race, from which modern Germans descended, was the 
strongest, most creative and most worthy race in human history, and, according to at least 
some Nazi theorists, the race responsible for almost all progress in human history.  Indeed, 
one Nazi educator, Paul Abl, went so far as to argue that the great cultural achievements of 
medieval Spain and Italy were to be attributed to the nordic blood of the nobility in those 
631Ibid, 122.
632Winkerlhöfer, 282.
633Blackburn, 67-69; Hohmann, 1-115; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener 
Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 687.
634Winkerlhöfer, 282-283; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und 
Abschlußklassen,” 637; “Der nordische gedanke in der deutschen Erziehung,” Der Neue Weg 1/2 (1939): 
51; Ulrich Haacke and Ernst Ziemann, Handbuch für den Geschichtsunterricht an Volksschulen (Leipzig: 
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regions, and even argued that Leonardo DaVinci’s artistic work resulted from his purported 
partial Germanic descent.635
One pedagogical theorist, Ludwig Woltmann, presented the foundations for the 
Nazis’ racially determined view of history in a 1941 article in Der Neue Weg.  In this piece, 
he distinguished between the old “spiritual” (geistig) history, the environmentally 
deterministic material history of liberal and Marxist historians, and the newer 
“anthropological” history, which focused upon race as the key element in human 
development over the centuries.  Woltmann argued that despite the claims of critics, an 
examination of the past revealed that certain races had undeniably maintained the purity of 
their blood throughout their history, and that racial characteristics were an enduring and 
unchangeable factor in human historical development.636
The Nazi view of history inevitably presented the Jews as the insidious racial 
counterpart to the Aryan Germans, and insisted that racial anti-Semitism was a crucial 
component of history education as well.  Nazi educators portrayed the Jews as a pestilential 
presence no matter where or when they appeared in human history, and one author blamed 
them for the ultimate downfall of the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman empires.637
Another Austrian Nazi teacher sought to combat any lingering sentiments among German 
students that there were any “decent Jews” in Germany or Austria, and continually railed 
against the danger represented to Germany by the mixing of German and Jewish blood.638
Verlag von Quelle and Meyer, 1941), 7.
635Paul Abl, “Nationsozialistische Weltanschauung und Geschichtsbetrachtung,” Der Neue Weg 1/2 
(1939): 12-16.  See also Klagges, 449.
636Ludwig Woltmann, “Grundfragen einer rassenkundlichen Geschichtsbetrachtung,” Der Neue Weg 1 
(January, 1941): 2-7.
637Ulrike Dietrich,  “Judentum und Schule,” Der Neue Weg 5 (May 1940): 97-9. 
638“Aus Zeitschriften.  Die Judenfrage in Unterricht,” Der Neue Weg 5 (1939): 231.
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Indeed, Klagges asserted that the ultimate defeat of the German Volk and race was only 
possible through the “racial suicide” of blood mixing, or through the adoption of dangerous 
“Jewish” ideologies such as pacifism, liberalism, or Marxism.639  Abl likewise argued 
against the notion, perpetuated by the Jews through the egalitarian dogmas of liberalism, that 
human beings were all equal.  He proclaimed that the inequality of racial groups was the 
foundation of the Nazi view of history.640
Austrian educators after 1938 realized that despite the tradition of political anti-
Semitism in their homeland, such a racial, biological, deterministic vision of history was 
relatively foreign to Austrian educational thought.  Thus, a provisional curricula for history 
education in Viennese schools urged Austrian teachers to lose no time in familiarizing 
themselves with Nazi racial ideals and in implementing those ideas in their classrooms.  The 
curricula suggested that teachers in the Ostmark present examples of the domineering 
tendencies and insidious, racially determined morality of the Jews throughout history and 
explain how the Viennese population had acted against the exploitative activities of that 
city’s Jewish population.641
Nazi pedagogues did their best to link the ideologies and institutions which they 
despised to the Jews.  Various educators argued that the Jews had a hand in the origins of  
internationalism, pacifism, liberalism, socialism, the League of Nations, freemasonry, 
political conservatism, Roman Catholicism, and indeed Christianity as a whole.642  Of all 
these ideas associated with the Jews, however, Nazi educational theorists focused most 
639Klagges, 449.
640Abl, 12-16.  See also Klagges, 403.
641“Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 638-
640; “Geschichtswende und Schule,” 280.
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closely upon intellectualism.  Hitler himself had expressed his contempt for intellectuals and 
academic professionalism in the pages of Mein Kampf.643  Nazi educators followed his lead, 
and proclaimed that intellectual learning was merely a secondary consideration for teachers 
in the Nazi system.  Intellectualism was a sterile, decadent movement bred in the urban, 
Jewish culture in which the modern German had allowed himself to become ensnared.  The 
real strength of the German people came from the strong character that came from the link 
between the Volk and German soil.  German teachers had to realize that a real education was 
not just a matter of knowledge, but rather consisted of building völkisch character and will.644
For Nazi theorists, there was no distinction between higher education and Volksbildung
(education in basic skills necessary for everyday life); Nazi education was to be an organic, 
value-laden enterprise which eschewed narrow academic specializations and effete 
intellectualism.
As a result, Nazi pedagogical theorists considered the character and qualities of 
teachers in German schools to be especially important.  As we have seen, Hitler himself had 
definite ideas concerning the sort of qualities and talents a German history teacher should 
have.  Nazi educators in Germany and Austria reiterated his argument that instructors should 
strive to transport students into the past and to inspire them to ideological zeal.  Nazi 
teachers had to make history clear, exciting, and “alive.”645  One sample curricula even 
specifically cited Hitler’s account concerning Professor Pötsch in Mein Kampf in order to 
642Blackburn, 143; Abl, 14; Klagges, 397-402.
643Hitler, Mein Kampf, 431-433.
644Blackburn, 120-121, 143; Klagges 107-110.
645Klagges, 111-114; Haacke and Ziemann, 3.
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present teachers with a model of an ideal history instructor.646   Such a history teacher had to 
have a forceful, magnetic personality, ready with a clear answer to any question which 
students might ask.  In other words, a good history teacher in Nazi Germany had to be a true 
Erzieher (educator of character), who transmitted not mere knowledge, but the vital values 
of honesty, obedience, self sacrifice, love of Volk and Vaterland, and a firm dedication to the 
principles of National Socialism to his students.647  In fact, a 1939 article in the Viennese 
edition of the Nazi newspaper Die Völkischer Beobachter, which listed the most desirable 
qualities for teachers, placed expertise in the relevant subject matter behind strength of 
character and loyalty to National Socialist principles in terms of importance.648
Nazi educational theorists also urged a reconsideration of the sources which German 
educators used to teach history.  According to many such theorists, students had learned a 
distorted picture of the German past in recent decades.  Liberal, Marxist, and Catholic 
historiography had all consistently misrepresented the German past, discarding the vital 
strengths of the Volk in favor of representations of history which stressed universalistic and 
humanistic ideals over national interests.  In particular, many Nazi educators took umbrage 
at the portrayal of ancient Germanic peoples as “barbarians.”  Nazi pedagogues such as 
Klagges and Abl argued for the rehabilitation of modern Germany’s Germanic ancestors, 
and argued that these early Germans should be portrayed as noble warrior-farmers who had 
cultivated an intimate link to the soil of their homeland, rather than as the savage antagonists 
646“Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 636-
637.
647  Klagges, 448-449, 451; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und 
Abschlußklassen,” 638; “An die deutschen Lehrer der Ostmark,” Der Neue Weg 1/2 (1939): 49.
648Völkisher Beobachter (Vienna), January 3, 1939.
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of the Roman Empire described by Tacitus.649  In order to counteract the negative portrayal 
of the Germanic peoples, Nazi educators argued that teachers  should emphasize folktales 
and sagas from German antiquity and the Middle Ages rather than hostile Roman or Church 
accounts of history in order to provide a clearer picture of the virtues of the German race 
throughout history.650
Thus the vision of history presented by Nazi educators was one which valued 
ideology over objectivity and  emotional urgency over dispassionate detail in order to 
present a racially determined version of the past to German students.  This view of history 
may be neatly summarized with Klagges’ list of suggested themes that German history 
teachers should emphasize:
649Klagges, 124-127; Abl, 15-16; Herfurth, 102-103. Of course Tacitus did praise the ancient Germans for 
their strength and nobility, but apparently not enthusiastically enough for the Nazis.
650Klagges, 400; Winkerlhöfer, 481.
(1) Nordic man as the creator and bearer of world culture
(2) Creative and uncreative races of men
(3) German territory over time
(4) Two millennia of the German state
(5) Nordic-German culture from the stone age to the present
(6) The Weltanschauung of struggle
(7) Arms, the military and struggle in the era of our forefathers 
and in the present
(8) Jewishness and Bolshevism as a danger to the world
(9) The danger of spiritual (geistigen) alienation
(10) Leaders and discipleship in German history
(11) Men make history
(12) Nation-states and world empires
(13) Volk as a community of destiny
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(14) (Work and the community of the Volk.651
Klagges intended this vision of racial and national struggle in the German past to prepare 
students for the conflict between Nazi Germany and the Jewish, Bolshevik, and decadent 
liberal antagonists who supposedly sought to wipe out the German Volk. 
v. Nazi Education and the Habsburg Past 
The textbooks, curricula and pedagogical journals produced in Nazi Germany and 
Austria faithfully represented the vision of the Habsburg past which Hitler articulated in 
Mein Kampf.  These educational texts presented Austria as part of the wider sweep of the 
history of Germany, and portrayed the Habsburgs as a pestilential, anti-national presence 
within that historical narrative.  Nazi school materials generally agreed with Hitler’s 
definition of the “Austrian mission,” and they shared his emphasis on Prussia and historical 
figures from northern Germany as the true defenders of the interests of the German Volk.  
This view of Austria’s past had a great deal in common with the formulations of a 
Germanist Austrian national identity presented in earlier Austrian educational material, yet 
at the same time it represented a distinctively National Socialist perspective on history 
which was foreign to these previous Germanist texts.
All Nazi educational materials presented Austria as part of German history.  Nazi 
representations of Austria’s part in German history focused upon the German people of 
Austria as whole, and often argued that all Germans, whether Prussian or Austrian, had 
played a role in advancing the interests of the Volk.652  Indeed, one Austrian educator during 
651Klagges, 447.
652Völkisher Beobachter (Vienna), August 3, 1938; Haacke and Ziemann, 115.
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the Nazi period explicitly argued against placing too much of an emphasis upon students’ 
Heimat, instead arguing for a focus upon the German nation as a whole in classrooms.653
Such descriptions of Austria obviously fit well with the official attempt by Nazi Germany to 
erase all remnants of Austria’s independence, from its name to its old administrative 
apparatus.  Just as there was no longer a separate or distinct “Austria” within the borders of 
the Third Reich after 1938, so too was there no separate Austrian history in the historical 
narratives presented in Nazi classrooms.
Nazi educational materials also reiterated Hitler’s emphasis upon a “German 
Mission” for Austria while it existed.  Various textbooks, educational manuals, and curricula 
reenforced the notion that an important part of Austria’s historical role had been to serve as 
a “bulwark” to protect Germany from the predatory advances of the Turks or other eastern 
antagonists.  Indeed, such descriptions of the “Austrian mission” were not at all foreign to 
Austrianist views of history.  For the Nazis, however, Austria’s protective role was 
specifically to protect Germany and areas of German settlement, and not to help defend 
Western civilization or Christendom as a whole as in Austrianist accounts.654
Several atypical accounts of Austria’s historical mission did appear during the Nazi 
period, however.  Hugo Hassinger’s 1942 book, Wiens deutsche Sendung im Donauraum
(Vienna’s German Mission in the Danubian Region), represented a peculiar blending of 
National Socialist ideology and earlier Austrianist presentations of Austria’s historical 
mission.  Hassinger, a professor of geology at the University of Vienna, had been active in 
653Heimat is German word which means “home” or “homeland” in a regional or parochial sense.  
Ferdinand Kopp, “Volkhafte Neugestaltung des Heimatkundunterrichtes,” Der Neue Weg (April, 1941): 
97.
654Abl, 16; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und 
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publishing educational materials during the Ständestaat, and his later discussion of Austria’s 
role in German history still bore some of the characteristics of the historical views endorsed 
by the corporatist regime. Hassinger’s book did undeniably endorse Nazism, and it argued 
that the Anschluß had freed the city of Vienna to play its proper role in German history once 
again.  Like other educational theorists during the Nazi period, Hassinger affirmed that part 
of the mission which Vienna, and through it, Austria, was destined to play in history was to 
advance German interests in East Central Europe.  Like other Nazi theorists, he argued that 
Vienna had lost contact with its historical mission after 1866, and especially after 1918, as 
Austria was no longer powerful enough to ensure the political and cultural predominance of 
the German Volk in the region.655
Yet Hassinger differed with other Nazi educational texts in his discussion of how 
best to secure Germany’s interests in Eastern Europe.  He argued that Vienna not only was 
the leading tower of Germandom in the East, but also that the city needed to serve as a 
mediator between Germans and non-Germans in the Danubian territories.  Hassinger 
asserted that the Habsburg Monarchy had led many non-Germans to adopt German culture, 
and that such Kulturdeutscher (cultural Germans) had been just as much apart of Vienna’s 
German mission as ethnic Germans.  Furthermore, he argued that Vienna had been a 
decisive and positive force in helping the other Völker within the Habsburg Monarchy to 
develop their own national cultures, even if such cultural development often came at the 
expense of German-Austrians.656  Such notions may have been fairly typical of previous 
Austrianist conceptions of the Habsburg past during the First Republic and the Ständestaat, 
Abschlußklassen,” 643; Haacke and Ziemann, 152.
655Hugo Hassinger, Wiens deutsche Sendung im Donauraum (Vienna: Ostmarken Verlag, 1942), 3-7.
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but they were profoundly at odds with the chauvinistic nationalism and the racially 
determined view of culture which orthodox Nazism espoused.  Yet Hassinger himself 
seemed to have seen no conflict between National Socialism and the Viennese mission he 
described, and at one point even argued that the Third Reich and the Habsburg Monarchy 
both stood for the same goal of order and cultural progress for the peoples of central and 
southern Europe!657
A 1941 article in Der Neue Weg by Wilhelm Deutsch also contradicted Nazi 
orthodoxy.  Deutsch, like Hassinger, argued that German settlement in the southeastern 
Europe had exerted benevolent influence upon the literary, cultural, and national 
development of the southern Slavs and Romanians.  He argued that this process had been 
begun during the “German Reformation,” and was initially opposed by the “Jesuit-Habsburg 
Counter-Reformation.”  Eventually, however, Austria’s government had encouraged such 
development, especially with the extensive school and administrative reforms under Maria-
Theresa and Joseph II.  Deutsch’s article, while not as dramatically peculiar as Hassinger’s 
work, is nevertheless curiously unideological for a pedagogical worked published during the 
Nazi era.  Deutsch’s emphasis upon Slavic and Romanian culture was at odds with the 
typical Nazi focus upon German culture and development, and he did not mention racial 
ideals in his work at all.658
Yet works such as those of Hassinger and Deutsch are remarkable precisely because 
they were so rare during the Nazi period.  The vast majority of Nazi educational materials, 
656Ibid., 3, 11, 21-22.
657Ibid., 16.
658Wilhelm Deutsch, “Österreichs frühe deutsche Mittlerrole im Südosten,” Der Neue Weg (April, 1941): 
90-7.
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whether produced by Austrians or Reichsdeutsche, repudiated any notions of an Austrian 
mission beyond its role as an eastern outpost of German settlement, and they condemned the 
supranational cultural efforts of the Habsburg Dynasty.  Indeed such educational sources 
most frequently argued that the Habsburgs, in serving their own interests or the interests of 
other regional Völker, had betrayed the cause of Germandom in their territory.  Various Nazi 
educators presented a diverse array of pejorative descriptions of the Habsburgs as a whole.  
Klagges argued that guilt for long delay in unifying the German Volk should be charged to 
the Habsburgs and asserted that “Nothing had so hindered the creation of a strong German 
national state as the continued existence of the Habsburg Imperial house, which was German 
in appearance only.”659  A provisional curriculum for history education in Vienna charged 
that Habsburgs had been a force of decay that had caused the German Empire to decline 
from its highpoint during the Middle Ages.660  The authors of a handbook for Nazi teachers 
of history, Ulrich Haacke and Ernst Ziemman, described various Austrian Habsburgs as 
“foreign to the Volk,” “foreign to the Viennese Geist,” and “Spanish,” and proclaimed that 
“it is the tragedy of the Germans in Austria that this royal house ruled them.”661  While Nazi 
educators certainly identified other enemies of the German people in their work, the 
Habsburgs consistently appeared alongside the Jews, the individualistic German princes of 
the early modern period, and political Catholicism as a corruptive force in German history, 
rife with such anti-Nazi qualities as decadence, humanism and cosmopolitanism.
Nazi historical educators identified several periods in which the House of Habsburg 
had had a particularly pernicious effect upon the German Volk.  The Counter-Reformation 
659Klagges, 383, 486.
660“Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 640.
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and the subsequent Thirty Years War represented one particularly destructive episode for 
Germany.  Nazi pedagogues were especially critical of the Habsburgs’ actions during this 
era, and charged that such Habsburg emperors as Karl V and Franz I had allied themselves 
with the anti- German Jesuit order in order to impose Catholicism forcibly upon a German 
population that had largely opted for the Protestant faith.  These Austrian rulers were guilty 
of choosing the interests of a universalistic, Jewish-influenced religion over the unity and 
prosperity of the German Volk, and of setting the stage for hostile foreign powers such as 
Sweden and especially France to rape and pillage the German homeland.  This conflict in 
many ways represented the nadir of German history for Nazi educators.  Not only the 
Habsburgs but also most of the other Germany princely houses had allowed their selfish 
political interests and fascination with anti-German cultures to justify keeping German 
Central Europe divided and nationally demoralized.662
The Vormärz era and the subsequent Revolution in 1848 also provided Nazi 
educators with the opportunity to denounce the Habsburgs.  Nazi educators presented Prince 
Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian architect of the Vormärz conservative order, as an 
oppressive figure who actively opposed the German nationalist movements which the Nazis 
regarded as the real force of progress in German history.663  The revolution which ended 
Metternich’s grip upon Austria in 1848 led to positive change according to Nazi educators, 
however, as the Habsburgs did all that they could to frustrate any effort to create a unified 
German national state in the name of maintaining their own exploitative multinational 
661Haacke and Ziemann, 75, 95.
662Haacke and Ziemman, 79-85; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener 
Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 640; Blackburn, 161; Dietrich Klagges and Fritz Stoll, So Ward Das 
Reich (Frankfur-am-Main: Verlag Moriz Diesterweg, 1943), 66.
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empire.  Indeed, the Frankfurt parliamentarians who sought national unity in 1848 fared 
little better with Nazi pedagogues.  According to Nazi educators, the revolutionaries of 1848 
had mistakenly sought to realize a German state on the impractical basis of liberal ideals 
derived from the French Revolution, which were in fact antithetical to real German 
nationalism.664  Still, for Nazi historians, any step toward German unity, no matter how 
confused ideologically, was good, and the Habsburgs in1848 had opposed this unity as they 
invariably had throughout German history.
One final era in which the House of Habsburg supposedly betrayed the German 
cause was during the First World War.  While Nazi educators largely blamed the Jews and 
the French for Germany’s defeat and for its subsequent humiliation by the treaties which 
ended the war,665 at least one Nazi educational text apportioned out a share of the guilt to the 
Habsburgs as well.  Haackes and Ziemann charged that the last Habsburg ruler, Karl I, had 
betrayed the German war effort and his own homeland by pursuing a separate peace near the 
end of the war.666  Thus up to its final demise, the Habsburg dynasty represented an anti-
German ruling house which continually placed its own political hegemony ahead of its 
concern for the German subjects whom it should have protected.
While Nazi educators almost universally abhorred and derided the Habsburg 
dynasty, they did have a vision of the forces that had truly served the cause of German 
progress in history.  This vision, when taken as whole, provided German students with a 
663“Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 643.; 
Haacke and Ziemann, 137-139; Klagges, 339.
664Ernst Krieck, “Französische Revolution und deutsche Zeitwende,” Der Neue Weg 6 (1939): 244-245; 
“Zur Geschichte des Zusammenschlußes aller Deutschen” Der Neue Weg 9 (1938): 671; Klagges, 395; 
Haacke and Ziemann, 143-4.
665See Klagges, 396, Blackburn, 145.
666Haacke and Ziemann, 185-186.
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heroic narrative of German history which moved from the victory of Armin’s Germanic 
warrior-farmers over the Romans at Teutoberger Forest to the final salvation of the Volk
under the leadership of Hitler himself.667  The heroic narrative presented in Nazi textbooks 
and pedagogical materials generally privileged the contributions of Prussians and north 
Germans, and frequently contrasted Prussia’s vigorous leadership with the Habsburg’s 
decadence and lack of völkisch sentiment.  Haackes and Ziemann’s handbook presented a 
particularly clear description of the National Socialist German heroic narrative, and of how 
that narrative was to be contrasted with the anti- national policies of the Habsburgs.  They 
argued that there had been three great leaders in historical march toward German unity: 
Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Hitler.668
Indeed, the conflict between the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs during the 
eighteenth century appeared to many Nazi pedagogues as the point when true leadership of 
the German Volk decisively passed from Austria to Prussia.  In comparing those two 
princely houses, Klagges wrote, “from henceforth there would be two treetops of the 
German Reich, an old one, increasingly desicated and dying, and a second one, a young and 
powerful force of regeneration.”669  Haackes and Ziemann likewise argued that the 
eighteenth century represented the time when the Habsburgs lost the future, even as the 
Hohenzollerns won it.670  Frederick the Great invariably appeared as the standard bearer of 
the German Volk in such accounts, and Nazi educational theorists praised his vigorous and 
nationalistic military leadership even as they minimized his regrettable lifelong patronage of 
667Blackburn, 130-134; Winkerlhöfer, 482.
668Haackes and Ziemann, 146.
669Klagges., 380.
670Haacke and Ziemann, 107.
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French culture and Enlightenment ideas.671  One Austrian Nazi author, specifically 
addressing an Austrian audience accustomed to the corporatist regime’s previous 
denunciations of Frederick’s wars against Habsburg Austria, took a milder tone, avowing 
that it had been a tragedy that Prussia and Austria had fought, but that the conflict had been 
brief and understandable in light of Frederick’s encirclement by hostile powers.672
Nazi educators likewise praised Bismarck as the next truly great national leader in 
Germany’s history, and endorsed his conflict with Austria just as they had Frederick the 
Great’s Silesian War.  Haacke and Ziemman argued that Bismarck had correctly identified 
the Habsburgs as the greatest obstacle to any sort of unified German state, and had shrewdly 
maneuvered the House of Austria into a decisive conflict which paved the way for a new 
German Reich.673  Various Nazi authors emphasized the manner in which Bismarck swiftly 
offered Habsburg Austria a conciliatory peace and a subsequent alliance, however, pointing 
out that Bismarck was not anti-Austrian, but was merely attempting to serve the interests of 
the Volk as a whole.  Indeed, these Nazi educators lamented the fact that Bismarck was only 
able to create a small German state, even as they acknowledged that it was probably the best 
the Prussian chancellor could have achieved given the circumstances.674
Adolf Hitler himself of course represented the climax of the Nazis’ heroic historical 
narrative.  He was key figure who finally realized a government in Germany on a truly 
national and völkisch basis, and who finally absorbed Austria and the other German-
671Blackburn, 96-97, Klagges 381, Haacke and Ziemann, 122; “Deutschland’s Geschichte, “Der Neue Weg
7 (1938): 597; Klagges and Stoll, 97.
672Abl, 17.  For similar point, see   “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener 
Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 640.
673Haacke and Ziemann, 146.
674Klagges, 405-406; Haacke and Ziemann, 151-160;  B. Kumsteller, U. Haacke, and B. Schneider, 
Geschichtsbuch für die Deutsche Jugend, Klasse-1 (Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle and Mayer, 1941), 61.
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speaking regions of the old Habsburg Monarchy into the German Reich.  He was also 
obviously the dictator around whom the Nazi regime had created a potent cult of personality, 
so naturally Nazi educational accounts praised him tirelessly.  Some Nazi pedagogical 
journals and German language readers even made him the subject of starry- eyed poems and 
breathless paeans.675  Still it is worth noting that educational authors consistently lauded 
Hitler for his role in “bringing Austria home” to the Third Reich, in essence finally ending 
the Austrian independence that had been the legacy of Habsburg rule.676
Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Hitler were the pinnacles of German national 
leadership in the National Socialist view of history.  Among the lesser heroic figures in such 
accounts, however, Nazi accounts featured a number of historical personalities most 
commonly associated with Austrian history, and indeed a few Habsburg rulers as well.  
Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II were the only Habsburg monarchs ever 
portrayed positively in Nazi educational materials.  Maria Theresa’s case is particularly 
interesting, given the fact that she was a woman, a pious Catholic, and the Austrian monarch 
who had fought against Frederick the Great’s Prussia.  As we have seen, Nazi educational 
policy typically focused upon motherhood and other family matters as the primary duty for 
German women.  Maria Theresa, as the Empress of Austria, had assumed a political role 
which the Nazis  reserved for men.  Nevertheless, Maria Theresa emerged in educational 
materials as a worthy antagonist for Frederick the Great, and Nazi teachers praised her 
toughness and shrewd diplomatic and military leadership, as well as her more motherly 
675Will Vesper, “Dem Führer,” Baldur von Schirach, “Dem Führer,” Schirach, “Der Größte,” in Der Neue 
Weg 4 (1938), 258-259; Kumsteller, Haacke, and Schneider, 12-13.
676Klagges, 442; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und 
Abschlußklassen,” 643-4; Flessau, 80.
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attributes.677
These Nazi accounts portrayed Maria Theresa as a great and truly German leader, 
despite her pious Catholicism and her perennial opposition to the Frederick the Great’s 
diplomatic and military endeavors in Central Europe.   While Nazi educators may have 
charged her Habsburg predecessors and successors for prioritizing their own political power 
or the demands of other, non-German Völker above the interests of the German nation, they 
portrayed the Austrian Empress as a leader just as concerned with German affairs and 
German welfare as Frederick.  Indeed, Haacke and Ziemann explicitly placed Maria Theresa 
alongside Frederick as a great leader of the Volk in their handbook for history teachers, and 
used both monarchs as symbols for reconciliation and brotherly ties between Austrian and 
Germany.  They wrote:
The two great opponents, the King and the Empress, grew together.  And today, after 
the year 1938, all the animosity and bitterness lies behind us.  Today Frederick the 
Great, as one of the greatest German men, belongs to the Austrian, just as Maria 
Theresa, one of the greatest German women, belongs to the Prussian.  Today, that 
which separated us has dwindled, and only the feeling that Prussians and Austrians 
are in the same manner Germans remains.678
Austrian Nazi educator, Paul Abl, similarly praised both Frederick and Maria Theresa, and 
repudiated the notion that there was any valid historical distinction to be drawn between 
nationally minded leaders from Prussia and Austria.679  Thus, even though the Habsburg 
dynasty as a whole was often compared unfavorably to the House of Hohenzollern, Nazi 
677Klagges, 282; Haacke and Ziemann, 115; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener 
Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 642; “Über den Geschichtsunterricht im 5. Schuljahr,” Der Neue 
Weg 10 (1938) 734;   Kumsteller, Haacke, and Schneider, 92; Gilmer Blackburn makes note of Maria 
Theresa’s uniqueness as a female political leader singled out for praise by the Nazis in their history 
textbooks.  According to his findings, the only other female leader praised in such terms by the Nazis was 
the Louise, the Queen of Prussia during the Napoleonic wars.  Blackburn, 109-110.
678Haacke and Ziemann, 106.
679Abl, 17.
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accounts often claimed Maria Theresa as part of Germany’s great historical heritage.
Joseph II, always a popular figure for German nationalists, also emerged in Nazi 
historical accounts as a praiseworthy figure.  As we have seen, Hitler himself thought highly 
of Joseph, and Nazi educational texts replicated the dictator’s positive view of the Austrian 
Emperor.  If other Habsburgs had been hostile toward the German Volk in Austria, Joseph II 
emerged in Nazi accounts as one of the rare Habsburg rulers who had truly thought of 
himself as a German, and who had sought to spread German language and culture through 
his administrative and educational reforms.  Indeed, Haackes and Ziemann lamented 
Joseph’s early death as a tragedy which resulted in the reversal of many of his reforms by 
his successors, who were more typically anti-German Habsburgs.680
Nazi historical educators also portrayed several other figures associated with the 
Habsburg dynasty as part of Germany’s heroic heritage.  Eugene of Savoy was one such 
historical personality, and Nazi textbook authors and pedagogues praised him for his role in 
defending Germany from the Turkish onslaught in the seventeenth century.  Such praise is 
perhaps unsurprising, given the fact that the Nazis christened one of the SS divisions 
operating on the Eastern Front during World War II the “Prince Eugen Division,” but it is 
interesting, especially since Eugene was not actually German.  Still, the Nazis lionized 
Eugene as a statesman and military leader during of the siege of Vienna of 1683, and gave 
him credit, alongside Starhemberg and the German people of Vienna, for the victory over 
the Turks.  Nazi educators were quite careful, however, not to allow any of this credit to 
accrue to the Habsburgs themselves, and emphasized the House of Austria’s flight from the 
capital in the face of the Turkish siege, which left the common German Volk of the city to 
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secure their own liberation.681
Nazi accounts treated Andreas Hofer’s resistance against Napoleon in a similar 
manner.  Hofer, the Tirolean leader who had struggled against and ultimately been executed 
by French and Bavarian forces serving under the French Emperor, had frequently been 
claimed by Austrianist views of history as an example of Austrian national sentiment.  Now 
Hofer emerged in Nazi narratives as a true German patriot, betrayed by the cowardly 
Habsburg rulers to die a martyr’s death for the cause of the German Volk.  Thus, Nazi 
teachers and pedagogues counted Hofer alongside such other opponents of Napoleon such as 
Arndt, Clauswitz, and Stein as a German national hero.682  They cast the Habsburgs, on the 
other hand, as the weak link in the struggle against Napoleon, and as the arch-betrayers of 
the burgeoning German national movement.683
Various other Austrians also appeared in the Nazis’ heroic narrative.  Nazi historians 
singled out Georg von Schönerer, for example, as one of the few German Austrians of his 
age who had seen national issues with clarity, and who had rightly opposed Habsburg rule in 
Austria rather than dividing his loyalties between the anti-German Habsburg dynasty and the 
German Volk.  Schönerer’s ardent anti-Semitism and firm stance against political 
Catholicism likewise fit well with Nazi views of Austrian history.  Even the Austrian 
dramatist Franz Grillparzer emerged in at least one Austrian Nazi educational article as a 
possible source of inspiration for Austrian National Socialists through the use of anti-
Semitic quotations carefully selected from his writing.  This account of course made no 
680“Über den Geschichtsunterricht im 5. Schuljahr,” 734; Abl, 17; Haacke and Ziemann, 115-116.
681“Über den Geschichtsunterricht im 5. Schuljahr,” 734; Abl, 17; Haacke and Ziemann, 94-97.
682Klagges, 388; Haacke and Ziemann, 131; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener 
Hauptschulen und Abschlußklassen,” 642.
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mention of Grillparzer’s firm sense of Austrian distinctiveness and occasional hostility to 
Prussian German culture.684  Nazi educators also sometimes mentioned figures from 
Austria’s strong musical tradition such as Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert as a source of 
pride for not just Austrians, but all Germans.685
Thus the National Socialist vision of the Habsburg past was one in which the dynasty 
had represented a decadent, internationalist, Catholic force hostile to the national aspirations 
which the Nazis held to be the true essence of German history.  It had been Prussia, not 
Habsburg Austria, which had led Germany toward its national destiny, and the Habsburg 
Monarchy for the most part merely served as an adversary to true völkisch leadership in the 
Nazi heroic narrative of German history.  Habsburg monarchs who had actually done their 
duty to protect and advance the interests of the German Volk were extraordinarily rare, and 
in general any German heroes from Austria had carried on their fight for the German nation 
despite the pernicious efforts of the House of Austria, rather than in conjunction with it.  
Austria had lost its appropriate sense of a German mission under the rule of the Habsburgs, 
and had only regained that calling with the final attainment of a great German state under 
the leadership of Austria’s most glorious son, Adolf Hitler.
This was the vision of Austria’s history which the government of the Third Reich 
derived from Hitler’s writing, and which it assiduously sought to inculcate in students in 
classrooms in Germany after 1933.  After 1938, the Nazi teachers, textbook authors, and 
educational theorists from the old Reich were enthusiastically joined by their counterparts in 
683Klagges, 389-391; “Übergangslehrplan für den Geschichtsunterricht an Wiener Hauptschulen und 
Abschlußklassen,” 643.
684  “Franz Grillparzer” Der Neue Weg 1 (1941): 18-19.
685Ibid., 19;. Klagges, 400.
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the Ostmark, and the pedagogical materials produced in Nazi Austria did not differ 
appreciably from those produced anywhere else in Hitler’s state.  Of course, not all 
Austrians had shared this Nazi vision of Austria’s Habsburg past before the Anschluß, just as 
not all Austrians supported Hitler’s regime after Austria’s inclusion in Nazi Germany.  The 
harsh realities of Nazi rule left some Austrians disenchanted with new government after the 
flush of enthusiasm immediately after the Anschluß faded.  This disillusionment only 
deepened as the Second World War began to go badly for Germany after 1943, and the 
Nazis’ promises of a return to greatness and economic prosperity for Austria began to ring 
increasingly hollow for more and more Austrians.  As the small Austrian resistance 
movement grew and the Allies came ever closer to defeating the Third Reich, “Austrianist” 
articulations of Austrian national identity typified the opponents of Nazi rule in the Ostmark.
vi. The Austrian Resistance Movement and the Resurgence of Austrian National 
Identity 
The extent to which the Austrian population truly supported the Hitler regime after 
1938 has been a controversial issue in the historiography of Nazi Austria.  The generation of 
Austrian historians working after the Second World War tended to minimize Austrian 
support for the regime, and generally portrayed the Nazi government in Austria as a foreign 
imposition upon the Austrian population.686  In the years after the 1986 controversy 
686For a discussion of postwar interpretations of the Nazi period, see Chapter 5 and Peter Thaler, The 
Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation_building in a Modern Society (West 
Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001); Heidemarie Uhl,  “The Politics of Memory: Austria’s 
Perception of the Second World War and the National Socialist Period,” in Austrian Historical Memory 
and National Identity, Contemporary Austrian Studies, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, vol. 5 (New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 64-5; Anton Pelinka, “Taboos and Self-Deception: 
The Second Republic’s Reconstruction of History,” in Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, 
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surrounding the Austrian President Kurt Waldheim’s past service in the Wehrmacht on the 
Balkan front, however, a new generation of Austrian historians began to question these 
accounts of Austria’s Nazi past.  Such Austrian scholars as Anton Pelinka, Erika Weinzierl, 
and Gerhard Botz spearheaded this drive to promote a more critical examination of Austria’s 
support for the Third Reich, highlighting Austrian participation in the Nazi regime, the 
Second World War, and the Holocaust.687
Work by foreign scholars has also helped redefine the state of the historical debate 
on the extent of Austrian support for the Anschluß and the Third Reich.  Recent research by 
Evan Bukey and Peter Thaler has revealed the extent to which Austrians supported the Nazi 
regime and the war which Hitler initiated in 1939.  Bukey, in particular, conclusively 
demonstrates that most inhabitants of the Austrian lands of the Third Reich, in a broad 
spectrum ranging from conservative Catholics to radical workers, generally supported 
Hitler’s rule, even if their level of enthusiasm varied from region to region, and according to 
ideology.  Bukey argues that only after the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1943 did many 
Austrians begin to express grievances against the Nazi regime openly, and that even then 
their complaints were unaccompanied by any large scale resistance.688  Thaler’s work on 
Austrian soldiers serving in the Wehrmacht reveals that the Nazi leadership had a great deal 
of confidence in the reliability of their troops from Austria, and that Austrian rates of 
desertion were comparable to those of other Reich Germans, and considerably less than 
99-100.
687Anton Pelinka,  Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998); 
Gerhard Botz, "Eine Deutsche Geschichte 1938 bis 1945? Österreichische Geschichte Zwischen Exil, 
Widerstand und Verstrickung," Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 1 (1986): 19-38; Wien vom ‘Anschluß’ zum Krieg
(Vienna: Jugend und Volk Verlag, 1978); Erika Weinzierl, Zu wenig Gerecht.  Österreicher und
Judenverfolgung, 1938-1945, 3rd ed. (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1986).
688Bukey, 288-93.
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those of German-speaking troops from Alsace and Luxembourg.689  Thus most Austrians 
supported, or at the very least did not actively oppose, Nazi rule until the very end of the 
war.
Yet the picture is more complex than such accounts of Austrian support for the Third 
Reich imply.  Timothy Kirk’s study of Austrian workers under National Socialist rule 
reveals a wide lack of support for the Nazi regime on the part of many Austrian workers, 
who had been for the most part quite successfully indoctrinated by the Austrian Social 
Democrats before 1933.  Kirk found that such sentiments rarely translated into overt 
opposition to the Nazis, but rather took the form of the quiet maintenance of networks 
within the labor community and in some instances covert industrial sabotage.690  Likewise, 
Radomir Luza’s work has focused on the role of the Austrian resistance in maintaining 
notions of Austrian distinctiveness during the war years.  According to Luza, Nazi policies 
which attempted to assimilate Austrians in the greater German Reich in fact helped inspire 
notions of Austrian patriotism, which the resistance did its best to build upon and magnify.  
He notes that,  “Part of the Resistance’s achievement was that by piercing the Nazi fiction of 
unanimous support for the regime, it constantly reminded Austrians of their inheritance.” 691
Bukey and Thaler convincingly demonstrate a high level of Austrian support for the 
Anschluß, the Nazi regime, and the war effort.  Yet at the same time,  these indications of 
689Peter Thaler, “‘Germans’ and ‘Austrians’ in World War II: Military History and National Identity,”  
Center for Austrian Studies, Working Paper 99-1, September, 1999; see also Walter Manoshek and Hans 
Safrian, “Österreicher in der Wehrmacht” in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch, 123-158.
690Timothy Kirk, “Nazi Austria: the Limits of Dissent,” in Opposing Fascism: Community, Authority and 
Resistence in Europe, ed. Timothy Kirk and Anthony Mc Elligot, 133- 149.  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 148-9; idem, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial Unrest and 
Political Unrest in the ‘National Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
691Radomir Luza, The Resistance in Austria, 1938-1945 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), 277; idem, Austro-German Relations in the Anschluß Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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broad popular support do not invalidate the findings of Luza, which estimate the 
membership in various illegal political groups in Austria during the war at about 100,000 
people out of a total population of more than 6 million.692  Such numbers are certainly 
significant even if they do not represent armed opposition to the Nazis on the level 
maintained elsewhere.  Thus, even as we acknowledge the extent to which many Austrians 
seemed to be quite comfortable with Nazi rule, and hence presumably with Nazi statements 
concerning Austria’s history and national identity, the existence of the Austrian resistance 
movement does provide significant evidence of opposition to Nazi Germany’s effort to co-
opt and redefine Austria’s Habsburg past.  Indeed, the Austrian resistance presented strong, 
if clandestine, articulations of an Austrian identity separate from the German nation in its 
struggle against the Nazi regime. 
The resistance movement did not come into existence during the Nazi years as an 
entirely new creation.  It developed from the ideological roots of the political parties which 
had dominated Austrian public life before 1938.  Thus various factions within the resistance 
movement continued to articulate the positions on Austrian identity and the Habsburg past 
already established by Christian Socials, Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, 
Communists before the Anschluß.  The Socialist resistance movement, deriving its ideals 
from the Austrian Social Democratic tradition, was reluctant to give up the support for 
Anschluß and a German Austrian identity which the old party had firmly adhered to since 
before World War I.  The Communists, on the other hand, maintained the sense of Austrian 
national distinctiveness that the Austrian Communist Party had established during the 1930s, 
1975), 259-256.
692Luza, The Resistance in Austria, 285.
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and supported that position with proclamations of Austrian nationalism which were almost 
as hostile toward the old Habsburg Monarchy as they were toward the Nazis.  Of all of the 
factions of the Austrian resistance, only those with roots in Austria’s conservative 
movement demonstrated both a sense of Austria’s national distinctiveness and a 
commitment to an Austrian historical tradition grounded in the old Habsburg dynastic state.  
Evidence concerning the Austrian resistance’s views on Austrian identity and the Habsburg 
past is of course quite rare because of the Nazi regime’s stringent censorship and brutal 
suppression of all overt political dissent.  Still, there are some documents which give us at 
least a partial picture of the manner in which the resistance movement made its arguments 
against Nazi rule.
The Austrian Social Democrats in many ways represented the least active political 
faction in terms of overt resistance to the Hitler regime.  The Social Democratic Party, a 
prohibited organization in Austria since it was outlawed in 1934, had mounted little in the 
way of active struggle against Austria’s corporatist government after a brief initial revolt, 
and it remained passive during the Nazi era.  By 1938, most of the Party’s leaders had 
already left Austria to escape the corporatist regime, and the Social Democrats’ traditional 
reluctance to engage in revolutionary activity left those Party members who had remained ill 
prepared to engage in the sort of clandestine resistance at which the more activist 
Communist Party excelled.693  The Social Democrats’ long commitment to Anschluß
likewise weakened their ability to mobilize the workers against a regime which had finally 
693For a criticism of the Social Democratic leaders’ reluctance to use force against the corporatist regime, 
see Anson Rabinbach, “Red Vienna: Symbol and Strategy,” in The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social 
Democracy and Austromarxism, 1918-1934, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Boulder and London: Westview, 
1985):187-194; idem, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism: From Red Vienna to Civil War, 1927_1934, 
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realized that ambition, albeit in a dramatically different form than the democratic and 
socialist great-German state which the Party had always envisioned.  Still, Socialist ideology 
did play an important role in “inoculating” the working class against Nazi ideals, and the 
Socialists were at least successful in maintaining underground networks which would serve 
as the basis for their post-1945 party organization.694
The Socialists had been among the strongest supporters of union with Germany 
during the interwar period.  Despite their vehement opposition to National Socialism, the 
Socialists continued to support the Anschluß even during the Nazi era.  On April 3, 1938, 
Karl Renner, the most prominent Socialist leader and the first president of the Austrian First 
Republic, made a public statement in the Neues Wiener Tagblatt entitled “Ich stimme mit 
Ja” (I vote yes), supporting union with Nazi Germany.  In this statement and a subsequent 
clarification in the British periodical World Review, Renner explained that he supported the 
Anschluß in 1938 for the same reason that he had supported it as president of the Austrian 
delegation to the conference drafting the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919: most Austrians 
considered themselves part of the German nation, and deserved the same right to self 
determination as any other national group.  Renner thought that an independent Austrian 
state would be economically unviable, and he rejected the notion of some sort of political or 
economic Danubian federation with the other former Habsburg lands as similarly unrealistic 
and lacking in popular support.   While he abhorred the Hitler regime, Renner argued that it 
represented little real change from Schuschnigg’s corporatist dictatorship.  He also 
characterized the National Socialist government as a temporary condition, and he hoped that 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983).
694Kirk, 133-149.
402
the Anschluß would prove a permanent boon for the Austrian people once the Hitler regime 
ended.  Indeed, Renner demonstrated his faith in the eventual demise of National Socialism 
by refusing to flee Nazi Austria as so many other Social Democratic leaders did.695
Not all Socialists supported the Anschluß as vigorously as Renner, however.  One 
leader of the Socialist exile community, Joseph Buttinger, defended his movement against 
charges that it supported Hitler’s Anschluß by remarking that the Socialists cared little for 
notions of Austrian independence, but rather focused on the goal of overthrowing Hitler.  In 
1939 he wrote, “The Socialist worker’s movement is neither altogether for nor against the 
Anschluß.  It is for the achievement of its political goals, for the realization of proletarian 
class power, for the victory of German and international socialism.”696  A year later, a group 
of Austrian Socialist exiles in Paris reiterated these themes, arguing that any decisions by the 
movement concerning what would come after the Third Reich should be put off until Hitler 
was successfully overthrown.  At the same time, the group warned that the efforts by 
Austrian legitimists to work for the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy played directly 
into the hands of the Nazis by alienating the former subject peoples of the Monarchy who 
had a “profound aversion” to such an idea.697  In a practical sense, the Anschluß made little 
difference to the Socialists so long as the struggle against Hitler continued.  Still, during the 
first years of Nazi rule in Austria, they generally remained far more receptive to the idea of a 
695Renner retired totally from public life in 1938 and spent the Nazi years quietly in his villa in Gloggnitz, 
Upper Austria.  Only after the Soviet “liberation” of eastern Austria in 1945 did he resume political 
activity.   Karl Renner, Karl Renner in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen, ed. Seigfried Nasko (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1982), 132-137; Jelavich, 247.
696“Flugschrift mit Stellungnahme des Sozialisten Emigrationführers Joseph Buttinger zum ‘Anschluß,’” in 
Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien 1934-1945. Eine Dokumentation, vol. 2 (Vienna: Österreichischer 
Bundesverlag, 1975), 31-33.
697“Flugschrift der Auslandsvertretung österreichischer Sozialisten mit grundsätzlicher politischer 
Stellungnahme, Neujahr 1940,” in Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 2, 37-40.
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continuing union with Germany than to any of the options supported by the other opposition 
factions such as  monarchical restoration or a Danubian confederation.
Only as it became clear that Nazi Germany would lose the war and that the Allies 
were unlikely to permit Austria to remain with Germany, did many Socialists begin to 
repudiate the Anschluß explicitly.  An excerpt from the memoirs of the future Socialist 
president, Adolf Schärf, concerning a conversation with the trade unionist resister Wilhelm 
Leuschner in 1943 illustrates how difficult it was for many members of the movement to 
abandon the idea even at that stage: 
I interrupted my visitor unheralded and said: “The Anschluß is dead.  The 
Austrians have been cured of their love of Germany. . . .”  Leuschner was 
surprised and shaken.  He told me that he had talked to other men in Vienna, 
and no one had presented him with such an impression of the mood in 
Austria.  I regained control of myself, so to speak, and initially could not 
understand how I had arrived at such an answer.  I continued, however, and 
declared that my political friends could only participate in the overthrow of 
the Hitler government, not in the preservation of the Anschluß.  Leuschner 
was disappointed.698
Not all Socialists had entirely abandoned the Anschluß even relatively late in the war.  It 
seems likely that even those who had rejected it did so out of practical considerations in 
light of Allied intentions, rather than out of genuine ideological or national conviction.  Still, 
the Socialist exile Rudolph Holowatyj anticipated the position that his Party would take on 
the Aschluß after the end of the Nazi regime when he wrote in 1944 that,
The victorious powers will have no need to issue ‘prohibitions’ against a new 
Anschluß.  The Concept of the Anschluß has ceased to exist.  Hitler and his 
disciples have finished it off.  After the liberation of the country, the 
Austrians will reject by an overwhelming majority the idea of Anschluß even 
with a democratic Germany.699
698Adolf Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, 1945-1955 (Vienna, 1955), 20; Thaler, The Ambivalence of 
Identity, 84-5.
699United States State Department excerpt of Rudolph Holowratyj’s article in L’Avenir, National Archives, 
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Holowatyj recognized that the ideal of an Austro-German union had simply become too 
inextricably intertwined with National Socialist ideology to survive as a viable political goal 
for the Party after the Third Reich’s defeat, no matter how ardently Socialists had supported 
Anschluß before 1938.  
The position and activities of the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) differed 
significantly from those of the Socialists.  During the 1930s, the Communists had 
proclaimed a theory of Austria’s nationhood based upon its distinctive history and culture.  
The Party’s main spokesman on national issues, Alfred Klahr, had vigorously supported 
Austrian independence as a bulwark for democratic ideals against Hitler.  In contrast to 
Renner and the Socialists, Klahr and the KPÖ saw a very significant difference between 
Schuschnigg’s dictatorship and Hitler’s racial state, and thus supported the corporatist 
regime’s efforts to maintain Austrian independence between 1936 and 1938, even though 
the party had been banned by that same government in 1933.700
Because the KPÖ had taken the Nazis very seriously as adversaries and were used to 
functioning underground, the Communists were poised from the beginning for resistance 
against the Hitler regime.  Indeed during the course of the war, the Communists constituted 
the single largest and best organized faction within the Austrian Resistance.  They were 
unable to mount any sort of serious armed insurrection until the last year of the war, 
however, and the early years of Nazi rule saw them struggle just to survive.  Yet the 
Communists did manage to produce propaganda during these years which portrayed the 
Washington DC, RG 59, 863.000/6-642.
700Alfred Klahr, “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich,” Weg und Ziel: Monatschrift für Theorie und Praxis 
des Marximus-Leninismus 2, no. 3 (1937):126-133; Luza, Resistance in Austria, 21-22.
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Nazis as foreign invaders and appealed to the Austrian people’s proud sense of 
distinctiveness.  Just two months after the Anschluß, Nazi Security Service records indicate 
that KPÖ distributed flyers in Vienna which read:
From a cosmopolitan city to a Prussian province?
Viennese!  Do you approve of the degradation of your city?
Fight with us for an independent Austrian Republic! 701
An illicitly published issue of Die Rote Fahne from November of the same year contained a 
similar message: “The Austrian working class, and with it the entire Austrian Volk, will with 
steely determination lead the struggle against Prussian foreign domination, which has 
brought the Austrian Volk only a lack of freedom, misery and war, to the end!”702  Nazi 
records indicate that such Communist propaganda continued to circulate throughout the war 
years with messages urging Austrians to fight for their independence against a Nazi regime 
invariably characterized as foreign or “Prussian.”703  The Communists thus explicitly 
disputed the Nazi government’s claims to represent a united German Volk by portraying 
National Socialism as a provincial ideology which was foreign to the traditions and values 
of the Austrian nation.
The KPÖ’s goal seems to have always been an independent “small” Austria, 
however.  The  Communists did not advocate a south German state or a Danubian 
federation, as did some other resistance groups.  The fact that Communists exclusively 
supported “small” Austrian independence makes sense in light of the ties between the Party 
and the Soviet government, which had no desire to countenance the creation of a powerful 
701“Vom SD in Wien XVI und XVII beschlagnahmter Steuzettel der KPÖ, Mai 1939,” in Widerstand und 
Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 2, 234.
702“Illegale Zeitschrift der KPÖ ‘Die Rote Fahne. Nachrichten Blatt’, November, 1939,” in Widerstand 
und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 2, 237-8.
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state with the power to oppose the Soviet Union’s own ambitions in Central Europe.  As 
might well be expected, the Communists also opposed any notion of a restored monarchy, 
and at least one Communist newspaper countered Western accusations of Soviet aggression 
in 1939 by accusing Chamberlain and Deladier of conspiring to return Otto von Habsburg to 
the Austrian throne.704  Thus, the KPÖ juxtaposed the cultural and historical traditions of 
Austria and its inevitable socialistic future with the militarism and foreignness of “Prussian” 
Germany, which had brought about Nazism.  At the same time, however, the Communists 
also repudiated the legitimacy of the old dynasty in no uncertain terms.
The “small” Austrian ideology of the Communists can be contrasted with opinions of 
the other large faction of opposition to the Nazi regime in Austria: the right wing legitimists 
and traditionalists.  This group represented the conservative core of the other prominent 
political faction in the First Republic, the Christian Social Party.  The CSP itself had 
supported Anschluß in 1919 just as the other parties had done, and it continued to do so, 
albeit in an increasingly muted manner, until 1933.  A portion of the right wing of the 
Austrian political spectrum maintained support for the Austrian ancien regime, however, 
and hoped for a resumption of Habsburg rule in Austria at some point in the future.  Such 
kaisertreu aspirations blended with firm devotion to Roman Catholicism, and were 
obviously at odds with any sort of greater German ideology.  The Schuschnigg regime used 
these ideals in an attempt to cultivate a distinctive Austrian identity and maintain a tenuous 
independence from Nazi Germany during the mid-1930s.705  Schuschnigg failed to prevent 
703Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 2, 214-264.
704“Illegale Zeitschrift ‘KPÖ-Nachrichten,” Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 2, 236-7.
705See Chapter 3 of this dissertation, and Anton Pelinka, “Austrian Identity and the Ständestaat,”  in The 
Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective, eds. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms 
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the Nazi invasion and subsequent Anschluß, but these attempts by Austrian conservatives to 
describe the basis for a distinctive Austrian identity laid the foundation for the Austrian 
right’s resistance to Nazi rule.
After the Anschluß, Nazi authorities were quick to move against Austrian 
conservatives and legitimists.  They detained Schuschnigg and arrested thousands of others.  
From 1938 on, records from the Gestapo and various courts reveal that the Nazis proceeded 
against Austrian legitimism with vigor and succeeding in capturing many conservative 
Austrian resisters.  These documents show that legitimist opposition to the Nazi regime was 
splintered and far less organized than the KPÖ’s resistance networks.  Right wing resistance 
groups with an array of names such as Österreichische Bewegung, Österreichische 
Freiheitsbewegung, Großösterreichische Freiheitsbewegung, Österreichisches Jungvolk,  
Karl-Vogelsang-Bund, Österreichische Volksfront, Antifaschistische Freiheitsbewegung 
Österreichs and Illegale Österreichische Kaisertreu Front give an idea of the proliferation 
of right-wing resistance movements and groups.  There was no widespread agreement by 
these groups as to the exact nature of their goals for their homeland, but all of them rejected 
the notion of continued union with greater-Germany and staunchly opposed Nazi rule.706
Some conservative resisters appealed to Austrian patriotism and separatism, but 
referred only vaguely to the precise form a postwar Austrian state ought to take, if indeed 
they addressed that issue at all.  For example, Friedrich Theiss of the Östereichische 
Bewegung maintained that his movement supported the “Austrian idea” against Bolshevism, 
National Socialism, and Judaism, but provided no details on what a new Austria might look 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 167-176.
706Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 3, 81-149.
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like.  Likewise, Franz Zellner noted in a Volksgerichthof  proceeding in 1940 that, “We 
Austrians are, through history and culture, in spirit and conviction, in character and lifestyle, 
different from other Germans, and opposite from Prussians,” but mentioned no specific 
goals other than Austrian independence.707
In arguing for Austrian independence, at least some conservative movements used 
the figures associated with the Habsburg past in order to inspire Austrian opposition to the 
regime.  For example, a resistance group’s pamphlet from 1938 harked back to Andreas 
Hofer’s struggle against Napoleon’s Bavarian allies in 1809, and used the Tirolean leader as 
a symbol of Austrian patriotism.708  Similarly, an Austrian resistance group made up of 
young people closed its illegally printed call to action with the old Habsburg motto, “Austria 
above all, if it so wills.”709
Other conservative resisters explicitly identified the restoration of the House of 
Habsburg as their ultimate ideal.  Nazi judicial proceedings charged Emilie Gehrich, 
Walther Dürr, and Maria Theresia Kettenberg, as well as the members of the “Burian 
Group,” with working toward precisely this goal in 1941.  Nazi prosecutors accused the 
members of Karl Polly’s Österreichische Arbeiterspartei not only of working for the return 
of Otto von Habsburg, but for the establishment of a “democratic monarchy in Bavaria, the 
Rhineland, the Alpine and Danubian Reichsgauen, in the former Czechoslovakia and in part 
of Poland,” which amounted to not merely a restoration but an expansion of the Habsburg 
707“Urteil des SG beim LG gegen Friedrich Theiss und andere wegen Vergehens nach dem Gesetz gegen 
die Neubildung von Parteien, 17. 12. 1941" and “Anklageschrift des Oberreichsanwaltes beim VGH gegen 
Franz Zellner, 5. 4. 1940” in Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 3, 91, 132-3.
708Klusacek, Steiner and Stimmer, 126.
709Ibid., 124.
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Monarchy as it existed prior to 1918!710  A number of other groups had similar notions of 
establishing either some form of revitalized Habsburg Monarchy, or a Habsburg-ruled 
Catholic state which would include Bavaria and Austria.
Even in exile, legitimist opposition to the Nazis attempted to work toward the goal of 
an independent, and possibly expanded, conservative Austrian state.  Otto von Habsburg 
himself spent much of the war in the United States working to muster support from the 
Austrian exile community.  He met a number of times with Franklin Roosevelt and served as 
a powerful voice for a particular vision of post-war Austria.  In a brief article in the January, 
1942 issue of Foreign Affairs, Habsburg criticized the dismemberment of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the peace settlement after World War I and the subsequent creation of 
numerous, economically unviable states which became easy prey for Nazi Germany.  He 
then proceeded to offer a vision for a Central European peace settlement for the Second 
World War :
I repeat that war policy is always a lasting mortgage on peace policy.  
Therefore everything will depend on whether the Allies choose to encourage 
the right forces this time in Germany and German-occupied countries. . . .The 
right forces are those which aim at decentralizing Germany in order to break 
Prussian leadership and which aim at reintegrating the old supra-national 
community on the Danube.711
Habsburg thus envisioned a renewal of the union between the Habsburg lands, but this time 
on federal terms with a central government which would truly serve the interests of all the 
710“Anklageschrift des Staatsanwalts beim LG Wien als SG gegen Emilie Gehrich, Walther Dürr and 
Maria Theresia Kettenberg, 5. 3. 1940,” “Urteil des VGH gegen Karl Burian, Josef Wotypa, Ludwig 
Krausz-Wienner, Rochus Kosak, Julius Kretchmer, Dr. Josef Krininger und Martha Krinninger, 9. 12. 
1943,” “Urteil gegen Karl Polly, Wilhelm Zach, Agnes Polly, Margarete Matzner und Gabriel Mesner 
wegen Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat, 20. 11. 1943,” in Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien, vol. 3, 129, 
141.  See also, Widerstand und Verfolgung in Tirol 1934-1945. Eine Dokumentation., vol. 2 (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984), 312, 319, 333, 339, for similar cases.
711Otto Habsburg, “Danubian Reconstruction,” Foreign Affairs 20 (January, 1942): 251.
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member nationalities.  He never unequivocally stated that he wanted such a Danubian 
federation to be a monarchy, but an OSS report indicates that some US officials were clearly 
suspicious of his motives and thought that he wished to claim the throne for himself.712
Habsburg nevertheless obtained approval from the US government at several points to 
gather an Austrian or “Austro-Hungarian” battalion of exiles to fight in Europe as a unit of 
the US army, although the State Department’s skepticism concerning the actual support for 
such a venture within the emigre community proved to be well founded.713
The legitimist and conservative opposition to the Nazi regime thus did not all agree 
on the form that a postwar Austrian state should take.  They unanimously argued for 
separation from Germany based upon Austria’s distinctive history and culture, but many 
were loath to return to the 1938 boundaries of the supposedly unworkable small Austrian 
state.  Many such proposals argued for a return to the format of a supra-national Danubian 
state, essentially a recasting of the old Habsburg Monarchy, while others supported a union 
with other German Catholics which would eliminate the strife between Germans and Slavs 
which had plagued the old Monarchy.
Reports on Austria from British and American sources seem to confirm the 
assertions of Austrian identity that these resistance documents contain.  Correspondence 
from the British consul in Vienna to the British Foreign Office in the months following the 
Anschluß describes the persistence of Austrian separatism and resistance to Nazi efforts to 
assimilate the population.  Consul-General Ganier reported that the Austrian upper and 
working classes were generally hostile toward Nazism even if they often welcomed the 
712“The Austrian Emigration and its Activity,” National Archives, RG 226, Entry 16, Record 16588.
713“General Jospeh McNarney to Sumner Welles,” “John C. Wiley to Ray Atherton,” National Archives, 
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Nazis’ anti-Semitic and anti-Czech policies.  Ganier described the Austrian youth, however, 
as more receptive to Nazi propaganda due to their lack of memory of "the last war or of 
Austrian traditions.”  He also reported that the threat of war during the September 1938 
Munich crisis and the Nazi-sponsored anti-Catholic violence in Vienna during October had 
caused many Austrians to be dissatisfied with the regime. Ganier even asserted that some 
sections of the population had not supported the November pogrom, although most 
historians agree that “Kristalnacht” was actually more vicious in Austria than in most of the 
Third Reich.714
During the war years, various reports by the US Office of Strategic Services likewise 
documented the survival of Austrian patriotism and separatism in the Ostmark which 
gathered in strength as the war turned against Germany.  The OSS argued that many 
Austrians resented German economic exploitation of the Ostmark, and were disappointed 
that they had not experienced the economic gains from the Anschluß which the Nazis had 
promised.  Reports also noted the especially strong Austrian resentment toward the so-called  
“Bombenfrischer,” Germans who had sought refuge in Austria from the Allied bombing in 
the Altreich.  By the final years of the war, OSS reports described brawls between Austrians 
and Germans, and economic discrimination toward Germans by Austrian merchants.  The 
OSS invariably characterized such animosity as “anti-Prussian.”715  One report from 
December of 1943 commented at length on the overall weakness of regional separatism in 
RG 59, 811.2221/307, 863.000/6-642.
714Christopher Seton-Watson, ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, From the First to the Second World War, Series F, Europe, 
1919-1939,  Vol. 14, Southern Europe: Italy, Balkan States and Danubian States, 1938 (University 
Publications of America, 1990), 346, 359.  On Kristalnacht in Austria, see Bukey, Hitler’s Austria, 144.
715National Archives, RG 226 Entry 14 Boxes 10-12; Entry 16, Reel 126, Document 22129; Box 1647 
Record 142130.
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the Nazi Reich, but distinguished Austrian resentments toward “Prussia” from those of other 
German regions:
The difference is striking if one compares the mass of reports of local opinion 
in the supposedly "separatist" regions of the Old Reich with reports from 
Austria.  In Austria the question is clearly continually debated in all classes 
whether or not secession would be preferable to continuation in the Reich, 
whether a return of the Habsburgs would be desirable, and so on.  In Bavaria, 
Württemberg, etc., such discussions are mentioned, if at all, only occasionally 
and in small circles.  Most observers report greater or less adherence to 
National Socialism in Bavaria as compared with Prussia, greater or less 
desire for immediate peace, and such things, but never think to mention 
separatist tendencies.716
In the early war years, the OSS frequently described Austrian support for 
independence, but also noted that these sentiments were sometimes tinted with profound 
skepticism about the political and economic viability of a resurrected small Austrian state.  
The OSS reports documented a spectrum of postwar proposals ranging from a Socialist or 
democratic small Austrian state to a Danubian economic federation to a Catholic Austro-
Bavarian monarchy.  These reports noted that many Austrians had lingering affinities for the 
Habsburg Monarchy and that some of them even believed that the comparatively lighter 
bombing in Austria than in the rest of Germany resulted from the personal intercession of 
Otto von Habsburg with the Allied leaders to spare his homeland so it could be reconstituted 
under his leadership.717  Only by 1945, with the unification of numerous resistance groups of 
all political stripes in the form of the Austrian Provisional National Committee (POEN), did 
support for a small, republican Austria predominate, and even then reports still occasionally 
716National Archives, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 622, Record 53144S.
717National Archives, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 838, Record 69480.  It is worth noting, however, that a report 
from February 24, 1944 indicates that, "The movement favoring monarchy has some force, but it is 
doubtful if it has the support of most of the people." RG 226, Entry 16, Box 735, Document 60655.
413
mention support for alternate proposals.718
The OSS did notice, however, the decided absence of any significant armed 
uprisings against the Nazis.  The Austrian response to the Allies’ Moscow Declaration of 
1943, which declared the Allied intention to reconstitute Austria after the defeat of the Hitler 
regime, but also warned that Austria needed to atone for its share of the responsibility for the 
war by contributing to its own liberation, was lukewarm at best.  There was never any 
significant Austrian effort to overthrow the Nazi regime in the Ostmark.  One OSS source 
attributed this lack of armed rebellion to Austrian uncertainty about which of the various 
options for a post-war Austrian state the Allies supported.  It certainly seems likely, 
however, that Austrian inaction had more to do with the weakness of the actual resistance 
and the continuing support by most Austrians for the Nazi regime.719
Indeed these findings concerning the durability of some sense of a historically 
grounded Austrian distinctiveness during the Nazi years ultimately do not modify the 
findings of Bukey or Thaler that most Austrians generally supported Hitler’s regime up until 
the actual end of the war.  The resistance in Austria was significant, but there was no 
widespread revolt against Nazism.  Likewise, no faction of the Austrian resistance voiced 
any appreciable opposition to the Nazis’ anti-Semitic policies or to the deportation of the 
Austrian Jews.  In fact, many of the right-wing resistance organizations displayed anti-
Semitic attitudes of their own.  Austria was obviously not the “first victim” of National 
Socialism, and most Austrians did not oppose the measures which led to the murder of the 
European Jews.
718National Archives, RG 226, Entry 14, Boxes 10-12; Entry 16, Box 1406, Record 122908.
719National Archives, RG 226, Box 648, Record 54103, Box 735, Record 60655.
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At the same time, it is clear that Austrian attitudes toward the Anschluß and the 
desirability of Austrian independence were far from monolithic.  The majority of the 
population supported the Anschluß, but that support did not mean that Austrians completely 
abandoned a separate Austrian identity or a sense of the distinctiveness of Austria’s 
Habsburg past.  Certainly there was a determined core of opponents of the Nazi regime who 
maintained firm support for Austrian independence in one form or another, and who 
explicitly counterposed their ideals of Austrian nationhood and history with the Germanist 
views of National Socialism.  These ideals had been present in the Austrian debate on 
national identity before 1938, and it is possible that the clearly articulated Austrian 
patriotism of the resisters and the Allied intelligence reports concerning lingering Austrian 
separatism reflected the sentiments of a sizable portion of the Austrian population who were 
unwilling to voice or act upon their feelings while under the threat of Nazi terror.  The 
continuously reiterated skepticism concerning the viability of the pre-1938 small Austria 
raises the possibility that the strong support for the Anschluß in 1938 was as much a 
statement against the shortcomings of a particular form of an Austrian state as it was a 
declaration in favor of greater Germany.  Likewise, it is even possible that many Austrians 
simultaneously supported the Nazi regime and many of its policies and resented the 
perceived lack of Nazi sensitivity toward Austrian distinctiveness.
Ultimately it is impossible to gauge how extensive these notions of Austrian identity 
were. All we can say for sure concerning Austrian identity during the Nazi period is that it 
was profoundly contested.  Some Austrians obviously supported the continuation of the 
union with Germany.  Others wanted a return to the Austrian state within its pre-1938 
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borders.  Still other groups argued that Austria should be expanded to include the Catholic 
parts of Germany, or the former territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, or both.  Such a range 
of opinions makes it impossible to speak of one unique, fully-formed notion of identity.  
Rather, there was a multiplicity of options and views, most of which were based upon the 
idea that Austria’s history and culture distinguished it from other German-speaking areas.  
There was, however, no wide agreement as what that distinctiveness might mean in practical 
terms.  
Ultimately it was the military defeat of the Nazi regime in the spring of 1945 that 
truly produced a halting consensus in the Austrian debate on national identity.  The horrific 
level of devastation wrought by the war which Hitler unleashed upon the world, the 
hideousness of the Nazi attempt to murder the Jews of Europe, and the decisiveness of the 
allied defeat of Nazi Germany all created a set of circumstances which profoundly de-
legitimized not only National Socialism, but also the Germanist conceptions of Austrian 
identity and history which the Nazis had promoted.  As we have seen, the Nazi government 
in Austria conceived of Austrians as Germans, and had viewed the Anschluß of 1938 as a 
crowning achievement in German history.  Hitler’s regime had sought to inculcate this view 
of Austrian national identity, as well as a view of the Habsburg Monarchy as a national 
tragedy for the German Volk into the minds of Nazi Germany’s youngest Austrian citizens 
through the Third Reich’s educational system.  
As the victors in World War II, however, the liberal democratic powers of the West, 
on the one hand, and the Communist Soviet Union on the other, all repudiated National 
Socialism as a destructive, evil ideology, and the allies did their best to undo the work of the 
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Nazi regime in the regions of Europe which had been conquered by Germany.  They 
arrested remaining leaders of the Nazi regime in both Germany and Austria and swiftly 
dismantled the legal and administrative apparatus of the National Socialist dictatorship.  An 
important part of this work of rolling back Nazism was the restoration of Austrian
independence.  The Allies had encouraged the independence-minded Austrian resistance 
movement with the Moscow Declaration of 1943, and in 1945 those same powers occupied 
Austria and moved quickly to once again separate Austria from Germany.  The Allies had 
come to see the Anschluß itself as a Nazi ideal, and its reversal too was part of the process of 
eliminating Nazism root and branch.
Thus, the Austrian people themselves again faced circumstances which determined 
the course of their debate on their own past and nationhood.  Whether they wanted to remain 
a part of Germany or not, they were once again citizens of a state separate from Germany.  
This state was now occupied by foreign powers which looked with a hostile eye upon 
anything associated with the Nazi regime, including Austro-German nationalism.  The 
Austrian people had also been placed in a position where continued support for Austria as a 
part of the German nation would implicitly require Austrians to share the blame for Nazi 
Germany’s crimes, while an assertion of Austrian independence and national distinctiveness 
would facilitate claims that Austria had merely been a victim of the Nazi regime rather than 
a willing collaborator.720
Austria had powerful incentives to repudiate the German national identity which had 
previously been so popular in the Austrian public sphere.  The era in which a view of 
720Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War: The Leverage of the Weak (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 1999), 1-13; Günter Bischof and  Josef Leidenfrost,eds. Die Bevormundete Nation, Österreich 
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Austria as part of Germany was the dominant point of view in the Austrian debate on 
national identity ended with the disintegration of Hitler’s regime.  From 1945 onward, 
Austrian independence from Germany was simply a given.  It would be up to the political 
factions and the government of the newly liberated Austrian Second Republic, however, to 
decide exactly how Austria’s Habsburg past related to Austria’s national identity in the new 
circumstances of the postwar world.
und die Alliierten 1945-1949, (Vienna: Haymo Verlag, 1988), 11-45.
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Part IV. The Past as an Alibi: Austria Reborn, 1945-1955
Chapter 6.  Politics and the Habsburg Past in the Second Republic 
In 1945, just as in 1918, Austria was separated from a large Central European 
Empire which had been defeated in a devastating world war.  The circumstances 
surrounding the birth of the Austrian Second Republic, however, differed from those which 
greeted the emergence of the First Republic in several crucial ways.  First of all, in late 
1945, most Austrians who had not been Nazi Party members denounced the Hitler regime, 
which had conducted a nakedly expansionistic war of conquest in Europe and murdered 
millions of Jews, Slavs, and various other ethnic and social groups, as not merely 
authoritarian, but evil.  While many Austrians in 1918 had repudiated the Habsburg 
Monarchy, none of them had done so with the same level of vehemence or outrage which all 
of Austria’s non-Nazi political factions unanimously directed toward the Third Reich.  
Secondly, while Austria had not been the site of any appreciable combat during the First 
World War, during the course of World War II, the Allied powers had subjected Austria’s 
urban and industrial centers to a massive aerial bombardment, and ultimately mounted a 
military invasion to seize control of the Austrian lands.  In 1945, after the astounding 
destruction wrought by the war, Austria found itself occupied by those Allies, forcibly 
separated from the great-German Reich to which it had been joined since the 1938 Anschluß, 
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and divided into four zones of occupation, administered by the United States, Britain, France 
and the Soviet Union respectively.721
721On the Allied occupation of Austria, see William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966); Donald R. Whitnah and Edgar L. Erickson, The American 
Occupation of Austria: Planning and the Early Years (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); Günter Bischor 
and Josef Leidenfrost,eds., Die Bevormundete Nation, Österreich und die Alliierten 1945-1949 (Vienna: 
Haymo Verlag, 1988); Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the 
Weak (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); James Jay Carafano, Waltzing Into The Cold War: The 
Struggle For Occupied Austria (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).
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In April of 1945, Karl Renner, the prominent Social Democrat and former president 
of the First Republic, formed an Austrian Provisional Government with the approval of the 
Soviet Union.  The other Allied powers were suspicious of Renner’s government, which 
they saw as a unilateral Soviet creation and a possible first step toward the creation of a 
Austrian Communist state dominated by Moscow.  The Soviet government had often 
criticized Renner’s moderate Marxism in the past, but now it sanctioned his efforts simply 
because he was the only Austrian political figure of prominence ready to seize the initiative 
and form a new Austrian government.  Indeed, Renner was no Stalinist stooge and he 
vigorously courted the Western Allies, seeking to assuage their fears by including members 
of the Austrian right in his government.  His efforts were successful; in October, 1945, the 
remaining Allied powers recognized his government.  None of the Allies, however, were yet 
willing to end their occupation or to grant full sovereignty to the Austria.  Before those 
things could happen, the occupiers wanted to ensure the elimination of any remaining 
vestiges of National Socialist power in Austria.  The rapidly increasing hostility between the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union over the postwar balance of power in Europe only 
served to complicate the Allies’ discussions about when and under what circumstances the 
occupation of Austria would end. 722
722Bischof, 45-61; Bader, 60-63; Carafano, 54-55; Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria: Empire and Republic 
1815-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 247.
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Therefore, by the end of 1945, Austria had a government, but was not fully 
independent.  The new political regime in Austria, which held its first elections in December 
of 1945, was able to set policies for Austria, but only with the approval of the Allied 
occupiers.  The Second Allied Control Agreement of June 1946 dramatically expanded the 
Austrian government’s autonomy, but the Allies could still veto any of its policies by issuing 
a unanimous objection within thirty-one days of the passage of any piece of legislation.  The 
increasingly tense relations between the two Cold War blocks made such unanimity on the 
part of the occupiers rare, however, and by the late 1940s, Austria itself had assumed a great 
deal of responsibility for even such critical matters as denazification and Austrian foreign 
policy.723  Moreover, Austria had much more autonomy than the other occupied portions of 
the former Third Reich, which remained divided throughout the Cold War, and where even 
the zone occupied by the Western powers did not hold elections or establish an independent 
government until 1949.724  Still, the Austrian Second Republic remained occupied by the 
Allies until 1955.
The new government which Renner formed divided power roughly equally among 
the three political factions which had opposed the National Socialist government–the 
conservatives of the old Christian Social Party, the Social Democrats, and the Communists–
and adopted as its ultimate goal the reestablishment of full Austrian sovereignty in the form 
723Bader, 60-63; Bischof, 52-77; Kurt K. Tweraser, “Military Justice as an Instrument of American 
Occupation Policy in Austria 1945-1950: From Total Control to Limited Tutelage,” Austria History 
Yearbook 24 (1993): 161-162; Robert Knight, “Britische Entnazifizierungspolitik, 1945-1948,” 
Zeitgeschichte 11, nos. 9-10 (1984): 287-295.
724See Hans-Peter Schwartz, Vom Reich zum Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der 
außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft, 1945-1949, 2d ed. (Berlin: 
Luchterhand, 1980).
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of a democratic republic.725  Issues of Austrian national identity were just as crucial for the 
Provisional Government and Austria’s postwar political parties as they had been for 
previous Austrian regimes since 1918.  As in all of those previous eras, the Austrian 
leadership was not completely free to decide upon such issues on its own, but rather 
operated under constraints imposed by the wider European political situation.
The occupying Allies in 1945 insisted that Austria be established as a democratic 
state totally separate from Germany.  These goals were grounded in the Allies’ Moscow 
Declaration of 1943, which had presented the Anschluß as a imposition upon Austria by a 
foreign invader, even as it had cautioned that Austria had to accept  responsibility for its 
participation in Hitler’s war of aggression.726  The response of all of Austria’s major political 
factions to most of these Allied constraints was far from unenthusiastic, however.  Whereas 
the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain of 1919 forbidding Austrian Anschluß with 
Germany had been greeted with only the most reluctant acceptance on the part of Austria’s 
political leadership at the time, Austria’s leaders in 1945 did not require much allied 
coercion to repudiate the goal of Austrian union with Germany.  The 1938 Anschluß with 
Nazi Germany had represented an unambiguous disaster for Austria, and had resulted in 
725These goals were clearly spelled out in the Provisional Government’s first statement to the Austrian 
people in April of 1945.  “Die Regirungserklärung der Provisorischen Regierung,” in Für Recht und 
Frieden: Eine Auswahl der Reden des Bundespräsidenten Dr. Karl Renner, ed. Austrian Federal 
Government (Vienna: Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1951), 13-17.
726The Allies differed significantly concerning the form which an independent Austria should take.  Before 
the end of the war, Britain and the United States had contemplated constituting Austria as part of a South 
German Catholic Monarchy, while the USSR wanted no part of such a plan.  The Soviet Union and the 
Western powers also clearly had drastically different conceptions of the meaning of “democracy” as well.  
As the Cold War era began, disagreements between the two ideological blocks were every bit as intense 
and extensive as elsewhere in Europe.  The Allies at least had reached a very basic consensus, though, that 
postwar Austria should be separated from Germany, and should have a government which was neither 
National Socialist nor fascist.  For a discussion of the Moscow Declaration and Austria’s part in the early 
Cold War, see Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 57, 78-129; “Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer 
Erklärung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg,” Zeitgeschichte 20(1993): 345-366; Bader, 31-33.
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unparalleled devastation and severe political oppression.  The only groups which would 
have retained any lingering affinity for Anschluß, the remnants of the old Pan-German 
parties and the Austrian National Socialist themselves, were utterly tainted by their support 
for and participation in the Nazi regime.  The Allies prohibited the remaining Austrian Nazis 
from participating in postwar Austrian politics and the remaining three Austrian political 
factions regarded them as traitors to Austrian freedom.727  The idea of Anschluß itself had 
simply become inextricably entwined with the experience of Nazism in the minds of the 
Allies and most of the Austrian people, and even apart from any demands by the Allied 
occupiers, “Germanist” conceptions of Austrian national identity had been throughly de-
legitimized by the severely negative consequences of Austria’s union with the Third Reich.
The Provisional Government and the Austrian conservative, Socialist, and 
Communist factions which participated in it thus cooperated enthusiastically with Allied 
demands to rebuild an independent, democratic state, and worked tirelessly to proclaim the 
existence of a separate and distinctive Austrian national identity, a notion which they 
regarded as the key element of Austria’s reconstruction.  These presentations of a unique 
Austrian nationhood also had the felicitous side effect of minimizing any Austrian 
connection to or responsibility for the crimes of Nazi Germany.  Austria’s new leaders 
eagerly embraced this project in order to rehabilitate Austria’s reputation and to end the 
occupation as soon as possible.  The three parties all portrayed the Nazi period as one in 
which a foreign dictatorship had imposed itself upon an unwilling Austrian Volk, the “first 
727Strictures against many former Nazis would be lifted as early as 1948, however, allowing them to return 
to political activity, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  See essays in Sebastian Meissl, Klaus_Dieter 
Mulley, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., Verdrängte Schuld, Verfehlte Sühne, Entnazifzierung in Österreich 
1945-1955 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986).
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victim” of Nazi aggression.  As we have seen, such a portrayal of Austria’s Nazi past 
considerably distorted reality.  Austrians had broadly supported the 1938 Anschluß, the 
National Socialist regime, and even the war itself.  
These efforts to distance Austria from the Nazi past were far from unique to Austria, 
however.  Political leaders in postwar West and East Germany and France sought to 
minimize their respective states’ complicity in World War II and the Holocaust.728  What 
was unique about the Austrian effort to downplay Austria’s  responsibility for the Nazi past 
was its use of the notion of a distinctive Austrian national identity in order to accomplish its 
aims.729  The postwar German and French states may have denied that their contemporary 
states bore any responsibility for what had occurred during the war, but they never denied 
their German or French identities in doing so.  The postwar Austrian leadership based its 
attempts to separate Austria from the legacy of the Nazis by presenting just such a denial, 
arguing that Austrians were not Germans, and never had been.  The Allies themselves, 
despite their initial demands that Austria shoulder its share of responsibility for the war, 
ultimately allowed Austria to present such claims because, by the late 1940s, the heightened 
Cold War tensions made the issue of war responsibility seem less pressing than the new 
728Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997);  Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitk: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-
Vergangenheit (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1996); Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and 
Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
729The best such account is Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: the Austrian Experience of 
Nation_building in a Modern Society (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001).  See also 
Anton Pelinka, Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998); and 
essays in Bischof and Pelinka, eds., Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, Contemporary 
Austrian Studies, vol. 5 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Peter Utgaard, 
Remembering and Forgetting Nazism: Education, National Identity and the Victim Myth in Postwar 
Austria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).  None of these accounts place enough weight on the 
importance of references to the Habsburg past to the Second Republic’s efforts to build a new Austrian 
identity.
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ideological conflict in Europe.730
The project of presenting and nurturing the sense of a distinctive Austrian national 
identity both in order to create a firm foundation for the Austrian independence and 
democracy and to minimize Austria’s responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust 
continued throughout the early Second Republic.  Indeed, as the Provisional Government 
gave way to an actual elected government which assumed increasing responsibility for 
Austria’s own affairs, culminating in the end of the occupation with the State Treaty of 
1955, this project was a central feature of Austrian politics and public discourse, although 
the intensity of the discussions of Austrian identity decreased significantly during the early 
1950s. As with the public debate about Austrian national identity which had raged between 
1918 and 1945, the postwar Austrian discussion of national identity invariably made 
reference to Austria’s past as part of the Habsburg Monarchy in order to make arguments 
concerning the contemporary state’s national status.  This time, however, there really was no 
“debate” concerning Austrian national identity as such, but rather widespread consensus 
among the major political parties and within the government that Austria really was its own 
nation.  Arguments for Austrian Germanness virtually disappeared from public discourse in 
Austria after 1945.  The main element of contention in the postwar public discussion of such 
nationhood involved exactly how Austria’s Habsburg past supported the notion of a 
distinctive Austrian national identity. 
The Austrian right after 1945 asserted that the Habsburgs themselves had been 
responsible for Austria’s unique nationhood.  These Austrian conservatives argued that the 
dynasty had created a benevolent supranational empire which had seen the development of a 
730Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 142-150.
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cosmopolitan Austrian Volk whose historical talent for understanding and toleration of other 
Völker was utterly opposed to the chauvinistic and domineering tendencies of the German 
nation.  The Social Democrats also supported the notion of Austrian nationhood, but their 
statements concerning such a national identity were generally more ambiguous than those of 
the Austrian right.  They argued that the Habsburgs had largely been an oppressive force in 
Austrian history, and that it was the working class which had represented the true subject of 
Austria’s history, and which had been led by the Socialist Party toward the realization of the 
democratic spirit which was ultimately the defining feature of Austrian national identity in 
the form of the Austrian First Republic.  Finally, the Communists presented a view which 
combined aspects of both of the major parties’ positions.  Like the Social Democrats, they 
argued  that the Habsburgs had been an oppressive force in the old Monarchy which the 
working class had opposed.  Yet the Communists’ vehement declarations of Austrian 
national identity, and their continuous contrasts between the national character of Austrians 
and that of Germans throughout history were quite similar to statements by the Austrian 
right.  Ultimately, all three of Austria’s postwar political parties presented differing visions 
of the Habsburg past.  Yet however different their views of that past may have been, each 
party’s vision still worked to fulfill the common goal of bolstering the Second Republic’s 
independence and democratic character, while distancing Austria from responsibility for the 
crimes of Nazi Germany. 
ii. The New Austrian Conservatism and the Habsburg Past 
The Austrian political right participated eagerly in the efforts to promote an 
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independent Austrian national identity through the articulation of an “Austrianist” view of 
the state’s history.  Such efforts were also part of a wider effort by the right to redefine 
itself. The former major right wing party in Austria, the Christian Social Party (CSP), had 
been subsumed within Dollfuß’ Fatherland Front in 1933.  Now the right reconstituted their 
movement under the new name of the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP- Austrian People’s 
Party).  This new label represented at least a symbolic break with the more problematic 
aspects of the Austrian conservative movement’s history.  The CSP had been tainted through 
its close association with Ständestaat dictatorship, and the new name signified not just a 
commitment to Austrian nationhood, but also the new republican principles which Austrian 
conservatism wholeheartedly embraced as it never had before 1945.  Indeed, the new party 
explicitly and emphatically supported democracy as the best form for Austria’s government, 
even though the Austrian right before the war had been willing to abandon democratic rule 
in Austria in the name of order and security.731  The ÖVP thrust those few CSP figures who 
had remained committed to democratic rule during the 1930s, such as Leopold Kunschak, to 
the forefront of its electoral campaigns in an effort to bolster the party’s democratic 
credentials.  The new party also represented a significant shift on the part of the right away 
from its previously close affiliation with Roman Catholicism and the Austrian Catholic 
Church.  The ÖVP downplayed that aspect of Austrian conservatism in favor of a newfound 
commitment to democracy, to the point of forbidding priests from running for political 
office.  In a similar manner, the ÖVP also placed less emphasis on anti-Socialism, and was 
731See “Die Programmatische Leitsätze der Österreichischen Volkspartei, 1945,” and “‘Alles für 
Österreich,’ Programmatische Grundsätze der Österreichischen Volkspartei, 1952,” in Österreichisch 
Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, ed. Klaus Berchtold (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967), 376-379, 379-
385.
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markedly more willing to approach their old adversaries, the Social Democrats, with a spirit 
of cooperation rather than hostility.  Likewise, the Austrian right’s previous staunch political 
anti-Semitism disappeared from the rhetoric of the People’s Party after 1945.732  These 
modifications transformed the Austrian right into a much more liberal faction than it had 
ever been before the war, as it sought to define a position which harmonized with the 
principles of the Western Allies whom it looked to for guidance and support.
Yet despite all of these changes, whether superficial or substantial, there was still a 
great deal of continuity between the CSP and ÖVP.  The new generation of conservative 
leaders, including Leopold Figl and Felix Hurdes, had all been active in the CSP during the 
1930s, as had many of the ÖVP’s lower ranking members.  The ÖVP’s basic political 
platform continued the CSP’s mixture of traditionalism and moderate social and economic 
reform, and the Party continued to target its appeals to Austrian farmers and petit-
bourgeoisie, much as it always had.  Despite its move away from clericism, the ÖVP 
remained committed to Catholicism as an important part of Austrian life and of its own 
ideology.  Thus, while it was technically a new party, the ÖVP was very much the successor 
of the CSP, and Austrian conservatism after the war had a great deal in common with the 
ideology of the Austrian right before 1938.733
This continuity of ideology allowed the new Austrian right to build upon its earlier 
presentations of Austrian history in order to provide the historical foundation for a renewed 
Austrian national identity.  Certainly the conservatives of the First Republic and the 
732Jelavich, 248; Adam Wandruszka,“Österreichs politische Struktur,” in Geschichte der Republik 
Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1954), 355-359; Erika 
Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik, eds., Österreich.  Zweite Republik, vol. 2 (Graz: Verlag  Styria, 1972), 208-
215.  On the previous political stance of Austrian conservatism, see Chapters 1 and 3.
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Ständestaat had been far from unambiguous and unanimous in their support of a view of 
Austrian history and national identity separate from that of Germany.  Immediately after the 
First World War, many in the Austrian right had favored union with Germany, and even 
those who advocated continued Austrian independence still viewed Austrians as Germans in 
at least an ethnic and cultural sense.  The right-wing Ständestaat  government had been 
outspoken in its support of Austrian independence and patriotism, yet had also presented 
Austria as a “second German state” rather than a national entity in its own right.  Yet there 
had been those Austrian conservatives such as Oscar Smitz, Ernst Karl Winter and even 
Kurt von Schuschnigg who had presented arguments for Austria as an independent nation 
with its own special history.734  Furthermore, as the political faction which maintained a firm 
reverence for Austrian traditions as part of its outlook, Austrian conservatism had a certain 
“built-in” tendency to take pride in Austria’s unique history.  Therefore for post-war 
Austrian conservatives the project of bolstering an Austrian identity through the forceful 
articulation of an “Austrianist” view of history was a matter of emphasizing ideas and 
sentiments that were already present within Austrian conservatism, while at the same time 
eliminating any of those elements of the conservative tradition which had portrayed Austria 
as part of the German nation.
One aspect of the Austrian right’s presentation of Austria’s history in the post-war 
era was especially distinctive.   The conservatives, unlike the other political factions of the 
time, were able to embrace the Habsburg dynasty and the old Austrian Monarchy as part of 
their presentation of Austrian history.  While the Socialists and Communists necessarily 
733Jelavich, 247-250; Wandruszka, 355-359, Frederick C. Engelmann, Government by Diplomacy: The 
Austrian Coalition 1945-1966 (Vienna: Braumüller, 2001), 44 -45.
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rejected the legitimacy of the Habsburg monarchs for reasons of ideology, the Austrian right 
was proud to claim the Monarchy and all of its representatives as part of the distinctive 
history which supported Austria’s nationhood.  Such an affinity for the Monarchy was 
certainly an advantage for arguments in favor of Austrian nationhood, which were 
necessarily based upon history and culture rather than language and ethnicity, which could 
only link Austria with Germany.  It was this embrace of the Monarchy as an important and 
beneficial part of Austria’s national history which helped make the conservative 
representation of the Habsburg past the most positive of all Austria’s political factions.
Postwar Conservatives and Austrian Nationhood
The necessary first element of all attempts to present Austria as its own nation 
separate from Germany was to provide a firmly negative answer to the question of whether 
of not Austrians could also in some sense be called Germans.  As we have seen, Austrians 
grappling with this issue between 1918 and 1945 were often reluctant to completely 
renounce Austrian membership in the German nation, even if they supported Austrian 
independence.  Even staunch conservative Austrian patriots such as Seipel, Dollfuß, and 
Schuschnigg maintained that Austria was at least German in a cultural sense, while 
maintaining that Austrian Deutschtum was different from and even superior to the Prussian 
or north German version.  After 1945, however, the conservative answer to this question was 
far less ambiguous.  The vast majority of conservative intellectuals and politicians now 
firmly and unequivocally asserted that Austrians were not and had never been Germans, and 
many of them argued that Austrians constituted a unique Volk, separate from the German 
734See Chapters 1 and 3.
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nation.
The most outspoken conservative to articulate this point was Alfred Missong, the 
editor of the ÖVP-sponsored journal the Österreichische Monatsheft .  Missong maintained 
that it was absolutely necessary for Austrians to completely abandon any lingering notions 
of kinship with Germany if they wanted their nation to be successful at maintaining its 
independence.  He argued that it was precisely this mistaken Austrian sense of belonging to 
the German nation which had allowed Hitler to seize power and absorb Austria into Nazi 
Germany.  Hitler had struck not just at Austrian democracy, but at Austrian independence 
itself.  Thus freedom and independence could only be preserved in Austria through a firm 
commitment to both democracy and Austrian nationhood.  Missong was optimistic about the 
invigorated sense of Austrian nationhood that he thought had surged forth after Hitler’s 
defeat, but he warned that if Austrians did not dispense with großdeutsch notions entirely, 
then sooner or later Austria would again be absorbed by Germany with results just as 
devastating for European peace as in 1938.  A mere revival of a sentimental or romantic 
Österreichertum which paid lip service to Austrian distinctiveness while claiming that 
Austria was a “second German state,” as the old corporatist regime had, would not suffice.  
Missong argued that the nation-state ideal had become an integral part of the European 
order, and that there was no room for two German states.  He argued that Austria must 
firmly and unequivocally dispense with such ideas once and for all.  In 1945, he proclaimed,  
”May Austria never again appear as ‘the second’ or “the other German state,’ and thus be 
included in a German combination.  May Austrian history and tradition never again be 
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prostituted as an appendage of German history and “German destiny.’”735
Missong systematically set out his ideas concerning the necessity for the total 
repudiation of Austrian national kinship with Germany in his article “25 Theses Concerning 
the Austrian Nation,” published in the August 1948 edition of the  Österreichische
Monatshefte.  In this essay he addressed the various varieties of großdeutsch ideology which 
had to be ripped out of Austria root and branch in order to maintain the state’s 
independence.  He of course mentioned the desire for actual Anschluß with Germany in his 
list of dangerous ideas, but he also argued against notions which posited a community of 
culture or destiny shared by Austria and Germany, or which claimed that the peoples of the 
two states possessed a common racial substance.  Thus, for Missong, even the most tentative 
assertion of a common community between Austrians and Germans would end up being an 
ideological Trojan horse which would undermine Austria’s very existence.736
Other conservatives joined the chorus denying that Austrians were Germans, even if 
they did not address the matter with quite Missong’s systematic stridency.  In response to 
one of Missong’s articles, Raimond Poukar provided a particularly eloquent statement 
concerning the necessity for Austrians to abandon their previous sense of kinship with 
Germany.  He noted in 1946, “The picture of Mother Germania must vanish from the  heart 
and brain of our Volk, not only because Germania has been a bad mother, indeed a true step 
mother to us.  No, because we therefore forgot our own mother to our shame, and that– to 
735Alfred Missong, “Oesterreichertum– einmal zu Ende gedacht,” Österreichische Monatshefte, Blätter für 
Politik 3 (December 1945): 104.  See also Missong, “25 Thesen über die österreichische Nation,” 
Österreichische Monatshefte 11 (August, 1948): 485-6.
736Missong, “25 Thesen über die österreichische Nation.,” 485.
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forget and disparage one’s own origin– is the most evil thing one can do.”737  No less a 
figure than Leopold Figl, the ÖVP leader and longtime chancellor of the Second Republic, 
also addressed this issue quite directly, arguing that the German language was all that 
Austria had in common with Germany.738  Perhaps the clearest statement on the question 
came from Leo Kirtste, however, who firmly declaimed in 1946, “we are not Germans, we 
are Austrians!”739
Yet for all this vehemence on the part of Missong and others, some conservative 
intellectuals did occasionally display the sense of kinship with Germany against which 
Missong had warned.  For example, an anonymous author in the inaugural edition of the 
Österreichische Monatshefte in November 1945 affirmed that Austrians indeed represented 
a portion of German culture, albeit one which was markedly differently from the Prussian 
variety of Deutschtum.740  The historian Wilhelm Böhm, an otherwise staunch defender of 
Austrian distinctiveness, acknowledged that Austria had a close historical relationship to the 
German states which would eventually make up Germany, although he asserted that this 
relationship was not the only or the most important factor in Austrian history. 741  Such 
comments stand as testimony that the notions of Austrian kinship with Germany which had 
characterized Austrian conservatism before 1938 had not entirely disappeared.  Still, after 
1945, the Austrian right rejected the notion of Austrian Germanness more firmly than it ever 
737Raimond Poukar, “Österreichs Weg zur Volkwerdung,” Österreichische Monatshefte 6 (March, 1946): 
225. 
738Leopold Figl, “Was ist Österreich?” Österreichische Monatshefte 3 (December 1945): 90.
739Leo Kirste, “Bekenntnis zur österreichischen Nation,” Österreichische Monatshefte 5 (February, 1946): 
183.
740XXX, “Das größere Österreich, Gedanken zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik,” Österreichische 
Monatshefte 2 (November 1945): 6.
741Wilhelm Böhm, “Prolegomena einer österreichischen Geschichtsauffassung,” Österreichische 
Monatshefte 6 (March, 1946): 230.  See also idem, “Die österreichischen Nation,” Forum 2, no. 24 
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had before.
In order to assert that Austrians were not Germans, conservatives had to refute 
earlier claims  that Austrians were indeed Germans.  Many conservative commentators 
argued that previous thinkers who had proclaimed Austrian membership in the German 
nation had based those claims on a fallacious theory of national identity which equated the 
nation too narrowly with language.  Such a theory had been particularly common in 
German-speaking lands, and had led to a facile association between Austrians and Germans 
in a national sense.  These conservative commentators, including Missong, Poukar, Böhm, 
and Kirste, as well as Michael Kroll, Walter Ost, and Ernst Joseph Görlich, argued that such 
theories of nationhood fell apart upon even a cursory examination of various national 
populations around the world.  These writers cited the examples of Switzerland, Brazil, 
Belgium, the United States, and the Spanish-speaking Latin American states as distinct and 
unique nations which also shared languages with other nations.  They argued that Austria 
belonged on this list because its history and culture indeed clearly set it apart from German-
speakers in Germany.742
Conservative Austrians also took issue with previous national theorists who had 
argued that Austrians were Germans in a racial or biological sense because they were the 
descendants of the Germans of the Bavarian Stamm (tribe) who had settled the territory 
nearly a millennium ago.  Several postwar conservatives argued that even if modern 
Austrians were in some sense the descendants of the Bavarian Stamm, such Austrians
(December, 1955): 429.
742Missong, “Oesterreichertum– einmal zu Ende gedacht,” 105; Poukar, 224; Kirste, 181-2; Michael Kröll, 
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‘Volksösterreicher,’” Österreichische Monatshefte 8 (May, 1946): 337; Ernst Jospeh Görlich, “Zur 
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certainly could not be considered Germans in a racial sense because of the frequent racial 
interbreeding which had occurred over the centuries in Austria.  According to the historian 
Ernst Joseph Görlich, the Austrian Volk descended not just from a branch of the Germanic 
groups of late antiquity, but also from the Romans, Celts, and Illyrians who had also at 
various times inhabited the Danubian region during that period, to say nothing of the more 
recent mixing with Slavic peoples and even small groups of Scottish, Irish, and French 
settlers.743  Missong also argued that the Austrian Volk represented the culmination of a long 
period of racial mixing, making it utterly nonsensical to view Austrians as Germans in a 
racial sense.744  These arguments reflected the traditional conservative discomfort with racial 
definitions of nationhood, and they clung to the cultural formulations of Austrian national 
identity which the Austrian right had professed since the First Republic.  After 1945, 
however, conservatives argued that Austria’s culture and history served to define a unique 
Austrian nation rather than to describe the distinctive qualities of the Austrian branch of the 
wider German nation.
If conservative Austrians were to fully assert a distinctive Austrian nationhood, they 
had to do more than assert that Austrians were not Germans; they also had to define 
Austria’s national character.  Such arguments often began with the rhetorical construction of 
a sort of idealized Austrian type: the “Austrian man.”  Conservatives often contrasted this 
Austrian man with the “German” or “Prussian man,” and used him to represent all that was 
distinctive and worthwhile about the Austrian Volk.  Such arguments generally depended 
Problem der österreichischen Nation,” Österreichische Monatshefte 9 (June, 1946): 443; Wilhelm Böhm, 
“Deutschnationalismus einst und jetzt,” Österreichische Monatshefte 2 (November, 1949): 128.
743Görlich, “Wann kommt das österreichische Geschichtswerk?” Österreichische Monatshefte 12 
(September, 1947): 494.
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heavily upon common stereotypes about Austrians, which conservatives in turn contrasted 
with stereotypes about Prussians or other north Germans.  The Austrian man first and 
foremost was a good European, free from narrow nationalist sentiments, and committed to 
peace and prosperity for the continent as whole in a way that Germans were not.  This ideal 
Austrian viewed the other national groups in a spirit of European brotherhood and 
cooperation, while Germans viewed them as enemies to be conquered and subjugated.  The 
Austrian was a lover of culture, art, and individual liberty, and worked to secure a good life, 
in contrast to the German, who was inherently militaristic and saw obedience and work as 
ends in and of themselves.  The Austrian man emerged in postwar Austrian accounts as a 
sensitive and cosmopolitan European citizen interested in understanding the other European 
Völker, completely unlike the warlike and pedantic German man, who sought to impose his 
views upon the rest of the continent.745
These descriptions of Austria’s national characteristics also sometimes contained 
statements which not only emphasized the positive qualities of the Austrian people, but 
which also had the added benefit of absolving Austrians of any responsibility for the crimes 
of Nazism.  For example, a number of conservative commentators explicitly stated that the 
Austrian national character was thoroughly opposed to the ideology of National Socialism.  
They therefore minimized Austrian participation in Hitler’s regime and Austrian support for 
Nazism in such accounts, and portrayed those Austrians who did support Hitler as dupes of 
Nazi propaganda who had lost faith in their own nation as a result of the hardships of the 
744Missong, Die österreichische Nation, (Vienna: Österreichischer Verlag, 1946), 5.  Böhm, Österreich, 
Erbe und Aufgabe (Vienna: Österreich-Institute, 1947): 9-10.
745Missong, Die Österreichishe Nation, 8; Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 9-14; Kröll, 339.
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1930s.746  In 1945 Figl affirmed such a view, and asserted that the Austrian national 
character had stood opposed to all sorts of “barbarism” for a millennium, from the invasion 
of the Huns up to the recent “foreign Prussian-Tartar Nazism.”747
These conservative theorists, however, often did not specify whether or not their 
archetypal Austrian inhabited only the territory of the post-1918 Austrian state, which of 
course was a great deal smaller than Habsburg Austria.  The intellectuals who discussed the 
idea of the Austrian man generally agreed that old Austria’s Slavic, Italian, and Magyar 
populations were not to be included in the concept of the Austrian man.  Such a judgement 
was undoubtedly based in large part upon the fact that all of these non-German-speaking 
groups within old Austria had defined themselves as distinct nationalities in the last years of 
the Monarchy, and had generally elected to form new states in the aftermath of the state’s 
collapse in 1918.  Yet interestingly, conservative exclusions of these other groups from the 
body of the Austrian Volk seemed to rest as much on notions of linguistic and ethnic 
nationality as did the very großdeutsch theories of nationalism that they so vehemently 
denounced, especially  given the strong historical and cultural bond which the Monarchy’s 
German-speakers, Slavs and Magyars had shared for so long.748  Furthermore, conservatives 
only rarely discussed whether the concept of the Austrian man ought to include the other 
German-speaking residents of the Monarchy who had found themselves living in the 
Monarchy’s other successor states.  Many conservative commentators laid much of the 
blame for the corrosive anti-Habsburg German nationalism before 1918 on German-
746“Das größere Österreich, Gedanken zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik,”4-5; “Wir und 
Nationalsozialismus,” Österreichische Monatshefte 2 (November 1945): 10.
747Figl, “Was ist Österreich?,” 90.
748Missong, Die Österreichishe Nation, 5-10; Böhm Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 9- 14; Kröll, 338-339.
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speakers living in Bohemia, outside of the territory which would later become the Austrian 
Republic.  Conservatives most frequently portrayed such German nationalists as kindred 
spirits to Prussians or other north Germans, and hence implicitly as people who were not 
“real” Austrians.749  Yet the precise national status of German-speakers living in other 
formerly Austrian lands went remarkably unmentioned in a body of conservative writings so 
otherwise concerned with describing an Austrian nationality which was by and large 
grounded in Austria’s Habsburg past.  These other German-speakers, who did not obviously 
belong to either the German or the Austrian state after 1945, were generally too problematic 
a group to be included in the urgent conservative project to neatly define and unequivocally 
proclaim Austrian nationhood during the Second Republic’s first decade.
A 1946 article by Walter Ost represented one notable exception to this blind spot in 
conservative national discussion.  In this essay, Ost discussed the concept of 
Volksösterreicher (members of the Austrian Volk), and argued that German-speakers living 
in the former Habsburg territories of South Tyrol, South Bohemia, South Moravia, Slovenia, 
and western Hungary all shared the sense of a cultural mission, the humanistic 
Europäertums (Europeanness) and the Christian Weltanschaaung which stood as the 
hallmarks of the Austrian Volk, and should be welcomed back to Austria now that so many 
of them had been expelled from their historic homes.  Ost did argue that the Sudeten 
German-speakers and German-speakers living in the rest of Hungary were too 
nationalistically pro-German or too oriented toward Budapest, respectively, to be considered 
749Missong, “25 Thesen über die österreichische Nation,” 485-488; Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 
30-31; Görlich, “Wann kommt das österreichische Geschichtswerk?” 495; Figl, 5.
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true Volksösterreicher.750  A respondent to Ost’s article, Leopold Müksch, warned Austrians 
against being too eager to welcome German-speaking immigrants from the Habsburg 
successor states, however.  Müksch agreed with Ost’s definition of Volksösterreicher in 
general terms, but argued that while farmers and other more average German-speakers in 
these lands had been and still remained true to Austria, the German-speaking intelligentsia 
of these regions was prone to an aggressive German nationalism which was precisely what 
the post-1945 Austrian state had dedicated itself to combating.  Thus, Austria needed to be 
cautious lest these anti-Austrian elements undermine its hard won second chance at 
independence.751
Ultimately, these descriptions of the Austrian man all shared an idealized portrayal 
of what it meant to be Austrian which minimized or ignored the words and actions of those 
Austrians who had fervently espoused German nationalism, and who had decried both 
democracy and peaceful coexistence with the neighboring Völker of Europe.  They also 
failed to acknowledge National Socialism’s Austrian roots, and the real and extensive 
support which the Nazis had commanded in Austria both before and after the Anschluß.  
Instead, these portrayals presented a vision of a freedom loving, benevolent Austrian 
national character.  Such presentations relied on arguments which were frequently rather 
vague and superficial, but which offered Austrians a positive view of themselves which 
could be contrasted with a correspondingly negative portrayal of “foreign” Germans.   In the 
end, this conservative representation amounted to, in the words of Görlich, the, “vague, 
750Ost, 337-340.
751Leopold Müksch, “Zum Begriff ‘Volksösterreicher,’” Österreichische Monatshefte 10 (July, 1946): 
488-489.
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intuitive sense that the Austrian is something different.”752
Postwar Conservatives and the Austrian Mission
In addition to this idealized “Austrian man,” the postwar conservative intellectuals 
also returned to the notion of the “Austrian mission” or the “Austrian idea,” so frequently 
discussed by the advocates of Austrian distinctiveness before 1938, as something which 
served to define the Austrian national character and which set Austria apart from Germany.  
The conservative arguments concerning the Austrian idea were in many ways no less vague 
than the idea of the Austrian man, but they were far more grounded in Austria’s historical 
experiences, and especially its experience as an integral component of the Habsburg state.  
Such arguments consequently also depended less upon a setting up a stark contrast with 
Germany, although many of the advocates of the notion of the Austrian mission did not fail 
to note when the opportunity arose how that mission differed from the historical motives and 
actions of Germany or Prussia.
The specific versions of the Austrian mission varied from intellectual to intellectual, 
but they generally corresponded to two basic and familiar ideas: that Austria had a mission 
to serve as a cultural mediator or “bridge” between the peoples of Eastern and Western 
Europe, and that it was called to be the defender of Western civilization and culture.   Both 
of these versions of the Austrian mission also correspond quite closely to the role that the 
Habsburg state had historically played in European affairs, and the Austrian right offered 
them not only as evidence of Austria’s distinctive nationhood, but also as a possible model 
for Austria in the postwar European order.
752Görlich, “Zur Problem der österreichischen Nation,” 445.
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The first aspect or version of the Austrian mission presented Austria as a meeting 
place of cultures which had historically facilitated communication and understanding 
between Western and Eastern European civilizations.  This idea was an extension of 
Austria’s geographic location along the European fault lines between Catholicism and 
Eastern Orthodoxy, between  Christendom and Islam, and between Germanic and Slavic and 
Magyar settlement.  As a regional and cultural crossroads, the Austrian state had by 
necessity been forced over the centuries to manage the relationships of numerous different 
ethnic, cultural, and religious groups.  The conservatives who advocated an Austrian mission 
did not present Austria as culturally neutral in this exchange.  They argued that Austria had 
functioned as an outpost of Western civilization, giving Western culture a paternal upper 
hand in the exchange between East and West.  Whereas many pre-1945 conservative 
descriptions of Austria as a cultural mediator often tended to describe Austria as a German 
land responsible for bringing a civilizing German influence to the East, these postwar 
accounts presented a slightly more balanced exchange, and portrayed Austria as an outpost 
of Europe as a whole rather than of Germany specifically.753
The metaphor which appeared most frequently in the Austrian right’s portrayal of 
such an Austrian mission was that of a bridge.  Such a metaphor was hardly new: one 
anonymous conservative in 1945 explicitly referred to Ignaz Seipel’s assertion during the 
1920s that Austria had functioned as a “bridge with ideas” to the East.754  The image of 
Austria as a bridge between West and East assumed a new vividness in the postwar era, 
753Böhm, “Deutschnationalismus einst und jetzt,” 127; “Resurrectio Austriae,” Österreichische 
Monatshefte 7 (April, 1946): 267-269; Alfred Kasamas, Wir wollen Oesterreich!” Österreichische 
Monatshefte 9 (May, 1947): 297; Kirtste, 183; Figl, 89-90; Görlich, “Zur Problem der österreichischen 
Nation,” 444-5.
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however.  The “bridge” was now more genuinely bidirectional as well.  Austria not only had 
the obligation to transmit Western civilization eastward, but also to make Eastern culture 
accessible to the rest of Western Europe.  Conservatives thus now portrayed Austria not as 
an imperialistic or colonial power, imposing the West upon the East, but rather as a servant 
in the cause of cultural understanding between the Völker of Europe.755  Some conservatives 
presented the Austrian bridge as something which involved just an exchange of culture and 
ideas; others argued that Austria even worked to combine cultural elements from East and 
West to arrive at something that contained the strengths of both European regions.  Wilhelm 
Böhm for his part found the bridge metaphor unsatisfactory, and he argued that it suggested 
a misleading passivity.   In 1947 he asserted Austria was more of a cultural transformer, 
synthesizing and spreading a mixture of German philosophy and legal thought, Italian art, 
French courtly culture, Magyar military abilities, Slavic peasant culture, and Byzantine-
Greek church culture.756  Fritz Hartylmayer abandoned the notion of a bridge entirely, opting 
instead to compare Austria with the Danube River: “Austria still has a function in common 
with the Danube: the connection between West and East.”757  These discussions of an 
Austrian mission to the peoples of the East decreased dramatically in frequency, however, as 
the Soviet Union tightened its control upon the Slavic lands of Europe after 1948, effectively 
separating them from the rest of Europe and eliminating any real possibility of a close 
Austrian relationship with them.
A related aspect of this Austrian mission as a cultural mediator and agent of 
754“Das größere Österreich, Gedanken zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik,” 5-6 
755Julia Plohovich, “Kulturelle Völkerverständigung– eine österreichische Aufgabe,” Österreichische 
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understanding was the notion that Austria must use its unique, historically-acquired 
sympathy for other cultures and Völker for the cause of peace.  This argument had also 
appeared sporadically before 1938, but it achieved a new sense of urgency after the 
devastation wrought by the Second World War.  If the German national character 
represented war and conquest in the writing of postwar Austrians, then the Austrian mission 
amounted to an obligation to use Austria’s aptitude for cultural understanding in the cause of 
peace in a war-ravaged Europe.  In 1946 Leopold Figl argued that the Austrian Volk had a 
calling to use Austria’s long tradition to test new ideas and to put them to political use in the 
cause of peace and to advance the ideals of freedom, equality, and humaneness.  He 
portrayed Austria’s history as one of peace and understanding which could serve as an 
example for all of Europe.  He asserted, “A world that has not understood the problem of 
Austria will also never be able to understand itself.”758  Thus, this first version of the 
Austrian mission depicted an Austria which had a timely role to help ease the still raw 
tensions between the Völker of Europe, and stood as a marked contrast to Europe’s recent 
experience with an aggressive, militaristic German state.
The second variation on the notion of an Austrian mission at first glance stood at 
odds with the first.  This second Austrian mission involved the defense of European 
civilization against threats to its existence from the East.  As with the mission of cultural 
mediation, this mission to act as a bulwark of the West was thoroughly grounded in 
Austria’s historical experiences.  Conservative writers cited Austria’s role in turning back 
756 Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 17.
757Fritz Hartlmayr, “Die Donaufrage,” Österreichische Monatshefte 9 (June, 1946): 425.
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Eastern invasions throughout its history, sacrificing its men and treasure to combat threats 
from the Huns, Avars, Magyars, and Turks.  Figl and Böhm both associated Austria’s very 
founding as a state with this defensive mission, as it was established as the eastern-most 
territory of the Carolingian Empire in the tenth century.  Since then it had stood against 
“barbarism” and “heathenism” throughout its history, no matter what specific state form it 
took or which territories it encompassed.  Interestingly, although the Austrian mission 
mostly faced Eastern threats, Figl included Austria’s eighteenth-century conflicts with 
Prussia and Böhm cited its struggle with revolutionary and Napoleonic France as important 
aspects of this defensive mission.759  None of these discussions of Austria’s defensive 
European mission, however, contained any of the references to the more modern Soviet 
threat from the East which had been fairly common in conservative rhetoric before 1945.  
This omission is certainly understandable, however, given the Soviet occupation of part of 
Austria’s territory up until 1955.  The ÖVP and its representatives in the Austrian 
government realized that they needed to convince the Soviet Union that Austria posed no 
threat to Soviet security, and despite their firm opposition to Communism they could ill 
afford belligerent rhetoric with the Red Army still stationed on Austrian soil.760
These apparently contradictory variations on the concept of the Austrian mission 
were  reconcilable to a certain extent, and indeed conservative intellectuals sometimes 
presented them as complimentary ideals.  This reconciliation came through the notion of an 
“Austrian idea.”  Most conservatives presented the essential nature of Austria’s historical 
experiences and actions as representing a humanistic and supranational European spirit.  
759Figl, “Was ist Österreich?” 89-91; Böhm Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 17-23.
760On the Austrian People’s Party’s cautious dealings with the Soviet Union, see Bischof, Austria in the 
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Indeed, the conservative historian Ernst Joseph Görlich argued that Austrian national 
identity and  European consciousness were intimately connected:  “Not only does European 
consciousness not conflict with Austrian consciousness, but it is the basic prerequisite of 
consciousness of the Austrian.”761  Some members of the Austrian right also added a 
commitment to the advancement and protection of Roman Catholicism to this Austrian idea.  
Whatever the precise mixture of values, these ideals to which Austria was committed 
allowed it to serve the cause of uniting Western and Eastern cultures in a felicitous and 
peaceful combination while protecting Europe from the more dangerous Eastern (or even 
Western) ideas and cultures which threatened to overwhelm it.  Thus Austria emerged as a 
nation which had historically been willing to extend its hand in peace and understanding to 
the Völker of the region, while remaining ready to grasp a sword to protect the continent 
against barbarism.762
All of these conservative formulations of the “Austrian mission” or the “Austrian 
idea” stood in explicit contrast to the sort of chauvinistic German nationalism which the 
Austrian right associated with Germany.  Germany had no mission to facilitate 
understanding between Völker, but rather sought to place the interests of the German Volk in 
a preeminent position through war in conquest.  Likewise, Germany assumed no obligation 
to defend Europe from outside threats, and indeed was at times itself a major threat to 
European civilization.763
First Cold War, 133-145; Bader, 184-209.
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The Postwar Conservative Vision of the Habsburg Past
The most important aspect of the conservatives’ efforts to define Austria as a 
distinctive nation was their reference to Austria’s history.  Austria’s Habsburg past was the 
actual foundation upon which the Austrian character, culture, and mission rested.  Given the 
fact that Austrians did have a great deal in common with Germans in terms of language, 
culture, and even religion, it was only natural that the conservative arguments referred to 
Austria’s history, which differed markedly from the history of the northern German states.  
Of course, previous advocates of Austria’s German character had also used Austria’s history 
in their arguments, asserting that Austria’s past was defined by its leadership of the Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation.  The postwar Austrian conservative movement 
strongly attacked such a position.  Spokesmen argued that the Holy Roman crown had 
always been an supranational, European title rather than one which stood for anything 
distinctively German in the national sense.  The Empire had encompassed not just ethnic 
Germans, but also numerous other nationalities as well.  The crown’s wearers, who had been 
exclusively Habsburg for more than half a millennium, had used their authority to advance 
the interests of all of Europe, defending the continent and its culture as a whole.  Willhelm 
Böhm argued, “Certainly we need to not belittle the imperial aspect of our historical past.  
On the contrary, we must be proud of it.  We must always, however, keep before our eyes 
the fact that the Holy crown did not constitute a national myth which became linked to 
Austria; rather, it was a part of our own Austrian power and our Austrian supranational 
mission.”764  In fact, some conservative intellectuals argued that if anything, Germany had 
763Poukar, 225.
764Böhm,“Resurrection Austriae,” 268; “Österreich,” Wiener Zeitung, October 30, 1946, 3.
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been a part of Austria thanks to its membership in the Habsburg-led Holy Roman Empire, 
and had benefitted from Austria’s benevolent, supranational stewardship.765
The Austrian right accused those who had claimed Austria as historically German of 
distorting the real past of the Austrian nation.  Austrian conservatives argued that such views 
were the work of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century “Prussian” historical 
propagandists acting to advance the hegemonic national ambitions of Germany at the 
expense of Austria.  Conservatives sharply disputed portrayals of the Habsburg state as 
religiously intolerant, socially reactionary, and nationally oppressive, and denounced such 
views as empty, anti-Austrian rhetoric which lacked any true historical basis.  Such 
otherwise well-regarded German historians such as Treitschke, Sybel, Droysen, and Ranke 
came under attack by the Austrian right with considerable frequency due to their 
presentation of a broadly conceived German history which included Austria.  According to 
Austrian conservatives, the fact that so many Austrian citizens had been taken in by such 
“misrepresentations,” which, as we have seen, were quite typical in Austria before 1945, 
was due to a lack of familiarity with the real substance of Austria’s history.  Thus the 
Austrian right considered the forceful presentation of a genuine, pro-Austrian vision of the 
Habsburg past to be critically important.766
A number of professional historians and historically-minded intellectuals including 
Fritz Stöckl, Gustav Blenk, Emmerlich Fehrnpach, Oscar Folkert, Wilhelm Böhm, Ernst 
Joseph Görlich and Alfred Missong spearheaded conservative efforts to articulate such a 
765Kirste, 183-4; Poukar, 225; Felix Hurdes, Österreich als Realität und Idee (Vienna: Österreichische 
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view of Austrian history.  Böhm and Görlich contributed most actively and prolifically to 
the endeavor, penning numerous articles and short books that sketched out Austria’s past 
and contrasted it with that of Germany, and discussing specific events and individuals from 
Austria’s history in terms that portrayed the old Habsburg state and its leaders in a positive 
light.  The common thread that united their work was the idea that an examination of the 
truth of Austria’s history led inevitably to the notion that Austrians were not German in any 
nationally significant sense, and never really had been.
The starting point for most of the Austrian right’s presentation of Austrian history 
was the tenth century, when Austria first received its name.  In 996, the territories which 
would later become the Austrian Republic were for the first time in recorded history referred 
to as Ostarrichi, an old German word which would later become Österreich (Austria).  The 
name, which roughly translates as “eastern land,” corresponded to the Danubian territories’ 
position on the easternmost edge of the Carolingian Empire.  Even though the name itself 
first appeared in the year 996, Böhm argued that historians might reasonably assume that the 
notion of Austria as a unified and distinctive territory within the Reich predated the first 
recorded use of the word.  As with so much of Austria’s history, the state’s name during the 
early Middle Ages was a politicized topic.  Many German and Austrian historians during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had referred to early Medieval Austria as the 
“Ostmark,” a label which described Austria’s position as the eastern most portion of what 
would become the medieval German Reich, but without the connotations of distinctiveness 
and independence suggested by “Ostarrichi.”  Indeed, as we have seen, Nazi Germany re-
labeled Austria as the Ostmark for a time after the 1938 Anschluß.  Austrian conservatives 
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now took umbrage at the label, which they described as an anachronistic name projected 
back upon Austria’s past by German nationalists eager to portray Austria as nothing more 
than a part of a greater Germany.  Ostarrichi does seem to be the usage which appeared 
earliest, and did ultimately provide the root of the name by which the German-speaking 
territories on the Danube would be known throughout their subsequent history.  In asserting 
the importance of Austria’s name, conservatives sought to emphasize their land’s ancient 
status as an independent and distinctive territory separate from other German-speaking 
lands.  In this, the Austrian right was not alone, as the Second Republic as a whole 
celebrated the 950th anniversary of the Austria’s name in 1946.767
If Austria’s name dated back nearly one thousand years, some commentators argued 
that the roots of the Austrian Volk were older still.  As we have seen, after 1945, the 
Austrian right repudiated the notion that Austrians were Germans in a racial or ethnic sense 
in favor of the idea that modern Austrians were the products of long centuries of 
interbreeding between Romans, Illyrians, Celts, and Germanic Völker.  Görlich argued that 
any examination of Austria’s history ought to begin even before the migration of Germanic 
peoples into the Danubian territories.  Such in-migration had been the customary starting 
point of many Germanist histories of Austria, but Görlich asserted that Austria should be as 
proud of its Roman, Illyrian, and Celtic, roots as France was of its Gallic and England its 
Brittanic past.768
Most conservative historians, however, argued that the most significant era of 
Austria’s early history was the period of Babenberg rule during the twelfth and thirteenth 
767Böhm, Oesterreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 15-16; “Oesterreich heißt das Land,” 7; Kirtste, 182; Offizielle 
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centuries.  The House of Babenberg separated Austria from the duchy of Bavaria, and 
established it as an autonomous land within the lose coalition of the Holy Roman Empire.  
The Babenberg state quickly became an economic and political power of note in Central 
Europe, and its capital, Vienna, developed into a center for trade and cultural and artistic 
achievement throughout the region.769  The postwar Austrian right argued that, despite the 
Babenbergs’ status as a German noble house, the state which they created, with its growing 
ties to Bohemia and Hungary and its affiliation with other non-Germanic cultural regions, 
was easily distinguishable from the other German states. Babenberg Austria was the first 
truly independent state which comprised the Austrian territories and its position of influence 
in Central Europe was easily recognizable as the one which Austria would occupy for most 
of the rest of its history.  Austrian conservatives had always lauded the Babenbergs, but after 
1945 they presented Babenberg Austria as the earliest version of the autonomous and 
supranational Danubian center of culture, trade and power which was the essence of 
Austria’s national character and mission as they saw it.770
If the Austrian conservatives saw the Babenbergs as the founders of the Austrian 
state, they argued that it had been the Habsburgs who had truly made the Austrian mission a 
reality by transforming Austria into great power in Europe.  If the Babenbergs had provided 
the foundations for the Austrian idea by creating bonds between their territories and those of 
the Slavs and Magyars who were their neighbors, it was the Habsburgs who brought the 
promise of an supranational political, cultural and economic community in Central Europe 
768Görlich, “Wann kommt das österreichische Geschichtswerk?” 494.
769For a brief treatment of Babenberg Austria, see Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 
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to real fruition in the eyes of most conservatives.  This conservative emphasis upon the 
House of Habsburg was hardly a new phenomenon, but after 1945 it assumed national 
implications.  For the postwar Austrian right, it was the Habsburg dynasty and the great, 
multinational Austrian state it had founded which represented the essence of Austria’s 
character, history, and nationhood.  Thus, the Austrian right focused most of their attentions 
upon the Habsburgs, emphasizing the most admirable aspects of their Monarchy, and often 
providing strident apologetics for specific events or figures which had been negatively 
portrayed by German nationalists.  Just as so many earlier proponents of a German identity 
for Austria had assailed the Habsburgs and their representatives as being an anti-German, 
negative force in Austria’s history, the postwar Austrian conservatives rallied around the 
dynasty and defended them as the very embodiment of Austria’s national uniqueness.
Wilhelm Böhm, as one of the most vigorous conservatives who used Austria’s 
history to bolster its postwar national identity, discussed Austria’s Habsburg past at length 
during the late 1940s.  Like other Austrian conservatives, he located Austria’s origins in 
Charlemagne’s empire and the subsequent Babenberg period.  In terms of Austria’s more 
modern history however, he argued that the real strength of the Habsburgs’ multinational 
state lay in the Catholic uniformity established during the wars of religion in the seventeenth 
century.  At that time, many of the state’s inhabitants had become Protestants, and only a 
protracted and bloody conflict in Bohemia and northern Austria enabled the Monarchy to 
reestablish religious conformity.  Many commentators on Austrian history had been critical 
of the Habsburgs’ actions, charging them with religious, and indeed national oppression of 
both Czech and German-speaking Protestants.  During the subsequent period, however, 
9 (June, 1946): 367-9.
452
Louis XIV’s France and the ascendent Ottoman Empire to the southeast had attacked the 
Habsburg state.  According to Böhm, only the religious unity created by he suppression of 
Protestantism allowed Austria to survive this difficult period.  Indeed, the experience of 
these wars had in fact created the modern Austria nation by unifying Austrian culture and 
cementing Austria’s Catholic character.  Furthermore, contemporary critics who assaulted 
the Habsburgs’ actions during this period were guilty of misunderstanding the practices and 
necessities of the time and of judging them by modern standards.  The Habsburgs’ 
imposition of religious uniformity was not only necessary, but not at all unusual for Europe 
at the time.771
The eighteenth-century Austrian empress Maria Theresa was also a particularly 
attractive historical figure for the Austrian right, especially given her Catholic piety and her 
struggles against the Prussian monarch Frederick II.  Conservatives portrayed Frederick as 
the quintessential militaristic German ruler and they contrasted his character with Maria 
Theresa’s more maternal qualities.  Postwar conservatives emphasized Frederick’s attacks 
on Theresian Austria and his seizure of the Silesian territory, to which he had no legal right, 
as evidence of the differences in character between imperialistic Germans and freedom-
loving Austrians.   In 1945, Leopold Figl forcefully contrasted Maria Theresa and Frederick, 
arguing that while the Austrian Empress was filled with the spirit of toleration, 
understanding, and humanism, Frederick represented all that was barbaric and violent about 
the German character.  Figl asserted that Frederick, traditionally called “the Great,” had 
benefitted from the inflation of his reputation by Prussian “historical lies.”  Böhm also 
771Böhm, “Oesterreichs innere Geschichte und ihre Behandlung,” Österreichische Monatshefte 10 (July, 
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criticized Frederick, arguing that he had sought to destroy Austria’s beneficial role in 
Central Europe without assuming any responsibility himself for securing peace and stability 
in the region.772  Such presentations were quite typical of the manner in which the Austrian 
right used the eighteenth-century conflicts between Austria and Prussia to symbolize 
national differences between contemporary Germans and Austrians. 
Of course, the eighteenth century was not without its problems for Austrians wishing 
to portray it as a time when a sense of Austria nationhood blossomed.  In particular, Joseph 
II had long been a popular figure with Central European German nationalists due to his 
efforts to impose German as the language of administration throughout the Monarchy.773
Böhm and Görlich argued, however, that Joseph had based these regulations upon reasons of 
state, rather than upon any sort of German nationalism.  They asserted that this reform made 
sense when considered within the context of the rest of Joseph’s efforts to extend centralized 
state power and to make the Monarchy’s administration more uniform.  His choice of 
German as a language of administration was reasonable given its status as the only widely 
spoken, fully developed literary language within his territories, but he might as easily have 
chosen any language.  According to the Austrian right, Joseph’s primary emphasis was upon 
reforming the administration of his territories, rather than on advancing German national 
interests.774
Thus conservatives portrayed the eighteenth century as an era were the Habsburg 
House made notable progress in advancing the power of its state and the prosperity and 
772Figl, 89-90; Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 26.  See also Görlich, “Fürst Wenzel Kaunitz-
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cultural development of its subjects.  They argued that this period of waxing Austrian 
national potence prepared Austria to resist the serious threats posed by the wars of the 
French Revolution and Napoleon which convulsed Europe between 1791 and 1815.  The 
revolution itself, with its democratic radicalism, provided a sharp ideological challenge to 
the Austrian Monarchy, and the postwar Austrian right viewed it with distaste.  Napoleon’s 
military might provided an even greater threat, and ultimately not only forced Austria to 
give up significant portions of its territory, but also obligated the Habsburgs to abdicate the 
Holy Roman throne which they had possessed for so many centuries. 
Austrian German nationalists before 1945 had often portrayed these wars as a period 
of invigorated German national consciousness, in which German Volk united under the 
pressure of French domination to drive back Napoleon.775  Post-World War II defenders of 
Austrian nationhood also celebrated Napoleon’s defeat, but obviously could not agree with 
such a German nationalist interpretation of events.  Andreas Hofer, the Tyrolean peasant 
leader who struggled against Napoleon and was executed by French forces in 1809, had 
often appeared in “Germanist” historical views as a German national martyr.776  They 
Austrian right had always viewed him as more of an Austrian patriot than a German national 
hero, but now its spokesmen denied any that there had been any German nationalist 
component to his struggles whatsoever.  For example, in 1946 Leo Kirste charged that the 
depiction of Hofer as a defender of Deutschtum was nonsensical given the fact that the 
Tyrolean had actually fought most of his battles against Napoleon’s Bavarian German allies.  
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774Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 24-5; Görlich, “Fürst Wenzel Kaunitz-Rietberg,”  510-513.
775See Chapters 1, 2, and 5.
776See Chapters 2 and 5.  For a discussion of conservative efforts to portray Hofer as an Austrian patriot 
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The appropriate view of Hofer, according to Kirste, was that of a dedicated fighter for his 
particular Heimat of Tyrol, which was of course a constituent part of the greater Austrian 
state.777
Wilhelm Böhm took a still broader view of Austrian participation in the wars against 
Napoleon, arguing that Austria’s role in the conflict proved its firm commitment to defend 
the freedom of the peoples of Europe against dictatorship.  Böhm portrayed Napoleon’s 
style of rule as a sort of proto-fascism which had sought to subjugate Europe and its Völker.  
Böhm painted Austria’s stand against him as part of a long Austrian historical tradition of 
opposition to authoritarian, predatory regimes.778  Naturally this alleged history of Austrian 
support for freedom in Europe also leant itself to contemporary efforts to portray Austrians 
as victims and opponents of Hitler’s Germany, rather than willing participants in the Nazi 
state.
The subsequent period in Austrian history was more difficult for the Austrian right to 
portray positively.  As we have seen, both Austrian German nationalists and Marxists 
habitually focused on the nineteenth century as a time when the Habsburg government had 
been particularly  oppressive, charging that the Monarchy had stifled the legitimate national 
aspirations of its subjects in order to maintain its own political power.  These critics of the 
Monarchy often presented Klemens von Metternich, the chief architect of Austrian policy 
from the time of Napoleon’s defeat until the Revolution of 1848, as the very personification 
of the Monarchy’s reactionary or oppressive tendencies.779  The postwar Austrian right 
during the Ständestaat, see Chapter 4.
777Kirste, 181.
778Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 24-5.
779See Chapters 1, 2 and 5.
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naturally disputed such characterizations of the Metternich and his era.  They attempted, just 
as they often had before 1945, to accentuate the positive aspects of the period, highlighting 
Austria’s diplomatic predominance in Europe, and the generation of peace and stability that 
the continent experienced under Metternich’s guidance.  
In a 1948 article in the Österreichische Monatsheft, Görlich argued that Metternich 
had to be understood as a product of the aristocratic culture of the ancien regime, who stood 
against what he saw as the greatest dangers to Europe: Prussian-German nationalism and the 
laissez-faire capitalism of the liberal Bürgertum.  Görlich argued that Metternich’s policies 
should not be judged by contemporary and anachronistic democratic criteria, but rather had 
to be evaluated under the standards of his own era, according to how ably he served his 
state.  In such a light, he then emerged as a devoted Austrian and  European.780  Böhm 
echoed these sentiments in an article of his own, asserting that Metternich should be judged 
by whether or not he was true to Austria, rather than how he measured up to modern 
democratic ideals.781
The Revolution of 1848 provided a similar interpretive challenge for the Austrian 
right.  If critics saw the Austrian state during the Vormärz as a reactionary and oppressive 
force, they portrayed the Revolution of 1848 as an attempt by Austria’s peoples to attain and 
secure national, social, and political liberties.  Austrian conservatives, however, more 
frequently presented the Revolution as a dangerous surge of anti-Austrian nationalism, 
despite the laudable democratic ideals of many of the revolutionaries.  Böhm was a 
particularly vehement critic of the Revolution of 1848, and of the nationalism-tainted 
780Görlich, “Fürst Klemens Lothar Wenzel Metternich,” Österreichische Monatshefte 5 (February, 1948): 
219-223.
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Austrian political liberalism which drove it.  He argued that the revolution represented an 
attempt to destroy the Monarchy and replace it with twin anti-Slavic German national and 
Magyar hegemonies.  He acknowledged that the revolution certainly brought with it 
important constitutional and anti-feudal reforms, and the Monarchy overreacted to the 
uprising with a counter-productive policy of neo-absolutism, yet Böhm argued that in its 
heart, the Revolution in Austrian was an anti-Austrian movement led by Sudetenlanders and 
Viennese liberal  intellectuals.  In response to the commemoration of the revolution’s 
centenary by the Austrian left, Böhm wondered if it was really appropriate to celebrate such 
an event which he clearly saw as a step on the road of German domination which led to 
1866, 1918, and ultimately to 1938 and Hitler.  He argued that 1848's democratic ideals 
were a thin disguise for the ugly German nationalism at its heart.  After a century of history, 
he wrote, “The covering had fallen from 1848– all of the world saw what it had concealed: 
naked violence, degradation, and crime.”782
Böhm’s sharp critique of Austrian liberalism and the revolution of 1848 
corresponded to his defense of Austria’s government during the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  Instead, the Austrian state had not been the oppressive “Völkerkerker” 
(prison of the nations) that so many of its critics, both at the time and more recently, had 
charged.  He argued that the Austrian state had traditionally worked for the freedom and 
prosperity of its Völker.  As early as the time of Maria Theresa, Austria had provided for the 
education of the Monarchy’s nationalities in their own languages.  In the nineteenth century, 
the Monarchy had attempted to protect and nurture the particularities of its various nation 
781Böhm, “Oesterreich heißt das Land,” 9; Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 25-27.
782Böhm, “Die Revolution von 1848 und Oesterreich,” Österreichische Monatshefte 6 (March, 1948): 247;  
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groups within a multinational framework, expanding educational rights and regional 
autonomy.  The real problem during the nineteenth century had been the fact that federal 
reforms necessary to guarantee the privileges of Austria’s national minorities could not be 
put in place so long as Austria retained the old boundaries of its historical Länder
(provinces). Yet those boundaries remained, turning the individual Länder into hotly 
contested national battlegrounds.  Also, the nationalities could not hope for a realization of 
the national equality implicit in the Austrian Staatsidee (state idea) so long as German-
speaking Austrian liberals attempted to upset the state’s delicate national balance, and to 
establish a predominant position for themselves.  The Hungarian half of the Monarchy was 
also a problem after 1867, as the dominant Hungarian lower nobility there systematically 
refused to grant national rights to any of Hungary’s non-Magyar minorities.  Indeed, if 
Austria had not been a Völkerkerker, then in Böhm estimation, Hungary certainly had 
been.783
Another conservative who provided a ready defense of Austria’s nineteenth-century 
government was Alfred Missong, who asserted that not only was Austria at that time not 
nationally oppressive, but that it was in fact more democratic than some critics were willing 
to admit.  In a 1947 essay, he traced Austria’s constitutional development during the 
nineteenth century to make the argument that Austria, like almost all other European states, 
had experienced a gradual development toward democracy.  He maintained that Austria’s 
modern constitutional history began with the democratic enthusiasm of 1848, despite the 
regrettable national prejudice of many of the revolutionaries.  The Monarchy’s suppression 
“Oesterreichs innere Geschichte und ihre Behandlung,” 441.
783Böhm, “Die ‘Völkerkerker,’” Österreichische Monatshefte 10 (June, 1947): 398.
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of the revolution did provide a series of setbacks for constitutionalism, yet Missong asserted 
that even the most flawed of the post-1848 constitutions and patents represented barriers to 
absolutist rule by the crown and provided a role for representative government.  He 
particularly emphasized the progressive character of the December Constitution of 1867, 
which created a full blown constitutional Monarchy with an array of legally protected 
freedoms which he compared favorably to the constitution of the French Third Republic.  
Missong concluded Austria was well on the road to democratization, and if it had not fallen 
apart in 1918 it would undoubtedly have arrived at a form comparable to Britain’s 
constitutional monarchy.784
If the postwar right defended the policies of Austria’s government in general during
the nineteenth century, so too did they rally to bolster the reputation of Franz Joseph, the 
Habsburg monarch who reigned between 1848 and 1916.  While Franz Joseph’s critics 
charged that his personal rigidity and aloofness personified the resistance to change typical 
of the Habsburg state at the time, conservatives such a Böhm and Missong portrayed him as 
a dedicated and conscientious ruler who always worked for the best interests of his state and 
his subjects, and who did what he could within the constraints of the times to ameliorate the 
problems that challenged the Monarchy.785  In a 1949 essay on the Emperor, Emmerlich 
Fehrnpach portrayed Franz Joseph as a proponent of peace, prosperity, and cooperation both 
within the Reich and indeed throughout Europe.  Fehrnpach shifted the blame for the 
Monarchy’s problems in its last decades to other figures such as the Austrian officials 
784Missong, “Oesterreichs Enwicklung zur Demokratie,” Österreichische Monatshefte 4 (January, 1947): 
152-154.
785Böhm, “Kaiser Franz Josef I und die ‘A.-Z,’” Österreichische Monatshefte 4 (January, 1949): 179; 
Missong, “Oesterreichs Enwicklung zur Demokratie,” 153.
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Ferdinand Beust and General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
and all Magyars.  These groups placed the interests of German-speakers or Hungarians 
above those of the multinational state as a whole, in marked contrast to the Austrian 
monarch.  Fehrnpach praised Franz Josef for fostering Austria’s economic and cultural 
prosperity, and for preserving the peace, both internally and externally, for so long in the 
face of all the problems which beset Austria during his reign.  Fehrnpach presented Franz 
Joseph as a ruler who fulfilled the Monarchy’s mission in Central Europe so as to help its 
Völker to progress economically and culturally, and who always did his best to serve the 
interests of the Monarchy as a whole.786
The Austrian right also used other figures within Franz Joseph’s government as 
symbols of the Monarchy’s benevolence and judiciousness.  For example, conservative 
writer Gustav Blenk praised Count Leo Thun, the Monarchy’s Minister for Public 
Instruction during the early part of Franz Josef’s reign, for his dedication to the rights of all 
of the state’s nationalities.  Blenk presented Thun, a native German speaker, as a defender of 
the Monarchy’s unity, a proponent of  federalism, an educational reformer, and a supporter 
of balance in matters of religion.  Blenk particularly emphasized Thun’s continual support of 
for Czech and Slovak political equality with German-speakers and Magyars, and lauded his 
advocacy for a special position for the Czechs within the Monarchy.   Blenk argued that if 
Austrian liberals and Hungarians had not obstructed Thun’s views, then the Monarchy might 
not have succumbed to the national pressures which ultimately destroyed it.787
A 1949 article by Fehrnpach similarly presented Franz Joseph’s heir and nephew, 
786Emmerlich Fehrnpach, “Kaiser Franz Josef I,” Österreichische Monatshefte 4 (January, 1949): 78-82.
787Gustav Blenk, “Graf Leo Thun,” Österreichische Monatshefte 7 (April, 1949): 319-321.
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as a proponent of national equality and federalism.  Fehrnpach 
argued that the Slavophile Franz Ferdinand was perhaps the only man in the Monarchy’s 
waning years who might have had the position and strength of character to reshape the 
Monarchy. Franz Ferdinand emerged in Fehrnpach’s writing as a plain spoken and ardent 
Austrian patriot who thought federalism was the only solution to the centrifugal forces 
which plagued the Monarchy’s last years and as a staunch opponent of the Magyars’ 
attempts to maintain and enhance their post-1867 privileged status within the Monarchy.  
Ultimately of course, the Archduke never had the opportunity to realize his plan for the 
federalization of the Habsburg state because of his 1914 assassination by a Serbian 
nationalist in Sarejevo.  Fehrnpach identified Franz Ferdinand’s death as the root cause not 
just of the First World War but also of the Second, and he argued that the Archduke’s 
assassination marked the real end of the Habsburg dynasty as a force for stability and 
national equality in Central Europe. Without the ballast of the Habsburg’s multinational 
state, the Völker of the region were doomed to decades of misery and bloody national 
conflict.788
Even Karl I, Franz Josef’s successor and the last Habsburg monarch, merited a 
defense by the postwar Austrian right.  Despite the fact that he reigned a mere two years, 
and presided over the Habsburg state’s military defeat in World War I and subsequent 
dissolution, Alfred Missong presented  Karl as a fair, federally-oriented ruler who was 
unable to overcome the narrowminded nationalisms of his time.  Missong pointed to Karl’s 
attempts to conclude a peace with the allies separate from Germany as evidence of his lack 
of interest in German nationalism, and emphasized his success at finally bringing federal 
788Fehrnpach, “Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand,” Österreichische Monatshefte 9 (June, 1949): 417-419.
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reform to the Monarchy, even if such reforms unfortunately came too late to save the state 
from dismemberment.789
Missong also asserted that Karl’s reputation had been besmirched by nationalist 
propaganda after 1918, and he criticized the Austrian left for not defending Karl against 
such slander.  He argued that instead of seizing this opportunity to rally to the defense of a 
true servant of the Austrian nation, the left merely regurgitated its traditional anti-
monarchical party line: “Even the best monarch is an enemy of the people!”790  Missong’s 
argument on this matter actually provides a concise summary of the Austrian right’s position 
on Austria’s Habsburg past after World War II.  He declared that the Second Republic 
should restore Karl’s reputation as a man, regent, and good European to its appropriate 
dignity, and remarked that anyone who thought that such a rehabilitation was anti-
democratic actually had very little confidence in Austrian democracy.  According to 
Missong, Austria would be far better served through reverence for its Habsburg past than by 
the nullification of that past.  For Missong and other conservatives, Austrian patriotism was 
not restricted to the Austria Republic, but encompassed all of Austria’s history.791
Of course, if the leaders of Habsburg Austria had been as benevolent and judicious 
as postwar conservatives asserted, then the Austrian right was obligated to explain why their 
state had ultimately disintegrated.  Naturally they blamed German nationalism for old 
Austria’s demise.  According to conservatives, it was ultimately the growth of such German 
nationalism which had led directly to the Hitler regime and its monstrosities as well as to the 





destruction of the Habsburg state, despite the best efforts of Austria’s rulers.  Although 
German nationalism had been relatively common among the German-speakers in the 
Monarchy, postwar conservatives portrayed it as treason against the Austrian nation.  
Ultimately, they presented German nationalism as a poisonous and anti-Austrian ideology 
which acted to unbalance the delicate relationships between all the national groups and to 
dilute Austrian loyalty to the Monarchy and its Central European mission.792
The Austrian right generally agreed that the origins of modern German nationalism 
lay in the eighteenth century.  Some figures like Böhm and Paunovic thought that its 
ultimate roots lay in the Enlightenment’s attack upon Catholicism and the old regime.  Most 
commentators, however, agreed that a sense of German unity inspired by the wars with 
revolutionary and Napoleonic France combined with the völkisch emphasis of German 
Romanticism provided the real inspiration for the emergence of German nationalist 
sentiment.  Such a depiction of German nationalism’s origins were of course at odds with its 
conception of its own origins, which German nationalists dated back to antiquity.793
According to postwar conservatives, such nationalism was ultimately foreign to 
Austria and most of its inhabitants, and indeed became prevalent during the nineteenth 
century only within a narrow portion of the population.  Böhm, Görlich, and Edward Josef 
Stur identified the liberal movement, the Viennese intelligentsia, and the Bohemian German-
speakers as the real proponents of German national sentiment in Austria.  According to their 
arguments, most of the other German-speakers within the Monarchy, and most especially 
792Böhm, “Deutscher und slawischer Nationalismus.” Österreichische Monatshefte 11 (August, 1948): 
488-491; Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 31; Paunovic, 515-516; Missong, “25 Thesen über die 
österreichische Nation,” 487-8.
793Böhm, “Deutschnationalismus einst und jetzt,” Österreichische Monatshefte 2 (November, 1949): 126-
464
the peasant class, had been untouched by such sentiment and had maintained their loyalty to 
the multinational state.  According to Böhm, even nationalistic liberals and intellectuals had 
not really wanted to abandon the Monarchy for a unified German state, but rather had 
wished to secure a predominant position within the Habsburg state for German-speakers 
while maintaining Austria’s dominance in the affairs of the German states.  It was only as 
nationalists felt the hegemony of German-speakers within the Monarchy threatened toward 
the end of the nineteenth century that they really began to look toward Anschluß with 
Germany as an attractive option.  Even so, such nationalism had had a detrimental effect on 
public discourse in the Monarchy, and indeed according to Böhm and Missong, the anti-
Slavic sentiment of German nationalists, especially in the Sudetenland, had inspired a Czech 
national movement which in turn further sharpened national differences within the 
Monarchy.794
Postwar Austrian conservatives also criticized Germany itself for exacerbating 
German nationalism.  From the wars of religion in the seventeenth century to the predatory 
design of Frederick II of Prussia, to the arrogant militarism of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, 
conservatives portrayed Germany as a power which worked against Austria’s interests.  As 
we have seen, the Austrian right accused nineteenth-century German historians of 
encouraging German nationalism within Austria with pro-German historical propaganda.   
Conservatives likewise charged that Austria’s alliance with Wilhelmine Germany essentially 
had bound Austria to Germany’s nationalistic dreams of conquest, while preventing any 
7; Paunovic, 515-6; Görlich, “Wann kommt das österreichische Geschichtswerk?” 492.
794Böhm, “Deutschnationalismus einst und jetzt,” 127; Missong, “25 Thesen über die österreichische 
Nation,” 488; Görlich, “Fürst Klemens Lothar Wenzel Metternich,” 223; Eduard Josef Stur, 
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possibility of easing tensions between Austria and Russia over the Balkans.795
This single-minded conservative effort to blame Germany and its Austrian German 
nationalist supporters for the catastrophes which Austria had experienced during the past 
century represented a significant change for the Austrian right.  Whereas conservatives 
during the First Republic and, to a lesser extent in the Ständestaat, had frequently blamed 
the Czechs for the end of the Monarchy, during the early Second Republic they shifted that 
culpability entirely onto “treasonous” Austrian German nationalists and German imperial 
ambitions in Europe.  Similarly, where earlier Austrian conservatives had vigorously 
denounced liberalism and Enlightenment ideas without providing a corresponding 
denunciation of the nationalist sentiment which frequently accompanied those ideals, the 
Austrian right after 1945 attacked German nationalism far more vehemently than it did 
liberalism.796  While individual conservatives such as Böhm did sometimes attack liberal 
ideas in terms reminiscent of the Christian Social Party’s rhetoric before 1938, the People’s 
Party as a whole now embraced republicanism and hence could not afford to strongly assail 
the liberal notions which provided the foundation of the Second Republic’s democratic 
ideology.  These new positions stemmed from Austria’s circumstances after 1945.  The 
experience of the Second World War had de-legitimized both authoritarianism and German 
nationalism for Austrian conservatives, and the ÖVP now positioned itself as a Party which 
was committed to republican rule and to Austrian nationalism.797
795Böhm, Österreich, Erbe und Aufgabe, 30.
796For previous conservative views, see Chapters 1 and 3.  The postwar Austrian right’s unwillingness to 
blame the Czechs for the collapse of the Monarchy, as they once had, might also stem from their 
reluctance to offend the predominantly Slavic Soviet Union which continued to occupy Austria.
797On the de-legitimization of right-wing authoritarianism in Europe after World War II, see Jerry Z. 
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Ultimately the Habsburg past emerged in the accounts of the postwar Austrian right 
as the source of the uniqueness of the Austrian nation.  The conservatives portrayed the 
dynasty as a generally benevolent force which had worked not just to protect the interests of 
Austrians, but of all the peoples within their multinational state, and which exemplified the 
best of Austria’s national qualities.  Such qualities could easily be contrasted with the far 
more negative Prussian or German character displayed so clearly in Germany’s own past, 
and revealed the fact that Austrians and Germans represented different nations despite the 
language which both groups shared.  They also minimized the authoritarian tendencies of 
the old Monarchy, while highlighting the reforms during the nineteenth century which had 
provided a constitutional basis for Habsburg rule.  These efforts to define Austrian 
nationhood through references to the Habsburg Monarchy and its legacy were most intense 
during the immediate postwar era, and decreased markedly in frequency once the Second 
Republic stabilized during the early 1950s.  Still, the Austrian right after 1945 used the 
Habsburg past as the starting point for their arguments about Austrian national identity, just 
as they always had since 1918.  The manner in which the Second Republic’s conservatives 
now used Habsburg past to proclaim the existence of an Austrian nation separate from the 
German Volk was new, however, and marked a profound change in the stance of the 
Austrian right.
ii. Postwar Socialists and the Habsburg Past 
Unlike the Austrian right, the Social Democrats, the major faction within the 
Austrian left, saw no need to reconstitute themselves as an entirely new party after the 
Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998): 286-326.
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restoration of Austrian statehood in 1945.  The Socialists saw themselves as the only 
political group in Austria which had unambiguously supported democracy in Austria during 
the decades since the collapse of the Monarchy.  They had resisted both the authoritarian 
corporatist regime of the 1930s and Nazi rule in Austria, and saw little in their political 
stance between 1918 and 1945 from which they had to distance themselves.  They had 
always supported Anschluß with Germany before World War II, however, and after 1945 
they needed to adjust their position to include support for Austrian independence in order to 
minimize Austrian responsibility for Nazi crimes and to secure an end to the Allied 
occupation..  Thus, the Social Democrats rechristened themselves with a more patriotic 
name– the Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (Socialist Party of Austria- SPÖ)– even as they 
still explicitly identified themselves as the direct inheritors of the old Social Democratic 
Workers Party’s heritage.798
In a certain sense, the Social Democrats’ ideological position in 1945 was the exact 
opposite of that of the ÖVP.  The SPÖ indeed possessed a rich democratic legacy, but, as we 
have seen, almost no tradition of Austrian patriotism or nationalism upon which to build in 
the postwar era.  So while the Austrian right could emphasize and amplify its own 
reasonably strong if somewhat ambiguous history of support for Austrian nationhood, but 
had to manufacture conservative enthusiasm for democratic republicanism where little has 
798Weinzierl and Skalnik, 215-222.  The position of the Austrian Social Democrats was in many ways 
similar to that of the German Social Democratic Party, which likewise based its postwar political rhetoric 
in part upon references to its traditional support of democratic rule, and which denounced the Nazis’ 
dismantling of German democracy.  The leader of the German Social Democrats, Kurt Schumacher, did 
explicitly and publically denounce the Third Reich’s murder of Europe’s Jews.  The Austrian Party, on the 
other hand, did not make the Holocaust a part of its public rhetoric during the early Second Republic. See 
Herf, 245-251; Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965); Douglas A. Chalmers, The Social Democratic Party of 
Germany: From Working Class Movement to Modern Political Party (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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existed before, the Socialists already had a firmly democratic past, but had to revise their 
ideology to accommodate an affirmation of Austria as a nation.  It should come as no 
surprise then, that the Social Democrats saw the task of rebuilding an independent Austria 
after 1945 in a somewhat different light than did the conservatives.  For the Socialists, 
Austria’s foremost goal in the postwar era had to be the reconstruction of a strong political 
culture which was unambiguously democratic and republican.  According to the Socialists, 
the primary crime of the Nazis, and indeed the Ständestaat before them, had been the 
dismantling of Austrian democracy, not an assault upon Austrian nationhood.  The SPÖ 
certainly did take part in the same postwar project to define Austria as a historically unique 
nation which all of the Second Republic’s other major political factions participated in, but 
Socialist denials of Austrian Germanness were more tentative and ambiguous than those of 
the ÖVP or the Communist Party.  The task of rebuilding of Austrian democracy and 
furthering the state’s progress toward social and economic justice were simply more 
important concerns for the Socialists than Austria’s national issues.799
Nevertheless, the Socialist Party did indeed make a place in their political ideology 
for at least a qualified affirmation of Austrian nationhood, and used that affirmation to 
distance the Austrian state from the crimes of the “foreign” Nazi German occupiers in a 
manner similar to that of Austria’s other political factions.  After all, Anschluß had never 
been an end in itself for Austrian Socialists, but rather a step on the road to a united, socialist 
German democracy.  If Social Democrats during the First Republic had been able to present 
1964).
799For examples of the SPÖ’s emphasis of democratic and social issues rather than national ones, see their 
political platforms in the 1940s and 1950s: “Aktionsprogramm der Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs, 
1947,” and  “Das Kommunalprogramm der Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs, 1953,” in Österreichisch 
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union with Germany as a progressive, socialist goal, however, after 1945 the ideal of 
Anschluß simply had been too tainted by its association with the Third Reich to stand as 
viable part of the Party’s postwar program.  Socialists in the Second Republic had to be 
content with pursuing their goals in an independent Austrian state, just as they had in the old 
Monarchy.  
The Socialists’ new arguments in favor of Austrian independence were based on a 
particular vision of Austria’s Habsburg past, just as were those of the Austrian right.  The 
Socialist narrative of that past, however, continued to build upon previous Socialist views of 
Austria’s history, which had defined the dynasty and its governmental representatives in 
largely negative terms, while at the same time emphasizing the progress of the Monarchy’s 
subjects toward democracy and socialism under the leadership of the workers’ movement.  
The SPÖ essentially returned to the position it had held before 1918, which presented the 
Monarchy as a supranational territory compatible with Socialist ideals of internationalism 
and national rights.   The Socialists after 1945 argued, just as they had before 1918, that it 
had ultimately been the resistance of the reactionary forces of the dynasty, the Austrian 
Bürger class, the aristocracy, the Church, and nationalists of all stripes which had kept the 
old state from achieving the federal, democratic, and social reforms necessary to its 
survival.800  Ultimately for the Social Democrats, however, it was not the history of the 
Monarchy itself which represented the best historical foundation for a democratic and 
Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, 269-278, 279-287.  See also Franz Pop, “Das Wesen der Demokratie,” Die 
Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 7, 1945, 1.
800On the Social Democrats views before 1918, see Tom Bottomore, “Introduction,” in Austro-Marxism, 
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independent Austria to rise from the devastation wrought by Hitler’s war, but rather the 
Austrian First Republic, which the Socialists claimed as their own legacy.
The SPÖ and the National Question
The Social Democrats in 1945 were ultimately somewhat more tentative in 
presenting Austria’s Habsburg past as something which demonstrated an absolute national 
and ethnic separation between Austria and Germany than either the postwar Austrian 
conservatives or the Communists.  Part of the reason for this hesitancy was the simple fact 
that the Socialists had maintained for so long and with such consistency that German-
speaking Austrians and Germans in Germany proper were indeed part of the same Volk.  
Therefore when it came to the question of whether or not Austrians were Germans or not, 
the leaders and theorists of the SPÖ found it difficult to break with their past positions.  This 
question was a crucial one when it came to denying Austrian complicity for the crimes of 
Nazi Germany, however, and even those Austrian Socialists who had  greeted the 1938 
Anschluß with at least halting approval as an event which furthered the eventual cause of 
German unity in a democratic and socialist state now admitted that the experience of Nazism 
had put an end to that prospect for good.  
In a 1946 statement in the Socialist monthly Die Zukunft regarding Austria’s position 
after the end of Second World War, Oscar Pollak argued that the experience of Nazism had 
instilled Austrians with a profound aversion to großdeutsch ideology, and now precluded 
any Austrian return to broad support for Anschluß.801  In a similar manner, the Socialist 
801Oscar Pollak, “Österreich Heute,” Die Zukunft, Sozialistische Monatsschrift für Politik und Kultur
(March, 1946): 4.
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leader and eventual president of the Second Republic Adolf Schärf described in his memoirs 
how during the Nazi years he had come to realize that: “The Anschluß is dead.  The 
Austrians have been cured of their love of Germany.”802  Even President Karl Renner, who 
in 1938 had proclaimed his qualified support for the Anschluß with Nazi Germany, argued in 
1946 that the entire notion of Anschluß with Germany was contradicted by Austria’s unique 
spirit and cultural relationship to the other Völker of Europe.  For Renner, 1938 now 
represented a total catastrophe for Austria after the Nazi assault on its name, political 
traditions, and unique character.803
Like Austria’s other postwar parties, the Socialists refused to admit any Austrian 
responsibility for Nazi Germany’s crimes, and vehemently denied that Austrians had been 
willing participants in Hitler’s war.  Yet at the same time, postwar Socialists did not blame 
ethnic Germans as a whole for the Nazi regime as the Austria conservatives and the 
Communists frequently did.  Rather they portrayed the Nazi regime also as a vicious 
dictatorship ruled by a relatively small National Socialist cabal which had oppressed not just 
Austrians but also most Germans within the Third Reich.  Germany’s real problem 
according to one Austrian Socialist had not begun with Hitler himself, but rather with the 
failure of the Weimar Republic to remove from positions of influence military officers from 
the Wilhemine Kaiserreich who were willing to oppose democracy with murder and 
violence.804
802Adolf Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, 1945-1955 (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1955), 20.
803Karl Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs am 
22. Oktober 1946,” in Für Recht und Frieden: Eine Auswahl der Reden des Bundespräsidenten Dr. Karl 
Renner  (Vienna: Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1951), 54.
804“Der Mord an Karl Liebknecht und an Rosa Luxenburg,” Die Zukunft  (January, 1947): 5-10.  See also 
Franz Winterer, “Österreichs Kriegsanteil,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), September 18, 1945, 1; “Sind 
wir Schuldig?”  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), March 15, 1947, 1-2; Franz Pop,  “Das Wesen der 
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This more charitable view of Germans illustrates the SPÖ’s lingering ambiguity on 
the issue of national kinship between Austrians and Germans.  Gustav Bieneck may have 
forthrightly stated that, “Austria never grew as the part of another entity, but rather always 
as a unified whole; it was the deliberate, natural creation of unfathomable historical laws . . . 
” but few other postwar Socialist commentators were so willing to state in a clear and firm 
manner that Austrians were not Germans and never had been.805  For example, Renner, who 
had written extensively on national issues from a Socialist perspective since before the 
collapse of the old Monarchy, argued that Austria’s history had really begun with the influx 
of German settlers into the Danubian region in the tenth century.  Whereas conservative 
commentators often emphasized the fact that Austrians were not really a purely Germanic 
people, but rather represented the culmination of centuries of intermixing between Germans, 
Slavs, Celts, Illyrians and others, Renner focused solely upon the ethnic Germanic roots of 
the Austrian Volk.  He did allow that Austrians were a particularly adaptable Germanic 
group due to their descent from a mixture of the Frankish, Schwabian, Hessen, and Saxon
tribes, rather than just one Germanic tribe, but ultimately for him the Austrians were 
essentially Germans in an ethnic sense.806
Yet Renner also concluded by 1945 that Austrians certainly constituted a separate 
national group from the German nation.  For him, part of the problem that had plagued 
Austria for so long involved theories of nationalism.  Western Europeans simply equated the 
concept of the nation with the state, while the inhabitants of Central Europe understood the 
Demokratie,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 7, 1945, 1.
805Gustav K. Bienek, “Gedanken über Österreich,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 8, 1945, 2.
806 Karl Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs am 
22. Oktober 1946,” in Für Recht und Frieden, 47; “Wohin wir kommen und wohin wir wollen . . .” 
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concept as signifying a linguistic, cultural, and ethnic community.  Renner argued that 
nations were in a constant state of flux, and continually developed.  He noted that the 
Czechoslovakian nation had formed through the fusion of the Czech and Slovak nations, just 
as the Yugoslavian nation had emerged the union of the Slovene, Serb and Croat nations807
Indeed, Renner asserted, the Habsburg state had contained many nations without being a 
nation itself.  According to Renner, the Austrian example was somewhat similar to that of 
Switzerland.  Both had been part of the German nation in the Middle Ages, but had 
gradually developed into separate national groups thanks to their historical, geographic, and 
cultural relationship with neighboring nations.  Austria’s relationship with Germany had 
been closer and longer lasting than Switzerland’s, but Renner argued that in principle their 
development was analogous.808  Renner of course never actually specified precisely when 
Austria had developed into a unique nation; given the fact that he had proclaimed Austrian 
Germanness as recently as 1938, one might be tempted to conclude that he believed the 
Austrian nation was less than a decade old.809
Other Socialist thinkers echoed Renner’s position that Austrians had in the past been 
part of the German nation, but now constituted a separate nation.  In a response to 
conservative criticisms of the Socialists’ lack of Austrian nationalism, Erich Körner 
countered that the ÖVP’s national position represented just the sort of nationalism that had 
Offizielle Festschrift zur 950-Jahr-Feier Österreichs, 4.
807Obviously Renner’s remark has proven to be ironic given the enduring mutual resentment among these 
respective groups and the immediate disintegration of both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia after the end 
of communist rule in East Central Europe in 1989.
808Karl Renner, “Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” Wiener Zeitung January 19, 1946, 
1-5.
809For Renner’s 1938 statements supporting Anschluß and Austrian Germanness, see Renner, Karl Renner 
in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen, ed. Seigfried Nasko, (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1982), 
132-137.
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led to the recent world wars.  Körner asserted that Austrians of earlier eras considered 
themselves to be both German and, thanks to their political and cultural history, distinctively 
Austrian. He admitted that the Social Democrats now agreed with conservatives that Austria 
was indeed a separate nation, but he argued that this Austrian nationhood had to serve the 
needs of internationalism and European unity and eschew chauvinism.  According to 
Körner, the Austrian right was falling prey to just such a chauvinism by attempting to 
replace German nationalism with Austrian nationalism.  For Körner, any ideology which 
placed national prestige ahead of the interests of all humanity inevitably represented a threat 
to peace.  He differentiated between the simple “feeling of national belonging” which the 
Socialists acknowledged, and the sort of Austrian chauvinism which he claimed the ÖVP 
advocated.  For Körner all nationalism, even Austrian nationalism, represented a grave 
danger.810  This fear of the dangers of nationalism of course had been a long standing feature 
of Socialist rhetoric.811
Indeed, Körner was not alone in asserting that nationalism of any sort was a problem 
for both Austria and the world as a whole.  Otto Koenig forcefully repudiated the racial 
nationalism espoused by the Nazis in a 1945 article in Die Arbeiter-Zeitung, arguing that the 
Nazi attempt to ground German history in a mythological link between the Indo-Germanic 
peoples and the ancient Aryans amounted not just to historical nonsense, but threatened the 
cause of international peace as well.812  Josef Hindels noted in a 1950 issue of Die Zukunft 
that the ideological split created by the Cold War in Europe had allowed German 
nationalism to flourish once more in West Germany.  He warned against allowing the threat 
810Erich Körner, “Gibt es eine österreichische Nation?” Die Zukunft (March, 1949): 74-76.
811For discussions of previous Socialist views on the dangers of nationalism, see Chapters 1 and 3.
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posed by the Soviet Union to blind the West to the dangers of a renewed nationalism in a 
rearmed Germany.  Renner agreed that any sort of nationalism or particularism, whether of 
the großdeutsch or pro-Habsburg Austrian variety, was harmful and tended toward fascism.  
The sort of internationalism that the Social Democrats had long espoused represented the 
only real chance for peace in Europe.   In the postwar era, Renner foresaw the end of 
nationalistic mass movements and the rise of internationalism.813
While most Social Democrats in the Second Republic denied Austrian Germanness, 
some of them did note that there were benefits to maintaining a close relationship between 
Austria and Germany.  While a 1947 article in the Socialist newspaper Die Arbeiter-Zeitung
avowed that Austrians were neither more nor less interested in affairs in Germany than those 
of any other European state, Renner argued that the language and continuing cultural 
community which Austria shared with Germany was an advantage for, rather than an 
obstacle to, Austria’s continuing independence.  Austria had to work with all European 
peoples, including the Germans in West and East Germany as well as Austria’s Slavic, 
Magyar, and Italian neighbors, especially now that the old political bonds which had caused 
so many problems under the Habsburg state were gone.  Such economic cooperation in 
Central Europe was in Austria’s best interests and could not be ignored due to nationalist 
prejudices of whatever variety.814
 The problem of the “Volksdeutsche,” the more than ten million German-speaking 
812Otto Koenig, “Arier?  Was ist das?” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 19, 1945, 2.
813Josef Hindels, “Der deutsche Nationalismus,” Die Zukunft (September, 1950): 242-245; Karl Renner, 
“Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” Wiener Zeitung, January 19, 1946, 1-5.; Karl 
Renner,“Gedanken zur Friedenskonferenz,” Die Zukunft (September, 1946): 1-3.
814The Socialists never distinguished between Germans living in East and West Germany, although they 
were clearly uncomfortable with both Soviet oppression in the East and NATO’s rearmament of the West.  
“Deutschland,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung. (Vienna), March 23, 1947, 1-2; Karl Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt 
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refugees brutally expelled from their historical settlements in the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and Yugoslavia after 1945, also illuminated the Socialist position on Austria’s 
relationship to the German Volk.815  Writing in 1950, Socialist commentator Gustav Korkisch 
displayed no real sense of ethnic kinship with the refugees beyond his remark that some felt 
a closer bond to Austria than to Germany thanks to the Habsburg past of their former 
homelands.  He did, however, portray the plight of these refugees as a European 
humanitarian crisis which required both a concerted international aid effort and a 
sympathetic stance from Austria.816
Thus the Socialist position on the issue of national kinship between Austria and 
Germany was essentially that Austria indeed constituted a separate nation, although in the 
past it had been part of the German nation.  The Socialist view of the nation did not purely 
depend on the existence of an independent Austrian political state; they clearly believed that 
the Austrian nation was based upon the ethnic, cultural, and, above all, historical bonds 
shared by the Austrian people rather than upon mere political citizenship.  They argued, 
however, that in the new postwar world nationalism in general was both outmoded and 
dangerous.  The appropriate response to the Nazi assault upon Austrian nationhood was not 
to embrace Austrian nationalism, but rather to focus upon international peace and European 
cooperation.  Such a stance fit in well with the SPÖ’s traditional internationalism and 
hostility toward overt nationalism, and it further minimized the significance of the lingering 
ambiguity in the Social Democrats’ newly minted “Austrianism.”
der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs am 22. Oktober 1946,” 55-6.
815Most of these German-speakers were deported to the East and West German states, but some were also 
deported from Czechoslovakia to Austria.  On the expulsion of the Volksdeutschen, see Mazower, 214-
225; Gerhard Ziemer, Deutscher Exodus: Vertreibung und Entgliederung von 15 Millionen Ostdeutschen
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The SPÖ and the Austrian “Mission” and National Character 
Just as the SPÖ’s statements concerning the national differentiation between 
Austrians and Germans were more ambiguous than those of the Austrian right, so too were 
their comments about Austria’s historical mission and distinctive national characteristics 
more tentative than similar formulations by the ÖVP.  Again, this ambiguity can be 
explained by the history of Austrian Social Democratic thought.  Simply put, Austrian 
Socialism already possessed a historical mission to which it was committed: the progress of 
democracy and social justice.  Thus the Social Democrats always made their statements 
about an Austrian mission in the context of their primary commitment to advance the cause 
of international socialism.  Likewise, they always evaluated the Austrian national character 
in terms of how closely Austria’s national characteristics either aided or hindered the cause 
of the workers’ movement.  Still, in the period after 1945 the Austrian Socialist Party did 
display a markedly stronger sense of Austrian national and historical distinctiveness than it 
had at any point in the past, and it articulated these views through references to Austria’s 
historical past.
Even though they were primarily dedicated to the Socialist cause, some Social 
Democratic intellectuals did recognize that Austria had a special and continuing role to play 
in European affairs.  Their views often resembled Austrian conservatives’ definitions of 
Austria’s “mission” to serve as a cultural bridge and a defensive bulwark.  For example in 
1946, Wilhelm Stemmer argued that thanks to its geographic position between East and 
West, Austria was destined to play a role as mediator between the two regions.  He avowed 
(Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1973).
816Gustav Korkisch, “Das Volksdeutsche Problem in Österreich,” Die Zukunft (June, 1950): 161-162.
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that even if the Austrian Volk was small in numerical terms, it had been and continued to be 
very important to Europe in intellectual and cultural matters.817  The Socialist historian 
Jacques Hannak combined the defensive and cultural aspects of the Austrian mission with a 
distinctively democratic Socialist slant in a 1948 article, in which he asserted that Austria’s 
geographically determined fate enabled it to defend Europe against detrimental changes 
pursued by hostile powers.  The Habsburg dynasty’s reactionary conservatism made it well 
suited to fulfill this historical role, and it successfully opposed the threats posed to Europe 
by the Turks in the east and the French in the west.  In 1848, however, the Austrian Volk
itself had become the agent of a sort of change which was creative and necessary rather than 
destructive, while the dynasty found itself working against the tide of historical progress.  
The Revolution of 1848 began the process which would ultimately depose the ruling house 
in 1918.  Austria’s mission thus changed from one of conservative defense to one of social 
and political progress.  Austria’s task in the postwar era was to spread the republican legacy 
of 1848 eastward to nations that were as oppressed by Communist Russian dictatorship in 
1948 as they had been by czarist Russia’s reactionary intervention in East Central Europe in 
1848. 818
Other Socialists thinkers approached the more traditional notions of the Austrian 
mission with more circumspection, however.  One commentator writing in 1949 warned that 
while Austria had once been the very heart of Europe and Vienna the continent’s real 
capital, that position of status and influence had vanished, and to maintain such a view of 
Austria in the postwar era was a dangerous illusion.  Austria was now a small state located 
817Wilhelm Stemmer, “Otto Glöckel und das Schulprogramm der Sozialistischen Partei: Zur Wiederkehr 
des Todestages Otto Glöckels (23. Juli 1935),” Die Zukunft (July, 1946): 3-4.
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on the fault line between the two mutually antagonistic ideological blocks in the Cold War.  
Austria’s very existence was threatened by both of the Cold War blocks, which both 
continued to have troops stationed on Austrian soil.  Austria still had a part to play in the 
European order, now as a neutral means of contact between the capitalist West and the 
Communist East.  Such a function had to serve the cause of international peace, and was to 
be carried out only in close cooperation with the United Nations.  Delusions of Austrian 
historical grandeur could only threaten this more modest and cautious Austrian role.819  The 
Socialist educator Anton Tesarek viewed the notion of an Austrian defensive mission vis-à-
vis the East not just with suspicion, but rather with outright hostility.  He saw such an idea as 
a thinly veiled version of the Austrian “German mission” which had served the cause of 
Nazi imperialism in Europe, and declared, “Austria is no longer an Ostmark, and no longer 
wants to be the ‘core land’ of an empire or a ‘bulwark’ with the function of ‘protection 
against the East.’” 820
One Socialist thinker even went so far as to replace the “Austrian mission” with an 
“Austromarxist mission.”  In a 1947 article discussing the significance of the 1917 
revolution in Russia, Karl Czernetz described the role of Austromarxism as a “bridge” 
between the authoritarian but revolutionary Marxism of the Russian Bolsheviks and the 
exaggerated emphasis upon reform within the capitalist system by the British Labour 
movement.  Czernetz saw Austrian Social Democracy as a necessary mediator between the 
extremes of the Western and Eastern varieties of socialism, parallel to the widespread 
818Jacques Hannak, “Österreich in der Geschichte,” Die Zukunft (April, 1948): 97-100.
819Cato, “Was für ein Österreich wollen wir?” Die Zukunft (May, 1949): 129-133.
820Anton Tesarek, Erziehung zur Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu 
einem politischen Problem,” Die Zukunft (May, 1946):18
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notions of an Austrian mission as a cultural bridge between East and West proposed by the 
Austrian right and even by some Austrian Socialists.821
Thus, the SPÖ’s discussions of Austria’s mission invariably either translated the 
nation’s historical task into forms which were compatible with the “Socialist mission” of the 
workers’ movement to advance democracy and social justice, or rejected such notions 
entirely as threats to the ideals of socialism.  In a similar manner, Socialists discussed the 
national character or aptitudes of the Austrian Volk with an eye to qualities which were 
valued by the international workers movement.  As we have seen, Karl Renner argued that 
Austria’s diverse Germanic background gave the Austrian Volk a particularly adaptable 
national character.  Renner also asserted that internationalism was a historical gift of the 
Austrian Volk thanks to the strength of the internationalist Austrian workers’ movement and 
of Roman Catholic universalism in Austrian history.  Indeed for Renner the potency of 
internationalist sentiment in Austrian history represented Austria’s true character, rather than
the trappings of the dynastic Monarchy which the ÖVP emphasized as Austria’s heritage.822
Gustav Bieneck presented the Austrian national character in a similar manner, arguing that 
thanks to its position between the Occident and Orient, Austrians had developed a special 
gift for absorbing numerous different foreign influences in a positive manner, and 
crystalizing them into a uniquely Austrian form.  This “chemical-cultural” process allowed 
Austria to benefit from  positive cultural influences from other nationalities both within and 
821Karl Czernetz, “Zum 30. Jahrestag der russischen Revolution,” Die Zukunft (November, 1947): 320.
822Renner, “Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” 1-5.
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outside of the Habsburg state.823
823Gustav K. Bienek, “Gedanken über Österreich,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 8, 1945.
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Unsurprisingly, Austrian Socialists were also far less eager than the conservatives or 
even the Communists to present a positive contrast between Austria’s benevolent national 
characteristics and the stereotypical negative national characteristics of north Germans or 
Prussians.  In a discussion concerning how best to educate Austria’s youth about the benefits 
of socialism and democracy, Fritz Kurz noted in passing that the major national flaw that 
Prussians had historically displayed was the inability to view situations from the perspective 
of others.  Kurz asserted that Austrians, on the other hand, had an aptitude for understanding 
that made them much better suited to democracy.824   Such statements by Socialist 
commentators were quite rare, however, and were presented with far less urgency than they 
were by the representatives of Austria’s other political factions.
The Austrian Socialists’ representation of the Austrian national character and 
mission thus was indeed more forceful than it had been in the past, but it was still relatively 
anemic compared to the positions of the other political camps .  In the end, these issues were 
simply less important for the Austrian Social Democracy than they were for the right or the 
Communist left.  The Socialists already had a historical mission in their political ideology, 
and any statements concerning Austria’s nationhood were always made in that ideological 
context.  Despite the relative newness and weakness of the SPÖ’s Austrian national 
consciousness, however, the Austrian past was every bit as important for them in terms of 
defining Austria’s place in the postwar world as it was for the other parties. 
The SPÖ’s View of Austrian History
The Social Democrats used Austria’s history extensively in order to define the 
824Fritz Kurz, “Erziehung zur idealen oder realen Demokratie?” Die Zukunft (November, 1947): 332-333.
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position of the Austrian Second Republic in the world after 1945.  Unlike the Austrian 
conservatives, however, the Socialists were not interested in glorifying the dynastic aspect 
of Austria’s history.  Just as they had before 1945, the postwar Social Democrats  presented 
a view of Austrian history which described the Habsburg dynasty itself largely as a 
reactionary, negative force.  Now that they had abandoned Anschluß in favor of Austrian 
nationhood, however, they were far more willing to portray the supranational state which the 
Habsburgs had governed as a positive, proto-internationalist entity.  This heightened 
appreciation for the Monarchy’s more felicitous qualities did not fundamentally alter the 
Socialist view of history, though.  Postwar Socialists continued to believe that the workers 
movement and the nascent Austrian democracy which rose out of the Monarchy’s ashes in 
1918 were far more important parts of Austria’s heritage than the old dynastic empire.  
Thus, Social Democrats’ view of Austrian history was one in which the Austrian working 
class struggled to achieve democracy and social justice in the face of the resistance of a 
reactionary dynasty, and ultimately fulfilled its aspirations through the creation of the First 
Republic.  In presenting this vision of history, the Social Democrats were able to distance 
postwar Austria from complicity in the crimes of Nazi Germany not just by asserting the 
distinctiveness of Austria’s historical past, but also by portraying the essence of Austria’s 
past in terms of democratic progress which was inimical to the authoritarian character Nazi 
ideology.
Given the Socialist emphasis upon democracy and social progress as the most 
important ideas in the post-1945 world, the Party had to grapple with the question of exactly 
how much historical continuity the Second Republic shared with the Habsburg past.  Could 
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the Second Republic reasonably be viewed as the successor to the history of the old 
Monarchy, which had indeed also included so many other territories and so many other 
national groups?  Or was modern Austria simply the inheritor of a democratic and territorial 
legacy which truly began with the First Republic in 1918?  During the First Republic, most 
Socialists had denied any real continuity between the Monarchy and the modern Austrian 
state.825  In 1946, one Socialist thinker, the educational theorist Anton Tesarek, continued to 
argue that Austria’s past as part of the Habsburg Monarchy should be minimized in favor of 
a view of history which emphasized 1918 as the real beginning of the modern Austrian state.  
In a 1946 article on education and democracy he wrote:
Our Second Republic cannot be a successor state to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy . . . . There are no longer any Czechs, Poles, Croats, or Hungarians 
who desire their state life to be linked to the Habsburg Monarchy– despite the 
architectural monuments from this epoch in their cities, despite all cultural 
relationships, despite many social institutions which recall the form of the old 
Monarchy.  They all write the history of the state as something new– and they 
essentially date it from the days of their liberation [from the Monarchy] . . .826
Most other Socialist commentators now argued, however, that Austria’s past could 
not reasonably be restricted to the First Republic, particularly in light of workers’ 
movement’s historical roots in the last half century of the Monarchy’s existence.  More 
importantly, the Party’s new stance in support of Austrian nationhood required that they take
a longer view of Austria’s past in order to ground these national views more firmly.  
Therefore, Social Democrats generally presented a vision of Austria’s history which 
included the old Monarchy.  At the same time, however, postwar Socialists did not see the 
dynasty itself as the real subject of Austria’s history.  The postwar Socialist historical 
825See Chapter 1.
826Anton Tesarek, “Erziehung zur Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu 
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narrative cast the Austrian Volk and the workers’ movement as the real protagonists of 
Austria’s past, and Socialists in 1945 still regarded the end of the Monarchy in 1918 as the 
culmination of that narrative, just as they had during the First Republic and the Ständestaat.  
Thus, the stance of the SPÖ during the Second Republic did not represent a wholesale 
revision of the Party’s earlier views on Austrian history, but rather constituted a subtle 
revision in which the old Monarchy assumed more importance than it previously had.
In a 1949 article, for example, Erich Körner expressed the view of a majority of 
Socialist thinkers that Austrian Republic’s past included the history of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, with all of its good and bad aspects:
Austrian history is neither worse nor better than that of other nations.  
We need neither to be especially proud of it nor to repudiate it, just as both 
light and shadow divide our land.  So next to an absolutist emperor stands the 
people’s emperor Joseph II, next to the “butcher”- General Heynau stands the 
peasants’ liberator Frundberg, and next to the Austro-fascist Stahrhemberg 
stands the workers’ leader Wallisch. . . . Thus it must be understood that the 
Austrian Socialists do not base their Austrian-confession upon the “good, old 
days” of the Monarchy, in which the workers were merely the object of 
feudal and capitalistic exploitation, but rather they unconditionally profess
their faith in the Austrian Republic which they helped create.827
Adolf Schärf also agreed that the territory of the current Austrian Republic had a past before 
1918.  He argued that the individual federal provinces of contemporary Austria had 
developed a common feudal and urban culture by the late Middle Ages.  Even though the 
Republic itself was relatively young, its territories had represented a unified region within 
the much larger Habsburg supranational state for many centuries, and it made sense to 
einem politischen Problem,” Die Zukunft (May, 1946): 18
827Erich Körner, “Gibt es eine österreichische Nation?” Die Zukunft (March, 1949): 75. 
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include the Habsburg period as part of Austria’s history.828
Socialists were definitely less interested in Austria’s medieval past then either the 
ÖVP or earlier proponents of a “Germanist” vision of Austrian history.  While the 
conservatives placed a great deal of emphasis upon the formal founding of “Ostarrichi” in 
the tenth century and upon the Babenberg creation of culturally vibrant Danubian duchy 
centered upon Vienna with strong ties to Bohemia and Hungary, Socialists discussed 
Austria’s history during the Middle Ages relatively rarely, and then only in passing.829  Such 
a lack of interest is unsurprising giving the Socialist focus upon the common Austrian Volk
and its democratic development.  The historical records from the medieval period have little 
to say about the masses, and largely describe a feudal order which Socialists rejected as 
inimical to democracy and social progress.
The postwar Social Democrats’ examination of Austria’s past generally began in 
earnest with the Habsburg dynasty’s creation of a multinational empire in the sixteenth 
century.  The early modern Habsburg Monarchy provided the Austromarxists with an 
supranational state that simultaneously prefigured Socialist internationalism, and served as a 
tool of reaction and oppression against its subjects of numerous different nationalities.  It 
was within the framework of this Monarchy that the democratic workers’ movement 
developed during the nineteenth century, and it was against the Habsburgs that the 
movement would struggle.
Socialist commentators gave the Habsburgs themselves a certain amount of credit for 
828Adolf Shärf, ”Oesterreichs Mission,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung  (Vienna), January 1, 1946, 1.
829See for example Renner, “Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” 1-5, which only 
briefly discusses the Middle Ages in Austria before moving on to a more substantial discussion of the 
Habsburg period.
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at least creating a state based on supranational principles, which the Socialists preferred to 
the nationalist ideals that had served as the inspiration for Nazism and its horrific war of 
conquest.  Indeed, Karl Renner recognized that as the “House of Austria,” the Habsburg 
dynasty, was historically synonymous with the sort of supranational ideas which were the 
antithesis of the nationalism which had poisoned Europe’s recent history.  He praised the 
Habsburg state’s openness to the cultures of other European lands such as Spain, Italy, and 
the Netherlands, and admitted that after the union of the Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian 
crownlands in the sixteenth century, the Monarchy experienced a highpoint of prosperity 
and power.   Apart from the achievement of building a vibrant multinational empire, 
however, the dynasty itself received little further credit from postwar Socialist thinkers.  
Renner charged that the arch-conservative dynasty had too often lagged behind the rest of 
the continent in recognizing important social and cultural changes sweeping Europe and 
indeed had frequently opposed such change, to the point where Austria’s very name had 
become synonymous with reaction.830
Likewise, Adolf Schärf lauded the Habsburgs for their ability to construct a strong 
supranational state which saw slow but continuous improvement in the condition of its 
Slavic and Magyar populations over the centuries, and which was able to turn back the 
threat posed by the Ottoman Empire.  Yet he also noted that the Monarchy was the central 
point of the Counter Reformation which had stopped the progress of Protestantism and its 
more progressive economic ideals from spreading to the east and south from its point of 
origin in northern Europe.  Schärf also argued that the Habsburgs based their continent-wide 
830Ibid., 1-5; Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs 
am 22. Oktober 1946,” 49-51. 
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cultural and political prominence on the backs of Austria’s oppressed peasant class.831
Other Socialist commentators refused to give even that much credit to the figures of 
the dynasty.  Tesarek argued that it was a historical distortion to laud the dynasty for the 
social and political progress that the Monarchy had made over the centuries.  He argued that 
the empress Maria Theresa, a particularly beloved figure of the Austrian right, could be not 
be praised for the centralization and progress which Austria had experienced during her 
reign.  These changes had depended upon Europe’s inevitable economic development 
toward capitalism rather than her policy choices.  In the place of the praise heaped upon 
dynastic rulers, Tesarek asserted that a truly Republican vision of Austria’s should 
emphasize the common people and their struggles toward democracy:
And the “heroes” of our history?  They come in 
part from the masses (the “unknown” workers, peasants, 
researchers, and soldiers of the many branches of the 
underground struggle against fascism), and in part from the 
history of the great democracies which must be a reminder and 
an inspiring model for us.832
Despite his qualified praise for the dynasty elsewhere, Renner made similar 
arguments concerning Maria Theresa’s son, Joseph II.  Other Socialists sometimes 
applauded Joseph II as a progressive “Volkskaiser” who had initiated numerous centralizing 
and anti-feudal reforms, but  Renner asserted that the emperor’s supposedly “enlightened” 
reforms merely amounted to a recognition of social changes which were already sweeping 
831Adolf Shärf, ”Oesterreichs Mission,” 1.
832Anton Tesarek, “Erziehung zur Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu 
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the continent, and came far later to the Monarchy than elsewhere in Europe.833  Ultimately, 
whatever small credit Socialist thinkers gave the dynasty, they most frequently defined it as 
a reactionary force and as a barrier to democratic development for all of the Monarchy’s 
peoples.
If the eighteenth century represented the key era in the history of Austria for the 
postwar right, then the nineteenth century was certainly the critical era in the Habsburg past 
for the Social Democrats.  Just as they had before 1945, postwar Socialists identified the 
nineteenth century as the epoch when the forces of progress truly awoke and began their 
struggles in earnest.  It was the century when the individual nationalities of the Monarchy 
began to strive for a recognition of their rights by the dynasty.  It was the time of the 
Revolution of 1848, a pivotal event in the Socialist view of history.  And of course, it was 
during the nineteenth century that the Austrian Social Democrats themselves first organized 
and began their self-styled historical mission to drag Austria out the feudal Middle Ages and 
into the modern era of democracy and social justice.
For Austromarxist commentators, the dynasty and its agents were at their most 
reactionary in the first half of the century.  After successfully turning back the progressive 
tide of the French Revolution, the Monarchy, guided by its arch-conservative foreign 
minister Metternich, allied itself with the reactionary forces of Russian tsarism and the 
Prussian Junkers to prevent any further revolutionary change in Europe.  Internally, it used 
censorship and its secret police force to prevent any sort of social progress from within as 
well.  Hannak, using a well established epithet, characterized the Monarchy during this time 
einem politischen Problem,” 18.
833Renner, “Am Ausgangpunkt der Zukunft,” 51.  For a more positive Socialist view of Joseph II, see 
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as a “Völkerkerker,” (prison house of nations) which had kept all of the its constituent 
nationalities from pursuing their aspirations for liberty.  The goal of Metternichian 
absolutism was to create one unified Volk throughout the Monarchy without any national 
qualities, a “kaiserlich-königlicher”834 people who would not stand in the way of the 
dynasty’s efforts to impose its reactionary will in Europe.  Yet Renner argued that ultimately 
the dynasty’s very rigidity and unwillingness to accept necessary social and cultural changes 
during this period made it brittle and unable to withstand new challenges.835
The Revolution of 1848 represented the first real challenge to Metternich’s 
stultifying policies, as Austria’s Bürger and working classes, and its various nationalities all 
rose up against the Monarchy.  Just as they always had, Socialists after 1945 celebrated the 
Revolution as the true beginning of Austria’s movement toward democracy.  These 
commentators unanimously portrayed the dynasty and the Monarchy’s old social order as 
the main villains of the narratives they crafted concerning the revolution.  A 1947 article in 
Die Arbeiter-Zeitung characterized the forces of reaction in Austrian in 1848 as, “the 
absolutist Monarchy, the feudal-patromonial constitution of society, the privileged social 
strata, the unrestrained bureaucratic administration, and the paternalist clergy.”836  In an 
account by Anton Tesarek, the dynasty and its noble representatives in the military appeared 
as a ruthless, bloodthirsty group that attempted to force obedience to its reactionary policies.  
He described an episode from the Revolution in Vienna in which Archduke Maximilian had 
Körner, “Gibt es eine österreichische Nation?” 75.
834“Imperial-royal.”  This term refers to the division of the Monarchy into the two equal and autonomous 
regions– the kingdom of Hungary and the rest of the Habsburgs’ imperial holdings–after the Ausgleich of 
1867.  Hannak’s use of this term to describe Metternich’s era is therefore anachronistic.  Hannak, 
“Österreich in der Geschichte,” 97-100.
835Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs am 22. 
Oktober 1946,” 53.
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ordered his troops to fire on the assembled crowds until dissuaded from his error by a 
cooler-headed junior officer. Similarly, Tesarek portrayed Windischgrätz and his troops as 
marauders and murderers who viciously looted Vienna after the dynasty retook the city from 
the revolutionaries.837
Hannak lauded the Revolution of 1848 for bringing dramatic change to Austria, 
which for  the first time became an agent of social change rather than a mere expression of 
the House of Habsburg’s dynastic power.  From that point on, Austria’s oppressed social 
classes and nationalities were never again passive objects in the face of the dynasty’s efforts, 
but rather became the subjects of their own stories.  Hannak concluded that the Habsburg 
tradition ultimately had been incompatible with the aspirations to freedom of all social 
classes and nationalities.  Thus, the end of the Monarchy in 1918 represented the completion 
of the republican task begun in 1848.838  For Oscar Pollak too, 1848 marked the first time 
Austria truly felt the effects of the inevitable progress of history toward freedom, as its 
working class awoke and began to develop true class consciousness.  The Revolution of 
1848 was a part of the same historical process that drove the earlier English and French 
Revolutions, a process which Marx himself revealed for the first time in the The Communist 
Manifesto of that year.  Pollack argued that it had been the ideologically mature liberal 
bourgeoisie, rather than the nascent proletariat, which had truly driven events in 1848, and 
which had subsequently brought constitutional rule to Austria.  Pollak warned that the 
workers’ movement could never take the political freedoms secured by the Bürger for 
836“Unvergängliche Ideen,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), March 14, 1947, 1.
837Tesarek,“Des 13. März des Jahres 1848 (Eine Gedenkfeier für Arbeiterkinder),” Sozialistische 
Erziehungsarbeit (1947): 5-6.
838Hannak, “Österreich in der Geschichte,” 97-100.
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granted, however, and he noted that recent Austrian history had shown that the Bürger could 
destroy the same system of rights and freedoms they themselves had achieved in the first 
place.  Thus for Pollak, when the SPÖ commemorated the centenary of the revolution in 
1948, they were not just celebrating the heroism of past fighters for freedom, whether 
proletarian or bourgeois, but internalizing lessons that were just as vitally important for the 
workers in the twentieth century as they had been in 1848:  
We do not merely celebrate a historical memory, we adopt,  in a 
correct understanding of the unfolding of history, our role in the great 
evolution of human culture, in the revolution of social relationships, which 
recurs so long as class separation, exploitation, injustice and lack of freedom 
exist.  We adopt the pathos of the struggle for liberation not as the faded 
tradition of 1848, but rather as a living mission for today.839
Although the revolution ultimately failed to achieve its goals of liberal-democratic 
reform and national equality in the short term, most postwar Socialists saw its legacy with a 
longer view which presented 1848 as the first step on the path to the replacement of the 
Monarchy with the First Republic. Whereas earlier Socialist portrayals of the revolution had 
generally lauded the movement toward German national unity as part of 1848's progressive 
legacy, Socialists after 1945 were much more reticent to discuss, let alone praise, the ardent 
German nationalism of the revolutionaries, and when they did mention the topic, they 
frequently minimized the importance of such nationalism to the revolution’s overall goals.   
This stance of course reflected the new post-war environment in which the experience of 
Nazi rule in Austria had tainted the very notion of German nationalism.  While the 
conservatives like Böhm were simply able to dismiss the revolutionaries of 1848 as 
dangerous, anti-Austrian zealots, the revolution was simply too important to the Socialists’ 
839Oscar Pollak, “Das Erbe von 1848,” Die Zukunft (March, 1848): 67-68.
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conception of their own history to reject.  Therefore the SPÖ had to downplay the national 
aspect of the Revolution of 1848 in order to maintain its place as a key part of the Party’s 
ideological heritage. 
Renner led the way in these efforts to remove the stain of German nationalism from 
the revolution, explicitly arguing that those who saw the 1938 Anschluß as the culmination 
of the ideas of 1848 were deeply mistaken.840  An article in the Arbeiter-Zeitung made a 
similar point in1947, proclaiming that the fruits of 1848 were democracy and freedom, and, 
far from being nationalistic, the real dream of the revolution was unity for the peoples of the 
Habsburg state in an international community.  These goals were not realized then, but were 
now on the horizon due to the foundation of the United Nations and the progress of 
democracy and human rights after the Second World War.841  Tesarek summarized the 
SPÖ’s basic position on the revolution more succinctly, avowing that though they failed to 
achieve their goals, the revolutionaries should be remembered as heroes who gave their lives 
for the cause of Socialism 842
With the temporary defeat of the forces of progress in 1848, however, the Monarchy 
entered a reactionary, neo-absolutist phase.  Gustav Bieneck portrayed the post-
revolutionary decades of the1850s and 1860s as an era in which the tensions and unresolved 
issues from 1848 had merely been postponed, and indeed had been deepened by the 
development of capitalism and working class consciousness.  The upper classes diverted 
themselves from these problems with a passionate interest in the waltzes of Strauß, opera, 
840Renner, “Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” 1-5.
841“Unvergängliche Ideen,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), March 14, 1947, 1.
842Tesarek, “Des 13. März des Jahres 1848 (Eine Gedenkfeier für Arbeiterkinder),” 5-6.
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and other displays of artistic opulence.843  Likewise, national tensions festered throughout the 
Monarchy.  Socialist thinkers argued that the Monarchy’s agreement with the Hungarian 
lower nobility in 1867 only exacerbated these national problems by awarding the Magyars a 
privileged position which they used to oppress Slovak and Croat minorities in their 
territory.844
Postwar Socialists also contrasted their own Party’s origins in the nineteenth-century 
awakening of the working class with the reactionary roots of the ÖVP.  Josef Hindels argued 
that despite the claims of the present day ÖVP to be a completely new political party, it was 
still the inheritor of the old Christian Social Party’s reactionary legacy.  According to 
Hindel, the party which grew into Austria’s primary bourgeois party actually began as a 
coalition of farmers and kleinbürger formed under the auspices of Taafe’s aristocratic 
government to oppose liberal efforts to sweep away the remaining refuse of feudalism.  The 
Christian Social Party was anti-capitalistic, yet unlike the Socialist Party, it offered no 
positive program for the future.  Instead, it was a  fundamentally backward looking group 
which idealized the past.  This anti-bourgeois coalition repudiated the ideals of the French 
Revolution in favor of the Middle Ages, using anti-Semitic rhetoric to advance its cause.  In 
its efforts to expand beyond its initial Viennese roots to become a genuine Reichspartei, the 
Party became a strong supporter of the Monarchy, and consequently backed the 
government’s efforts to block national reform, and to allow nationalistic German-speakers to 
continue their domination of the Monarchy’s Slavic peoples.  Indeed, Socialists after 1945 
843Gustav K. Bienek,“Das Zeitalter Johann Strauß,’” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), October 25, 1945, 2.
844Renner, “Die Ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Österreichs,” 1-5; Cato,“Was für ein Österreich 
wollen wir?” Die Zukunft (May, 1949): 129-133; Jacques Hannak, “Drei Marksteine,” Die Zukunft
(November, 1951): 293-296.
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likewise had not forgotten the role of the conservative movement in creating the 
authoritarian Ständestaat, which had persecuted and restricted Austrian Social Democracy, 
and they suspected that ÖVP still concealed fascist tendencies beneath its veneer of 
republicanism.845
As always, the Socialists naturally saw their own party as the historical force which 
did the most to oppose such reactionary elements in Austrian history, and portrayed the 
workers’ movement as the real bearer of the ideals of democracy and social change in 
Austria’s past. As an article in Die Arbeiter-Zeitung declaimed, 
Social Democracy stood as the only international power able to 
oppose the supranational might of the House of Habsburg, which supported 
itself upon the disappearing feudal elements of the old Monarchy and which 
was threatened by the young, surging nationalism of the Czechs, Poles, 
Ruthenes, Slovenes and so forth. Thus Social Democracy became the great 
adversary of the Habsburgs.  It represented the ideal of the transformation of 
the feudal, coercive state into a democratic-federal state.846
The Socialists particularly praised their party’s first leader, Viktor Adler, who had crusaded 
against the “half-feudal” Monarchy which he had famously characterized as “Absolutismus 
gemildet durch Schlamperei” (absolutism made more bearable through slovenliness).  They 
lauded Adler’s decision to guide the party along a  Bernstein-inspired reformist path which 
took advantage of the long period of peace and economic expansion in Europe to improve 
845Josef Hindels, “Die Vergangenheit der Österreichische Volkspartei,” Die Zukunft (April, 1949): 109-
112;  “Sie sind nicht vergessen,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), February 12, 1954, 1.
846 “Der Staatsbaumeister.  Zu Karl Renners 75. Geburtstag,”  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung  (Vienna), December 
14, 1945, 1-2. 
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the condition of the working class, and they argued that Adler’s Vienna Program of 1901 in 
particular had maintained Marxist principles while seeking immediate, practical gains for 
workers.  The Social Democrats cited the attainment of universal manhood suffrage in the 
Monarchy in 1907 as proof of the success of the workers’ movement under Adler.847
As for the national question, the Social Democrats noted that their party after 1899 
had demanded equality and freedom for all of the Monarchy’s nationalities.  Hannak 
asserted that Adler, Renner, and Otto Bauer all had proposed various reform plans to 
improve the position of the various nationalities while still keeping them within the 
Habsburg Völkerstaat.  The rationale behind these programs was that the situation of these 
nationalities would be better in a federal Austria than it would be if they broke away to form 
independent, isolated states vulnerable to the domination of an Eastern, reactionary power 
such as Russia.  And indeed, Hannak argued that the contemporary condition of 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland had proven them right.  In fact, one 
Socialist commentator argued that in advocating a federalized state in which numerous 
nations cooperated with one another in the spirit of democracy, the Austromarxists had 
847“Zum 12. November, Viktor Adler und die Republik,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), November 11, 
1945, 1-2; Jacques Hannak, “Drei Marksteine,” 293-296; “Der Vertrauensman,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung
(Vienna), September 26, 1945, 1-2.  These  points seem to have been directed as much in response to the 
KPÖ’s postwar criticisms that SPÖ was no longer truly Marxist as they were toward presenting a Socialist 
view of history.  On Adler and the foundation of the Social Democratic Party, see Kann, 427; Robin Okey, 
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provided the prototype for the sort of postwar internationalism which had been expressed in 
the United Nations.848
The Habsburg Monarchy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 266-267.
848Jacques Hannak, “Drei Marksteine,” 293-296; Cato, “Was für ein Österreich wollen wir?” 129-133; 
“Victor Adler und die Begründung der ersten Republik Österreich,” Die Zukunft (November, 1948): 317-
320; “Die große Gestalt von Österreichs Vegangenheit in die Zukunft,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), 
January 3, 1951, 1-2.  On the Austromarxism and the national question in Austria, see Kann, 346; 
Bottomore, 30-36, 102-125; Bauer, 509-521; Renner, Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um der 
Staat.
The Social Democrats’ nineteenth-century proposals concerning the nationalities 
issue actually provide some insight into their stance concerning the Habsburg state as a 
whole.  While Adler and the other early party leaders had been vehemently opposed to the 
Habsburg dynasty in principle, and railed against it as an oppressive force, in practice they 
were willing to work with the government of the Monarchy, and their national proposals 
always envisioned reforming the Habsburg Völkerstaat along federal and democratic lines 
rather than dissolving it completely.  Hence, the thinkers of the SPÖ in the era after 1945 too 
were reluctant to completely repudiate the achievements of the Habsburg Monarchy in the 
era after Social Democracy had become part of its political mainstream and indeed had 
worked to preserve its multinational form.
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In fact, some Socialist analysts even praised the Monarchy’s last decades as evidence 
of an increasing tendency in Austria toward democracy.  Hans Strenitz identified 1867 as the 
point at which Austria finally rid itself of the last vestiges of its semi-feudal character.  1848 
been an attempt to accomplish this task, but with the exception of the lifting of the feudal 
obligations of the peasantry, the work was not completed until nearly two decades later, 
when Franz Joseph was forced by Austria’s military defeat at the hands of Prussia to break 
with the anti- reform nobility and clergy and forge a new coalition with Austrian liberals.  An 
era of liberal rights, constitutional rule and economic development ensued which marked the 
real beginning of modernity in Austria, and these changes largely carried over into the 
constitution of the First Republic in 1920.  Strenitz of course argued that the early  workers’ 
movement, and in particular Hermann Hartung’s Allgemeiner Arbeiterbildungsverein, had 
played an important role in achieving these changes.849  On the other hand, however, such 
praise was far from unanimous from the Socialist camp, and a number of commentators 
dismissed parliamentary rule in imperial Austria as a democracy in name only that merely 
served to perpetuate the Habsburg oppression in a milder form.850
If the postwar Socialists were generally hostile toward the Habsburgs as a dynasty, 
some of them did manage to muster a certain degree of sympathy for Franz Joseph, the 
monarch who sat on the Austrian throne for the nearly seven decades between 1848 and 
World War I.  The Socialist historian Wilhelm Ellenbogen, in an article written in 1941 but 
reprinted by Die Zukunft in 1951 to commemorate his recent de ath, portrayed the monarch 
849Hans Strenitz, “80 Jahre österreichischer Verfassungsstaat,” Die Zukunft (December, 1949): 272-3; 
Renner, “Österreichische Demokratie,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 14, 1945, 1; Kurz, 332.
850 “Victor Adler und die Begründung der ersten Republik Österreich,” Die Zukunft (November, 1948): 
317-320; Tesarek, “Erziehung zur Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu 
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as a tireless and well-informed administrator who was dedicated to fairness and law, and 
who put aside his own personal piety and conservatism in order to do what was best for the 
state.  He oversaw many reforms which were favorable to the workers’ movement despite 
the Church’s opposition because he saw the movement as not detrimental to the unity of the 
state.  Ellenbogen contrasted Franz Joseph quite favorably with Wilhelm II of Germany, and 
argued that the Habsburg was far less reactionary than he was sometimes portrayed.851
Such generous views, however, were not widespread in the Socialist camp.  In an 
article that commented on reports that members of the Habsburg family had been seen in 
Austria in 1947, Die Arbeiter-Zeitung lamented the older generation’s view of the era of 
Franz Joseph as the “good, old times” when things were “so viel schön (so very beautiful),” 
and that some Austrians consequently thought that they might reclaim that splendor by 
returning a Habsburg to power in Austria. The author of the piece advised his readers not to 
forget that Franz Joseph’s reign began with the subjugation of the Revolution of 1848 and 
the especially brutal suppression of the revolution in Hungary.  Thus Franz Joseph’s first 
decades on the throne were “truly and bloodily reactionary.”  Only in his later years did he 
become the arch-conservative elder statesman who accepted change with weary  resignation.  
Under him, Austria saw some of the industrial development which swept through Western 
and Central Europe, but never to the same degree, so that even in the twentieth century 
Austria still retained aspects of feudalism.  The article’s author asserted that the workers 
movement advanced despite Franz Josef’s efforts, not because of them, and that the emperor 
einem politischen Problem,”17-19; “Schluß mit den Habsburgern!” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung, (Vienna), 
January 20, 1946, 1-2.
851Wilhelm Ellenbogen, “Wilhelm Ellenbogen über Kaiser Franz Josef,” Die Zukunft (March, 1951): 64-
67.
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himself, however reluctantly, had signed the declaration which led Austria into the war, a 
death sentence not just for his antiquated Monarchy but for millions of Europeans.852
Thus the end of the Monarchy in 1918 represented for the postwar Socialists the 
culmination of decades of progress toward democracy in Austria, just as they had for 
Socialists before 1945.  Regardless of whether or not Franz Josef had been an oppressive 
reactionary or merely an old-fashioned conservative who had reluctantly endorsed change, 
Social Democrats all agreed that the Monarchy which he had presided over in its last 
decades had been too loath to allow the democratic, social, and federal reforms which might 
have allowed the Völkerstaat to survive.  Karl I’s efforts to institute these reforms in 1918 
represented an acknowledgment of the dynasty’s mistakes, but came far too late to be of 
help.  Even as relatively generous an observer of the Monarchy’s twilight years as 
Ellenbogen allowed that although the Monarchy was not as backward as it was often 
portrayed, ultimately capitalism had been a centrifugal force there rather than the 
constructive one which it had been in the West due to shortsighted policies of the Austrian 
governments of the nineteenth century.  In the end, the Monarchy simply was not strong 
enough to withstand nationalism.853  In considering the history of the twentieth century, one 
socialist commentator summed up his party’s basic position concerning the Habsburgs by 
simply including them in a list of other oppressive imperial dynasties–the Manchus, 
Ottomans, Romanovs, and Hohenzollerns–which had been deposed and replaced with 
republics.854
852“Schluß mit den Habsburgern!,” 1.
853Ellenbogen, 64-67
854Karl Czernetz, “Bilanz eines halben Jahrhunderts,” Die Zukunft (January, 1950): 1-5.  See also “Schluß 
mit den Habsburgern!,” 1
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In contrast to the postwar Austrian right, which had provided a vigorous apologetic
for the Monarchy, lauding its emperors and their representatives as the exponents and 
defenders of a rich Austrian national tradition, the Socialists proffered a historical counter-
narrative which presented the democratic opponents of the dynasty, and especially the 
workers’ movement, as the true essence of Austrian history.  In the place of monarchs, 
nobles, and generals, the Social Democrats presented the leaders and theorists from their 
movement as the “heroes” of Austrian history.  Postwar Socialist newspapers and 
periodicals celebrated well known Socialist Democrats like Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer, Karl 
Renner, and Otto Glöckel alongside other, less familiar figures like Herbert Kohlich, 
Ferdinand Tschürtz, Anton Afritsch, Max Winter, Rudolf Brunngraber and Hans Kelson.855
The SPÖ even claimed democratic or revolutionary figures from outside Austria such as 
Goethe, Marx, Thomas Masaryk, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and, in a qualified 
manner at least, Lenin, as predecessors or comrades-in-arms in the wider struggle for 
freedom and social justice.856
The ultimate culmination of this Socialist narrative was the Austrian First Republic, 
855“Otto Bauer,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), September 23, 1945, 1-2;  “Zum 12. November, Viktor 
Adler und die Republik,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), November 11, 1945, 1-2; “Victor Adler und die 
Begründung der ersten Republik Österreich,” Die Zukunft (November, 1948): 317-320; Heinrich 
Schneidmadl, “Herbert Kohlich zum Gedanken,” Die Zukunft (November, 1949): 342-343; “Ferdinand 
Tschürtz: Gedenkworte zu seinem Todestag,”  Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), January 19, 1946, 3; 
Marriane Pollack, “Max Winter: der Sozialist des Herzens,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), January 9, 
1946, 2; Wilhelm Stemmer, “Otto Glöckel und das Schulprogramm der Sozialistischen Partei: Zur 
Widerkehr des Todestages Otto Glöckels (23. Juli 1935),” Die Zukunft (July, 1946): 3-4; Tesarek, 
“Sozialistische Erziehung– eine Funktion der Sozialistischen Partei,” Die Zukunft (February, 1948): 56-59. 
Karl Ziak, “Rudolf Brunngraber, der Dichter-Soziologe,” Die Zukunft (October, 1951): 287-288; Otto 
Tschadek, “Hans Kelson zum 70. Geburtstag,” Die Zukunft (October, 1951): 279-280.
856“Revolutionär Goethe/ 1749-1949,” Die Zukunft (April, 1949): 247-250; Anton Tesarek, “Thomas G. 
Masaryk (Zu seinem zehnten Todestag),” Die Zukunft (September, 1947): 257-260; “Der Mord an Karl 
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which the Social Democrats claimed as the legacy of their decades of struggle against the 
Habsburgs.  Whatever that Republic’s flaws might have been, the SPÖ argued that it had 
been superior to both the Monarchy which had preceded it and the corporatist and National 
Socialist regimes which followed it.  The Social Democrats regarded themselves not just as 
the creators of the First Republic, but as the only faction which had truly believed in and 
supported Austrian democracy. They charged the Christian Social Party and the Austrian 
bourgeoisie with sole responsibility for destroying the Republic and replacing it with a 
fascist dictatorship.  Furthermore the Austrian right’s destruction of republican rule in 
Austria had, according to the Socialists, suppressed the democratic forces in the country 
which might have represented the sole hope for Austria to defend itself against the Nazi 
threat of the 1930s.  For the Socialists, the Second Republic represented a second chance for 
Austrian democracy, and they considered the new republic to be built directly upon the 
historical foundations of the previous one.857
Thus the Social Democrats after 1945 presented a version of Austrian history which 
distanced Austria from the crimes of Nazi Germany by emphasizing the democratic content 
of Austria’s past.  For the Socialists, it was not enough to use Austrian history to argue that 
Austrians were not Germans, although as we have seen, the SPÖ did make such arguments, 
albeit with less frequency and less urgency than either the Austrian right or the Communists.  
Ultimately for the Socialists, the aspect of the Austrian past most crucial to reestablishing 
the state’s independence in the postwar era was not the fact of its distinctive Austrianness, 
but rather that it contained a narrative of democratic development which provided the 
857Anton Tesarek, “Umrisse einer republikanische Schule,” Die Zukunft (December, 1946): 20; “Victor 
Adler und die Begründung der ersten Republik Österreich,” Die Zukunft (November, 1948): 317-320; 
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antidote and the antithesis to the sort of fascist thinking which the Nazi dictatorship had
embodied.  In such a light, the Habsburg Monarchy emerged as a largely reactionary entity 
against which the forces of Austrian democracy, embodied by the workers’ movement, had 
to struggle.  The end point of that struggle for the Socialists was the First Republic, which 
may not have been able to preserve the beneficial supranational structure of the Habsburg 
Völkerstaat, but which was able to provide a firmer foundation for Austrian independence 
and a peaceful international order than the old Monarchy ever could.  The postwar Social 
Democrats made no mention of their own support for Anschluß during the First Republic, 
however.  That was simply a part of their own past which they could not use to help build an 
independent Austrian state after 1945.
iii. The Postwar Communist Party and the Habsburg Past 
The third of the major postwar parties, the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ), also 
participated in the Second Republic’s efforts to present a vision of the Habsburg past which 
denied Austrian Germanness.  Like the Social Democrats, the Communists drew a clear 
distinction between the forces of progress and freedom and those of reaction and oppression 
in Austrian history.  Yet the Communist Party’s strong and unequivocal proclamation of the 
existence of a distinctive Austrian nationhood resembled that of the Austrian right much 
more closely than it did the ambiguous national stance of the Socialists.  On a surface level 
at least, the Communists had much more of a claim to a history of simultaneous support for 
both social progress and Austrian nationhood during the 1930s and than did either of the 
other parties.  The Communists, however, were beholden to the influence of the Soviet 
Julius Deutsch, “Geschichtsfälschung am Werk,” Die Zukunft (April, 1848): 100-102.
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Union on all ideological matters, and their advocacy for freedom and independence rang 
hollow given the actions of their patrons in East Central Europe and the Soviet zone of 
occupation in eastern Austria after the war.  
In the Second Republic’s first national election after the war in late 1945, the 
Communists managed to win only five percent of the vote, far less than the other two anti-
Nazi parties.  This lack of electoral success indicates the anti-Soviet leanings of Austria’s 
voters and the mistrust with which they regarded the KPÖ’s association with the U.S.S.R., 
which was clearly more interested in appropriating Austria’s few remaining economic 
resources and exploiting it for leverage in the Cold War than it was in restoring genuine 
Austrian independence.  Indeed, in 1948, the leaders of the KPÖ secretly approached their 
patrons in Moscow to discuss the possibility of transforming the Soviet occupation zone into 
a Austrian “people’s republic,” separate from the western zones, along the lines of Soviet-
dominated East Germany.  In the end, however, the Soviet government was simply too 
occupied with consolidating its hold on the rest of East Central Europe to seriously 
contemplate the creation of a territorially small and economically unviable “East Austria,” 
and decided to simply continue the economic exploitation of its occupation zone.858  Such a 
division of Austria would certainly have flown in the face of the KPÖ’s strident professions 
of Austrian nationhood during the Nazi years, and after the Soviet refusal, the Party 
supplemented its continuing public support for Austrian independence with demands for the 
guaranteed Cold War neutrality of a unified Austria after the end of the occupation.859
858Wolfgang Mueller, “Die Teilung Österreichs als politische Option für KPÖ und UdSSR 1948,” 
Zeitgeschichte 32 (January/February, 2005), 47-54.
859 Ernst Fischer, “Deutsche division oder österreichische Unabhängigkeit? (1. Dezember, 1954)” Friedl 
Fürnberg, “Für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit Österriechs (17. Februar, 1955);” “Resolution des 
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Despite its willingness to secretly compromise Austrian unity and autonomy, however, the 
KPÖ’s public statements after World War II concerning Austria’s Habsburg past presented a 
vision of Austria’s nationhood which combined an emphasis on freedom and social progress 
with an unambiguous differentiation between the Austrian and German nations.
The Communists and the Austrian Nation
The Communists’ postwar comments concerning the existence of a distinctive 
Austrian nation represented a continuation of their pre-war position.  As they had during the 
1930s, the KPÖ’s representatives after 1945 stridently proclaimed that Austrians were not 
Germans, and could easily be distinguished from the German Volk through an examination 
of  their distinctive national characteristics which they had developed over the centuries of 
Austria’s unique history.  Communist commentators invariably characterized the Nazis as 
foreign occupiers who had imposed their dictatorship upon a largely unwilling Austrian 
population.  Ernst Fischer, the Communist historian and the Second Republic’s first Minister 
of Education, described the Nazis as “Prussian-German” tyrants who had oppressed the 
freedom-loving Austrian Volk.860  The Communist Party’s position on national issues during 
the 1930s had of course been guided both by Stalin’s own writings on nationalism and by 
the Soviet Union’s determination to cast European Communists as the defenders of national 
Volkeskongresses für Einheit und Unabhängigkeit Österreichs vom 13. März 1955,” in Die Kommunisten 
im Kampf für die Unabhängigkeit Österreichs (Vienna: Stern Verlag, 1955), 247-255.
860Ernst Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters (Vienna: “Neues Österreich” 
Zeitungs- und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1945): 3.  Fischer’s  references to Germans and Nazis as “Prussians” 
seem designed to play upon the fact that Prussia had been Austria’s major rival for power in Germany 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.   In essence, Fischer cast Prussia as the antithesis of 
everything Austrian, and used the contrast between “Prussian” Germans and Austrians in order to play 
upon the patriotic sentiments of his Austrian audience. Needless to say, the Nazi dictatorship was not a 
predominantly Prussian institution, and National Socialism had far deeper roots in Bavaria and Austria 
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rights in the face of reactionary fascism.  In a similar manner, Moscow now molded the 
KPÖ’s postwar stance to align with the Soviet Union’s new guise as the liberator of the 
nations of Eastern Europe from the yoke of Nazism.861
The postwar Communists were highly critical of the lack of Austrian consciousness 
which Austria’s other political parties had displayed throughout the nation’s history and 
argued that such weakness of national sentiment had allowed the Nazis an easy opening in 
their conquest of Austria.  According to Communist intellectuals, most Austrians had not 
supported the Nazis, but they had unfortunately lacked the sort of clear and unambiguous 
sense of Austrian national identity which might have allowed them to prevent the Anschluß.  
The actual experience of the oppressiveness of Nazi rule, however, had produced a more 
potent feeling of nationhood in the Austrian Volk.  The Communists were encouraged by 
this upsurge of Austrianist sentiment, but they were still concerned that it was neither 
sufficiently strong, nor supported with appropriately progressive reasoning on the part of 
many Austrians.  They also thought that they could detect the lingering remnants of 
großdeutsch sentiment beneath the veneer of the Austrian patriotism proclaimed by the 
conservatives and the SPÖ.862  Therefore, the Communist Party embarked upon a program to 
describe how Austrians should view their nation and its history in order to forestall any 
future German nationalist catastrophes.
than in Prussia.
861On the KPÖ during the 1930s see Chapter 3 and Heinz Gärtner, ed. Zwischen Moskau und Österreich: 
die KPÖ, Analyse einer sowjetabhängigen Partei (Vienna : Braumüller, 1979).  On the Soviet Union’s 
positions on these issues during the 1930s and 1940s see Mazower, 104-137, 250-284; François Furet, The 
Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999): 209-266; 361-395.
862Fischer, ”Der großdeutsche Gedanke und die Arbeiter Bewegung.,” Weg und Ziel, Monatsschrift für 
Fragen der Demokratie und des Wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus (March, 1946): 140; Otto Langbein, “Was 
ist überhaupt Österreich?” Weg und Ziel (August, 1946): 489-490; “Der Nationalismus in Österreich,” Weg 
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The first element in this program involved correcting the fallacious theories of 
national development which had allowed großdeutsch sentiment to fester for so long in 
Austria’s public sphere.  Like the conservatives, the Communists argued that part of the 
problem was that such theories had equated the concept of the nation with language and 
race.  In 1946, Franz Marek presented the postwar Communists’ view of what constituted a 
nation, which, like their statements during the 1930s, depended heavily upon Stalin’s 
theories of national development.  Marek echoed Stalin’s definition of the nation as a 
“historically developed stable community of language, territory and economic life which 
reveals its psychological uniqueness in a cultural community.”863  Language was a necessary 
component in this definition, but it was certainly not the most decisive element.  Marek 
argued that a people’s actual consciousness of their own nationhood and of their own 
historical development was the most important signifier of nationhood.  Marek was equally 
clear concerning what nations were not.  He regarded notions of an immutable racial or 
biological basis for nationhood as a dangerous falsehood.  Nations were always the product 
of continuous historical development.  One could not “follow” the history of nation; rather 
the nation was its history, and changed over time.  A nation also did not correspond to the  
political state, as so many Western theorists had argued.  Thus Marek proclaimed that the 
correct understanding of the concept of nationhood defined the nation as a complex cluster 
of historically contingent elements which found expression in the national consciousness of 
a Volk.  The Austrian Volk had all of the necessary components of nationhood except for a 
strong national awareness, and it was this lack of awareness that had left it vulnerable to the 
und Ziel (January, 1949): 14-23.
863Franz Marek, “Was ist eine Nation?” Weg und Ziel (February, 1946): 118; Josef Stalin, Marxismus und 
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sort of simplistic großdeutsch racial and linguistic nationalism espoused by the Nazis.864
Ernst Fischer also carefully denied the existence of nationality as a racial category in 
the Nazi sense.  Instead, he based his assertion of Austrian nationhood upon the only feature 
which he considered real and meaningful in defining national character: the possession of a 
unique history.  Fischer repudiated any definitions of national identity couched in terms of 
ideal types, or the “soul” of a people (Volkseele) or race (Rassenseele).  According to 
Fischer, national character did not represent one distinct set of features, but rather 
encompassed a broad body of characteristics which were in a continual state of evolution as 
they were influenced by historical events.  So ultimately, historical factors were the most 
important markers of national identity.865
The Communists also sought to define the characteristics of the Austrian national 
character.  Like the Austrian right, postwar Communists frequently presented these 
characteristics as a positive contrast with national characteristics which they associated with 
the German or “Prussian” nation.  First of all, many postwar Communists presented the 
Austrian nation as the result of a felicitous mixture of numerous cultural and ethnic groups 
in the Danubian region dating back to antiquity.  They emphasized the contributions of the 
Illyrians, Celts, Slavs, Franks, and Bavarians in the early centuries of Austria’s history, who 
combined to help shape the national characteristics of contemporary Austrians.  The 
presentation of modern Austrians as the product of millennia of ethnic and cultural 
intermixing also simultaneously repudiated the familiar großdeutsch argument that 
Austrians were descended solely from tenth-century Germanic settlers and thus represented 
nationale Frage (Vienna: Stern-Verlag, 1949), 10-11.
864Ibid., 115-118.
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a tribe of the German Volk.866
The national character which had resulted from this cultural admixture and from 
Austria’s centuries of history contained positive and negative features.  Fischer described the 
Austrian character as one tending toward tolerance, understanding, open-mindedness, 
informality, love of personal freedom, and the enjoyment all of life’s pleasures, a set of 
qualities which he termed “Natürlichkeit” (naturalness).  These characteristics were 
accompanied by an abhorrence of rigidity and constraint, drill and military precision, and 
authoritarianism.  On the opposite side of these positive characteristics, however, lay some 
less fortunate tendencies: a certain passivity and lack of decisiveness, an inclination toward 
improvisation and opportunism rather than careful planing, and a willingness to postpone 
difficult solutions to complicated problems.  Also, hand in hand with the basic Austrian 
distaste for nationalist chauvinism went a certain lack of clearly defined national
consciousness which Fischer described as “national nihilism.”  Thus for Fischer, the content 
of the Austria’s national character explained both the Austrian Volk’s conspicuous lack of 
Austrianist nationalism as well as its ultimate incompatibility with the subservience and 
militarism inherent in the Prussian national character.867
If the German-speaking inhabitants of the modern Austrian republic had forged a 
real national character thanks to centuries of cultural and social development under the 
auspices of the Habsburg Monarchy, the German-speakers throughout the rest of the 
Monarchy had not shared in that development, at least according to the Communist 
theoretician Otto Langbein.  Langbein argued that Monarchy’s other German-speakers in 
865Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 4-5.
866Ibid., 4- 5; “Sind die Österreicher ein ‘deutscher Stamm?’”  Weg und Ziel  (July/August, 1948): 551-552.
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Bohemia,. Moravia, the Banat, and Transylvania historically had distanced themselves from 
the Austrian national community centered around Vienna, and had instead oriented 
themselves toward Berlin.  These groups had ultimately been the dupes of großdeutsch
German nationalism in the nineteenth century which Prussia used in order to transform 
German-speakers living in various states throughout Europe into a fifth column for German 
imperialism.  As such, they had not shared in Austria’s national heritage of toleration and 
understanding for other Völker, but rather displayed the chauvinism and hostility toward 
other peoples so characteristic of Prussian Germany.  These German-speakers had lacked 
not just loyalty to the Habsburg state, but also to the various states which had succeeded the 
Monarchy, and had ultimately become notorious supporters of the Nazi Germany.  While 
these groups had called themselves “Volksdeutsch” before World War II, after the war they 
had styled themselves “Volksösterreicher” and had come to Austria for assistance after their 
expulsion from the states in which they had lived.  Langbein, however, had no sympathy for 
such “scum,” and stated in no uncertain terms that they were not part of the Austrian Volk, 
and, as an examination of the history of the Monarchy clearly showed, never had been.868
While the postwar Communists fervently asserted that Austrian Volk had developed 
a distinctive national identity and character over the centuries of its history as a part of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, they also felt proclamations of Austria’s nationhood had to be made 
867Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 5-9.
868Otto Langbein, “Die ‘Volksösterreicher,’” Weg und Ziel ( March, 1947): 181-190; “Was ist überhaupt 
Österreich?” 489.  Langbein’s notable lack of sympathy for these German refugees also may have had 
something to do with the fact that they had all been expelled from the states in East Central Europe that the 
Soviet Union had “liberated.”  Indeed, the Soviets themselves had been heavily involved in these 
expulsions.  See Mazower, 214-225.  Langbein also did not mention the Austrians in Upper Austria, Styria 
and Carinthia who had also been enthusiastic supporters of both German nationalism and Nazism.  See 
Timothy Kirk, “Fascism and Austrofascism,” in The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment
(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 15.
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very precisely.  For example, while Langbein welcomed the ÖVP’s publication of articles by 
Missong and others which totally repudiated any lingering großdeutsch sentiments in 
Austria as a threat to the very existence of the nation’s independence, he noted that even in 
1946 the Austrian consciousness of the ÖVP was deficient.  He argued that thinkers from 
both of Austria’s major parties too often relied on vague notions of an Austrian historical 
mission in Europe which were insufficient as a foundation for a firm Austrian national 
identity, and which reminded Austria’s neighbors of their past oppression under the 
Habsburgs and the Nazis, who had both espoused a similar sort of hegemonic mission.  In 
the end,  ill-defined notions of an Austrian mission or “Österreichertum” could never be 
enough to support the Second Republic’s existence.  The mere fact that so many Austrian 
conservatives and Socialists had to pose the question “what is Austria?” was evidence for 
Langbein that they lacked an appropriately clear and strong sense of Austrian consciousness.  
Austria’s nationhood was a plain, unquestionable fact which required no lengthy 
justifications.  He noted:
Why Austria?  What is Austria?  Who is the Austrian?  We have seen: 
only a clear, unqualified realization of existence can give an answer to these 
questions.  The correct answers will make the questions themselves 
superfluous, because they will give our Volk what it has so often lacked: a 
clear and peaceful national consciousness. 869
Langbein certainly felt that Austria’s history and national development were vital topics for 
discussion, but he denied that there was anything mysterious or elusive about those matters.  
They were simply concrete realities.
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Indeed, by 1949 Langbein denounced the notion of an Austrian mission not just as an 
insufficient foundation for a postwar Austrian national identity, but also as an inherently 
dangerous idea.  In the context of the heightened Cold War tensions of that year, Langbein 
asserted that the idea of an Austrian mission represented an anti-Slavic form of Austrian 
nationalism which served the interests of “American imperialism” in Europe.  Langbein thus 
repudiated not just German nationalism, but also Austrian nationalism as  grave dangers for 
the postwar era.  Indeed according to Langbein the notion of an Austrian mission was the 
other side of the German nationalist coin, and implicitly called for a renewal of the Austrian 
hegemony over the Slavic peoples of the East which had characterized the oppressive 
policies of the Habsburg Monarchy.  Such hegemony had been the goal of großdeutsch Nazi 
ideology as well, and the fact that the Austrian right had called for the rebirth of the Austrian 
mission under the auspices of America rather than in the context of Habsburg or German 
imperialism did not change the reactionary nature of the idea.  For Langbein, true support of 
Austrian independence meant fighting the “bourgeois poison” of Austrian nationalism which 
was being used by the Americans against the champion of freedom and progress in the 
world, the Soviet Union.870
The Communist historian and journalist Eva Priester also criticized the manner in 
which the other parties supported the notion of Austrian identity, and took particular 
exception to the content of the various celebrations of the 950th anniversary of Austria in 
1946.  She acknowledged that any event which portrayed Austria as an independent 
historical entity separate from Germany amounted to a positive step, but she argued that the 
869Otto Langbein, “Was ist überhaupt Österreich?” 490.
870Langbein, “Der Nationalismus in Österreich,” 14-23.
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commemorations focused too narrowly on Austrian culture and contributions to the arts.  
Without providing a critical view of Austria’s history and especially of the großdeutsch
sentiments which had almost destroyed it, and without a firm and clearly stated declaration 
of Austria’s nationhood, such commemorations amounted to no more than pleasant pastoral 
landscapes and celebrations of historical monuments which accomplished little.  Priester 
sarcastically characterized the attitudes displayed by the other parties toward Austria as:
An idyll with painterly national traditions and stilted buttons of horn 
with the inscription, “greetings from Styria,” with baroque art, baroque 
culture, and “baroque men” (however one might understand that), a little of 
the beautiful mountain landscape, a little of the Salzburg Cathedral and a few 
Salzburg dumplings, a little advertising for foreign trade, a little classical 
music–and the whole thing topped with a light sauce of self satisfaction: 
“See?  This is how we are.  Are we not a Volk with a great culture?  Are we 
not by the mere fact of our existence a valuable commodity for Western 
culture, worthy to be preserved and maintained by the entire world?”871
After all, such a celebration of Austria’s traditional culture could easily have occurred in 
1936 rather than 1946.  What such a portrayal truly lacked was an emphasis upon, or indeed, 
any mention of, the struggles which Austria had undergone in order to reclaim its very 
existence from the foreign Nazi dictatorship:
Of course, this is to say nothing against the baroque, Salzburg, 
Bruckner’s music or landscape paintings.  All of these things are part of our 
cultural heritage, and it is necessary to speak of them.  They are not enough, 
however.  The new, patriotic Austria did not originate in a museum or a 
traditional festival.  It originated–excuse the hard expression which is so 
rarely heard by the cultivated “Austrian men” of Vienna with their gentle 
sensibilities–in struggle.  It originated in the struggle of a few small and, for a 
long time, nearly isolated groups of Austrian patriots, was born in their 
struggle against German domination, grew into the struggle for the rebuilding 
of a free, happy, and peaceful land, and will be an unconquerable reality 
when a free and strong people’s democracy is also a reality.872
871Eva Priester, “Nationale Kundgebung oder Trachtenfest?” Weg und Ziel (September, 1946): 558.
872Ibid., 558.
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For Priester, the 1946 celebrations represented the sort of compromise so typical of Austria 
after the war.  The political leaders of the two dominant parties wanted a statement that 
Austria really was a nation independent from Germany, but neither faction was willing to 
risk alienating the other.  The resulting bloodless neutrality was insufficient to provide the 
sort of fiery confession of Austrian statehood which was necessary in the postwar era.  
Priester avowed that it was ultimately up to the Austrian Volk to fill the 950th anniversary 
celebrations with the sort of passionate national and progressive consciousness that the ÖVP 
and SPÖ were unwilling to provide.
The Communist Representation of Austrian History
As we have seen, the Communists based their notions of a distinctive Austrian nation 
largely upon Austrian history, and argued that a correct presentation of Austria’s past was 
crucial to bolster a postwar sense of Austrian identity which distinguished it from Germany. 
As Langbein wrote, “acknowledgment of Austria’s unique history is a weapon in the 
struggle for an Austria ruled by the working Volk which is not to be underestimated.”873  In 
many respects, the Communist vision of Austria’s Habsburg past was quite similar to that of 
the Social Democrats.  As a revolutionary working class movement, the KPÖ saw both the 
dynasty and the Austrian bourgeoisie largely as oppressive forces in Austria’s history which 
had done their best to stifle the efforts of the Monarchy’s working classes and nationalities 
to move toward freedom and justice.  The Communists, in competition with the Socialist 
873Langbein, “Ein großer Fortschritt der östereichischen Geschichtsschreibung,” Weg und Ziel (June, 
1949): 467.
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Party for the votes of the workers and progressive minded individuals in postwar Austria, 
portrayed the Social Democrats as a group which had ultimately betrayed the forces of 
freedom and equality during the nineteenth century in favor of an opportunistic 
accommodation with the dynasty and the bourgeoisie.  The Communists disagreed with the 
Austromarxists concerning German nationalism as well, which the KPÖ identified as the 
most poisonous reactionary force in Austria’s history.  Thus the Communists’ portrayal of 
the Habsburg past presented their predecessors in the radical left of the workers’ movement 
as the true heroes of Austrian history who struggled against the reactionary dynasty, the 
oppressive Bürger class, and a Social Democratic Party which had been corrupted by 
German nationalism.  According to the Communists, the end of the Monarchy in 1918 had 
not represented the successful liberation of the working class, but merely the exchange of 
one form of subjugation for another in the form of the “bourgeois” First Republic.  The true 
goal of Austrian history was not bourgeois democracy, but rather a “people’s democracy” of 
the sort which existed in the Soviet Union and, after 1948, in Eastern Europe.
Like the Austrian right, the Communists argued that the reality of Austrian history 
could not be understood until the lies which had been perpetuated by großdeutsch historians 
concerning Austria had been thoroughly rebutted.  Fischer accused the “großdeutschen 
falsifiers of history” of systematically distorting Austria’s past in order to pretend that 
Austria had historically been part of the German nation.874  Langbein echoed Fischer’s 
criticisms, charging that the Austrian right had participated in similar distortions.  According 
to Langbein, the right’s duplicitous professions of patriotism amounted to a “fossilized, anti-
Austrian, anti-democratic concealment of großdeutsch myths with a black and yellow 
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covering which was foreign to the Volk.”875  Selma Steinmetz argued that for too long the 
forces of reaction had presented the dynasty and its representatives as the protagonists of 
Austrian history while ignoring the important contributions of the leaders of the workers’ 
movement to progress and freedom in Austria.  Thus it was left to the Communist Party to 
correct the myriad fabrications and distortions concerning Austrian history, whatever their 
source, and to present the “real” view of Austria’s Habsburg past.876
Above all, it was Ernst Fischer who took it upon himself to present this Communist 
version of Austrian history.  While other Communist thinkers wrote about Austria’s 
Habsburg past, Fischer was the one who provided the most systematic discussion of how to 
view that past correctly.  In his books Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters
and Nationale Probleme des Jahres 1848 in Oesterreich, as well as in numerous articles in 
the Communist monthly Weg und Ziel, Fischer provided the most extensive statements of 
the Communist vision of the Habsburg past.877
Fischer maintained an essentially negative view of the Habsburg dynasty, as did 
other Communist commentators on Austrian history.  He portrayed them as originally a 
foreign group which had, along with the Magyars whose crown they later inherited, 
established control over a territory that was predominantly Slavic. Fischer characterized 
such early modern Habsburg emperors as Leopold I and Karl VI as reactionaries who 
874Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 3.
875Langbein, “Ein großer Fortschritt der östereichischen Geschichtsschreibung,” 468
876Selma Steinmetz, “1848-1948.  Hans Kudlich, ein Freiheitskämpfer von 1848,” Weg und Ziel (April, 
1948): 310-312.
877Fischer had been a Social Democrat during the First Republic before being attracted by the 
Communists’ more activist stance against fascism during the 1930s.  After the “Prague Spring” of 1968 he 
became disenchanted with the totalitarian character of Communism, and left the KPÖ as well.  See Ernst 
Fischer, Das Ende einer Illusion, (Vienna: Molden, 1973).
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presided over a state which was “ponderous, backward, and medieval.”878  The Habsburg 
Monarchy initially fulfilled a double role, acting as the focal point of the unstable Holy 
Roman Empire of the German nation, while at the same time striving to unite a disparate 
group of nationalities in Central Europe into a unified body for use as a defense against the 
encroaching Ottoman Turks.  According to Fischer, the Monarchy’s German function ended 
during the Thirty Years War because of the Habsburgs’ inability to force the zealously 
independent German principalities to become part of the stable, centralized Central 
European empire which they sought to build.879
The Habsburgs’ other unifying efforts were more successful, however, and they 
helped forge a state which contained numerous nations which were distinct from one 
another, yet which still maintained a sense of common community.  Fischer was careful not 
to give the Habsburgs themselves too much credit for the actual creation of the bonds which 
ultimately bound the various nations of the Monarchy to each other.  While the Habsburgs 
consciously encouraged unity among the nations until well into the eighteenth century, it 
was really the Turkish threat which forged the enduring feeling of mutual ties between the 
nationalities.  Indeed, Fischer argued that there were times when the dynasty was passive in 
the face of the Turkish predation, while the Völker themselves spontaneously banded 
together for mutual defense.  The sense of unity among the Monarchy’s nationalities also 
878Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 17.
879It is worth noting while Fischer denied that Austrians were Germans, he posited a point where Austrian 
history “separated” from German history.  This apparent contradiction is also present in works by Priester 
and Alfred Klahr, who identified the point of separation as 1866 and 1848, respectively, despite both also 
denying that Austrians had ever been Germans in the first place. Fischer, Die Entstehung des 
österreichischen Volkscharakters, 15-16; ”Der großdeutsche Gedanke und die Arbeiter Bewegung,” Weg 
und Ziel (March, 1946): 130; Priester, “1866 und die Folgen.  80 Jahre Könniggrätz,” Weg und Ziel (June, 
1848): 337-339; Alfred Klahr, “Der März 1848 und die nationale Freiheit,”  Weg und Ziel (March, 1946): 
158-160 (Reprint of a 1938 article). 
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inspired a number of peasant uprisings against the Habsburgs during the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and nineteenth centuries, and ultimately persisted until the Monarchy’s demise 
in 1918.880
However reactionary and feudal the Habsburg dynasty may have been in Fischer’s 
eyes, it was not without its redeeming qualities.  Whatever their individual and collective 
failings, the Habsburg monarchs were still Austrians, and frequently displayed the tolerant 
and cosmopolitan national character which the Austrian people possessed.  Fischer 
contrasted the relatively mild dynastic rule of the Habsburg House with the thoroughly 
thuggish brutality of the Prussian Hohenzollerns.  In Die Entstehung des österreichischen 
Volkscharakters he used Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great to personify the differences 
between tolerant Austria and militaristic Prussia.  Fischer presented Maria Theresa as 
motherly, understanding, prudent, and  “folkloric” in contrast to Frederick’s cynicism, 
amorality, and contemptuousness.  Despite the comments of certain großdeutsch historians 
to contrary, Fischer asserted that the Austria of Maria Theresa and Joseph II was actually far 
more progressive than Frederick’s Prussia, and that their Austrian state did far more for such 
traditionally oppressed groups as peasants or weavers than did Prussia.  This progress may 
have been replaced by reaction under Metterrnich, but the progressive stamp which Maria 
Theresa and Joseph II’s reforms left upon the state never entirely disappeared.881
Other Communist commentators, however,  portrayed the dynasty as a throughly 
oppressive force which was generally no less of an impediment to freedom for social classes 
and nationalities than the Hohenzollerns.  In a 1949 article concerning the possibility of an 
880Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 10-12; ”Der großdeutsche Gedanke und 
die Arbeiter Bewegung,” Weg und Ziel ( March, 1946): 130.
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American-sponsored Habsburg restoration somewhere in Central Europe, for example, 
Franz West argued that Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last emperor, was no less 
reactionary than his forebears who had pursued the same sort of anti-Slavic imperialism and 
anti-progressive agenda as the Nazis.  He wrote,  “Hitler and Habsburg in reality represented 
the same program: animosity toward the Soviet Union, animosity toward the Völker, 
animosity toward anything progressive”882
The Communists agreed with the Social Democrats that the Revolution of 1848 
represented an especially important turning point in Austrian history.  It was the pivot point 
in time when the working class first began to realize its power to transform Austrian society, 
even as the Austrian bourgeoisie waged its own struggle to wrest political control from the 
dynasty and the nobility in order to protect its economic interests.  The Communists 
portrayed the dynasty and its representatives as the chief antagonists of the forces of 
progress in the revolution, and they painted the era of ascendent conservatism and stringent 
social control under Metternich which proceeded the Revolution as especially oppressive.  
Indeed, if Fischer had characterized the reigns of some previous Habsburg monarchs as 
reactionary and feudalistic, then he portrayed the era of Metternich, Franz I, and Ferdinand 
as one of absolute ossification.  The Metternich regime had done its best to prevent all the 
social tensions that were simmering below the surface of Europe’s conservative order from 
changing Austria in any way, postponing decisions concerning important issues indefinitely 
in favor of stasis.  Metternich succeeded in preserving the status quo for a generation, but 
when the Revolution finally came, it expressed the repressed social outrage which Austria’s 
881Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 24-27.
882Franz West, “Habsburg– Eine Karte im Spiel der amerikanischen Imperialisten,” Weg und Ziel
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mannered Biedermeier culture had concealed.883
Communist commentators agreed it was the Austrian Bürger class which at first 
drove the Revolution.  Yet as the uprising continued, the workers came to the aid of the 
bourgeoisie’s struggle to attain a broad program of constitutional and liberal rights.  
According to Eva Preister, however, the further the Revolution progressed, both in Vienna 
and elsewhere, the more hesitant the Bürgertum grew and the more dedicated the working 
class became.  Finally the workers began to push the revolution further than the Bürger had 
intended, adding their own demands for social reform to the bourgeoisie’s insistence on 
political change.  At this point the Bürgertum felt threatened by the burgeoning workers’ 
movement, and subsequently sought an accommodation with the crown, allowing it to 
suppress the Revolution with brutal force.884
The Communists argued that the Bürgertum ’s flight into the camp of reaction in 
1848 also related to the national issues at stake during the Revolution.  Indeed the postwar 
Communists emphasized the national aspect of the revolutionary events to a much greater 
degree than the Socialists.  Priester noted that the Monarchy’s German-speaking bourgeoisie 
had been more frightened by the activities of workers in Bohemia than they had been even 
by the Viennese working class.  The Czech workers in the Monarchy’s most industrially 
advanced centers in Bohemia and Moravia had developed a platform of socially oriented 
demands far earlier than the Viennese proletariat, and had also coupled claims to national 
equality with those demands  Thus the bourgeoisie feared losing its hegemony over the 
(February, 1949): 143.
883Fischer, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, 20-21; Priester, “1848-1948.  1848 und 
die Arbeiter,” Weg und Ziel (February, 1948): 127-131.
884Priester, “1848-1948.  1848 und die Arbeiter,” 127-131.
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Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia as much as it dreaded losing its economic dominance 
throughout the Monarchy.885
Fischer agreed with this argument, asserting that Austria’s German-speaking 
Bürgertum feared that the Slavs would assert their sheer strength of numbers and destroy the 
status of German-speakers as the dominant faction in Austria.  These fears led the German-
speaking Bürger to oppose Czech demands for democracy and national equality in Bohemia.  
Instead of banding with the Czechs and presenting a united, democratic front against the 
reactionary Habsburg government, German-speaking Austrians in both Bohemia and Vienna 
aligned themselves with the Bohemian nobility (who, no matter what their linguistic 
proclivities, opposed reform) against Czech progressives who they feared represented a 
“new Hussitism.” Fischer noted that while the Austrian Bürgertum talked about securing the 
rights of other nationalities, they never really followed through on such ideals, and indeed 
ended up actively opposing such rights.886
Fischer and Priester both argued that it was anti-Slavic German nationalism which 
caused the revolution to fail.  Fischer asserted that for a brief time during Metternich’s era 
großdeutsch thinking had actually been a progressive force which had inspired German-
speakers throughout Europe to dream of a German union in a democratic state.  Yet 
ultimately German-speakers both in Austria and in Prussia demonstrated in 1848 that they 
cared more about maintaining their own privileged positions in their respective societies 
than they did about the dream of democracy.  The March 1946 edition of Weg und Ziel
reprinted a 1938 article by Alfred Klahr which had made the same point, arguing that 1848 
885Priester, “1848-1948. 1848 und die nationale Frage,” Weg und Ziel (March, 1948): 182-186.
886Fischer, Nationale Probleme des Jahres 1848 in Oesterreich (London: Free Austrian Books, 1947), 3-6.
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had represented the last point at which a union of Austrians with other German-speakers had 
been possible.  The selfishness and chauvinism of the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the 
Bürger classes of both their states had ultimately scuttled that dream in favor of a 
reactionary nationalism which maintained their dominance.  Thus 1848 for the Austrian 
Communists not only marked the moment when the working class awoke, but also the time 
when großdeutsch ideology was transformed into a reactionary force which the dynasty used 
to play the individual nationalities off one another.887
In the aftermath of the unsuccessful conclusion of the revolution, the dynasty 
attempted to reimpose absolutist rule.  Neither the bourgeoisie nor the nationalities had 
achieved their aims in 1848, however, and the tensions from that year had merely been 
postponed.  According to the postwar Communists, großdeutsch ideology had now emerged 
as the most serious reactionary poison in the Monarchy’s political culture, and it would 
fester in Austria even after 1918.  Now instead of representing any genuine desire for union 
with Germany, großdeutsch sentiment actually represented the anti-Slavic prejudices and 
desire to maintain national predominance of the Monarchy’s German-speaking Bürger
class.888
For the Communists, 1866 represented a further turning point in the relationship 
between class power and national ideology in Austria.  Priester asserted that it was in the 
aftermath the Habsburg military defeat by Prussia in that year that many Austrians, whether 
887Ibid., 18; Fischer, ”Der großdeutsche Gedanke und die Arbeiter Bewegung,”132; Klahr,“Der März 1848 
und die nationale Freiheit,” 158-160.
888Fischer, ”Der großdeutsche Gedanke und die Arbeiter Bewegung,”132; Fischer did not mention the 
nascent Czech middle class in his discussion of the Revolution of 1848.  For an overview of the 
relationship of German nationalism to the Revolution, see Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries: 
Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848_1914 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1997). 
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Bürger or workers, began to think of themselves as “not German.”  Despite having all of the 
characteristics which defined a nation, most Austrians at this point still lacked a true 
Austrian consciousness, but as a result of Prussia’s aggression they at least had developed a 
firm sense that they did not belong with Germany.  For the dynasty, 1866 marked the end of 
any pretense of Austrian domination of a group of south German “satellite states,”  For more 
than three hundred years, Austria had struggled first with France, and then with Prussia for 
influence in the southern Germany.  By 1866, Austria had lost not only the struggle for 
German influence with Prussia, but also its contest with France over influence in Italy.  
According to Priester, Austria had not “been expelled” from a nation to which it had 
previously belonged in 1866, as German nationalist historians had argued, but rather had lost 
a great deal of its international influence. This blow to Austrian prestige, coupled with 
unfulfilled national demands of the Magyars and the class aspirations of the Austrian 
bourgeoisie, prompted a half hearted attempt by the Monarchy to shore up its weakness by 
compromising with those groups.  The Ausgleich of 1866 gave the Hungarian nobles the 
freedom to oppress the nationalities in their half of the Monarchy.  Likewise, the sharing of 
political power between the crown and the bourgeoisie in the Austrian half of the Monarchy 
resulted in some reform, but, thanks to the Bürgertum’s fears of losing its privileged position 
within the state, not enough to help the stagnating, semi-feudal economy to industrialize 
fully.  Without real solutions to any of the lingering problems after 1848, Austria was weak 
and doomed to be Germany’s junior partner, against its own better interests.889
It was in this era of weakness and compromise that the Austrian workers’ movement 
first organized.  While the Communists fiercely criticized the Social Democrats, they 
889 Preister,“1866 und die Folgen. 80 Jahre Könniggrätz,” 337-339.
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allowed that in the beginning at least, the Social Democratic Party had truly represented the 
interests of the Austrian working class.  In 1948, the KPÖ commemorated the sixtieth 
anniversary of the Socialist Party Congress held in Hainfeld in Lower Austria, in which the 
previously fractious movement united under the leadership of Viktor Adler.  Franz Strobl 
described the Hainfeld Platform as a document which committed the movement for the first 
time to the revolutionary, scientific socialism which Marx had prescribed.  Strobl praised 
Adler for his leadership, but lamented the vagueness of some of the program’s provisions, 
which had allowed the movement to drift into reformism and to split along national lines.  
Strobl argued that it was the Communist Party, not the ideologically compromised SPÖ, 
which represented the real successor to the pure Marxist principles set forth at Hainfeld.890
According to the Communist view, after the promising start at Hainfeld, 
Austromarxism, like all varieties of social democracy, had found its ideological potency 
diluted by its opportunistic compromises with bürgerlich democracy and capitalism.   Franz 
Marek argued that the Socialist Party’s downward spiral began in earnest with the Brünn 
Program of 1899 and the Vienna Program of 1901.  While the Vienna Program represented 
the basic abandonment of revolutionary Marxism by the Social Democrats in favor of 
reformism, the Brünn Program saw the Austromarxists mirroring the nationalistic 
hypocrisies of the Austrian Bürgertum.  That class habitually presented itself as Austrian 
when in economic competition with German industry, but styled itself as German when it 
came to preserving its national privileges within the Monarchy.  By 1899 Austrian Social 
Democrats had come to reflect the stance of their class enemies.  The Socialist Party had 
claimed to represent the entire working class of Austria, but in reality the German-speaking 
890Franz Strobl, “60 Jahre Hainfeld,” Weg und Ziel (December, 1948): 867-872.
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workers enjoyed  higher status and more prosperity than the Monarchy’s other national 
proletariats.  The Brünn program sought to maintain this privileged position by committing 
the party to equal rights, but only within the structure of the Monarchy.  The workers of 
other nationalities were not allowed to advocate leaving the Habsburg state.  Thus, Marek 
argued that in the name of internationalism, Austrian Social Democrats had covertly 
replicated the anti-Slavic, pro-Habsburg patriotism of the Monarchy at its worst.  “The 
Austromarxists based themselves on the soil of the Habsburg Völkerkerker,” he declared.891
For the Communists, the strikes which convulsed Vienna in January of 1918 
represented the Social Democrats’ worst abnegation of their responsibilities to the working 
class.  The strikes had come in on the heels of  the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 
in Russia, partly in response to the Soviets’ call for peace.  The postwar Austrian 
Communists naturally saw the Soviet seizure of power as an example of exactly the sort of 
socialist revolution that Marx had called for and portrayed the Viennese strikes as the 
beginning of the a spontaneous effort by the Austrian working class to follow the Soviet 
example and seize power from the Habsburg regime.  According to the Communists it was 
ultimately the Austromarxist leadership that prevented a Communist revolution in Austria.  
L. Hornik argued that when Karl Renner and Viktor Adler coopted the leadership of the 
newly formed workers’ councils that had driven the events of January and brought the 
strikes to an end, they had betrayed the Austrian working class.  Instead of general peace, 
the Social Democrats, like the Habsburg government, supported only a peace with Russia 
while calling for continued fighting elsewhere.  Thus the forces of Austromarxism sold out 
891Franz Marek, “Zur Ideologie des Austromarxismus,” Weg und Ziel (December, 1946): 680.  On the 
SDAP’s Brünn Program of 1899, see Kann, 436; Okey, 308.
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their cause to act as mouthpieces for the dynasty.  In the aftermath of this betrayal, the 
radical left wing of the party split off from the rest of the Socialist Party, founding the 
Austrian Communist Party later that year.  Thus for the postwar KPÖ, 1918 represented the 
year when the leadership role of the truly progressive forces in Austrian history passed from 
the Social Democrats to the Communists.  As the Monarchy crumbled and the era of 
Bolshevism dawned in Europe, the Socialists had decisively lost their claim to represent 
freedom and social progress in Austria.892
While the First Republic which had replaced the Habsburg Monarchy represented the 
triumphant culmination of decades of work in the service of democracy for the SPÖ, for the 
Communists it merely represented the exchange of one form of oppression for another.
Again, the Social Democrats had failed to fulfill their duty to act in the interests of the 
working class.  In a bitter polemic on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
founding of the First Republic, the Communist journalist Leopold Spira argued that the 
Socialist Party had failed in every way possible to live up to its obligations as a Marxist 
organization, casting its lot with the Bürger class, and letting the bourgeoisie and the 
imperialist Entente powers dictate the form of the new state.  Spira even charged that the 
Austrian Socialists pursued a großdeutsch, imperialist campaign to undermine the progress 
of freedom in Czechoslovakia and Soviet Hungary, aiding reactionary forces with arms and 
892L. Hornik, “Der Jännerstreik 1918,” Weg und Ziel (January, 1947): 49-51. On the strikes and their 
effects, see Okey, 388-389; Richard Georg Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, and Arnold Suppan, eds., Innere 
Front.  Militärassistenz, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918, vol. 2, Umsturz (Vienna: 
Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1974), 316-328; Hans Leo Mikoletzky, Österreichische Zeitgeschichte 
vom Ende Donaumonarchie bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1966), 30-44; 
Hans Hautmann, Die verlorene Rätererupublik: Am Bespiel der Kommunistischen Partei 
Deutschösterreichs (Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1985); Adam Wandruszka and Peter 
Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, vol.6 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 359-360.
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support while leaving the bourgeois domination of finance, administration, and security in 
their own state absolutely untouched.  He even asserted that the Social Democrats would 
have preserved the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 if it had at all been within their power.  For 
Spira, the shameful actions of the Socialists during the founding of the First Republic served 
as ample justification for the necessity of the Austrian Communist Party.893
Marek echoed these sentiments, asserting that after the end of the Monarchy, the 
Austromarxists replaced their habitual support of the Habsburg state with a pro-Anschluß
stance, and spurned the friendship of the Soviet Union, abandoning any last vestiges of true 
Marxism,.  Austromarxism’s impotence was amply demonstrated by the Social Democrats’ 
dismal failure to defend the interests of the working class in 1918, 1934, and 1938.  Fischer 
summed up the Communists’ position on the First Republic by arguing that it had not 
represented any sort of real democracy, but had rather been an instrument of bourgeois 
domination which had gone virtually unchallenged by the Social Democrats.  In 1946, he 
declared that the Second Republic should not be built upon the flawed foundation of the 
First.  He avowed that the Communists wanted to move toward a new, real democracy, and 
urged the rest of the country not to be content with a false, bourgeois democracy.894
The KPÖ proclaimed a much different version of the last several decades of the 
Austria’s history than did the SPÖ.  While both parties of the left agreed on the reactionary 
character of the dynasty, the exploitive nature of the Bürger class, and the primacy of the 
working class struggle for democracy and social justice, the two factions differed 
893Leopold Spira, “Vor 30 Jahren: der 12. November 1918,” Weg und Ziel (October, 1948): 691-703; 
Friedl Fürnburg, “Kommunisten und Demokratie,” Weg und Ziel (January, 1946): 12-17.
894Marek, “Zur Ideologie des Austromarxismus,” 678-685; Fischer,“Der Weg der Provisorischen 
Regierung,” Weg und Ziel (January, 1946): 1-12.
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dramatically about who truly defended the freedom and the interests of the workers.  They 
even disagreed about the history of the workers movement.  While the Socialists had held up 
such diverse figures as Goethe, Masaryk, and Otto Bauer as the heroes of Europe’s fight for 
freedom, the Communists looked primarily to the forces of the radical left such as the Paris 
Communards and, most importantly, to the Bolshevik founders of the Soviet Union as their 
ideological forebears.895  For the Austrian Communists, the Social Democrats represented 
bitter antagonists who had been corrupted by German nationalism and reformism, and who 
had hurt Austria almost as much as the Habsburg dynasty and the bourgeoisie.
Thus, the Communist view of the Habsburg past was distinctive.  It possessed both 
the fervent sense of Austrian national identity and the animosity toward großdeutsch
ideology displayed by the Austrian right, as well as the negative view of the dynasty and the 
Austrian Bürgertum as oppressors of the truly progressive forces of history proclaimed by 
the Socialists.  Yet the Communists presented these elements in a radical, pro-Soviet 
context.  The Austrian Communists used their view of Austria’s past as part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in order to distinguish between the forces of Austrian progress and democracy, 
which they themselves claimed to represent, and the Nazi German dictatorship against 
which they had struggled for the better part of a decade.  Ultimately they saw the Habsburgs 
and the Hitler regime, the bourgeois conservatives and the reformist Social Democrats, the 
German nationalists and the American “imperialists” all as obstacles in Austria’s historical 
895See for example the following articles in the Communist monthly Weg und Ziel: Leopold Grünwald, “30 
Jahre Sozialistische Revolution: 30 Jahre Sowjetmensch,” Weg und Ziel (June, 1947): 433-437; F. M., “75 
Jahre Pariser Kommune 18. März 1871- 18. März 1946,” Weg und Ziel (March, 1946): 160-163; “Das 
Jahrhundert Lenins und Stalins,” Weg und Ziel (December, 1949): 765-721; Grünwald, “30 Jahre 
Sozialistische Revolution: 30 Jahre Sowjetmensch,” Weg und Ziel (June, 1947): 433-437; Fritz Lang, 
“Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin– Der Mann des Volkes.  Zu seinem 22. Todestag,” Weg und Ziel (January, 1946): 
19-23; Franz Marek “30 Jahre Sozialistische Revolution: 1917 und der Weg zum Sozialismus,” Weg und 
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march toward “true” democracy and social freedom under Communist leadership and Soviet 
patronage.
iv. Enduring German Nationalist Sentiment in Postwar Austria 
Despite the fervent proclamations of Austrian national identity based upon various 
visions of Austria’s distinctive history by the postwar conservatives, Socialists, and 
Communists, there were still indications of lingering German nationalist sentiments in 
Austria after 1945.  The most significant expression of such Germanist ideals was the 
emergence of the Verband des Unabhängigen (Union of Independents- VdU) in 1949.  This 
new organization represented a loose coalition of various elements of the Austrian polity 
which did not feel that the other political parties expressed their interests and ideals.  Former 
supporters of the Nazi regime comprised an important portion of this political block, 
although it also operated as an umbrella group for diehard proponents of großdeutsch
ideology of other orientations.896
For obvious reasons, however, the VdU was extremely circumspect about its partial 
dependence upon groups which had supported National Socialism.  As we have seen, in the 
postwar era most of Austria’s political leadership portrayed Nazism as a treasonous, anti-
Austrian ideology.  The four Allied occupying powers all clearly proscribed Nazism as well 
and mandated the prosecution of Austrian Nazi party members after the war.  Still, by the 
late 1940s, the Allies had largely lost their zeal for denazification in Austria due to the fact 
that each of the Cold War ideological blocks regarded the other as a more pressing enemy 
Ziel (April, 1947): 267-272.
896Engelmann, 31-32; Jelavich, 272; Weinzierl and Skalnik, 222-224.
530
than the defeated Nazis.  In a similar manner, the leaders of Austria’s other political parties 
were eager to move beyond the topic of Austria’s responsibility for the war and the 
Holocaust, even if the suppression of those matters allowed lower level former Nazis and 
Nazi supporters to resume political activity in the Second Republic.897  This complicity 
between the postwar Austrian political order and the Cold War factions to scale back 
denazification in Austria allowed former supporters of National Socialism to return to 
Austrian political life so long as they did not overtly advocate policies or ideological themes 
which had been associated with the Hitler regime.
As a result, the Independents did not openly use Nazi tropes in their public 
statements, but rather fell back upon the sort of political goals which had been advocated by 
großdeutsch Austrian liberals during the First Republic and the last decades of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.  In fact at least some of the supporters of the independent voting block, including 
one of its most important leaders, Viktor Reimann, had themselves languished in Nazi 
jails.898  Consequently the earliest platforms of the VdU formulated the coalition’s political 
stance along the classically liberal lines of support for democratic government, private 
property, lower rates of taxation, anti-clericism and opposition to Marxism.899  Still, many of 
897Günter Bischof has persuasively argued that it was the ability of the leaders of the ÖVP and SPÖ to 
skillfully play the competing Cold War blocks off of one another in order to end the occupation of Austria 
which resulted in the shallow level of denazification in Austria, and which allowed postwar Austria to 
avoid any real discussion its Nazi past.  See Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 52-77.  See also 
Brigitte Balier, “They Were All Victims: The Selective Treatment of the Consequences of National 
Socialism,” in Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), 103-115 and various essays in Meissl, Mulley, und Rathkolb, eds.,
Verdrängte Schuld, Verfehlte Sühne.
898Although Reimann had been affiliated with the Austrian Nazi Party before 1938, he fell out with the 
Nazi regime soon after the Anschluß and was imprisoned for four and a half years for participation in an 
anti-Nazi resistence group.  See Albert Massiczek, “Zweimal Illegal,” in Verdrängte Schuld, Verfehlte 
Sühne, 308- 311.
899“Das Programm der Verbandes der Unabhängigen, 1949," in Österreichisch Parteiprogramme, 1868-
1966, 484- 488.
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the leaders of the independent movement had been associated in some way with National 
Socialism, and certainly the numbers of such individuals within the VdU were far greater 
than in any of Austria’s  other postwar political parties.900  Indeed, while the People’s Party 
and the Socialists accepted the VdU as a valid political organization, the Communists 
continually denounced it as a neo-Nazi organization.
The Independents’ postwar statements concerning a Germanist conception of 
Austrian national identity were tentative at first, but grew bolder over time.  The 
organization’s first political program in 1949 supported Austria’s independence, yet still 
proclaimed a sense of cultural community with Germany, stating, “alongside full protection 
of our state independence we profess our Germanness.”901  By the time of the publication of 
their Aussee Program of 1954, however, the Independents more boldly announced their 
großdeutsch position, avowing that “Austria is a German state.  Its polities must serve the 
entire German Volk and may never be aligned against any other German state.”902  Indeed 
that program even presented a vision of a “German mission” for Austria which was designed 
to serve the cause of unity and common defense in the German-speaking regions of Europe.  
The VdU presented this mission in the context of its support for a potential European union 
in which the German Volk would inevitably participate, but such a vision of Austria’s role in 
the world remained quite similar to previous großdeutsch presentations of a German mission 
for Austria.903
The VdU rarely justified these confessions of Austrian Germanness with the sort of 
900Oliver Rathkolb, “NS-Problem und politische Restauration: Vorgeschichte und Etablierung des VdU,” 
in Verdrängte Schuld, Verfehlte Sühne, 73-99.
901“Das Programm der Verbandes der Unabhängigen, 1949," 489.
902“Das ‘Ausseer Program’ des Verbandes der Unabhängigen, 1949,", 489.
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lengthy historical arguments which had characterized the German nationalist camp before 
1945, however.  The Independents were ultimately far more concerned with providing 
vehement denunciations of the current political parties and government in Austria than they 
were with presenting treatises on Austria’s history as a German state.  Certain small 
examples of a historically grounded notion of a Germanist national identity did appear from 
the VdU from time to time, however.  For example, the party’s main newspaper, Die Neue 
Front, published an article in 1950 urging Austria’s compassionate treatment of Central 
European German-speaking refugees on the grounds that they had for centuries shared “a 
common history, culture and language” with Austrians.904  Similarly, the party’s leaders also 
called for the renewed use of the First Republic’s Austrian national anthem (the Haydn-
composed melody which had been the basis for the anthems of both the Habsburg Monarchy 
and Germany) on the grounds of its important place in Austria’s history.905  Yet such 
historical arguments were by and large tangential and vague, and certainly not the main 
focus of a political party which was in essence trying to appeal to former Nazis and 
großdeutsch idealists in Austria while also not associating itself too overtly with ideas which 
had been tainted by their association with the Hitler regime.
Some historians of the Austrian Second Republic have argued that the postwar 
confessions of Austrian national identity on the part of the three main political parties after 
1945 represented an opportunistic effort by Austria’s postwar order to regain independence 
and to avoid the issue of Austria’s responsibility for its Nazi past.  Peter Thaler, Anton 
903Ibid., 489-490.
904“Die Volksdeutschen als Europäer,” Die Neue Front (Vienna), January 19, 1950, 2.
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Pelinka, and others have argued that such positions represented too rapid and profound a 
rupture with the strong currents of German nationalist sentiment in Austria before 1945 to 
have really represented the views of all, or even most, Austrian citizens.  Indeed, with the 
VdU garnering more than ten percent of the vote (twice the percentage gained by the KPÖ) 
in the national election of 1953, there is certainly ample reason to argue that notions of a 
German national identity had not been extinguished in Austria.906  Still, the vigorous and 
repeated presentations of a unique Austrian national identity grounded in various visions of 
Austria’s Habsburg past by the ÖVP, SPÖ and KPÖ were far too systematic and enthusiastic 
to have been merely opportunistic.  Rather they represented a concerted effort on the part of 
Austria’s postwar leaders to eliminate from Austria’s psyche the German nationalist notions 
which they felt had nearly destroyed Austrian independence.  No doubt there was a 
pragmatic element to such efforts, but the sentiment behind them was sincere.
Sincerity and vehemence are not in themselves enough to transform the opinions of 
millions of people, however.  The leaders of the three major parties themselves may have 
nearly universally repudiated großdeutsch conceptions of national identity in favor of a 
historically grounded “Austrianism,” but they could hardly have expected to establish a 
similar uniformity of opinion in Austria’s population simply through the publication of 
articles, books, and speeches alone.  Therefore, Austria’s postwar political leaders  mounted 
a concerted effort to instill in the Austrian people an appropriately Austrianist view of 
national identity based upon a vision of the state’s past as part of the Habsburg Monarchy.  
905Reported in “Wieder die neonazistische Lüge,” Die Neue Front (Vienna), June 29, 1950, 1.
906Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity, 180-188; Anton Pelinka, “Taboos and Self-Deception: The Second 
Republic’s Reconstruction of History,” in Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, 95-102; Emil 
Brix, “Zur Frage der österreichischen Identität am Beginn der Zweiten Republik,” in Die Bevormundete 
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Educational policy represented the primary means for those leaders to attempt to fulfill such 
goals.
Nation, Österreich und die Alliierten 1945-1949, 93-104.
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Chapter 7.  Education and the Habsburg Past in the Second Republic 
The Austrian Second Republic witnessed not just efforts by the state’s individual 
political parties to bolster Austrian national identity by presenting various views of the 
Habsburg past, but also saw those parties work together in order to present Austrian citizens 
with a historically grounded sense of Austria’s unique nationhood.  The conservatives, 
Social Democrats, and to, a lesser extent, the Communists, were not content merely to make 
statements concerning Austria’s national character and history directed at their own 
constituents.  Rather, they also used the state education as a means through which they could 
both express their national and historical convictions and help convince Austrian citizens of 
the necessity and reality of Austria’s historical nationhood.
The Second Republic’s government used a number of different methods in order to 
express and advance notions of Austrian national identity.907
907The historian Peter Thaler has also discussed the Second Republic’s efforts to shape Austrian ideas 
concerning Austrian national identity.  In addition to education, he also identifies judicial restrictions on 
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German nationalist discourse and public rhetoric delegitimizing such discourse as important parts of this 
effort.  Thaler does  briefly discuss how public figures in the Second Republic used Austrian history to 
argue for the existence of an Austrian nation, but he does not deal in depth with the centrality of Habsburg 
past to the efforts of all of Austria’s postwar political factions and pedagogical leaders to present their 
distinctive visions of Austrian nationhood.  Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian 
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  Educational policy, however, was by  far the most significant tool used by Austria’s 
postwar leaders to pursue such goals.  As we have seen, previous governments in Austria 
had all considered state educational policy, and especially policies about teaching history, as 
crucial to indoctrinating the state’s population on the most appropriate view of Austria’s 
place in the world.  Austria’s political leaders after 1945 were no different, and leading 
figures from all of the parties self consciously and forthrightly stated that the state’s 
educational system represented a vital tool in their efforts to convince the people of Austria 
to embrace an Austrianist conception of the state.
To that end, the Second Republic set out to reform the Austrian educational system 
after 1945.  Obviously one of the Ministry of Education’s first tasks was to remove any and 
all vestiges of Nazism from Austrian education.  The government went beyond merely 
denazifying state education, however.  It committed itself to helping Austria’s youth develop 
a firm dedication to Austrian independence and democracy in order to avoid the weak 
national and republican consciousness which Austria’s leaders thought had contributed to 
the Nazi conquest of Austria.  Thus, Austria’s postwar leaders attempted to recast state 
curricula in Staatsbürgerkunde (civics), literature, language and, especially history, in order 
to portray Austria as democratic, Danubian, and European, rather than as a mere historical 
appendage of Germany as had so often been the case earlier.  Austrian educators conducted 
a vigorous debate concerning educational policy on those topics in the pages of pedagogical 
journals with a eye toward influencing the government’s policy decisions.  Finally, the 
Second Republic’s government oversaw the publication of new educational materials and 
textbooks which would instill a strong Austrian national and republican consciousness in the 
youth.  All of these efforts of course  involved frequent references to Austria’s Habsburg 
538
past in order to achieve their aims.908
Ultimately, these efforts at transforming the content of Austrian education were only 
partially successful.  As an examination of the postwar curricula and civics and history 
textbooks shows, Austrian education may have been denazified by 1955, but, just as before 
the war, Austrian students after 1945 still often read books which emphasized Austria’s 
relationship to Germany.  Some changes certainly did occur, but the stated goals of Austria’s 
leaders and educators during this period to effect a sweeping Austrianist transformation of 
educational materials went at least partially unrealized.  Efforts to portray Austria as a 
historical entity separate from Germany in textbooks and readers were half-hearted, 
although such texts did invariably cast Austria’s more recent Nazi past as one in which 
foreign German invaders had subjugated the Austrian nation, and forced it to participate in 
war and mass murder for which the Austrian people themselves bore no responsibility.  
The new government’s lack of success in transforming the content of history 
education to reflect the new consensus on Austrian nationhood stemmed from a number of 
factors.  First, the decade after 1945 saw Austria struggle to recover from the devastation 
wrought by World War II.  Its economic infrastructure had been reduced to rubble by Allied 
bombing, and the Soviet Union made matters worse by parasitically expropriating the 
remaining Austrian economic resources in its zone of occupation in eastern Austria.  The 
Second Republic received some aid from the Western powers and participated in the 
908Peter Utgaard has also extensively studied the relationship between the Second Republic’s education 
system and its efforts to construct a new Austrian identity.  He concludes that the Austrian education in the 
decades after 1945 sought to portray Austria as a nation separate from Germany in order to minimize 
Austria’s responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich.  He does not, however, pay significant attention 
to the role which portrayals of Austria’s Habsburg past played in those educational efforts to cast a 
distinctive Austrian nation as the “first victim” of “foreign” Nazi aggression.  Peter Utgaard, Remembering 
and Forgetting Nazism: Education, National Identity and the Victim Myth in Postwar Austria (New York: 
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Marshall Plan after 1948, but it still had to strain throughout the immediate postwar period 
merely to provide for the most basic needs of its citizens.  A comprehensive educational 
reform would have been a difficult and complicated endeavor under the best of 
circumstances, and Austria’s straitened circumstances and limited resources after 1945 made
such a project even more problematic.909
Additionally, while the major political postwar parties all agreed on the importance 
of cultivating a sense of Austrian nationhood in the population, they were still unable to 
reach a consensus about the meaning and legacy of the Habsburg past.  The parties 
cooperated on matters of policy far more effectively during the early Second Republic than 
they ever had before 1945, but their continuing disagreements about Austrian history made 
it difficult for them to achieve a comprehensive transformation of history education.  The 
extensive provincial autonomy inherent in the Second Republic’s federal organization 
likewise continued to complicate the government’s efforts to disseminate its Austrianist 
ideals in education at the local level.  
Finally, systematic and comprehensive educational reform simply is process which 
takes time.  As we have seen, none of the Austrian governments between 1918 and 1945 
were entirely successful in transforming state education either, and even the authoritarian 
corporatist and Nazi regimes could not entirely achieve the educational changes they desired 
despite their extensive ability to quash dissent.  In the end, the constraints upon the early 
Second Republic’s educational reforms–limited resources, a lack of central authority, and 
widespread ideological disagreement among the major parties–resembled the barriers to 
Berghahn Books, 2003).
909On Austria’s difficult circumstances after World War II, see Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold 
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similar efforts in the First Republic.  Austria after 1945 had certainly learned valuable 
lessons from the First Republic’s failure to craft a stable democratic order, and its leaders 
were far more willing to set aside their ideological disagreements and cooperate with one 
another than they had been between 1918 and 1933.  Still, the Second Republic was not able 
to free itself entirely from the constraints which had stymied educational reform in the 
earlier Republic, some of which were inherent in federal, parliamentary government.  In the 
end, however, the Second Republic benefitted from one advantage which all of the other 
post-Habsburg Austrian governments lacked: time.  None of those other regimes lasted more 
than fifteen years, while the Second Republic had generations to accomplish its educational 
labors.  The new Republic’s reforms may not have been entirely successful in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, but the educational changes which Austria’s postwar leaders 
sought gradually bore more fruit after 1955.910  Thus, the early Second Republic laid the 
foundations for a durable Austrian national identity, even if it only partially succeeded in 
transforming the content of state history education during the first decade after the war.
i. The Second Republic’s Cooperative System of Government 
In the Republic’s first months, Austria’s Provisional Government divided its 
positions roughly equally between the Austria’s three most prominent political factions: the 
People’s Party, the Social Democrats, and the Communists.  The Communists, whose 
prominence was due more to Soviet patronage and to the prestige derived from their 
War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the Weak (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 30-129.
910On the educational reform efforts of previous Austrian governments, see Chapters 2,4, and 5.  On the 
success of the Second Republic’s educational reforms after 1955 see Utgaard, Remembering and 
Forgetting Nazism, 71-160.
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underground, anti-Nazi activism during the war than to any history of electoral success in 
Austria, suffered a resounding defeat in the Second Republic’s first round of parliamentary 
elections in late 1945.  Afterwards, their influence upon the government’s policies waned 
dramatically, but the ÖVP and the SPÖ continued to share power, cooperating closely in 
order to avoid the sort of fractious ideological conflicts between left and right which had led 
to the end of Austrian democracy during the 1930s.  The conservatives and Socialists 
continued to disagree sharply on matters of ideology, but they nonetheless were able to put 
aside their differences and cooperate with one another to forge a government based upon 
compromise.  The coalition system that these two parties created, the so-called Proporz
system based upon power sharing between the two parties proportional to their electoral 
support, endured as the Second Republic’s guiding political strategy until 1966.  Using this 
strategy of governance based upon cooperation rather than confrontation, Austria’s postwar 
political leaders were able to use the power of the Austrian government, and especially the 
state’s educational system, as a tool in their attempts to instill a sense of Austrian national 
identity in the population.911
Cooperation between the political parties meant that the Second Republic was able to 
present a unified front which strongly advocated Austrian independence and a commitment 
to democracy, and sought to implant these values in the Austrian population.  While the 
parties still disagreed about the specifics of various policies, they agreed about the state’s 
basic direction and the government proceeded with broad support.  In fact, the political 
911Frederick C. Engelmann, Government by Diplomacy: The Austrian Coalition 1945-1966 (Vienna: 
Braumüller, 2001), 29-60; Manfried Rauchensteiner, “The ‘Big Two:’ The Grand Coalition, 1945-1966 
and 1987-2000,” in Austria in the Twentieth Century, eds. Rolf Steininger, Günter Bischof and Michael 
Gehler (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002): 235-262.
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parties all avowed that it was more important for them to put aside their differences in order 
to secure the broader goals which they held in common than it was for them to squabble 
concerning matters of ideology.  To this end, the parties jointly published a newspaper, 
Neues Österreich, dedicated to fostering political cooperation between all of the state’s 
ideological factions in order to lay the groundwork for a truly independent, democratic 
Austria.912
The Second’s Republic’s education policy demonstrated this unity of purpose 
between the parties  The parties all agreed that Austria was a unique nation which had been 
victimized by the Nazis, and they argued the easy “conquest” of Austria by Germany in 
1938 had occurred because of the weak national and democratic consciousness in Austria 
during the First Republic and the Ständestaat.  Thus they agreed that the new Republic 
needed to inculcate Austrian children with the principles of Austrian nationhood, democratic 
government, and international cooperation in order to avoid the recurrence of the sort of 
devastating conflicts which had convulsed Europe twice within the space of generation.  All 
the parties identified the teaching of Austrian history as the most important tool for 
achieving such educational goals.  This new spirit of cooperation did not, however, 
necessarily translate into a consensus on the actual details of educational policy, and the 
ideological differences between the parties did continue to limit the speed and thoroughness 
of educational reform, despite the more conciliatory tone in Austrian politics after 1945.
In the first few months of the Provisional Government, the Communist leader and 
intellectual Ernst Fischer served as the Second Republic’s first Minister of Education.  After 
912For a statement of this new newspaper’s purpose to serve as a multiparty forum for the advocacy of 
Austrian independence and democracy, see Ernst Fischer’s lead article in Neues Österreich 1 (April 23, 
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the KPÖ’s electoral defeat at the end of 1945, however, the conservative Felix Hurdes 
replaced him as Minister, ushering in more than a decade of ÖVP leadership of the Ministry 
of Education.913  As we have seen, however, there was a surprising amount of agreement 
between the Communists and the conservatives concerning the role of the Habsburg past (if 
not the dynasty itself) in defining the Austrian nation, and even the SPÖ shared a certain 
sense that the Monarchy, reactionary as it may have been, had helped forge Austria’s 
nationhood.  Thus, the Second Republic’s educational policies expressed the broad 
agreement between the parties about the importance of the Habsburg past in their efforts to 
define and strengthen Austria’s national identity.
Of course while the parties shared a dedication to the concept of a distinctive 
Austrian nation which was defined by its historical past, there was enough substantive 
disagreement between their visions of that past to make the presentation of a coherent view 
of Austria’s history in the state’s educational system difficult.  The conservatives saw the 
past in terms of a benevolent dynasty which had helped forge a unique Austrian Völkerstaat 
beneficial to all of the old Monarchy’s nationalities, while the parties of the left largely saw 
the dynasty as an obstacle to the historical forces of freedom and progress, even if it had 
helped create a multinational state which had some positive aspects.  These competing views 
were difficult to harmonize, and attempts to find neutral ground between the three parties’ 
visions often diluted the forcefulness of assertions that Austria’s history had defined its 
1945): 1-2.
913The exact title of both the Ministry and the officials responsible for education in Austria changed several 
times after 1945, but no matter what exact terms were used, this division of the Second Republic’s 
government was always responsible for educational policy in Austria, and hence is simply rendered here as 
the “Ministry/Minister of Education.” Under the Proporz system, the ÖVP’s leadership of the Education 
Ministry was generally offset by the appointment of a Socialist undersecretary; the converse was true in 
ministries that were headed by Socialists.  See William T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation: The 
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unique nationhood apart from Germany.  The one area where the parties did completely 
agree, and which consequently was translated into the state’s postwar educational system 
with great success, was the notion that Austria had represented a victim of German 
aggression in 1938, which bore no guilt for Nazi Germany’s crimes.
ii. The Second Republic’s Educational Reforms 
Political Integration of a Western State (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1973), 73.
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The first task of the new republic’s government was obviously to remove all the 
trappings of the National Socialist educational system which had been in place in Austria 
between 1938 and 1945.914  Such efforts went hand in hand with uprooting the entire 
apparatus of the Nazi governance in Austria.  Just as the Provisional Government in 1945 
nullified the Nuremberg laws and laws establishing the NSDAP and its affiliate 
organizations as the only legal political bodies in Austria, it also repealed all National 
Socialist laws concerning higher education and all Nazi academic titles.915  The 
government’s plan for the first postwar school year in 1945/1946 explicitly annulled all 
National Socialist curricula, and returned the state’s primary and secondary educational 
systems to the reformed curricula instituted by the First Republic in 1930 and 1928, 
914This task was also mandated by the Allied powers occupying Austria, which had an especially 
significant role in influencing the state’s educational policy between 1945 and 1948.  Utgaard, 
Remembering and Forgetting Nazism, 25-70.
915“Kundmachung der provisorischen Staatsregierung vom 13. Mai 1945 über die Aufhebung der 
‘Nürnberger Rassengesetze,’” “Kundmachung der provisorischen Staatsregierung vom 12. Juni 1945 
betreffend die Aufhebung der deutschen Rechtsvorschriften über die NSDAP, ihre Gliederungen und 
angeschlossen Verbände,” “Kundmachung der provisorischen Staatsregierung vom 20. Juni 1945 über die 
Aufhebung der Reichskulturkammergesetz,” “Kundmachung der provisorischen Staatsregierung vom 20. 
Juni 1945 über die Aufhebung der deutschen Rechtsvorschriften auf dem Gebiet des Hochschulwesens,”
Verordnungsblatt für den Dienstbereich des Bundesministeriums für Unterricht (February 1, 1946): 3-5; 
“Amtsbezeichnungen,” Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1946): 58.
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respectively.916
916It is worth noting that the laws mandated a return to the curricula from the First Republic, rather than to 
subsequent curricula from the Ständestaat which the Second Republic deemed insufficiently democratic, 
even if they had been products of an Austrian government rather than a German one.  “Maßnahmen für 
den Beginn des Unterrichtes an Volks- und Haupts- und Mittelschulen im Schuljahr 1945/6,”
Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1946): 59-61.  
547
  The same law also returned the state to the use of the traditionally Austrian school 
nomenclature of Gymnasien, Realgymnasien, Realschulen, and Frauenoberschulen, 
removing Nazi designations which had followed the standard usages from the German 
educational system.  Further laws banned political insignias from Austrian schools and the 
Ministry of Education even decreed that crucifixes, which had been removed from Austrian 
classrooms by the Nazi government, be once again displayed as an “Austrian popular 
religious custom anchored in a more than 1000 years of history.” 917
The Ministry of Education also set about removing from Austria’s schools educators 
associated with the NSDAP or Nazi ideology.  The Second Republic removed members of 
the Nazi Party and its subsidiary organizations, and prohibited non-Party members who were 
“politically contaminated” from even assisting other teachers in an auxiliary capacity unless 
there were no other candidates available.  Furthermore, the government excluded high 
ranking members of the NSDAP, the SD, Gestapo, SS, Death’s-Head Corps, Waffen-SS, 
high level SA functionaries, and the bearers of any number of Nazi honors or awards from 
Austrian higher education.  Finally, the Ministry restored teachers who had been removed 
from their jobs due to Nazi racial or political restrictions, or due to recruitment for military 
service, to their old positions.918
The Second Republic did not restrict its efforts to the removal of teachers affiliated 
917Ibid., 59-61; “Verbot aller Propaganda für Schulfremde Zwecke an Schulen,” Verordnungsblatt 
(February 1, 1946): 59; “Aufhebung der ‘Deutschen Normalschrift’: Richtalphabet 1945,” 
Verordnungsblatt (October 1, 1945): 69; “Wiederanbringung der Kreuze in den Schulen,”
Verordnungsblatt (May 1, 1946): 97.
918“Übersicht über die Behandlung der Mitglieder und Anwärter der ehemaligen NSDAP an Volks- Haupt-
, Mittelschulen und anderen mittleren Lehranstalten,” Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1946): 76-7; 
“Verwendung politisch belasteter Lehrkräfte,” Verordnungsblatt (November 1, 1946): 156-7; “Politische 
Überprüfung der Hochschüler,” Verordnungsblatt  (December 15, 1947): 19-21; “Zulassung von 
Kriegsteilnehmen und Geschädigten zu Lehrbefähigungsprüfungen für Volksschulen,” Verordnungsblatt 
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with National Socialism.  The new government also mounted a campaign which resulted in 
the removal of university professors who had promoted a view of the Austrian past as part of 
the history of Germany.  For example, the government relieved the prominent interwar 
Austrian historian Heinrich von Srbik of his university teaching duties due to his German 
nationalist views, and even  investigated the staunchly anti-Nazi conservative historian 
Hugo Hantsch for his commitment to teaching Austrian history in a German context before 
deciding to allow him to keep his position.919
The Ministry of Education acknowledged that such measures also represented a 
symbolic repudiation of Nazism in the educational system in favor of educational policies 
which were native to Austria.  Such measures by themselves however, could not achieve the 
sort of systematic change that the government desired.920  Thus, while the Ministry of 
Education did not produce a new set of complete curricula for the Second Republic between 
1945 and 1955, it did publish a series of provisional curricula for Austria’s schools which 
sought to augment the democratic content of the First Republican curricula in use and to 
supplement the insufficient Austrian national consciousness of those curricula. For example, 
the provisional curriculum for secondary schools published in 1948 essentially reproduced 
the basic approach of the 1928 curriculum, but supplemented it with material emphasizing 
Austrian nationhood and the importance of democratic rule.  This curriculum, however, 
admittedly lacked detail, and it merely advised Austrian teachers to produce their own more 
extensive personal lesson plans to augment the official ones.921  Indeed the absence of 
(October 1, 1945): 69.  
919Thaler, 130-131.
920“Stundtafel der Mittelschulen,” Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1946): 62-7.  
921“Maßnahmen für die Erteilung des Unterrichtes an Haupt- und Mittelschulen im Schuljahre 1948/49,”  
Verordnungsblatt (August 1, 1948): 122-8.  
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completely new and revised curricula during this period seems to have been a source of 
frustration for many Austrian teachers.  In an introduction to a republished edition of the 
provisional curriculum for Austrian Mittelschulen in 1955, the conservative Minister of 
Education at that time, Heinrich Drimmel, acknowledged these criticisms, but argued that it 
would have been both impractical and confusing for the Ministry to publish a completely 
new curriculum before Austria had finished its lengthy task of totally reforming its school 
system.  This Ministry intended this new edition of the provisional curriculum to provide 
more guidance for instructors than the earlier version, and it incorporated more material on 
such nationally sensitive topics as German language and history education.922
From its inception the Second Republic operated with a set of curricula which 
attempted to redefine the goals of the school system without totally abandoning the content 
of lesson plans which were twenty years old.  The stated goals of such curricula were 
generally quite lofty, and used bold terms to describe the changes that were to be made in 
Austrian education.  For example, Viktor Fadrus, in the introduction to a published edition 
of the 1947 Curriculum for Hauptschulen, discussed efforts to incorporate the latest 
pedagogical ideas from the United States and Switzerland, and to make Austrian education 
more democratic in spirit, emphasizing critical thinking and understanding of opposing 
viewpoints rather than simple obedience.923  Similarly, a decree from the ministry of 
Education from late 1945 spoke of transforming students into mature democrats imbued 
with a sense of the interconnectedness of all the world’s nations.924
922“Neuverlautbarung der Provisorischen Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” Verordnungsblatt (October 15, 
1955): 3-5.
923 Victor Fadrus, Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen (Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1947), viii-ix.
924“Erlaß des Staatsamtes für Volksaufklärung, für Unterricht und Erziehung und für 
Kulturangelegenheiten vom.  3. September 1945, Zl. 4690/IV/45, betreffend allgemeine Richtlinien für 
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The new curricula were particularly ambitious when it came to defining the role of 
history education in the new state.  An edition of the provisional curriculum from 1946 for 
Hauptschulen, for example, advocated the utility of historical study in awakening in students 
a love of the Austrian Volk and Fatherland, and an appreciation of Austria’s democratic 
development as well as  its cultural achievements.925  Similarly a 1946 ministry decree 
recommended that, in order to lay the groundwork for students’ loyalty to the state, teachers 
should emphasize Austrian Bürgerkunde (civics), geography, flora and fauna, and especially 
a sense of “Austria as a multinational state, its development, its disintegration and its 
reconstruction as a democratic Volksstaat.”926  This new history education was to be more 
balanced than previous efforts by the Austrian educational system, correcting the prior 
overemphasis upon political matters in favor of a more organic representation of the intimate 
linkages between politics and culture in Austria’s past.  Likewise, Austrian history was to be 
presented in the context of wider world history, with a focus upon freedom, humanity, 
reason, and the peaceful resolution of conflict.927  Certainly the Ministry of Education made 
it amply clear that history education in the Second Republic was to present Austrian history 
as separate and different from German history.  For example, a decree from the ministry in 
1945 declared that the goal of Austrian history education “is to awaken the will of the youth 
to joyfully collaborate in the cultural mission of the Austrian Volk and of humanity.”  This 
history “should be an Austrian history, that is, a history which does not present Austria as a 
Erziehung und Unterricht in den österreichischen Schulen,” in Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen (Vienna: 
Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1947), xiv. 
925Provisorische Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen, Veröffentlicht auf Grund der Verordnung des 
Bundesministeriums für Unterricht vom 18. Oktober, 1946 (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für 
Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1946), 39.
926“Übergangsmaßnahmen für die fünfte und sechste Hauptschulklasse in Schuljahre 1945/6,”
Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1946): 58.
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mere annex of the German Reich, but which rather points out the uniqueness of Austrian life 
which served to separate Austria from that Reich even in the Middle Ages.”928
In practice, however, these curricula were less new than such statements of purpose 
might suggest.  Certainly some revisions significantly changed the interpretative framework 
and substantive materials used in various subjects.  For instance, sections in the geography 
curricula completely replaced the old presentations of Austria as part of “the area of German 
settlement” in Europe in favor of a view which emphasized Austria in the context of Europe 
as a whole and which did not even mention Germany.  Similarly, instruction in literature 
deemphasized selections from German literature in favor of a variety of readings from 
elsewhere in Europe, Russia, and the United States, and the curricula encouraged the study 
of living foreign languages in order to foster “cooperation between peoples.”929  On the other 
hand, however, at least one change in the curriculum represented an almost ridiculously
symbolic gesture.  In 1946, the Ministry saw fit to rename German language education in 
schools as education in “the language of instruction.”  The subject matter was obviously still 
927“Neuverlautbarung der Provisorischen Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 84.
928“Erlaß des Staatsamtes für Volksaufklärung, für Unterricht und Erziehung und für 
Kulturangelegenheiten vom.  3. September 1945, Zl. 4690/IV/45, betreffend allgemeine Richtlinien für 
Erziehung und Unterricht in den österreichischen Schulen,” xx-xxviii.
929Ibid., xv-xvii; “Neuverlautbarung der Provisorischen Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 89.
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German grammar and writing; the Ministry simply refused to call the language which 
students learned German.  This change was emblematic of the thoroughness with which the 
Ministry of Education declared that Austrians were not Germans.930
930Indeed, some Austrian mocked the Education Ministry’s new nomenclature for German language 
education, calling German “Hurdestani” after the conservative Minister of Education.  The government 
returned to calling the German language by its name in 1955.  Provisorische Lehrpläne für die 
Hauptschulen, Veröffentlicht auf Grund der Verordnung des Bundesministeriums für Unterricht vom 18. 
Oktober, 1946 (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1946), 3; 
“Änderung der Bezeichnung ‘Deutsche Unterrichtssprache’ in ‘Deutsch,’” Verordnungsblatt (October 
1,1955): 218; Bluhm, 133; For a critical view of efforts to cast “Austrian” as a unique language separate 
from German, see “Oesterreichisches Deutsch. 1,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (September, 
1948): 196-7. 
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The success of the new curricula in achieving a truly new approach to history 
education was mixed.  There were indeed significant alterations to the descriptions of the 
historical subject matter to be covered.  The Ministry wanted to include more material on 
social and cultural history and to de-emphasize political and military matters in the 
curricula.931  It added, for example, sections to history curricula which discussed the status 
and progress of the peasant class, and the rise of industrial capitalism.  There were also 
sections which emphasized Austria’s democratic development and which portrayed fascism 
and Nazism as ideologies destructive to world peace.  Ultimately, however, these additions 
did not generally replace any of the old content of the curricula from the First Republic.  
Rather, the Ministry inserted the new elements into the previous text without changing any 
of the original substance of the historical narrative.  Thus the First Republic’s curricula for 
history education, which had traced Austrian history from Charlemagne’s Reich through the 
Babenberg and Habsburg eras, accompanied by extensive discussion of significant events in 
the German states, remained largely intact in the Second Republic’s curricula.  The Second 
Republic did make some minor alterations, but these changes were usually shifts in the 
language of the original text to eliminate overt references to the German character of 
Austrian history.  For example, the new curricula now prescribed the study of “urban culture 
in the Middle Ages,” rather than “the German city in the Middle Ages” and no longer 
931Social Democratic educators during the First Republic had also wanted to include more social and 
political history, but they were often opposed by conservative pedagogues.  After 1945, the conservatives 
joined the left in this reform effort.  See Chapter 2.
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contained any references to the Holy Roman Empire as a “German Empire.”932
932Provisorische Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen, 47-9.  As compared to the text of the 1928 curricula in 
“Lehrpläne für die Hauptschulen,” Volkserziehung (June 1, 1928), 13-14.
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  The re-publication of the curricula in 1955 made some further additions, such as the 
inclusion of a new section on the “rivalry between Austria and Prussia” in the early modern 
period, but even these newer versions also largely replicated the content of the First 
Republic’s curricula.933
Thus the various curricula implemented by the Austrian Second Republic 
represented only a partial break with the past in order to transform the state’s educational 
policy.  The Ministry of Education’s stated goals of emphasizing Austrian independence and 
democracy and of presenting a distinctive view of the state’s history were indeed reflected in 
the Republic’s provisional curricula, but only as additions inserted into a curricular 
framework which was essentially a generation old.  The Second Republic would ultimately 
have to wait until 1962 to see the completion of postwar reforms to its educational system 
and the publication of completely rewritten curricula.934
iii. The Second Republic’s Pedagogical Community and the Habsburg Past 
Given the fact that the actual curricula published during the first decade of the 
Second Republic set such ambitious goals for Austrian education yet did not provide 
teachers with much detail concerning how exactly to effect such changes, there was 
considerable discussion among educators and politicians within the pages of Austria’s 
various postwar pedagogical journals concerning how best to improve Austrian education 
within the relatively skeletal curricular framework.  Indeed, as we have seen, some versions 
of the provisional curricula actually encouraged instructors to flesh out the curricular 
933“Neuverlautbarung der Provisorischen Lehrpläne für die Mittelschulen,” 82-86.
934On Austrian education and national identity after 1955, see Utgaard, Remembering and Forgetting 
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material themselves, and to use their own judgement as to how best to inculcate young 
Austrians with a sense of Austrian national identity and a commitment to democratic 
government.  This postwar discussion concerning the Austrian educational system was 
extensive, involving all of the major political factions and educators from all over the 
country, and involved a wide range of topics.  Invariably, however, educators and 
commentators focused on Austria’s history and how best to teach it to students so that they 
might internalize the stronger national and democratic consciousness which Austria’s 
leaders believed was so critical for the state in the postwar era.
One topic which many educators commented on with considerable frequency in the 
years immediately following World War II were the perceived deficiencies of the 
educational efforts of Austria’s previous governments.  Naturally enough, the Nazi 
educational system which had been in place between 1938 and 1945 provided the initial 
target for such criticisms.  No matter what their political orientation, educators agreed that 
Nazi education had done considerable damage in Austria.  As with every other aspect of life 
under the National Socialist regime, Nazi education had been fundamentally unfree, 
inhibiting ideals absolutely crucial to real education such as critical thought, dedication to 
truth, and objectivity.  The Nazis’ racial ideals and sense of the Germans as history’s 
“chosen Volk” had permeated every facet of education in the Third Reich.  Postwar Austrian 
educators argued that the teleological historical view imposed upon the Austrian educational 
system by the Nazis had  “provincialized” Austria, portraying it as a mere eastern march of 




Many postwar Austrian teachers and educational theorists argued that the 
educational efforts of earlier governments in Austria had displayed systematic deficiencies 
as well.  Critics on the left usually charged that earlier Austrian education had not been 
sufficiently democratic.  Norbert Janitschek, for example, argued that the problems in 
Austrian education had not begun under the Nazi regime.  Education under the Monarchy in 
its absolutist, pre-constitutional period had been similarly undemocratic and had attempted 
to inculcate students with blind patriotism and bonds to the ruling house.936  The Socialist 
educator Anton Tesarek went further, arguing that even education in the First Republic had 
lacked any real commitment to democracy.937
Conservatives, on the other hand, frequently critiqued pre-1945 education for failing 
to distinguish between Austria and Germany.  The right-wing historian Ernst Josef Görlich 
argued that the main problem in Austrian education, the presentation of Austrian history as 
935Leopold Zechner, “Geschichtsunterricht im neuen Österreich,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 23-28; 
Hans Brachtmann, “Unsere Erziehungs Aufgabe,” Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna), August 8, 1945; Ottokar 
Wanacek, “Demokratische und National sozialistische Erziehung,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 29-
39; Ernst Mayer, “Nationalsozialistische und objektive Geschichtsauffassung,” Erziehung und Unterricht
(1946): 392-402; Oscar Pollak, “Der Kampf gegen den inneren Nazi,” Sozialistische Erziehungsarbeit 4 
(1946): 3-15.
936Norbert Janitschek, “Grundsätzliches zur ’staatsbürgerlichen Bildungsarbeit,’” Erziehung und 
Unterricht (1948): 251.
937Anton Tesarek, “Umrisse einer republikanische Schule,” Die Zukunft, Sozialistische Monatsschrift für 
Politik und Kultur (December, 1946): 20-23. 
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part of German history, dated back further than 1938 or 1934, to the last decades of the old 
Monarchy.938
938Ernst Josef Görlich, “Einige Grundaufsetzungen einer österreichischen Geschichtsdarstellung,”  
Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 309-312.
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  Ernst Mayer concurred, asserting that the previous fifty years of Austrian education had 
been plagued by the großdeutsch “lie” that Austria was a mere part of Germany’s history 
without any distinctive past of its own, a notion which had led to the diminution of interest 
in Österreichertum as something unique and worthwhile.939
Indeed many educators singled out the previous prevalence of the großdeutsch view 
of Austrian history as a particularly dangerous and persistent misrepresentation which 
needed to be uprooted from the Second Republic’s educational system.  Yet not all 
commentators felt that previous Austrian governments had been really responsible for this 
problem. The conservative educator Ludwig Reiter criticized “pro-Prussian, pro-
Hohenzollern” historical writing which had consistently inflated the reputations and 
significance of Frederick “the Great” and other Prussians at the expense of Austria’s own 
history and achievements.  While he acknowledged that some Austrian historians had been 
complicit in this enterprise, Reiter reserved most of his vitriol for nineteenth-century 
German nationalist historians who, he argued, had ultimately succeeded in defeating Austria 
with their ideas when the military might of Austria’s historical antagonists such as Francis I, 
Suleiman II, Gustavus Adolfus, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had failed.940
Friedrich Korger and Heinrich Gassner agreed that Germanist interpretations of 
Austrian history had largely been imported to Austria during the nineteenth century from 
Prussia and other German states.  Gassner identified such ideals as the product of the 
Romanticism which had flourished in Germany after the defeat of Napoleon.  Ultimately, 
939Ernst Mayer, “Nationalsozialistische und objektive Geschichtsauffassung,” Erziehung und Unterricht
(1946): 396-7;  See also Ferdinand Tremel, “Die Aufgaben des Geschichtsunterrichtes im neuen 
Österreich,” Unser Weg 4/5 (April/May 1946): 61-69.
940Ludwig Reiter, “Zu neuen Wegen der Geschichtsschreibung,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
(March, 1946): 26-7.  
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however, he argued that this großdeutsch vision of history amounted to mere mythology 
which had placed an undue emphasis upon the medieval history of German-speaking Europe 
while ignoring the early modern developments which had had such a profound impact upon 
the development of a distinctive Austrian nation.941
Thus Austrian educators essentially agreed about the importance of correcting the 
flaws in previous presentations of Austrian history.  The conservative postwar Minister of 
Education Felix Hurdes argued that Austrians must not lose sight of their real history, and 
that they had already seen the bitter fruits of what happened when they renounced their past 
and historical inheritance.942  Görlich likewise asserted that teachers had to have a clear view 
of the facts of Austria’s distinctive and ancient history in order to educate Austria’s youth to 
appreciate a free, independent and democratic Austria in the present.943  Ernst Mayer put the 
matter most succinctly, warning that, “The bad history education of today is the disastrous 
politics of tomorrow!”944
Thus no matter who was to blame form the previous absence of democratic and 
national consciousness in Austrian education, postwar Austrian educators agreed that these 
problems could only truly be solved through educational reforms emphasizing the necessity 
of democracy and the uniqueness of Austria’s history.  The democratic aspect of these 
prescriptions was relatively straight forward, and involved the use of instruction in civics 
941Friedrich Korger, “Erziehung zu Österreich,” Verordnungsblatt (November, 1950): 1-7; Heinrich 
Gassner, “Die Schule im neuen Österreichisch.  Aufgabe, Weg, Ziel,” Verordnungsblatt (June 1, 1946): 3-
4; “Proglegoma zu einer österreichischen Geschichte,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1948): 1-19.
942Feliz Hurdes, “Und Österreich lebt doch . . . .,” in  Offizielle Festschrift zur 950-Jahr-Feier Österreichs
ed. Österreich-Institut (Vienna: Brücken Verlag, 1946), 6.
943Ernst Josef Görlich,“Einige Grundaufsetzungen einer österreichischen Geschichtsdarstellung,” 
Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 312.
944Ernst Mayer, “Nationalsozialistische und objektive Geschichtsauffassung,” Erziehung und Unterricht
(1946): 398.
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and history to inculcate students with a commitment to democracy.  Such instruction was to 
focus not just upon the basic mechanics of democratic rule in the Second Republic, but also 
to teach the inner values of democracy, such as love of the Austrian Fatherland, 
understanding, toleration, cooperation, and respect for the opinions of others.945  Friedrich 
Korger argued that students had to be taught that even the worst democracy was better than 
the best dictatorship, and that individual responsibility for state politics, the willingness to 
stand up for one’s beliefs, and the spirit of compromise were ideals valued by the Second 
Republic in a way they had not been under previous authoritarian regimes.  He also argued 
that under previous Austrian governments, teachers had been afraid to voice any political 
opinions.  In the new Republic teachers could feel free to express their views, so long as 
they placed a commitment to the spirit of democracy above their party politics, and did not 
attempt to force students to accept a particular political ideology.946  Heinrich Gassner and 
Viktor Fadrus further avowed that such democratic efforts could not be restricted merely to 
the study of civics and constitutional rule in the contemporary Republic, but also had to 
trace the development of democracy from the struggles of humanity under the oppressive 
state forms in antiquity and the Middle Ages up to the rise of modern democratic politics, 
society, and economy.  Such democratic historical narratives likewise needed to draw a 
sharp contrast between the evils of Nazism and the virtues of democratic rule.947
In order to further such democratic ends, the educators of the Second Republic 
945Werner Tschulik, “Staatsbürgerkunde und demokratische Erziehung,” Österreichische Pädagogische 
Warte (February-March, 1951): 47; Mayer,  “Nationalsozialistische und objektive Geschichtsauffassung,” 
400-402; Franz Kramer, “Erziehung im demokratischen Staat,” Unser Weg (November 1945): 29-40.
946Korger, “Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1948): 460-467; “Erziehung zu 
Österreich,” 5-7.
947Heinrich Gassner and Viktor Fadrus, “Grundlinien eines Erziehungsplan für die österreichischen 
Schulen,” Verordnungsblatt 11 (1947): 5.  
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founded a new pedagogical journal, Erziehung und Unterricht, which began  publication in 
late 1946.  This periodical was a continuation of the earlier journals Der Neue Weg and Die 
Quelle, which had  been published during the First Republic but which had subsequently 
been coopted by the Austrian corporatist and Nazi regimes in turn.  The editors of Erziehung 
and Unterricht argued that journals in the First Republic had been so devoted to the non-
ideological discussion of pedagogy that they had left Austrian teachers insufficiently 
prepared to deal with anti- democratic philosophies.  The editors thus conceived of their 
journal as an unabashedly ideological enterprise to correct such deficiencies. Its editors 
argued that pedagogy depended heavily upon Weltanschauung and was necessarily a 
political topic.  Erziehung und Unterricht would not shy away from political matters and 
would welcome a variety of opinions from representatives of all of Austria’s political parties 
so long as their contributions displayed a dedication to democracy, truth, fairness, toleration, 
and international cooperation.948
In addition to education promoting democratic government, many postwar educators 
also recommended teaching young Austrians about the vital interconnectedness of the 
nations of the world as an antidote to the sort of nationalist chauvinism which had featured 
so prominently in Nazi education.  Karl Wiesinger argued that efforts to instill in students a 
love of the Austrian Volk should also include instruction directed toward an appreciation of 
the cultures and achievements of other Völker and their bonds with Austria as well.  Such an 
education would constitute a rejection of racial hatred and chauvinism, values which had 
948Albert Krassnigg and Anton Simonic, “Ziel und Weg,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 1-5.  It is 
worth noting that despite the new periodical’s professed commitment to democratic values, one of its first 
postwar editors, Anton Simonic, had been involved in the efforts of the Ständestaat to transform the 
Austrian educational system along authoritarian lines between 1933 and 1938.  See Chapter 4 for more 
details.
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always been inimical to the character of the Austrian Volk.949  Other educators recommended 
that education about world citizenship be accomplished by focusing not just upon Austrian 
history, literature, and geography, but also upon the cultures of all of the world’s peoples.  
The Second Republic’s educators identified the role of the newly created United Nations and 
its charter in fostering peace and cooperation in the postwar world as an important aspect of  
global education, and some educational theorists even recommended that the training of 
Austria’s teachers be conducted under the auspices of the UN.950
Even teachers closely affiliated with political parties agreed with one another 
concerning the desirability of educational efforts which highlighted Austria’s vital 
connections with the other nations of the world, although they often disagreed about the 
specific justifications for such efforts.  For example, the conservative educator Heinrich 
Peter argued that education about world citizenship should focus on the inevitable economic 
and cultural bonds between Völker, but avowed that internationalism which denied love of 
the Fatherland and Austrian patriotism was as bad as exaggerated nationalism.  He identified 
the universalism of the Roman Catholic Church, the Red Cross, and the UN as healthy 
varieties of internationalism which had to be balanced with the positive ideals of patriotism 
and Austrian nationalism.951  The Socialist leader Oscar Pollak likewise agreed that one of 
the highest callings of Austrian education was to emphasize Austria’s bonds with the rest of 
the world.  He argued, however, that internationalist education should be presented along 
949Karl Wiesinger, “Nicht Völkerverhetzung, sondern Völkerversöhnung,” Erziehung und Unterricht
(1947): 143-145.
950“Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung,” Verordnungsblatt (August 1, 1949): 149-153; Gassner and Fadrus, 
“Grundlinien eines Erziehungsplan für die österreichischen Schulen,” 6; Renatus Fürstenberg, “Die Schule 
im Dienste der Völkerverständigung,” Unser Weg (March/April, 1947): 5-6; Heinrich Peter, “Unterricht 
und Erziehung als Bekenntnis zum Vaterlande.” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (October, 1949), 
233.
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Socialist lines to the secure support for a just international distribution of economic goods 
and capital.952
Education about democratic values and the concomitant interconnection between 
Völker was undeniably important to most postwar Austrian educational theorists, but they 
discussed the necessity of instilling a sense of Austrian national consciousness in students 
with just as much urgency.  Again, Austrian educators all agreed that such national 
consciousness had been absent from the pedagogical efforts of previous governments, but 
they strongly disagreed about how to inculcate students with a sense of Austrian 
distinctiveness.  Educators and theorists from the conservative camp frequently argued that 
the antidote to the German nationalism which had done so much damage in Austria’s recent 
past was simply Austrian nationalism.  Görlich and Peter proclaimed that a sense of the 
Austrian Fatherland and loyalty to the Austrian Volk were necessary values in Austrian 
education.  Students should be firmly grounded in the ideals of Österreichertum and 
Austrian patriotism, although they were careful to distinguish between the cosmopolitan 
Austrian nationalism which they advocated and the aggressive, chauvinistic großdeutsch
nationalism that had nearly destroyed Austria.953  Other Austrian educators, particularly 
those on the left, were more circumspect about advocating any variety of nationalism, 
however, even as they highlighted the existence the Austrian nation.  The textbook author 
Friedrich Korger asserted that the idea that there was a necessary linkage between notions of 
Volk, nation, and state was an outmoded concept which had shown its destructive character 
951Peter, “Unterricht und Erziehung als Bekenntnis zum Vaterlande,” 233.
952Oscar Pollack, “Der Kampf gegen den inneren Nazi,” 5-6.
953Peter, “Unterricht und Erziehung als Bekenntnis zum Vaterlande,” 233; Görlich, “Österreichischen 
Staatsbewußtsein,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (1955): 296-7; “Erziehung zu Österreich,” 2-3.
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during the Second World War.954  Likewise, Socialist commentators such as Erich Körner 
argued that even the sort of Austrian nationalism advocated by the right was a danger to 
Austrian independence.955
There were even rare instances in which Austrian educational theorists seemed to 
allow that Austria, as nationally distinctive as it supposedly was, was still in some sense part 
of the wider German community of Europe.  In a 1955 article in the conservative journal 
Österreichische Pädagogische Warte, Karl Schalberger supported the cultivation of a non-
chauvinistic form of Austrian nationalism, but at the same time he argued that the Austrian 
nation had descended from the medieval German Volk, and even in the postwar period there 
remained a wider German cultural community to which Austria belonged.  Schalberger 
noted that Austria’s own cultural output was indistinguishable from the larger culture of 
Germandom, and that respect for the German cultural community was a necessary part of 
Austrian patriotism.956  Such statements were extraordinarily rare in mainstream pedagogical 
discussion, but as we have seen, were not so different from the postwar Austrian president 
Karl Renner’s comments concerning the enduring nature of Austria’s linguistic and cultural 
bonds with Germany.957
Indeed, there seems to have been some confusion concerning the meaning of 
concepts such as “Volk” and “nation” in postwar Austria.  In a 1951 article, Klemens Zens 
recounted a dialogue from an Austrian secondary school classroom on the topic of “the 
state.”  The students and the instructor discussed what notions such as “state,” “race,” 
954Korger, “Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung,” 460-467.
955Erich Körner, “Gibt es eine österreichische Nation?” Die Zukunft (March, 1949): 74-76.
956Karl Schalberger, “Wo ist das Vaterland?” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (1955): 228-31.
957Karl Renner, “Am Ausgangspunkt der Zukunft.  Rede zur Neunhundertfünfzigjahrfeier Österreichs am 
22. Oktober 1946,” 55-6.
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“Volk,” and “nation” might mean, and puzzled over the extent to which they corresponded to 
one another.  The instructor did not resolve any of these questions for the students, but rather 
left them as matters for further reflection.  Zens himself seemed to think that such 
discussions were important for postwar Austrian students, but he offered no firmer answers 
to the questions raised in the dialogue than the unnamed instructor.958
Thus, although there was nearly unanimous support among Austrian educators for 
the inclusion of instruction concerning an Austrian national consciousness in Austria’s 
postwar educational efforts, they often disagreed with one another considerably concerning 
what Austrian national identity meant.  No matter what their specific definition of Austrian 
national identity,  however, they all generally agreed that a new view of Austria’s history 
was vitally necessary in order to bolster a postwar sense of Austrian distinctiveness.  
Since postwar educators felt that one of the most serious problems with previous 
visions of Austria’s past had involved presenting that past as too narrowly entwined with the 
threads of German history, they usually argued that such deficiencies could best be corrected 
by portraying Austrian history in a more appropriately multinational context.  Ernst Mayer 
and Heinrich Gassner argued that the true context for Austria’s history was a Danubian one, 
given the longtime association between the territory of the contemporary Austrian republic 
with the other territories on the Danube.  They admitted that Austria’s ties to German 
Europe certainly could not be ignored, but argued that Austria and Vienna had traditionally 
been much more oriented toward the Donauraum than they had toward the northern German 
958Klemens Zens, “‘Der Staat.’  Möglichkeiten des freien Unterrichtsgespräches auf der Oberstufe.”
Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (February-March, 1951): 47-50.
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states.959
Other commentators argued that Austria had historically been far more of a 
European entity than a German one, and hence the nation’s past was best to be understood in 
the context of the history of the continent as a whole.  Franz Joachim asserted that Austria’s 
culture had derived its distinctiveness from such broad European roots as Greek philosophy 
and art, Jewish religion, and Roman law and political organization, all of which had been 
brought to Austria by the Roman Catholic Church.  The strength of the Church and Catholic 
piety in Austria ultimately served to distinguish its culture from that of the predominantly 
Protestant German nation.960  Other educational theorists such as Gassner and Leopold 
Zechner did not emphasize the role of Catholicism in Austria to the degree that the 
conservative Joachim did, but largely agreed with his assessment that Austria had 
traditionally been a supranational European entity which had little in common with notions 
of a historical German “nation.”961
Indeed, some educators argued that the vital European context of Austrian history 
was necessary to understand Austria’s continuing mission to work as a force for 
international peace and understanding, and to serve as a cultural bridge between East and 
West.  This notion of  Austria’s European “mission,” which had been so frequently 
discussed throughout Austria’s recent history, thus also appeared in a pedagogical context as 
well.  Postwar Austrian educators did not endorse this Austrian mission unequivocally, 
959Ernst Mayer, “Nationalsozialistische und objektive Geschichtsauffassung,” Erziehung und Unterricht
(1946): 392-402; Heinrich Gassner, “Prolegoma zu einer österreichischen Geschichte,” Erziehung und 
Unterricht (1948): 11.
960Franz Joachim, “Der Geschichtsunterricht im neuen Österreich,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
(March, 1949): 39-41. 
961Gassner, “Proglegoma zu einer österreichischen Geschichte,” 7-9; Leopold Zechner, 
“Geschichtsunterricht im neuen Österreich,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 23-28;  “Staatsbürgerliche 
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however.  Fischer warned against the return to any notions of a “German mission” for 
Austria which had been used to such evil ends by the Nazis, and Korger avowed that a sense 
of quasi-religious nationalistic mission for any people inevitably resulted in bloodshed.  For 
may other pedagogical theorists, however, the notion of an Austrian calling to work for 
peace in Europe seemed innocuous enough and fit with the European character of Austrian 
history that many theorists proposed 962
Postwar Austrian educators obviously had to grapple with the question of the degree 
to which Austrian education should emphasize continuity between the contemporary 
Austrian Republic and the Habsburg Monarchy which had proceeded it.  A view of Austrian 
history which emphasized the distinctive multinational character of the old Monarchy was 
certainly useful to the efforts of Austrian teachers to trace the development of a distinctive 
Austrian national character which differentiated Austria from Germany.  At the same time, 
however, the monarchical and even absolutist nature of Habsburg Austria seemed to be at 
odds with the sort of democratic values which the Second Republic’s educational system so 
fervently sought to emphasize.
Ultimately Austrian educators could not agree about the extent to which the 
Monarchy’s history should be emphasized.  The Socialist educational theorist Anton 
Tesarek advocated completely disavowing Austria’s Habsburg past in history education in 
favor of a historical narrative which emphasized the founding of the first Republic in 1918 
Erziehung,” Verordnungsblatt (August 1, 1949): 149-150.
962Gassner, “Proglegoma zu einer österreichischen Geschichte, “18-19;Viktor Fadrus, “Das einheitlich 
Schulbuchwerk für alle Schulen in Österreich,” Verordnungsblatt (June 1, 1946): 8; Anton Simonic, “Die 
Aufgaben des Lehrbilders,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 73-78; Korger, “Erziehung zu Österreich,” 
4; Fischer, “Österreich, wie es war,” Unser Weg 9/10 (November/December 1946): 16-17.
569
as the true beginning of Austria’s history.963  Gassner and Fadrus also downplayed continuity 
between the old Monarchy and modern Austria, noting that while memories of Austria’s 
past continued to have importance, 1918 and even the final demise of pro-Anschluß
sentiment after 1945 represented more logical starting points for the study of such a truly 
new entity as the Austrian Republic.964
Most Austrian educational theorists recognized that such views were not particularly 
practical when it came to instilling students with a sense of Austrian national consciousness, 
however.  Ultimately a longer view of Austria’s past was indispensable in terms of 
grounding Austria’s nationhood.  Some educators compromised by emphasizing the 
historical unity of the Alpine territories within the Monarchy as the legacy for the modern 
Austrian Republic, rather than focusing on the Monarchy as a whole.  For example, in a 
discussion of the pedagogical use of illustrations, Rudolf Kroyer presented a map of Austria 
which listed when the provinces which now comprised the Second Republic joined the 
Habsburg state, implying a continuity between the Monarchy and modern Austria, but 
emphasizing only Alpine Austria.965
Other Austrian educational thinkers, however, did not shy away from presenting the 
entire multinational Habsburg state as the historical foundation for modern Austria.  
Conservative educators were of course particularly willing to discuss contemporary 
Austria’s roots in the Monarchy.  Ernst Josef Görlich presented the Austria of his era as the 
result of the gradual union of the Alpine provinces dating back to the pre-Roman kingdom 
963Anton Tesarek, “Erziehung zur Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu 
einem politischen Problem,” Die Zukunft (May, 1946): 18.
964Heinrich Gassner and Viktor Fadrus, “Grundlinien eines Erziehungsplan für die österreichischen 
Schulen,” Verordnungsblatt 11 (1947): 1-8.  
965Rudolf Kroyer,“Behandlung des Merkstoffes im Geschichtsunterricht,” Österreichische Pädagogische 
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of Norica, but he argued that it had been the Babenbergs and especially the Habsburgs who 
had really advanced such unity, and he emphasized the importance of Alpine Austria’s 
historical ties to other regions of the Monarchy.  Indeed, as we have seen, even Ernst 
Fischer, the Communist intellectual and first Minister of Education of the Second Republic, 
had been quite willing to ground his unabashedly Marxist understanding of Austrian 
national identity in a national character which had been the fruit of the larger Habsburg 
state, and had recommended that Austrian history education disseminate this view to 
students.966
The government of the Second Republic itself explicitly endorsed such a vision of 
Austria’s past with its official celebration of the 950th  anniversary of Austria’s name in 
autumn of 1946.  The celebration focused upon the first recorded usage of the name 
“Ostarrichi” in 996, and aimed to “strengthen the Austrian state idea after years of foreign 
domination,” and to “proclaim the political and cultural independence of the Austrian 
Volk.”967  Many Austrian educators rallied around the celebration, presenting the 
“Ostarrichi” name as the counterpoint to the anachronistic usage of the label “Ostmark” for 
Austria which had been foisted upon the state by Prussian and Nazi historical propagandists 
who had aimed to subsume Austrian history into that of Germany.  They portrayed modern 
Austria as the culmination of nearly a millennium of continuous historical development, a 
development which obviously included the Habsburg Monarchy’s centuries of rule of 
Warte (April, 1951): 95-8.
966Ernst Josef Görlich, “Ewiges Österreich. 3. Der Staat,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
(December, 1948): 271-4; Ernst Fischer, “Österreich, wie es war,” Unser Weg 9/10 (November/December 
1946): 3-17.
967Offizielle Festschrift zur 950-Jahr-Feier Österreichs, 3.
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Alpine Austria.968
Of course, given the extensive disagreement among Austria’s major political parties 
concerning the exact role of the Habsburg dynasty itself in Austria’s history, there naturally 
was little widespread agreement among Austrian pedagogical thinkers concerning how best 
to depict the Habsburgs’ contribution to modern Austria’s history.  Representatives of 
Austria’s major political ideologies such as Görlich, Fischer, and Tesarek were also active in 
the Second Republic’s pedagogical discussions, and generally expressed what could be 
regarded as the “party line” of their respective political camps regarding the Habsburgs.  The 
conservatives portrayed the dynasty as the creators of a benevolent multinational Monarchy,
while the two parties of the left presented a more negative view of the imperial house as an 
obstacle to democracy and freedom in the admittedly felicitous supranational state which it 
had founded.969
Less ideologically committed pedagogical thinkers presented a more balanced view 
of the dynasty.  They praised the Habsburgs for helping create the Austrian nation and for 
forging the ties between German-speakers and Slavs and Magyars in the Danubian region 
968Erhard Dzimirsky, “950 Jahre Österreich: Österreich als Staat,” Unser Weg 7/9 (September/October 
1946): 24-39; J. Dobretsberger, “Hinter dem Hass steht das Grauen und der Tod–die Güte allein schafft 
neues Leben.  Worte zur 950-Jahr-Feier Österreichs,” Unser Weg (February l, 1947): 2-8;  Ludwig Reiter, 
“‘Ostmark’ oder Ostarichi? (Zu Feier ‘950 Jahre Österreich’),” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte
(September, 1946): 116-7; Görlich, “Einige Grundaufsetzungen einer österreichischen 
Geschichtsdarstellung,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 309-312; Josef Kallus, “Kulturbild aus der Zeit 
der Entstehung des Names ‘Ostarrichi,’” Erziehung und Unterreicht (September-October 1949): 473-5.
969For the basic conservative view of the Habsburgs as expressed in educational journals, see 
Görlich,“Einige Grundaufsetzungen einer österreichischen Geschichtsdarstellung,” 309-312; Franz 
Joachim, “Der Geschichtsunterricht im neuen Österreich,” 39-41; Richard Meister, “Die grosstaten des 
alten Österreich auf dem Gebiet des Bildungswesens,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1946): 200-211; for the 
Communists, see Fischer, “Österreich, wie es war,” 3-17; for the Socialists, see Tesarek,  “Erziehung zur 
Demokratie, zum Republikanismus, zum Pacifismus.  Gedanken zu einem politischen Problem,” 18; idem, 
“Des 13. März des Jahres 1848 (Eine Gedenkfeier für Arbeiterkinder),” Sozialistische Erziehungsarbeit
(1947): 1-18.. See Chapter 6 for a more complete discussion of the representation of the Habsburg past by 
the Second Republic’s political parties.
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which had largely been responsible for the prosperity and cultural progress for all of their 
Monarchy’s national groups, including the Austrian Volk.970  Yet at the same time, such 
educators did not shrink from criticizing the sometimes oppressive actions of the dynasty 
over the course of Austrian history.  These criticisms generally focused upon the widespread 
censorship and legal restrictions in Austria under Metternich, or upon the opposition of the 
dynasty to legitimate demands by the Austrian people during the revolution of 1848.  
Likewise, educators frequently criticized the Monarchy’s government for its unwillingness 
to modify the state’s administrative arrangements during the last years of its history in order 
to create a more equitable situation for the oppressed nationalities.971  The postwar 
pedagogical community’s emphasis on the Monarchy’s multinational character, and its 
frequent criticisms of the dynasty’s failure to recognize the national rights of their subjects 
were new features in Austrian pedagogical discourse.  Earlier critiques of the Monarchy’s 
oppression of the German Volk or discussions of the civilizing role of German culture in the 
East had disappeared in favor of a new appreciation for the Habsburg Monarchy as a flawed 
but admirable supranational community of nations.
Despite their acknowledgment of the importance of the dynasty to Austria’s history, 
several educators also argued that previous presentations of the nation’s past had vastly 
overrated the importance of military and dynastic history.  While the Habsburg monarchs 
and the leaders of their armies had certainly had a significant influence upon the life of 
Austria’s inhabitants, to focus upon those subjects to exclusion of other vital matters such as 
970Gassner, “Die Schule im neuen Österreichisch.  Aufgabe, Weg, Ziel,” 3-4; “Proglegoma zu einer 
österreichischen Geschichte,” 14-15; Ludwig Battista, “Hundert Jahre Unterrichtsministerium,” Erziehung 
und Unterricht (1948): 237; Max Kössler, “Geschichtliches Wissen als wertvolle Hilfe beim Bau des 
neuen Österreich,” Unser Weg (April, 1948): 36-40.  
971Franz Hillebrandt, “1848,” Unser Weg (March, 1948): 2-13; Ferdinand Tremel, “1848,” Unser Weg 
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cultural, economic, and social development was to do the Austrian Volk a disservice.  Such 
an overemphasis upon dynastic and military matters was, in the eyes of these pedagogues, 
also at least partially responsible for the recent nationalistic conflicts between the Great 
Powers of Europe as well. 972  Conservative educators of course did not share this criticism 
of dynastic history, despite their newfound emphasis upon peace, democracy and 
internationalism.
Thus, the postwar Austrian pedagogical community had considerable enthusiasm for 
the Second Republic’s avowed goals of reforming the state’s educational system in order to 
instill a commitment to democracy and a sense of Austrian identity in Austria’s youth.  
Austrians educators likewise generally agreed that a portrayal of Austria’s past which 
eschewed previous Germanist and anti-democratic misconceptions was a profoundly 
important tool to generate consciousness of Austrian distinctiveness in students.  The 
consensus concerning such matters broke down, however, when it came to the actual details 
of such an enterprise.  Postwar pedagogical theorists disagreed frequently concerning the 
sort of Austrian identity which was most desirable for the educational system, and were at 
odds with one another concerning how to portray the dynastic element of Austria’s past.  So, 
as with the debate concerning the relationship between the Second Republic and the 
Habsburg past among Austria’s political parties, Austrian educators agreed upon the broad 
goals of reform within the educational system, but they could not arrive at any actual 
consensus about how exactly to accomplish those aims.
(March, 1948): 13-23; Gassner, “Proglegoma zu einer österreichischen Geschichte,”16.
972J. C. Maderner, “Ein neues Geschichtslehrbuch,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1948): 189-191; Renatus 
Fürstenberg, “Die Schule im Dienste der Völkerverständigung,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1948): 156-7; 
Isolde Emich, “Kulturgeschichte statt kriegsgeschichte,” Erziehung und Unterreicht (January-February 
1949): 27-8; Walther Winternitz, “Kriegsspielzeug auf dem Gabentisch?” Unser Weg (November-
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iv. The Second Republic’s History Textbooks and the Habsburg Past 
Ultimately the success of the Second Republic at reforming its educational system in 
order to inculcate students with democratic and national consciousness must be judged not 
by the content of postwar pedagogical debates or of relatively vague official curricula, but 
rather according to what happened in the classroom.  The history and civics textbooks used 
by the Second Republic thus reveal how postwar educational system produced a new 
program of instruction.  Given the lack of a total overhaul of the state’s postwar curricula, 
and the failure of Austria’s educators to come to complete consensus concerning how best to 
effect changes in the character of Austrian history education, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the textbooks and readers produced by the Second Republic failed to achieve all of the 
ambitious goals set by Austria’s postwar leaders.  The new textbooks changed rather slowly 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, and ultimately remained remarkably similar to 
the instructional materials which had been used by the First Republic and the Ständestaat.  
The postwar texts did ultimately show a significant shift toward an emphasis upon the 
importance of democracy in the postwar era, and presented a view of Austria’s recent Nazi 
past as the subjugation of Austria by a foreign invaders.  In the end, however, such 
textbooks frequently did not present the sort of vision of Austria’s deeper Habsburg past 
which decoupled Austrian history from that of Germany that was advocated by the Second 
Republic’s leaders.
From the very beginning of the postwar era, Austria’s new government recognized 
the absolute necessity of producing new educational texts.  The books used in Austria’s 
December, 1953): 499-504.
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schools under the Nazis had of course glorified National Socialism and presented Austrian 
history as a mere appendage of the history of the wider German Volk.973  As the one of the 
Second Republic’s Ministers of Education, Felix Hurdes, noted, denazifying the textbooks 
used in Austrian classrooms was just as important for the Second Republic as cleansing the 
educational laws of the Nazi spirit.974  There was a consensus among Austrian educators, 
however, that merely denazifyning textbooks would not be sufficient to truly establish an 
independent, democratic Austria.  Viktor Fadrus argued that the state’s new textbooks had to 
be oriented toward inculcating students with Austrian state and cultural consciousness, 
democratic thought, and social equality.  Anton Tesarek similarly argued that the textbooks 
of previous governments had not been sufficiently democratic, and had perhaps contributed 
to Austria’s descent into fascism.975
Educational theorists and policy makers thus wanted the production of new history 
textbooks to be a special priority for the Second Republic.  As J. C. Maderner noted, other 
subjects might be able to use the old, pre-1934 textbooks, but Austrian history education 
certainly could not continue to utilize such materials.  The old history texts were too 
großdeutsch in orientation, and paid homage to dynastic monarchs, even those who were 
undeserving of the obedience of their subjects.  The recent failings of the Austrian Volk were 
in part due to a failure of historical judgement, so history texts had to be totally rewritten.976
Karl Heinz Dworczak similarly argued that Austrian history textbooks had to break sharply 
with previous representations of the past, emphasizing a critical view of Austria’s anti-
973See Chapter 5.
974Hurdes, “Zur Aufgabe der katholischen Lehrerschaft beim Neuaufbau des österreichischen 
Schulwesens,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (March, 1946): 3-6.  
975Fadrus, “Das einheitlich Schulbuchwerk für alle Schulen in Österreich,” 9-13; Tesarek, “Umrisse einer 
republikanische Schule,” 21.
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democratic and German nationalist failings.  Only through a frank discussion of the faults 
and failures of Austrians in the past could the postwar republic help Austrian students 
embrace a new democratic and patriotic Austrian state.977  In 1950 the conservative educator 
Karl Johannes Grauer even proposed international textbooks be produced cooperatively by 
multiple states.978
In order to enact this sweeping textbook reform, the Second Republic founded the 
Kommission für Lehrbücher und Schulgestalt in late 1945 to oversee the editing, publication 
and advertising of all texts, picture books, maps, films, and other educational materials used 
in Austrian schools.979  The government charged the commission with ensuring that such 
materials’ content conformed to postwar Austria’s democratic and national ideals, and gave 
it the power to approve all such materials.  The Ministry of Education did make allowances, 
however, for the use of “classic” readings or books in conjunction with the state curricula, 
and these materials required no special approval.  In a similar manner, texts on relatively 
noncontroversial subjects such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and vocational training 
also did not require the committee’s close attention.980
Early in the Second Republic’s history, however, Viktor Fadrus noted that the 
production of new educational texts was proceeding slowly.  In response to requests by 
educators from Austria’s various provinces that they be allowed to produce individualized 
976J. C. Maderner, “Ein neues Geschichtslehrbuch,” 189-191.
977Karl Heinz Dworczak, “Entgiftung der Geschichtsbücher,” Erziehung und Unterricht (1948): 608-610.
978Nothing ever came of such ideas, however.  Karl Johannes Grauer, “Probleme der 
Geschichtsdarstellung,” Österreichische Pädagogische Warte (May-June, 1951): 129.
979The Allied occupiers of Austria also exercised significant oversight of Austrian textbooks, especially 
between 1945 and 1948.  Utgaard, “From Blümchenkaffee to Wiener Melange: Schools, Identity, and the 
Birth of the ‘Austria-as-Victim’ Myth, 1945-55,” Austrian History Yearbook 30 (1999): 134-135.
980“Herausgabe, Begutachtung und Zulassung von Schulbüchern, Jugendschriften und Lehrbehelfen,”  
Verordnungsblatt (October, 1945): 69-71.
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textbooks to suit the needs of the particular regions, Fadrus argued that Austria’s educational 
system still had a long way to go in order to return its textbooks to the high quality which 
they had displayed before the Nazi period.  Paper was in short supply, and the government 
needed Allied financial and material assistance to produce any new texts.  As matters stood 
in 1946, Fadrus asserted that to simply even produce workable textbooks on the national 
level required all of Austria’s best pedagogical minds to work together.981  Indeed, getting all 
of the state’s teachers to use the new texts was apparently a problem throughout the early 
years of the Second Republic, as in 1950 the Ministry of Education, in response to reports of 
the use of non-approved textbooks, had to reiterate that only texts approved after 1945 could 
be used in Austrian schools.982
The Second Republic did ultimately produce a number of new history textbooks, 
which more or less presented new views of Austria’s past.  These textbooks did incorporate 
more cultural and social history, and consequently less military and dynastic history, than 
before.  Aus alter und neuer Zeit, a history textbook for primary schools produced in late 
1945, for example, contained a section on “Heroes of Humanity” which discussed figures 
from the sciences, scholarship, and the arts as well as everyday citizens, and made 
absolutely no mention of military or political icons.  War, when it was discussed, appeared 
as an evil which afflicted humanity.983  Similarly, a pedagogical manual for teachers in 
Austrian primary schools presented material for instructors to use which drew in equal 
981Viktor Fadrus, “Das einheitlich Schulbuchwerk für alle Schulen in Österreich,”  Verordnungsblatt (June 
1, 1946): 9-13.
982“Mißbräuchliche Verwendung von nicht approbierten Lehrbüchern,” Verordnungsblatt (October 15, 
1950): 203.
983Aus alter und neuer Zeit, vol. 1 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Ed Hölzel, Österreichischer 
Bundesverlag, Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1945), 16-17.
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measures from social, cultural, economic, and political history.984  Ludwig Stöger’s 1951 
history textbook for secondary schools also presented a mixture of military, political, and 
cultural matters, discussing martial heroes such as Leopold V von Babenberg and Andreas 
Hofer alongside more peaceful heroes such as researchers, discoverers, inventors, and 
artists. 985  Ultimately, however, most history texts either inserted small vignettes concerning 
Austria’s social and cultural development into their texts, or simply retained the political and 
military focus which the states history textbooks had presented since the Habsburg era.  
Even Stöger’s account ultimately had far more political and military content than it had 
concerning cultural and social matters.986
Postwar textbooks also largely retained the view of Austria as an area of Germanic 
settlement characteristic of earlier texts.  As we have seen, not all postwar Austrians 
themselves agreed on whether the Austrian Volk was first and foremost a Germanic people 
or not, but a sizable group of postwar commentators from both the conservative and 
Communist camps had argued vigorously that Austrians represented an ethnic admixture 
rather than a purely Germanic lineage.  The postwar textbooks rarely reflected such notions.  
Heinrich Kotz’s history text for Hauptschulen portrayed Austrians as the descendants of 
tenth-century Germanic Bavarian settlers who had overwhelmed the region’s previous 
Slavic inhabitants.  Stöger presented an even more blatantly Germanist orientation explicitly 
984Ferdinand Prillinger, Methodik für Volksschulen, vol. 2, Heimatkunde, Geographie und Geschichte  
(Salzburg: Verlag Salzburger Kultur Vereiningung, 1949), 77-89.
985Ludwig Stöger, Geschichte in Tafelbildern und Zusammenfassungen (Wels: Verlagsbuchhandlung 
Leitner, 1951), 22-23.
986Ibid., 22-23; see also Franz Heilsberg and Friedrich Korger, Allgemeine Geschichte der Neuzeit, von der 
Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 4, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die Oberstufe der 
Mittelschulen.  (Vienna: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Verlag Ed. Hölzel, Österreichischer 
Bundesverlag, 1955); Heinrich Kotz, Geschichte für Hauptschulen, vols. 1-2 (Innsbruck: Verlagsanstalt 
Tyrolia, 1945).
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avowing that Austrians were part of the German Volk, even though they had traditionally 
had their own separate state and “other missions” than the rest of their national brethren.987
Textbooks which demonstrated a willingness to explicitly break with such Germanist 
interpretations of Austrian descent, such as Robert Endres’ 1950 civics manual, which 
proclaimed that Austrians represented a racial mixture of Illyrians, Celts, Bavarians, Franks, 
Slavs, Avars, and Magyars, were quite uncommon during the early Second Republic.988
Moreover, some postwar textbooks did not even reflect the postwar consensus on the 
importance of using “Ostarrichi” or “Österreich” instead of “Ostmark” to describe Austria.  
Both Endres and Prillinger made a note of the preferred usage and denounced “Ostmark” as 
an anachronistically großdeutsch label, but Kotz and Stöger used both labels 
interchangeably without noting any sort preference one way or the other.989
At least some texts did attempt to emphasize Austrian distinctiveness, however.  For 
example, Aus alter und neuer Zeit described an Austrian Volk which spoke “österreichisch,” 
presenting the Austrian dialect of German as a distinctive language.990  Even Stöger allowed 
that the Germans of Austria had their own special mission to protect the West from Eastern 
invasions while spreading Western culture eastward in times of peace.  Franz Heilsberg and 
Friedrich Korger’s textbook for upper level students in Austrian Mittleschulen presented a 
similar sense of Austrian mission which saw Austrians spreading Viennese and Alpine 
German culture to areas of Slavic and Magyar settlement.991  Likwise, Endres described the 
987Kotz, 64-71; Stöger, 20-21.
988Robert Endres, Österreichische Staatsbürgerkunde, 6th ed. (Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1950), 
34-37.
989Prillinger, 77; Endres, “Österreich geht nicht unter,” in Der Österreicher hat ein Vaterland, ed. Florian 
Gröll (Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1955), 15; Kotz, 5-7; Stöger, 30.
990Aus alter und neuer Zeit, 11-13.
991Stöger, 30, Heilsberg and Korger, 96.
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distinctive Austrian national penchant for humaneness, toleration, and freedom, and he 
advised young Austrian citizens to preserve and build upon Austria’s millenia-old culture 
and political essence (Dasein).992
Ultimately, however, the most serious failing which all of the Second Republic’s 
textbooks displayed was a tendency to repeat the same sort of Germanocentric historical 
narrative characteristic of previous texts.  Their focus was clearly on Austria’s Habsburg 
past, and upon the various monarchs and leaders who had guided that state, but they made 
little effort to portray the old Monarchy as anything other than a particularly large German 
dynastic state which had just happened to contain numerous other non-German national 
groups.  When the empire’s non-German-speaking nationalities appeared in a significant 
way in these narratives, it was usually only in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and then generally only because they contributed to the demise of the Habsburg state.993
While postwar textbooks did not denounce the dynasty as anti-German oppressors, 
as Nazi texts had done, neither did they differentiate  much between the history of the 
Habsburg state and the history of the German states.  Indeed most of the Second Republic’s 
history texts contained the same interweaving of the history of the Habsburg imperial house 
with the history of the wider domain of Germany which had featured prominently in 
historical narratives in textbooks during the First Republic, the Ständestaat, and even the last 
decades of the Monarchy itself.  Thus, alongside the discussions of the expansion’s of 
Vienna’s regional influence, the Turkish wars, and Biedermeier culture, postwar Austrian 
history textbooks frequently discussed German culture during the Middle Ages, Germany 
992Endres, 115.
993See Heilsberg and Korger, 89-98, 105-107; Stöger, 207; Hermann Gsteu, Geschichte Österreichs 
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after the Thirty Years War, and the wars of German unification.994  Only the history 
textbooks produced just before the signing the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, such as that of 
Heilsberg and Korger, showed even the beginnings of an attempt truly to differentiate 
between Austrian history and German history.995
These textbooks, however, frequently portrayed the main figures from the Habsburg 
dynasty itself in a positive light.  They praised such medieval and early modern monarchs as 
Rudolf von Habsburg, Rudolf IV, “the Founder,” and Maximilian I as dynastic figures who 
exemplified the best aspects of knightly culture, and who had encouraged the growth of a 
powerful Central European state through their judicious combination of military might, 
cunning diplomacy, and cultural patronage.996  Postwar textbooks similarly lauded 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century leaders such as Eugene of Savoy, Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II as individuals who helped lay the foundations for a strong, modern Austrian state 
through their wise military, administrative, and cultural policies.  Ultimately only the 
architects of the restrictive Vormärz-era policies such as Metternich and Franz I emerged as 
targets of significant criticism from postwar authors, and even then the textbooks frequently 
balanced those criticisms with an appreciative view of the era’s Biedermeier culture.997
Postwar textbook authors often did not analyze the Monarchy’s end in much detail, but even 
those who did, did not generally blame the dynasty itself for the state’s demise.  Stöger, 
Heilsberg, and Korger all attributed the collapse of the Habsburg state to a combination of 
national unrest on the part of the Monarchy’s Slavic subjects and the devastation wrought by 
(Innsbruck and Vienna: Tyrolia Verlag, 1947), 395.
994See for example Kotz, 7, 26-27, 89, 92-94; Stöger, 36, 44-45.
995For example, Heilberg and Korger contrast the Habsburgs’ multinational empire not only with czarist 
Russia and Ottoman Turkey, but also with the nationalistic German states.  Heilsberg and Korger, 26.
996Kotz, 29-31, 37, 69; Stöger, 126-127, 131, 136-137.
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the First World War.  Stöger at least did ultimately blame the outbreak and duration of that 
conflict upon “Prussian Germany,” one of the rare anti-German statements in his narrative.998
Thus postwar textbooks did portray the Habsburg dynasty and its representatives 
positively.  Ultimately, however, such depictions did not mark any sort of dramatic 
departure from the descriptions of Austria’s dynastic past in older textbooks.  Educational 
materials from  the last years of the old Monarchy, the First Republic, and the Ständestaat
had always focused upon the dynastic aspects of Austrian history.999  Only Nazi textbooks 
had really mounted a concerted effort to portray the Habsburgs in a negative manner and to 
diminish the value of their historical achievements.1000  What was really missing from most 
of the Second Republic’s textbooks was a new interpretive framework which portrayed the 
Habsburg past as unique, and fundamentally different from the German past.
One area where almost all of the Second Republic’s history and civics texts did 
directly reflect the postwar debate on Austrian national identity was in their portrayal of 
Austria’s more recent past.  Almost all of these textbooks did thoroughly differentiate 
between Austria and Nazi Germany.  The Nazi regime in Austria invariably appeared in 
postwar textbooks as a foreign imposition upon Austria established through invasion and 
conquest.  In the pages of these texts the Nazis emerge as the guilty parties in the Second 
World War and the Holocaust, events for which Austrians themselves bore no responsibility.  
997Stöger, 45-46.
998Stöger, 203-207; Heilsberg and Korger, 107.
999See for example Gustav, Rusch, Alois Herdegen and Franz Tiechl,  Lehrbuch der Geschichte (Vienna: 
Verlag von Pichlers Witwe & Sohn, 1911); Karl Czerwenka Alfred Bohmann, Lehrbuch der Geschichte 
für die Unterstufe der Mittelschulen (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, 
Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930); Andreas Zeehe and Adam Schuh, Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die oberen 
Klassen der Mittelschulen. (Vienna: Verlag Ed. Hölzel, 1930); Wilhelm Schier, Lehrbuch der Geschichte 
für österreichische Hauptschulen (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, 
Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1937).
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Thus even if history textbooks ultimately did little to bolster a historical sense of national 
identity in postwar Austria, they did at least reflect the convenient mythology of the Second 
Republic that Austria had been an innocent victim of Hitler’s regime between 1938 and 
1945.1001
History textbooks in the Second Republic may not have presented a clear vision of 
Austria’s historical distinctiveness, but postwar readers and anthologies did a somewhat 
better job.  Such collections were obviously easier to produce than completely new historical 
narratives, and the editors of such works were able to select readings which emphasized the 
importance of certain people, cultural products, or trends in Austria’s past.  For example, 
one reader for Austrian primary schools from 1950 contained a selection by Friedrich 
Schiller about Rudolf von Habsburg emphasizing the knightly values which he brought to 
the throne, a brief text concerning role of St. Stephan’s cathedral as a focal point for the 
thoroughly Austrian city of Vienna, and an essay about the importance of music in Austria’s 
distinctive culture.1002  A 1949 reader for secondary schools edited by Friedrich Korger and 
Josef Lehrl contained even more material which emphasized Austria’s unique history and 
distinguished culture.  It included works by such notable Austrians as Franz Grillparzer, 
Hugo von Hofsmanthal, Anton Wildgans, Leopold Kunschak, and Karl Renner, and its 
contents ranged from patriotic poems such as the Second Republic’s state anthem to 
1000See for example Dietrich Klaages, Geschichte als Nationalpolitische Erziehung (Frankfurt am Main: 
Verlag Moritz Diensterweg, 1939).
1001Aus alter und neuer Zeit, 15; Endres, 41; Heilsberg and Korger, 149-169.  Note that Heilsberg and 
Korger produced the only narrative history text between 1945 and 1955 which directly dealt with the Nazi 
era in Austrian history.  The other texts are citizenship textbooks or collections of brief historical 
descriptions for younger students.  For a detailed discussion of the Nazi past in the Second Republic’s 
textbooks, see Utgaard, Remembering and Forgetting Nazism, 25-70.
1002It is worth noting that the essay on music claimed such figures as Gluck, Beethoven, and Brahms for 
Austria’s cultural heritage, despite their German origins.  Heimat und weite Welt: Lesestoffe für die 7. und 
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depictions of important historical figures like Maria Theresa, Eugene of Savoy, and Andreas 
Hofer to democratic documents such as the text of the proclamation of the Second Republic 
in 1945.1003  Similarly, two books published in 1946 presented brief biographical sketches of 
a number of notable Austrians, including Wildgans, Freud, Otto Wagner, Gustav Mahler, 
Nestroy, and Mozart, in order to bolster the national pride of students.  The selections in 
these two works were fairly predictable, although they did also include biographies of less 
well known figures such as the nineteenth-century pacifist leader Berta von Suttner, the 
twentieth-century playwright Max Reinhardt, and the turn-of-the-century painter Franz von 
Defragger, as well as a description of the contributions of Austrian researchers of Indian 
culture.1004
Indeed, the Ministry of Education itself became involved in the selection of notable 
figures for students to look to with pride through its organization of periodic official 
celebrations.  In 1955 for example the state celebrated the lives and achievements of the 
baroque architect Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach, the nineteenth-century author Marie 
von Ebner_Eschenbach, and the classical composer Mozart, all of whom it presented as 
examples of characteristic and genuine Österreichertum.1005  Interestingly however, the early 
Second Republic also celebrated the cultural importance of figures from outside of Austria 
8. Schulstufe der österreichischen Volksschulen (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1950), 27-
30;215-219.
1003Friedrich Korger, and Josef Lehrl, eds.  Lesebuch für Mittelschulen, vol. 1 (Vienna: Österreichischer 
Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1949), 3, 153-157, 198-203, 230-233, 303-309, 335.
1004Alfons Übelhör and Richard Wolf, Grosse Österreicher (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 
1946); Alfons Übelhör and Richard Wolf, Grosse Österreicher II (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 
1946).
1005“Gedenktage; Fischer von Erlach, Mozart, Stifter, Edner Eschenbach.” Verordnungsblatt (December 1, 
1955): 249-50.
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such as Hans Christian Anderson, Tolstoy, Bach, Schilling, and Goethe.1006  The Ministry of 
Education did not  describe any of the latter three figures as in any sense nationally German, 
and indeed in the case of Goethe, it explicitly portrayed him as a figure of global importance 
rather than the cultural hero of just one nation.  Still the selection of such clearly German 
figures does seem unusual given the dedication to differentiating between Austria and 
Germany professed by Austria’s postwar leaders.
Ultimately, however, such efforts to highlight key figures or aspects of Austria’s past 
in isolation from an overarching historical narrative represented only superficial attempts at 
instilling Austrian students with a stronger Austrian national identity.1007  Similar efforts, 
after all, had also been made by the Ständestaat, which had proclaimed Austrian 
distinctiveness and patriotism within the context of a German conception of Austrian 
national identity.  Laudatory descriptions of the character of Maria Theresa and paeans to 
Austria’s natural beauty amounted to weak substitutes for a thoroughly revised vision of 
Austria’s past in the Second Republic’s efforts to lay the groundwork for a durable sense of 
Austrian nationhood.  Austria’s postwar leaders and educators clearly desired to provide the 
Republic’s students with such a systematic revision of Austria’s history, but by 1955 they 
had only barely begun to realize this goal.
1006 “Goethe-Jahr 1949, Veranstaltung in den Schulen Österreichs,” Verordnungsblatt (February 1, 1949): 
13-5;“Gedenkfeier für J. S. Bach,” Verordnungsblatt (March 15, 1950): 67; “125. Geburtstag Leo 
Tolstojs,”  Verordnungsblatt (August 1,1953): 124; “150. Geburtstag von Hans Christian Andersen, 150. 
Todestag Friedrich Schiller, Schulfeiern,” Verordnungsblatt (April 1,1955): 53-4.
1007Peter Utgaard, in examining the Second Republic’s educational policy and the “Austria-as-victim 
myth,” places undue weight upon such presentations of Austrian patriotism, culture and Heimat in 
transforming Austrian education.  A closer examination of the historical narratives presented to postwar 
Austrian students indicates that the actual changes in educational policy were less sweeping than he 
allows.  Utgaard, “From Blümchenkaffee to Wiener Melange: Schools, Identity, and the Birth of the 
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iv. The Changing Face of Austrian National Identity 
The Second Republic’s efforts at transforming its educational system met with only 
partial success.  The Ministry of Education, under various leaders, explicitly dedicated itself 
to the goals of instilling students with a commitment to democracy and a sense of Austrian 
national identity, and such aims were reflected in the state’s official curricula.  Both the 
state’s leaders and its pedagogical community agreed that a thorough reform of the study of 
Austrian history, which stressed the distinctiveness of the state’s long past and which clearly 
differentiated and even drew a contrast between Austria and Germany was vitally necessary 
to such an enterprise.  In the end, however, such a real transformation of the state’s 
educational presentation of the Habsburg past did not occur.  In both the state’s curricula 
and its textbooks there were some substantive changes, but for the most part any alterations 
came in the form of additions to existing educational materials.  The curricula and the 
textbooks by and large maintained the narrative of the state’s past that had been presented by 
previous Austrian educational systems, and postwar history textbooks in particular 
frequently preserved a großdeutsch aesthetic which was utterly out of step with the rhetoric 
coming from Austria’s political leaders.  The Austrian educator Friedrich Korger had 
warned in a 1950 article that vague platitudes concerning the special qualities of the 
Austrian homeland and its culture would be insufficient to ground a true sense of loyalty to 
the Austrian state in students.1008 Yet at times it seemed that such relatively empty gestures 
were all that the Second Republic offered students in terms of a new vision of Austria’s past.  
Austrian leaders and educators certainly advocated the sort of intensively political education 
‘Austria-as-Victim’ Myth, 1945-55,” 127-58.
1008Korger, “Erziehung zu Österreich,” 2.
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which Korger had recommended, but while they agreed on very basic goals for Austrian 
education, they could reach no consensus concerning the details, and they often lacked the 
resources to fully implement them.  Indeed perhaps the only total success of the postwar 
Austrian educational system was in its presentation of the Nazi past as a foreign conquest for 
which Austria itself bore no responsibility.
Indeed, there are certainly clear indications that the leaders of the Second Republic 
did not achieve the total transformation of the national outlook of its students which they 
desired.  In a 1956 public opinion survey reprinted in Georg Wagner’s Österreich Zweite 
Republik, forty-six percent of Austrians surveyed still maintained that Austrians were part of 
the German Volk, compared to forty-nine percent who claimed that Austrians were a people 
of their own.1009  The persistence of such großdeutsch notions as well as the small but 
continuing support for the German nationalist VdU are evidence that the efforts of the 
postwar leaders and educators to radically transform Austrian national identity were far from 
universally successful.
Ultimately, however, we should not be too quick to devalue the accomplishments of 
the postwar Austrians in changing the tone of the dialogue concerning Austrian national 
identity.  It is important to remember how prevalent statements which identified Austrians as 
part of the German Volk were between 1918 and 1945.  During that period German 
conceptions of Austrian national identity were much more prominent than Austrian ones.  
By the end of 1955, the Second Republic had witnessed a substantial reversal in the public 
discussion concerning Austrian national identity.  Now it was the Austrianist point of view 
which predominated and the Germanist one which represented a minority opinion.  A 
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universal transformation of Austrian public opinion concerning national identity was 
certainly not a realistic expectation, but the actual extent to which such opinion did shift 
after 1945 was impressive.  And the efforts of postwar Austrians to transform national 
opinions in fact continued beyond the end of Austria’s occupation.  The signing of the 
Austrian State Treaty in 1955 officially enshrined Austria’s separation from Germany in a 
binding legal document and brought the period of intense postwar discussion concerning 
Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past to a close, but the Second Republic’s 
efforts to promote an Austrianist identity continued in succeeding decades with 
incrementally increasing success.1010
Ultimately, the Second Republic’s leaders, intellectuals and educators did not 
contribute any new ideas to the Austrian debate on national identity.  Rather, they 
recapitulated arguments which had in fact been presented continuously by various 
individuals and groups since 1918.  The Second Republic’s attempt to recast Austrian 
national identity thus represented an amplification of previous Austrianist ideas from 
Austria’s public sphere accompanied by efforts to delegitimize the Germanist discourse 
which had been so dominant prior to 1945.  The arguments presented by Austria’s postwar 
leaders, thinkers and pedagogues invariably focused most upon the Habsburg past, and 
portrayed that past in a variety of different ways, but always with the aim of creating a sharp 
contrast between Austria’s national character and that of Germany.  The need of Austria’s 
leaders to deny their nation’s responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi state and to suppress a 
painful and potentially socially disruptive public discussion in Austria about such matters 
1009Wagner, 1432. 
1010For a discussion of these efforts beyond 1955, see Utgaard, Remembering and Forgetting Nazism, 71-
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undoubtedly played an important role in their efforts to support Austrian nationhood.  We 
cannot discount, however, the simple fact that großdeutsch sentiments had born catastrophic 
fruit for Austria during the Nazi era.  The undeniably horrific results of the Nazi Anschluß
certainly provided ample justification for Austrians to abandon their German nationalism.  
Ultimately, then, it was the tremendous physical devastation and the terrifying moral lapses 
which accompanied the Second World War which added a new urgency and momentum to 
Austrianist visions of the Habsburg past, while simultaneously delegitimizing the Germanist 
views which had been so fervently advocated by the Nazis.  Thus the decisive influence of 
the experience of the Second World War upon the Austrian debate concerning the Austrian 
nation and its Habsburg past stands as powerful evidence of the essential variability and 
fluidity of notions of national identity.
199; Thaler, 51-190.
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Conclusion: The Long Shadow of the Habsburg Past in Austria
The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and the withdrawal of Allied troops from 
Austria in 1955 marked the beginning of a new era of stability in Austrian public rhetoric 
concerning Austrian national identity.  Scholars who have written on the emergence of this 
new consensus regarding Austrian identity have focused on the fact that Austrian political 
leaders minimized Austrian complicity for the crimes of the Third Reich and thereby 
articulated a vision of Austrian nationhood which denied Austrian Germanness.1011  There is 
certainly good reason for this scholarly emphasis.  As we have seen, the Second Republic’s 
politicians, intellectuals and educators all declared their newfound belief in Austria’s 
distinctive nationhood as part of a conscious project to portray the 1938 Anschluß as a 
“foreign invasion” which had joined Austria with the Third Reich against its will.  While the 
new national rhetoric of Second Republic’s elites cannot be regarded as a totally cynical 
enterprise solely designed to evade Austria’s just share of the responsibility for the crimes of 
Third Reich, it is undeniable that Austria stood to gain a great deal of practical benefit by 
portraying itself as an entity separate from the German nation which had led Europe into a 
catastrophic war and genocide.  It is indeed true that no other factor was as important to the 
de-legitimization of Germanist conceptions of Austrian national identity and the emergence 
of a broadly based and forcefully articulated vision of a unique Austrian nationhood after 
1011See for example Utgaard, Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: the Austrian Experience of 
Nation_building in a Modern Society (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001).  See also 
Anton Pelinka, Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), and 
essays in Bischof and Pelinka, eds., Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity (New Brunswick 
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1945 than the Austrian experience of Nazi rule and the Second World War.
and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
In acknowledging the decisive importance of the Second Republic’s efforts to 
minimize Austrian complicity in the crimes of the Hitler regime in the debate over Austrian 
national identity, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that this Austrian debate did 
not begin in 1945, and that it encompassed other issues besides Austria’s Nazi past. As this 
study has demonstrated, the debate over Austrian national identity had deeper roots.  This 
national discussion in the Austrian public sphere had begun during the nineteenth century, 
but it gained a new urgency after1918 as Austria’s leaders were forced to define Austria’s 
place in the world apart from the multinational, dynastic Monarchy with which the destiny 
of their land had been inextricably linked for so many centuries.  The Austrian debate on 
national identity between 1918 and 1955 encompassed deeply important, existential 
questions for Austrians: Who were the Austrian people?  Where in Europe did they belong?  
What did the future hold for them?  It was simply impossible for any Austrian leader, 
intellectual, or educator to offer any answers to these queries without reference to the 
Habsburg Monarchy which had only so recently collapsed, and which had helped provide 
the necessary answers to these questions before 1918.  Indeed, as we have seen, any effort 
by Austria’s post-Habsburg elites to discuss whether or not Austrians were part of the 
German Volk or whether or not the existence of an independent Austrian state was desirable 
always entailed a concomitant effort to grapple with the meaning, historical function, and 
legacy of the old Habsburg Monarchy.  Simply put, Austrians could not make sense of their 
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present circumstances or possible future path without first coming to grips with their past.  
While the Nazi past may have been an overwhelmingly important issue for Austrians after 
1945, the Habsburg past was the most important component of the Austrian debate 
concerning national identity during the tumultuous period between 1918 and 1955.
Any scholarly discussion of Austrian national identity during this era cannot help but 
note that Austrian national identity was a “constructed” phenomenon.  The intellectual, 
political, and educational leaders of the Austrian state between 1918 and 1955 all recognized 
the importance of national identity, and they all consciously and openly worked to influence 
opinions on Austrian nationhood.  These Austrian elites were not content just to make public 
statements regarding Austrian identity, but they also attempted to use state educational 
policy as a tool to mold the national opinions of the next generation of Austrian citizens. 
The constructed character of Austrian national identity is revealed even more clearly 
by the fact that during this period multiple views regarding the national status of Austrians 
were advanced and disseminated by different political parties and governments.  During the 
era of the First Republic between 1918 and 1933, most of Austria’s political parties argued 
that Austrians were a part of the German Volk whose destiny lay in Anschluß with a great-
German state, an aspiration which was frustrated by the victors of the First World War.  This 
point of view was articulated even more vigorously by the Nazi regime which forcibly 
absorbed Austria into the Third Reich between 1938 and 1945, a fact underscored by the 
Nazi government’s active efforts to eradicate any sense of Austrian distinctiveness in the 
Austrian Gaue.  Of course, after the restoration of Austrian independence in 1945, the 
leaders of the Second Republic presented a vision of Austrian national identity which denied 
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any national kinship between Austrians and Germans, in part to minimize Austrian guilt for 
the war and to secure the withdrawal of Allied forces as quickly as possible.  Between these 
two extremes lay the authoritarian Ständestaat of the mid-1930s, which proclaimed Austrian 
membership in the German nation, but which also sought to inspire a sense of pride in 
Austria’s distinctive culture and history, and a loyalty to an independent Austrian state in its 
citizens, in no small part to try and keep the National Socialists both inside and outside of 
Austria from seizing power.  Each of these visions of Austrian national identity– whether 
Germanist, Austrianist, or of Austria as the “second German state”– had roots in Austria’s 
history and culture and represented a potentially viable resolution of Austria’s crisis of 
national identity of 1918.  The course and ultimate resolution of the Austrian debate on
national identity in 1955 depended far more on the shifting political circumstances which 
faced the Austrian state during this era than it did on the inherent correctness of any one of 
the proposed views on Austrian national identity.
Thus, the formulation of the modern notion of Austrian national identity generally 
serves to confirm the theories of nationalism proposed by scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm 
and Benedict Anderson, who argue that nationhood is a property which is constructed by the 
work of social and political elites rather than some inherent property of a people.1012  At the 
same time, however, we ought not lose sight of the fact that to say that a thing is 
“constructed” is to imply that it was constructed out of certain materials.  Such was certainly 
the case with Austrian national identity.  Austria’s leaders between 1918 and 1955 used the 
same “raw materials” in their national projects which scholars and historians have identified 
1012Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
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as the basic components of nationhood since the dawn of the era of modern nationalism in 
the nineteenth century: language, culture, religion, ethnicity and history.
The main difference between the various visions of Austrian national identity
proposed by the territory’s ideological factions and governments involved the manner in 
which these components of nationhood were put together.  Proponents of an Austrianist 
view of Austrian national identity were unable to make use of language or ethnicity to define 
the Austrian nation because those characteristics served to tie Austrians to other German-
speakers.  In a similar manner, the religion of the majority of Austrians, Roman Catholicism, 
was a faith which Austrians shared with other Germans, as well as other European national 
groups.  Thus, most Austrianists were forced to look to Austria’s history as part of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, separate from Europe’s other German states, and to the distinctive 
culture which Habsburg Austria produced, as the most important aspects of Austrian 
nationhood.  Austrian proponents of a Germanist national identity, on the other hand, were 
also forced to explain the meaning of the Habsburg past in Austria, even if only to 
characterize that past as a national aberration which had served to keep Austrian Germans 
apart from the ethnically, culturally, and linguistically defined German nation.  The 
Ständestaat’s more moderate view of Austria as nationally German but also as a land which 
was culturally and historically distinctive enough to merit its own state likewise drew 
heavily upon the memory of the Habsburg past.  
Opinions regarding Austrian national identity varied along a spectrum which 
stretched from a view of Austrians as Germans to a vision of Austrians as a unique national 
group, and which encompassed intermediate formulations of Austrian nationhood between 
of Nationalism (Thetford, Norfolk: The Thetford Press, Ltd., 1983).
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these two extremes.  In order to make arguments for any one of these opinions, Austrian 
political, intellectual, and educational leaders  had to assemble the building blocks of 
Austrian identity in different ways, alternately emphasizing or de-emphasizing various 
elements in order to make their case.  Without exception, all of these Austrian leaders were 
forced to confront and define the meaning of Austria’s Habsburg past.  So, we should not be 
too quick to assume that the constructed nature of Austrian identity meant that such an 
identity was simply invented by the territory’s leaders.  As the historian of nationalism 
Anthony Smith notes, national identity always has some concrete anchor in a perceived 
community of kinship.1013  Austrian national identity after 1918 could and did vary, but only 
within limits.  Those limits left enough room for Austrians to embrace either a Germanist or 
an Austrianist conception of national identity, or indeed even some intermediate 
formulation.  The circumstances with which Austria was confronted between 1918 and 
1955, as Anschluß with Germany was in turn prohibited, threatened, forcibly achieved, and 
just as forcibly undone by the great powers of Europe, dictated the shifting terms of this 
debate regarding national identity, and were in large part responsible for the form of the 
debate’s ultimate resolution.
Another critical element which helped to define the course of the Austrian debate 
over national identity was political ideology.  All of Austria’s major political camps after 
1918 possessed an ideological framework which served to define how each viewed Austria’s 
past.  These political ideologies changed somewhat as did Austria’s circumstances, and so 
too did their views of the past.  For example, the Austrian conservative camp in 1918 was 
guided by an ideology which was religious, traditionalist, and suspicious of democratic rule.  
1013Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (New York: B. Blackwell, 1987).
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Their initial vision of Austria’s Habsburg past held that the old Monarchy had been a 
benevolent institution which had fostered the material, cultural, and spiritual progress of the 
German Volk.  After the regrettable collapse of the Habsburgs’ admirable dynastic state, 
however, most conservatives in the early First Republic believed that Austria’s future lay in 
a union with a great-German state.  Once it became clear that the Entente powers would not 
relax their stance against Anschluß, the conservative faction made its peace with Austrian 
independence and by the late 1920s increasingly emphasized their positive narrative of the 
Habsburg past as the basis of a resurgent Austrian patriotism.  By the 1930s, the waxing 
threat of a National Socialist takeover of the Austrian state, whether from within Austria or 
under the auspices the Nazi government in Germany after 1933, helped inspire the 
conservative Austrian right to dismantle the democratic apparatus of the First Republic and
to replace it with an authoritarian government, The leaders of the Ständestaat proclaimed 
both Austrian Germanness, and Austrian uniqueness and independence, which they 
supported through their portrayal of the old Monarchy as the defender of both Austrian
tradition and  the German Volk as a whole.  After the feared Nazi takeover indeed occurred, 
the ideals of Austrian conservatism were driven underground, only to emerge considerably 
altered after the restoration of Austrian independence in 1945.  Postwar conservatives 
replaced their previous hostility toward democracy and liberalism with a newly minted 
devotion to democracy.  In a similar manner, they amplified their previous commitment to 
Austrian patriotism with a full blown sense of Austrian nationalism.  Their positive narrative 
of Austria’s Habsburg past remained, but conservatives after 1945 emphasized the 
multinational character of both the dynastic state and indeed the Austrian people themselves 
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to a far greater degree than the had before.
The major party of the Austrian left experienced a similar transformation of its 
ideology, and hence its views regarding Austrian history.  Unlike the conservatives, 
commitment to democracy was never a problem for the major faction of the political left, the 
Social Democrats.  They always fervently supported republican rule, and their vision of the 
Habsburg past reflected that fact.  They celebrated the foundation of the First Republic as 
the victory of the forces of progress in Austrian history over the reaction and oppression 
which the Habsburgs’ dynastic state had always represented.  They also believed that 
Austrians were part of the German Volk, and unlike the conservatives, they did not back 
away from that view before 1945.  The Social Democrats held that the Habsburgs had 
oppressed all of the constituent nations of their Empire, including the German Volk.  At the 
same time, however, the Social Democrats denounced chauvinistic nationalism, and argued 
that German unity could only be achieved as part of the movement of the working classes of 
all nations toward peace, democracy, social justice and international cooperation.  They 
viewed both the corporatist dictatorship of the mid-1930s and the Nazi regime which ruled 
Austria between 1938 and 1945 as variations on the same reactionary and predatory themes 
which they associated with the Habsburgs.  The reversal of the National Socialist Anschluß
in 1945 and the new realities of the Cold War forced the Social Democrats to abandon their 
previous dedication to German national unity.  Their newfound and comparatively weak 
sense of Austrian nationhood required the Socialists to modify their narrative regarding the 
Habsburg past.  While they still denounced the dynastic government itself as noxious and 
oppressive, they now celebrated the multinational community which the Habsburgs had 
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helped to create in a manner that they never had before 1945.
The other faction of the Austrian left, the Communist Party, which really only 
achieved genuine political significance during the 1930s and 1940s, presented a narrative of 
the Habsburg past which in many ways resembled that of the Social Democrats.  The 
Communists decried the oppressive character of the Habsburg government, and portrayed 
the Austrian working class as the true heroes of Austrian history.  Yet the Communists used 
this view of Austria’s past to make an argument concerning Austrian national identity which 
was the exact opposite of that of the Socialists before 1945.  The Communists argued that 
Austria was a nation separate from Germany, and they vehemently opposed any arguments 
in favor a union with the German state.  The political and national ideals of the Austrian 
Communists did not change to a large degree after 1945, a fact that is unsurprising given 
their ideological dependence upon their patrons in the Soviet Union.  While the Communists 
were committed to democracy in at least a rhetorical sense and had a firmer dedication to 
Austrian nationhood than their Social Democratic rivals did, the first decade of the Second 
Republic saw the precipitous decline of Communist electoral strength in Austria.  The 
Austrian voters experienced first hand the emptiness of the Soviet Union’s professed 
commitment to democracy and social justice during the Soviet occupation of eastern Austria 
between 1945 and 1955, and they consequently rejected the Austrian Communist Party at 
the ballot box despite its Austrian nationalist bona fides.
One further ideological group which found itself thoroughly de-legitimized in the 
early Second Republic was the Austrian German nationalist faction.  Since 1918, this group 
had argued most loudly in favor of Anschluß and Austrian Germanness.  While the early 
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years of the German nationalist faction were marked by a lack of unifying political 
principles, the members of this faction tended to portray the Habsburg Monarchy in a 
negative light.  The most generous German nationalists simply remarked that while 
Austria’s Habsburg past might have had some positive aspects, after its collapse in 1918, its 
example was simply no longer relevant to the Germans of Austria, whose destiny lay with 
the rest of the Volk.  The more hostile German nationalist commentators were far more 
critical of the old Monarchy, and decried it as an institution that had historically worked 
against German interests in order to bolster the dynasty’s political power.  Ultimately, it was 
this latter point of view which won out as the German nationalists of Austria became 
increasingly radicalized as a result of the depression of the late 1920s and the First 
Republic’s inability to achieve Anschluß.  By the 1930s the Austrian National Socialist Party 
had managed to attract the largest part of these Austrian German nationalists, and after the 
Nazi seizure of power in Austria in 1938, the Party’s virulently nationalistic and anti-
Habsburg interpretation of history became the dominant historical narrative in the Austrian 
lands.  After the end of the Hitler regime in 1945, however, German nationalism in Austria 
became taboo as the leaders of the Second Republic attempted to secure the withdrawal of 
the Allied forces by portraying Austria as the “first victim” of Nazi aggression.  The Union 
of Independents represented the political rebirth of the old German nationalist camp under 
liberal auspices, but it failed to win much support from Austrian voters due to its all too 
recent Nazi tendencies, and its statements regarding Austria’s Habsburg past were rare and 
quite timid when they occurred at all.
While almost all of Austria’s political factions were forced to transform their 
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national and political ideals in order to respond to Austria’s changing circumstances 
between 1918 and 1955, what is remarkable is how much continuity their respective 
narratives of Austrian history displayed throughout this period.  These narratives certainly 
changed between 1918 and 1955, but those changes were a matter of nuance rather than 
wholesale revision.  For example, the conservative view of the Habsburg Monarchy as the 
benevolent guardian of Austrian tradition after 1945 was certainly recognizable as the same 
basic narrative proffered by conservatives in 1918, despite the ÖVP’s newfound 
abandonment of German nationalism and its embrace of republican rule.  The Austrian 
conservative camp simply emphasized historical interpretations that had always been present 
within their ranks, albeit as minority views, while pushing other ideals which had once been 
dominant in its historical rhetoric into the background.  Thus, individuals within the 
conservative camp such as Oscar Schmitz or Ernst Karl Winter, who had seemed like voices 
in the wilderness before 1938 due to their unusually strong sense of Austrian nationhood, 
saw their views adopted by the mainstream of Austrian conservatism after 1945.  
In the same way, the Social Democrats’ characterization of the old Monarchy as a 
reactionary and oppressive institution, which had deservedly been vanquished by the 
Austrian working class, remained fundamentally unchanged between 1918 and 1955.  What 
did change was the degree to which the Party after 1945 emphasized the socialist principles 
of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and cooperation between Völker, which had always 
been present in its historical and national rhetoric, while at the same time de-emphasizing its 
previous focus upon German national unity.  The broad thrust of their historical narrative 
remained unchanged, while the manner in which they used that narrative to support Austrian 
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independence and nationhood shifted significantly. 
Those factions which were unable or unwilling to adapt their historical and national 
ideals to fit the Second Republic’s new circumstances, the Communists and the Austrian 
German nationalists, quickly found themselves without influence in Austrian politics after 
1945.  Again, it bears repeating that, no matter what position a given ideological faction 
took regarding Austrian national identity, all of these groups were forced to present some 
interpretation of Austria’s Habsburg past in order to make their arguments.  As the 
arguments concerning Austrian identity changed, so too did the manner in which the 
ideological camps used their narratives regarding the Habsburg past.  The necessity of 
confronting the Habsburg past in order to make statements regarding Austrian nationhood 
never changed, however, nor did the basic outline of the historical narratives that each of 
Austria’s major political groups presented throughout this era.
Educational policy provided the practical context in which various governments and 
parties tried to disseminate their views regarding Austrian nationhood and Austrian history 
to the public.  All governments and parties regarded education, especially history education, 
as a vitally important aspect of their efforts to influence public opinion on such matters.  The 
success of attempts to mold the content of Austrian education in order to reflect dominant 
views regarding Austrian national identity and the Habsburg past varied according the extent 
to which the Austrian government in power was able to establish a consensus regarding 
those topics, as well as according to the amount of time available to undertake the 
educational transformation. As dictatorships, both the Ständestaat and the Nazi regime were 
able to establish ideological conformity in education more effectively than either of the 
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Austrian Republics simply because they were able to quash dissent.  The governments of the 
First and Second Republics had a much more difficult time building an educational 
consensus through democratic means.  Even the Ständestaat and the government of the 
Third Reich, however, found themselves unable to completely transform education in 
Austria, given the short amount of time, five and seven years, respectively, which they had 
in order to accomplish the task.  The Second Republic, which was ultimately the most 
successful post-Habsburg Austrian government in terms of translating its national ideals into 
educational policy, had only just begun to reform the content of Austrian state education in 
order to reflect its Austrianist view of national identity by the time of Allied troops withdrew 
in 1955.  The Second Republic’s major political parties had accomplished the task of 
transforming their own national and historical ideals by that time, but it would not be until 
after 1955 that those views truly dominated in Austrian classrooms.1014  Other Austrian 
governments simply never had the luxury of time to effect similar ideological overhauls of 
the state educational system.
We may conclude then that while public political rhetoric regarding national identity 
and the interpretation of the past changed rapidly in order to reflect new circumstances in 
Austria between 1918 and 1955, it took far longer to transform state educational institutions 
in order to reflect those ideological changes. It was one thing to transform the national and 
historical opinions of political, intellectual, and pedagogical elites; it was another, far more 
laborious task entirely, to change the direction of the state’s educational bureaucracy from 
the Ministry level down to individual textbooks, teachers, and classrooms.  That was a 
1014For information of Austrian state education and national identity after 1955, see Peter Utgaard, 
Remembering And Forgetting Nazism: Education, National Identity and the Victim Myth in Postwar 
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process which required decades to succeed.  
Still, the Austrian case does provide evidence of the constructed nature of national 
identity.  Thanks to the committed work of the leaders of the Second Republic, and, to a 
lesser extent, to Austrianist patriots working before 1945, the state of national public opinion 
changed from majority support for a German Austrian identity in 1919 to a near majority in 
favor of a unique Austrian national identity in 1956.1015  By 1992 one public opinion survey 
in Austria revealed that more that 70 percent of those surveyed believed that Austrians 
constituted a distinct national group.1016  Given the absence of actual public opinion surveys 
between 1918 and 1955, and the actual suppression of free debate under the Ständestaat and 
Nazi governments between 1933 and 1945, we can never know the precise nature of public 
opinion on Austrian national identity for the entire period covered by this study.  We do, 
however, have data points for the Austrian public’s views concerning their identity for the 
beginning and end of this era, and this evidence strongly suggests a dramatic shift in these 
views.  It may have taken longer for this transformation of Austrian national sentiment to be 
completed, but the initial change in direction certainly had been decisively accomplished by 
1955.  The role of Austria’s political leaders, intellectuals, and educators in shaping the 
debate on Austrian national identity seems to have been a decisive one, and discussions and 
Austria (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 71-160. 
1015According to plebiscites in Voralberg and Tyrol in 1919 and 1921 cited in Alfred D. Low, The 
Anschluss Movement 1918-1919 and the Paris Peace Conference (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, (1974), 326-328; Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria, Empire and Republic, 1815-
1986 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 159-162; John Swanson, The Remnants of the 
Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of Modern Austria and Hungary, 1918-1922 (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 2001), 35-37; and a 1956 public opinion survey cited in Georg Wagner, Österreich Zweite 
Republik: Zeitgeshichte und Bundesstaatstradition, vol. 2 (Thaur/Tirol, Austria: Österreichischer 
Kulturverlag, 1987), 1432.
1016Peter Thaler,  The Ambivalence of Identity: the Austrian Experience of Nation_building in a Modern 
Society (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 127.
604
interpretations of Austria’s Habsburg past were the most important element of their efforts 
in that regard.  Likewise, the dramatic change in Austria’s circumstances between 1918 and 
1955 had a profound influence on the shift in Austrian national opinions, and it is impossible 
to explain to final outcome of the debate without reference to delegitimization of Austrian 
German nationalism by the experience of Nazi rule.  Thus, political ideology, diplomatic 
circumstance, and historical memory all interacted in complex manner between 1918 and 
1955 to shape the course and ultimate conclusion of the Austrian debate on national identity.
The Habsburg Past and Questions of Identity in Austria and Europe After 1955.
But what of Austrian national identity and interpretations of the Habsburg past after 
1955?  The ultimate success of the Austrianist view of national identity in the Second 
Republic after the signing of the State Treaty was due to one luxury which the new 
government enjoyed and which all of Austria’s other post-Habsburg governments had 
lacked: stability.  Paradoxically, the Cold War, which was such a profoundly destabilizing 
phenomenon throughout much of the rest of the world, created a stable political and 
diplomatic environment for Austria which it had not experienced since at least the reign of 
the Emperor Franz Joseph.  No longer did Austria have to agonize about its appropriate 
place in the European order or concerning whether or not its destiny lay in a great-German 
nation state.  The State Treaty had neatly resolved all of those issues for the Austrian people.  
After 1955, Austria became a neutral state on the border between the two mutually 
antagonistic Cold War blocks in Europe, enjoying the benefits of the liberal-democratic 
West’s economic prosperity without actual participation in the Western military alliance.  In 
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many ways, Austria became the “Ostmark” of the West that so many public figures had 
portrayed it as throughout its history, sitting on the ramparts of the border between the 
Western community of nations, face to face with a frightening and potentially hostile 
Eastern empire. The issue of Anschluß was a dead one, as the defeat of Nazi Germany and 
the division of Germany and the rest of Central Europe by the NATO and Iron Curtain 
ideological camps had made amply clear.  Neither of the two Cold War blocks was willing 
to allow even a reunification of Germany as it had existed before 1938, let alone the 
recreation of the sort of great-German union which had wrought so much havoc on the 
continent after the Anschluß.  Austria’s own eagerness to distance itself from the crimes of 
the Hitler regime likewise put an end to the hopes for a pan-German unity of all but the most 
fanatical of Austrian German nationalists.  
Simply put, the debate over Austrian national identity had come to an end by 1955.  
The public argument, which had been so critical a part of Austrian life between 1918 and 
1955, had ceased to be an issue of any particular importance for Austrians in the new era.  
The views of all of the Second Republic’s major political factions regarding Austria’s 
national identity had solidified, and the ensuing three decades did not provide Austria’s 
leaders with any compelling reason to revisit the national debate which previously had been 
so divisive.  After the signing of the State Treaty, Austria concerned itself with an entirely 
different set of issues than it had between 1918 and 1955.  The new order of the day was the 
preservation of Austrian neutrality, the extension of its participation in the United Nations 
Organization and other international entities, and the expansion of its economic prosperity, 
as the state rebounded impressively from its destitution in the aftermath of the Second 
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World War and the Allied occupation.  The two main Austrian political factions, the 
People’s Party and the Social Democrats, had for the most part learned the lessons of their 
experiences during the First Republic and the Ständestaat well.  The later Second Republic 
was characterized far more by the grudging cooperation of the Proporz system than by the 
destabilizing ideological squabbling of earlier eras.  Between the 1950s and the early 1980s 
the Second Republic experienced a period of growth and stability, and it seemed that Austria 
had finally put its past behind it.1017
Of course such stability could not last forever, and indeed it did not.  The 1980s and 
1990s brought at least a partial reopening of some of the issues which had been so integral a 
part of Austrian life before 1955.  The first event which prompted a reconsideration of much 
that had been settled with the State Treaty was the controversy over the election of the 
former Nazi Wehrmacht officer Kurt Waldheim to the Austrian presidency in 1986.  
Waldheim’s election reopened old wounds which centered on Austria’s Nazi past far more 
than its Habsburg past, and it inspired a new generation of Austrian intellectuals and 
historians to reexamine Austria’s participation in World War II and the Holocaust.  
Ultimately, the Waldheim controversy prompted Austria begin to dismantle its “victim 
myth,” so long the Austrian government’s official view of its Nazi past, and to admit that 
Austrian participation in Nazi crimes had been far less coerced that the leaders of the Second 
Republic had been willing to admit.  
With this new focus on Austrian complicity in the crimes of the Third Reich came a 
1017On the later years of the Second Republic, see Jelavich, 269-324; Hella Pick, Guilty Victim: Austria 
From the Holocaust to Haider (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 49-148; Oliver Rathkolb, “The 
Kreisky Era: 1970-1983,” in Austria in the Twentieth Century, eds. Rolf Steininger, Günter Bischof, and 
Michael Gehler (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 262-293.
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concomitant reconsideration of Austria’s postwar national identity.  Whereas throughout the 
early decades of the Second Republic, a sense of Austria’s unique nationhood apart from 
Germany had been presented by Austria’s leaders as an article of faith which Austrians 
simply needed to accept without much discussion, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, a new 
wave of scholars such as Anton Pelinka, Erika Weinzierl, and Ernst Hanisch began to 
examine the widespread Austrian support for Anschluß with Germany in 1938, and the role 
of the Second Republic’s early leaders’ efforts to distance Austria from Nazi crimes in the 
formulation of a new Austrianist sense of national identity.1018  As of this writing, the 
scholarly reconsideration of Austria’s Nazi past and the topic of its national identity 
continues unabated, even as the Austrian population as a whole continues to support 
Austrian independence and nationhood.
The matter of Austria’s Habsburg past has also once again become relevant thanks to 
a far more epochal event in European history: the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the 
subsequent expansion of the European Union.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
enforced community of Communist satellite states in Eastern and Central Europe did not 
really prompt the sort of reexamination of Austrian identity in the way which one might 
have expected, however.  Despite the reunification of Communist East Germany with the 
German Federal Republic in 1990, there was no movement on the part of Austria to revisit 
the notion of Anschluß to any significant degree.  Neither was there any real movement on 
the part of Austria or any of the Habsburg successor states which emerged from behind the 
1018Erika Weinzierl, Zu wenig Gerechte.  Österreich und Judenverfolgung 1938-1945 (Graz: Verlag Styria, 
1985); Anton Pelinka, Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Ernst 
Hanisch, Der Lange Schatten des Staates.  Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert
(Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994); and various essays in Pelinka and Weinzierl, eds., Das große Tabu.  
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Iron Curtain to move toward a Danubian or Central European community of nations and 
interests of the sort that Austrianist intellectuals had so often discussed before 1955.  For 
several years during the 1970s and 1980s, dissident intellectuals in Communist Central 
Europe such as Václav Havel, Adam Michnik and György Konrád had indeed rallied around 
the notion of Central Europe as a concept which might help deliver their states from the 
Soviets’ oppressive ideological domination.  Once the Iron Curtain fell, however, the Soviet 
Union’s former satellite states moved fairly quickly to adopt the Western model of liberal-
democratic government and free market economics rather than cultivate ties with the other 
states and nations of Central Europe.1019  The Habsburg successor states that freed 
themselves from Soviet domination vigorously pursued membership in Western Europe’s 
major political, economic and military organizations with varying levels of success.  
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
1999 and the European Union in 2004.  Slovakia and Slovenia joined both bodies in 2004, 
and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and is slated to become a member of the EU in 2007.  
Austria for its part abandoned its longstanding abstention from European alliances by 
joining the European Union in 1992, but has not sought NATO membership, in keeping with 
its official neutral stance in military matters.  Thus, the first decade of the twenty-first 
century has seen the integration of the vast majority of the territory of the old Habsburg 
Monarchy into the institutions and organizations of Europe.
Yet the union between the Habsburg successor states and the Western European 
Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit (Vienna: Edition S., 1987).
1019Charles Maier, “Whose Mitteleuropa?  Central Europe Between Memory and Obscolescence,” in 
Austria in the New Europe, eds. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1993), 8-18.
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powers did not mark an end to the relevance of the Habsburg past for Austria and the rest of 
Central Europe.  In fact, the European Union’s expansion into the regions over which the 
House of Austria reigned for so many centuries instead has made the Habsburg past a 
relevant issue for all of Europe.  The new EU’s composition in the twenty-first century 
resembles the multinational character of the Habsburg Monarchy of one hundred years ago 
in a striking manner.  The European continent, a region in which the idea of the nation state 
was so dominant for much of the twentieth century, has now sweepingly embraced 
multinational federalism with all the promises and difficulties which that ideal entails.  
Indeed, the difficulties which the European Union faces as it consolidates its 
expansion into Central and Eastern Europe powerfully recall the experiences of the 
Habsburg Monarchy.  The EU’s open borders and common currency have opened up the 
original western core states of the Union to immigration from and economic competition 
with the inhabitants of the Central and Eastern European expansion states.  Now the western 
EU states have been brought into direct contact with the different cultures, languages, and 
historical experiences of the newer members. The contrast between the recent economic 
stagnation and high unemployment of the West and the comparatively more dynamic 
economic performance of the expansion states has only made this experience more 
unsettling for the older members.  
Many of the western EU members, once so eager to expand the Union eastward in 
order to cement peace and prosperity on the continent, are now apparently reconsidering the 
wisdom of the organization’s enlargement.  Radical right-wing politicians such as Jean-
Marie Le Pen in France and Austria’s own Jörg Haider have recently seen their electoral 
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popularity expand dramatically, in part in response to the fears of their constituencies that 
the Union was diluting their national distinctiveness and harming their economic position.   
In a similar manner, the rejection of the proposed EU constitution by the Netherlands and 
France in 2005, which would have further regularized and streamlined the relationship 
between the EU members, and the frequent references to the threats posed by low-wage 
immigrant “Polish plumbers” to the French economy in the period before that vote in France 
all point to misgivings on the part of voters in the established member states to EU 
expansion.1020  It is impossible to observe the European Union’s recent difficulties and not 
see the similarities with the national tensions which wracked the Habsburg Monarchy a 
century ago, as the Monarchy’s privileged German-speakers reacted with anxiety and 
hostility toward the increasingly militant demands of its Slavic and Magyar populations.  
The relationship among the EU member states and national groups is a looser one than that 
between the Völker of the old Habsburg state, but new Europe certainly bears more of a 
resemblance to the Monarchy on the Danube before 1918 than it does to the system of 
nation states found on the continent after the empire’s demise.  So, far from being irrelevant 
in the modern era, it seems that the lessons of Austria’s Habsburg past could be more 
significant to more of Europe than at any time since the end of the First World War.
Another, perhaps even more vexing issue to which Austria’s Habsburg past may be 
vitally relevant involves Europe’s Muslim immigrant populations.  Much of Western 
Europe’s impressive economic growth during the later half of the twentieth century was 
fueled by low wage immigrant labor from predominantly Muslim lands, as millions of 
1020For a review of the European Union’s recent growing pains, see Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “The End of 
Europe?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (November/December, 2005): 55-67.
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workers flooded into France and Spain from north Africa, into Britain from Pakistan, and 
into Germany and Austria from Turkey.  The Western states always had confidence that the 
virtues of their liberal-democratic traditions, which were comparatively more open and 
tolerant that those of much of the Islamic world, would lead to the cultural assimilation of 
these immigrant groups into the Western society.  While many Muslim immigrants have 
indeed become enthusiastic participants in the West’s liberal culture, other sectors of 
Europe’s new Muslim community have rejected that culture in a violent manner.  The 
sensationalistic murder of the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan 
Islamic militant in 2004, and the devastating bombings in Madrid in 2003 and London in 
2005 by Islamist terrorists illustrate the extent to which Europe’s faith in the assimilating 
powers of its liberal traditions may have been misplaced.  The weeks of rioting by the 
offspring of north African immigrants in the suburbs of Paris in 2005 over their straitened 
economic circumstances indicate that the disenchantment of Europe’s Muslim populations 
with Western society is not solely the purview of religiously motivated radicals either.  The 
controversial prospect of Turkish membership in the EU at some point in the future would in 
all probability only exacerbate these issues by opening up the member states to still greater 
numbers of Muslim immigrants.1021
All of these recent tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe once 
again call to mind Austria’s Habsburg past, and in particular the dual “Austrian mission” 
which so many Austrian patriots used in their arguments for a unique Austrian national 
identity.   On the one hand, this Austrian mission was often cast as one of defense of the 
1021For a discussion of problems posed by Europe’s Islamic population, see Robert S. Leiken, “ Europe’s 
Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July/August, 2005): 120-135.
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Christian West by the Habsburg state against the threats posed by Islamic invasions 
throughout centuries of European history.  Indeed, it should not be forgotten that the colors 
of the flag of modern Austrian are at least apocryphally based upon the tunic soaked with 
Muslim blood of Austrian Archduke Leopold during the crusades.  On the other hand, 
however, the Austrian mission also frequently entailed an Austrian function as a mediator or 
“bridge,” which brought the benefits of Western civilization to the supposedly less advanced 
East.  Traditionally, the East to which proponents of the Austrian mission referred was that 
of the Slavic and Magyar lands of Europe, but the concept might just as easily apply to the 
Islamic East as well.
Both of these aspects of Austrian public rhetoric concerning Austria’s historical 
mission correspond to possible reactions on the part of Europe’s leaders to the recent round 
of Muslim violence throughout the continent.  They might either crack down upon the 
continent’s Islamic populations, restricting their movements and activities while proscribing 
further immigration, or they could pursue Muslim assimilation to the Western liberal model 
even more aggressively.  Both approaches certainly have their advocates in Europe today.1022
Thanks to the ease of transportation and the porous nature of state borders in the twenty-first 
century, Austria itself may not stand on the “bulwark” between Western civilization and the 
Islamic East.  Clearly, however, the concepts involved in Austria’s dual mission are quite 
relevant for all of Europe in this new era.  If anything, the old Austrian mission of the 
Habsburg Monarchy has become the “European mission” of the twenty-first century, as the 
continent decides how best to deal with the tensions between its traditions, and the culture 
1022Indeed, radical right-wing politicians such as Le Pen and Haider are if anything even more concerned 
with the effect of Muslim immigration upon European society than they are about that of immigrants from 
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and aspirations of its growing Muslim populations.
Thus, while there is no longer really a crisis of Austrian national identity which 
requires constant references to and interpretations of the Habsburg past, what we might term 
a European crisis of identity in the twenty-first century has made the Habsburg past as 
significant to life on the continent as it has ever been.  While there has been no concerted 
European effort to draw upon the lessons and legacies of the Habsburg era in Austria, the 
parallels between the problems which faced the old Monarchy and the challenges that 
confront a new multinational European federation which encompasses numerous different 
national and religious cultures are clear and striking.  The Habsburg past was the most 
critical component of Austria’s effort to define its own national identity and its place in the 
world between 1918 and 1955.  It is difficult to imagine that the example of the House of 
Austria’s history might not be a fruitful topic in any discussion of Europe’s own identity and 
position at the beginning of a new millennium.  Emperor Karl may have stepped off of the 
throne in 1918, but both Austria and the Europe as a whole continue to live in the long 
shadow of the Habsburgs.
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